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WHAT ARE THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES?
Fifty countries are currently designated by the United Nations as “least developed countries” (LDCs): Afghanistan, 
Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guin-
ea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mal-
dives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Timor–Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, 
Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia. The list of LDCs is reviewed every three years by the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) in the light of recommendations by the Committee for Development Policy (CDP).
The following criteria were used by the CDP in the 2006 review of the list of LDCs:
(a) A “low-income” criterion, based on the gross national income (GNI) per capita (a 3-year average, 2002–
2004), with thresholds of $750 for cases of addition to the list, and $900 for cases of graduation from LDC 
status;
(b) A “human assets” criterion, involving a composite index (the Human Assets Index) based on indicators of (i) 
nutrition (percentage of the population undernourished); (ii) health (child mortality rate); (iii) school enrol-
ment (gross secondary school enrolment rate); and (iv) literacy (adult literacy rate); and
(c) An “economic vulnerability” criterion, involving a composite index (the Economic Vulnerability Index)
based on indicators of (i) natural shocks (index of instability of agricultural production; share of population 
displaced by natural disasters); (ii) trade shocks (index of instability of exports of goods and services; (iii) 
exposure to shocks (share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries in GDP; merchandise export concentration 
index); (iv) economic smallness (population in logarithm); and (v) economic remoteness (index of remote-
ness).
For all three criteria, different thresholds are used for addition to, and graduation from, the list of LDCs. A country 
will qualify to be added to the list if it meets the three criteria and does not have a population greater than 75 mil-
lion. A country will qualify for graduation from LDC status if it has met graduation thresholds under at least two 
of the three criteria in at least two consecutive reviews of the list. After a recommendation to graduate a country 
has been made by the CDP and endorsed by ECOSOC and the General Assembly, the graduating country will be 
granted a three-year grace period before actual graduation takes place. In accordance with General Assembly reso-
lution 59/209, this standard grace period is expected to enable the relevant country and its development partners 
to agree on a “smooth transition” strategy, so that the loss of LDC-specific concessions at the end of the grace period 
does not disturb the socioeconomic progress of the country.
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OVERVIEW
“Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? 
Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?” 
T.S. Eliot, The Rock
The Changing Challenge of Development
Since the year 2000, UNCTAD’s Least Developed Countries Report has argued that there are two possible future 
scenarios for the 767 million people who now live in the poorest countries in the world. 
At the one extreme, the LDCs will remain trapped at a low level of economic development. By 2015, they will 
be the major locus of extreme dollar-a-day poverty in the global economy. They will continue to fall behind other 
developing countries and be obliged to call on the international community for aid to tackle humanitarian crises 
and for peace-keeping missions to deal with recurrent conflicts. They will also be epicentres of the global refugee 
population, incubators of global health crises and major sources of international migrant workers, who leave their 
countries, sometimes dramatically risk their lives, for the sake of earning a living because their life-chances are simply 
too restricted at home.
At the other extreme, it is possible to envisage a progressive transition in which sustained and accelerated economic 
growth is achieved through the development of productive capacities, and that with the associated expansion of 
productive employment opportunities, there will be substantial poverty reduction. In that scenario, foreign aid supports 
development rather than “fire fighting” complex humanitarian emergencies. Moreover, dependence on development 
aid is reduced as economic growth is more and more sustained by domestic resources mobilization and the LDCs are 
no longer marginalized from beneficial international private capital flows.
This Report is a contribution to promoting the second scenario. It focuses on how LDC Governments and their 
development partners can promote technological progress in LDCs as part of their efforts to develop domestic productive 
capacities.
If one focuses on the problems associated with the first scenario, that may seem to be an irrelevant luxury. Some 
might also argue that existing policies are already adequate. In the past few years the economic growth performance of 
the LDCs as a group has indeed much improved. However, from the LDC Report 2006 it is apparent that a significant 
number of LDCs still have slow growth and the poverty-reducing effects of the form of GDP growth that is occurring 
are weak. The recent growth spurt which some LDCs have experienced is also very fragile as it depends in particular 
on high commodity prices and, for a number of LDCs, high levels of aid and also FDI to exploit natural resources. 
Experience indicates that such growth spurts can easily be followed by growth collapses unless windfall resources are 
properly invested. 
Sustained economic growth and substantial poverty reduction in the least developed countries require the 
development of the latter’s productive capacities in such a way that the working-age population becomes more and 
more fully and productively employed. This was discussed at length in the LDC Report 2006. National productive 
capacities develop through the interrelated processes of capital accumulation and technological progress, which in turn 
lead to structural change. Promoting technological progress is thus vital for achieving a positive scenario in the LDCs. 
The basic challenge of development is to increase the knowledge intensity of their economies. 
The overall argument of this Report is that unless the LDCs adopt policies to stimulate technological catch-up with the 
rest of the world, they will continue to fall behind other countries technologically and face deepening marginalization 
in the global economy.  Moreover, the focus of those policies should be on proactive technological learning by domestic 
enterprises rather than on conventionally understood technological transfer, and on commercial innovation rather 
than on pure scientific research.  Since the 1990s most LDCs have undertaken rapid and deep trade and investment 
liberalization. Liberalization without technological learning will result, in the end, in increased marginalization. 
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The Approach of this Report
Effective national and international policies to promote technological progress in LDCs require a good understanding 
of how technological change occurs. This Report builds on the commonly accepted insight that processes of technological 
change in rich countries, where firms are innovating by pushing the knowledge frontier further, are fundamentally 
different from such processes in developing countries, where innovation primarily takes place through enterprises 
learning to master, adapt and improve technologies that already exist in more technologically advanced countries. 
Policies to promote technological development should be different in technologically leader countries from those in 
follower countries, including LDCs. The central issue is not acquisition of the capability to invent products and processes. 
Rather, policies to promote technological change in LDCs, as in all developing countries, should be geared to achieving 
catch-up with more technologically advanced countries. That is, they are concerned with learning about and learning 
to master ways of doing things that are used in more technologically advanced countries. 
From that perspective some might argue that innovation is irrelevant to the LDCs. But this view is based on a definition 
of innovation sensu stricto, as occurring only when enterprises introduce for the very first time, products or production 
processes that are new to the world. It can hardly be expected that an LDC is already knocking at the frontiers of 
technological breakthroughs. Whilst this strict definition has wide currency, it is now common to recognize that creative 
technological innovation also occurs when products and processes that are new to a country or an individual enterprise 
are commercially introduced, whether or not they are new to the world. With this broader view, innovation is a critical 
aspect of technological catch-up even though it does not depend on inventions which are new to the world. Innovation 
also occurs when a firm introduces a product or process to a country for the first time. It occurs when other firms imitate 
this pioneering firm. Moreover, it occurs when the initial or follower firms make minor improvements and adaptations 
to improve a product or production process, leading to productivity improvements. In short, innovation occurs through 
“creative imitation”, as well as in the more conventional sense of the commercialization of inventions.
In the context of technological catch-up, the process of innovation within a country depends critically on its links 
with the rest of the world. However, there are divergent views on how technological acquisition occurs. 
According to one extreme view, technological acquisition in follower countries depends on the transfer of technology. 
In that process, access to foreign technology is equivalent to its effective use. Such access can be maximized through 
openness to trade and foreign investment, coupled with investment in education and perhaps increasing access to the 
Internet and stimulating competition between international telecom providers. 
A basic problem with this view is that it largely treats knowledge in static terms, as a commodity with almost 
instantaneous transformative properties that can be transferred from one context to another quickly and with little cost. 
From that perspective, technology is seen as a blueprint which can be acquired off the shelf by any producer seeking 
to transform a particular combination of inputs dictated by a given factor endowment. At its most simplistic level, that 
perspective assumes that knowledge is like any other commodity, without geography or history. Information, knowledge 
and learning are all collapsed into one simple input into the universal productive process. In this approach, there is almost 
no discussion of how information is converted into knowledge or how learning occurs in practice –– indeed, learning 
is not really understood or elucidated in any meaningful way. The complex dynamics of knowledge accumulation are 
essentially excluded from the picture altogether. This conception of knowledge ignores the fundamentally dynamic 
character and plural aspects shaping knowledge production and generation, as knowledge is perceived as socially 
disembodied and universally transferable. That perspective essentially ignores the components and processes that shape 
the production and generation of knowledge.
In practice, it is clear that the assimilation and the absorption of foreign technology involve costs and risks, and 
that success depends on technological effort –– investments in technological change –– of various kinds, and the 
development of competences and capabilities at the enterprise level. 
For agriculture, the type of technological effort that is required reflects the fact that a key feature of agricultural 
technology is its high degree of sensitivity to the physical environment (circumstantial sensitivity). The strong interaction 
between the environment and biological material makes the productivity of agricultural techniques, which are largely 
embodied in reproducible material inputs, highly dependent on local soil, climatic and ecological characteristics. 
This means that there are considerable limits to the agricultural development which can occur simply through the 
importation of seeds, plants, animals and machinery (agricultural technology) that are new to the country. What is 
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required is experimental agricultural research stations to conduct tests and, beyond that, indigenous research and 
development capacity to undertake the inventive adaptation of prototype technology which exists abroad –– for 
example, local breeding of plant and animal varieties to meet local ecological conditions. Without such inventive 
adaptation capabilities, knowledge and techniques from elsewhere are locally of limited use.
For industry and services, such circumstantial sensitivity is less important, but nevertheless technological effort is 
required because technology is not simply technological means (such as machinery and equipment) and technological 
information (such as instructions and blueprints), but also technological understanding (know-how). The latter is tacit 
and depends on learning through training, experience and watching. Tacit knowledge is important because various 
adaptations are required in establishing and operating new facilities. These may capitalize on local knowledge of various 
kinds. The development of firm-level capabilities and support systems is vital for successful assimilation of foreign 
technology. 
The capabilities which are required in agriculture, industry and services are both core competences and dynamic 
capabilities. The former refer to the knowledge, skills and information to operate established facilities or use existing 
agricultural land, including production management, quality control, repair and maintenance of physical capital, and 
marketing. In contrast, dynamic capabilities refer to the ability to build and reconfigure competences to increase 
productivity, competitiveness and profitability and to address a changing external environment in terms of supply and 
demand conditions. The latter “technological capabilities” are particularly important for the process of innovation.  The 
effective absorption (or assimilation) of foreign technologies depends on the development of such dynamic technological 
capabilities.
R&D can be part of those capabilities, but only a part. Design and engineering capabilities are particularly important 
for establishing new facilities and upgrading them. Moreover, technological capabilities are best understood not simply 
in the narrow sense of mastering “physical” technologies which are associated with machinery and equipment, the 
properties of materials, and the knowledge possessed by engineers and scientists. Beyond this, production processes 
involve various complex organizational processes related to the organization of work, management, control and 
coordination, and the valorization of output requires logistic and marketing skills. All these can be understood as part of 
“technological learning” in a broad sense. 
The enterprise (firm or farm) is the locus of innovation and technological learning. But firms and farms are embedded 
within a broader set of institutions which play a major role in these processes. In advanced countries, national innovation 
systems have been established to promote R&D and link it more effectively to processes of innovation. In LDCs, what 
matters in particular are the domestic knowledge systems which enable (or constrain) the creation, accumulation, use 
and sharing of knowledge. Those systems should support effective acquisition, diffusion and improvement of foreign 
technologies. In short, there is a need to increase the absorptive capacity (or assimilation capacity) of domestic firms and 
the domestic knowledge systems in which they are embedded. 
Key Issues Addressed in the Report
The subject of knowledge, technological learning and innovation is a large one, and this Report is the first to address 
the issue in the context of the least developed countries. It focuses on five issues: 
• The extent to which the development of technological capabilities is occurring in LDCs through international 
market linkages, particularly through international trade, FDI and licensing;
• The way in which science, technology and innovation (STI) issues are currently treated within LDCs, particularly 
in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), and how STI policies geared towards technological catch-up 
could be integrated into the development strategies of LDCs; 
• Current controversies about how stringent IPR regimes affect technological development processes in LDCs and 
policy options for improving their learning environment; 
• The extent of loss of skilled human resources through emigration and policy options for dealing with that issue; 
and
• How ODA is supporting technological learning and innovation in the LDCs and ways to improve it.
The rest of this overview summarizes the major findings and recommendations of the Report in each of those areas. 
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Building Technological Capabilities
through International Market Linkages
The level of development of technological capabilities in LDCs is very weak. Indicators to show this are scarce and 
not wholly appropriate. But examination of where LDCs stand on some of the key indices reveals a dismal performance 
from an international comparative perspective: 
• UNDP Technological Achievement Index (TAI) classifies countries as leaders, potential leaders, dynamic adopters 
and marginalized countries, and all the LDCs for which there are data are in the last category.
• Work conducted within the RAND Corporation has classified countries into scientifically advanced, scientifically 
proficient, scientifically developing and scientifically lagging countries, and of the 33 LDCs in the sample all except 
Benin are in the scientifically lagging category.
• LDCs are ranked at the bottom of UNCTAD’s Innovation Capability Index. Moreover, for half the LDCs their 
“innovation capability”, relative to the rest of the world, was worse in 2001 than in 1995.
The domestic knowledge systems in the LDCs are very weak and the level of technological capabilities of domestic 
enterprises is very low. Initiating a sustainable process of knowledge accumulation that could accelerate the development 
of productive capacities in the LDCs is not a simple task, but it is not an impossible one either. A strategy for catch-up 
needs to focus on the building of an endogenous knowledge base, but also facilitate the transfer and effective absorption 
of foreign technology. Informal knowledge systems in LDCs and in informal sectors in other countries include creative 
repair, reprocessing and recycling of artefacts, including in some cases complex technologies. In addition, traditional 
knowledge plays a crucial role in various sectors, including agriculture, health and creative industries. The design of 
policies aimed at upgrading technological capabilities in LDCs should not ignore but develop the potential offered by 
existing local innovation and integrate it with transferred technologies. However, learning through international linkages 
is vital. A fundamental issue for LDCs is how to access the international knowledge pool, master foreign technologies 
and thus benefit from international technology diffusion. 
This Report examines the extent to which the diffusion of foreign technology is now occurring in LDCs through 
international trade and FDI, and has a number of key findings.
IMPORTS OF CAPITAL GOODS
By far the most important source of technological innovation in LDCs, as perceived by firms themselves, is new 
machinery or equipment. Most of the machinery and equipment operated in LDCs is imported, and therefore imports 
of capital goods, and their effective use, are overall the main source of innovation for firms in LDCs.
Total capital goods imports by LDCs have lost momentum over the last 25 years. While expanding in nominal 
terms, they have either been stagnant or risen only marginally when compared with macroeconomic variables or the 
population. While the technological effort of acquiring foreign embodied technology was comparable in LDCs and 
other developing countries (ODCs) in the 1980s, the gap has widened greatly since that time. In 2000–2005 LDC 
capital goods imports corresponded to 6 per cent of GDP, only half the level for ODCs. 
In the LDCs, imports of capital goods have been hampered by their premature de-industrialization process, the 
slow progression of the investment rate, the composition of their fixed capital formation (with a low share of machinery 
and equipment) and balance-of-payments restrictions. The sluggishness of those imports means that domestic firms are 
upgrading their processes and products only marginally. Importing relatively few capital goods implies that LDC firms 
are forgoing the potential technological learning and adaptive innovation associated with a greater volume of imports of 
technology embodied in those goods, in contrast to what ODC firms are doing.
The composition of LDCs’ capital goods imports to a large extent mirrors changes in those countries’ productive 
structure, trade specialization, FDI patterns and overall level of technological development. African LDCs were the 
group of countries that imported mining and metal-crushing machinery most intensively in 2000–2005, as compared 
with all groups of developing countries. At the same time Asian LDCs were the group with the relatively highest imports 
of textile machinery. As a group LDCs imported relatively little agricultural machinery and ICT capital goods. This 
Overview V
indicates, on the one hand, the low level of technological development of those countries’ agriculture and, on the other 
hand, the still incipient penetration by the recent wave of ICT and ICT-based innovation. 
EXPORTS AND THE ROLE OF GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS
LDC firms can develop their technological capabilities through the market linkages they develop with their 
downstream customers, including in particular the foreign ones. Integration into global value chains (GVCs) often 
represents one of the very few options for LDC firms and suppliers to secure access to international markets and 
innovative technologies, and to learn by exporting. However, the upgrading process is fraught with difficulties and 
obstacles, which are particularly great for LDC firms. 
International value chains are increasingly driven by buyers and downstream lead firms. The latter have the power 
to set the standards (technical, quality, environmental) that must be met in order to participate in the chain. Chain 
leaders, however, rarely help producers to upgrade their technological capabilities so that they are able to fulfil those 
requirements. Barriers to integrate GVCs are therefore becoming higher. 
Although LDCs had increased their specialization in several value chains since the mid-1990s, they did not manage 
to significantly upgrade their specialization within those chains. The analysis of 24 selected value chains that are relevant 
for LDC exports reveals that the LDCs have achieved upgrading in only nine of them. By contrast, their exports were 
downgraded in 12 value chains. The latter represent 52 per cent of total merchandise exports, but the former account 
for just 18 per cent. In most cases LDCs have increased their specialization in relatively basic products at a low stage of 
processing. Those export patterns indicate that little technological upgrading has taken place recently among LDC firms, 
irrespective of their participation in GVCs. 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
It is generally contended that the arrival of TNCs leads to technological upgrading of domestic firms through 
technological spillovers via imitation, competition, training, labour mobility, backward and forward linkages, and exports 
(which entail exposure to the technology frontier). Those spillover effects have the potential to increase the productivity 
of other firms. However, the materialization of the potential positive impacts of FDI on knowledge accumulation in host 
countries hinges on a large number of conditions, including their structural characteristics, the type of insertion of TNCs 
in host economies, their job-generating impact, and the direct consequence of their entry for domestic firms. 
FDI inflows into LDCs have increased markedly since the early 1990s. Between 2000 and 2005 they were on 
average three times higher than during the preceding 10 years. LDCs accounted for 3.5 per cent of total developing 
country inflows during that period and for 2.7 per cent of the total FDI stock of developing countries in 2005. Since the 
1990s the FDI intensity of LDCs has accelerated considerably, so that FDI inflows as a share of both GDP and gross fixed 
capital formation doubled between the 1990s and 2000–2005. During the early years of the 21st century LDCs largely 
surpassed other developing countries in those respects. 
There is little evidence of a significant contribution by FDI to technological capability accumulation in LDCs. This is 
not due to those countries’ insufficient “opening” to foreign investors, given the policy changes that they have enacted 
since the 1980s and the substantial growth of FDI penetration since the 1990s. Rather, its limited contribution is due to 
the type of integration of TNCs into host countries’ economies, the sectoral composition of FDI, the priorities of policies 
enacted by LDCs and the low absorptive capacity of those countries.
In African LDCs typically the mineral extraction activities of TNCs are capital-intensive, have little impact on 
employment, are highly concentrated geographically, have high import content and result in exports of their output as 
unprocessed raw materials.  Most of those operations are wholly owned by foreign investors (rather than joint ventures) 
and a large share of their foreign exchange earnings is retained abroad. Those operations tend to operate as enclaves 
since they are weakly integrated into domestic economies, as they have few forward and backward linkages in host 
economies. Some of the main channels for potential knowledge circulation between TNCs and domestic firms are 
largely absent, namely linkages, joint ventures and labour turnover.
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In Asian LDCs the rapid growth in garment-related FDI inflows, employment and exports has not been accompanied 
by a corresponding development of firms’ technological capabilities. The Governments of these countries have not 
enacted an effective policy to develop garment manufacturing and foster its anchoring in the domestic economy, 
although the industry plays a major role in those economies. Their policy actions have been limited to liberalizing 
foreign investment regulation, promoting private enterprise, coordinating investment approvals, customs facilitation and 
basic infrastructure provision in exporting processing zones to stimulate the growth of the different segments of activities 
in the value chains. Indeed, none of these economies has even imposed training levies on firms to stimulate upgrading. 
The lack of embedding in the domestic economy and of technological learning in the garment industry means that 
garment manufacturing in LDCs remains dependent on preferential market access conditions and is therefore vulnerable 
to their disappearance. 
LICENSING
The use of licensing as a channel for accessing the international knowledge pool (through imports of disembodied 
technology) is directly related to the income level and technological sophistication of economies. Licensing should 
therefore be less relevant to LDCs than to other developing countries as a channel for foreign technology diffusion, and 
this is borne out by evidence. Licensing activity in LDCs is much lower than in ODCs: licence payments as a share of 
GDP in the former was just 6 per cent of the level of the latter in 2000–2005. Moreover, while ODCs have increased 
their effort to acquire foreign technology through licensing since the mid-1990s, in relative terms this has been stagnant 
in the LDCs.
To summarize this analysis of international linkages, technological assimilation and absorption in LDCs through 
market mechanisms are taking place only to a very limited degree, as reflected in the weak development of technological 
capabilities and productive capacities. For some channels, notably capital goods imports, the scale of interaction in 
relation to GDP is much too low. For other channels, notably FDI and exports, the scale of interaction is actually high, 
but the learning effects of those channels are low. Thus, the growing integration of LDCs into international trade and 
investment flows since the 1980s has not prevented their marginalization from technology flows. 
The learning associated with international transactions does not occur automatically. There is, for example, no “fixed 
quotient” of learning that arrives in developing countries with every “unit” of exports or FDI. Consequently, measures to 
increase the volume of exports or FDI inflows do not guarantee any increase in learning. Instead, the learning intensity 
of such transactions is variable, and the key policy issue is to raise that learning intensity –– that is, to increase the 
magnitude of knowledge and skill acquired “per unit” of exports, imports or inward FDI. It is on the learning potential 
of international linkages that policy –– at national, regional and international levels –– should focus. 
National Policies to Promote Technological Learning and Innovation
Analysis of recent PRSPs in a sample of LDCs shows a striking paradox. Although LDC Governments are concerned 
with promoting sustained economic growth as a basis for poverty reduction, the treatment of technological change as 
a source of economic growth in PRSPs is generally weak. Only four out of the sample of 11 recent PRSPs which were 
systematically analysed include science and/or technology as a priority policy for poverty reduction. But all mention 
the importance of agricultural research and extension. However, there is only a marginal concern for how to learn 
through international linkages. Moreover, only three countries note the need to expand business services to support the 
technological upgrading efforts of local firms.
The limited attention to technological change reflects the marginalization of technology policies within structural 
adjustment programmes, which have been particularly intensely implemented within the LDCs, the omission of 
technology issues from the PRSP approach, and the failure to embed PRSPs, which are essentially three-year public 
expenditure plans within broader development strategies which include actions to promote technological progress. But 
it is paradoxical because promoting technological change is recognized as a key source of economic growth. It is at the 
heart of efforts by the OECD to promote growth in member countries. Moreover, it is becoming a central component 
of development strategies in more and more developing countries. 
Overview VII
The broad revival of interest in policies to promote technological change, partly inspired by the East Asian success, 
is indicative of wide dissatisfaction with current policies. There is a desire to find a new, post-Washington Consensus 
policy model, as well as the intuition that it is in this area –– promoting technological change –– that it is possible to find 
more effective policies to promote growth and poverty reduction. If LDCs do not participate in this policy trend they 
will be increasingly marginalized in the global economy, where competition increasingly depends on knowledge rather 
than on natural-resource-based static comparative advantage. Moreover, accelerated and sustained growth depends 
on diversification out of economic activities subject to diminishing returns into activities with increasing returns, which 
generally are knowledge-based.  
NEW POLICY DIRECTIONS
 As argued in earlier LDC Reports with respect to international trade, LDC Governments should elaborate 
development strategies which include a strategic vision for national economic development and the way to achieve that 
vision. Technology issues should be included in the development strategy through the integration of an STI policy as part 
of the development strategy. The priority actions within PRSPs can be derived from those development strategies.  
Successful developing countries have adopted policies to promote technological learning and innovation which 
are geared towards achieving technological catch-up with more advanced countries. There is no reason why LDC 
Governments should not adopt a similar orientation. However, policies to promote technological learning and innovation 
in LDCs need to be appropriate to their level of technological development, economic structure and the capabilities of 
their Governments and business sector.  
Technological catch-up in LDCs will require the co-evolution of improvement in physical infrastructure, human 
capital and financial systems, together with improved technological capabilities within enterprises and more effective 
knowledge systems supporting the supply of knowledge and linkages between creators and users of knowledge. It will 
also require a pro-growth macroeconomic framework which can ensure adequate resources for sustained technological 
learning and innovation, as well as a pro-investment climate which stimulates demand for investment. 
Improving physical infrastructure, human capital and financial systems is absolutely vital because many LDCs are 
right at the start of the catch-up process and have major deficiencies in each of those areas. Without an improvement 
in these foundations for development, it is difficult to see how technological change will occur. But it is important that 
LDC Governments and their development partners go beyond these foundations. In that regard, it is possible to identify 
six major strategic priorities for LDCs at the start and the early stages of catch-up:
• Increasing agricultural productivity in basic staples, in particular by promoting a Green Revolution;
• Promoting the formation and growth of domestic business firms;
• Increasing the absorptive capacity of domestic knowledge systems;
• Leveraging more learning from international trade and FDI;
• Fostering diversification through agricultural growth linkages and natural-resource-based production clusters; 
and
• Upgrading export activities. 
Those priorities should be promoted through a systems rather than a linear model of the innovation process. This 
requires measures which go beyond those that are traditionally identified with S&T policies, particularly supporting 
scientific research, expanding universities and setting up research institutes. It should include measures to stimulate 
the supply side of technology development, but also measures to stimulate the demand for technology development, 
measures to lubricate the links between supply and demand, and measures that address framework conditions. They 
should influence all the interrelated factors that affect the ability and propensity of enterprises (both firms and farms) to 
innovate.
The relevant STI policy tools thus include explicit measures which are concerned with S&T human resource 
development, public S&T infrastructure and policies to affect technology imports. But beyond this they include a 
number of implicit measures –– for example, public physical infrastructure investment; financial and fiscal policies 
which increase the incentive for investment and innovation; trade policy and competition policy; public enterprises and 
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public procurement; and regulation, notably in relation to intellectual property rights and other innovation incentive 
mechanisms. There is above all a need for improved coherence between macro- and microeconomic objectives. 
Excessive pursuit of macroeconomic stabilization objectives can undermine the development of conditions necessary 
for productive investment and innovation.
In the past the instruments of STI policy were articulated through an old-style industrial policy which involved 
protection and subsidies for selected sectors. Those instruments should now be articulated within the framework of a 
new industrial policy which is based on a mixed, market-based model, with private entrepreneurship and government 
working closely together in order to create strategic complementarities between public and private sector investment. 
Within the new industrial policy, the State should act as a facilitator of learning and entrepreneurial experimentation. 
The private sector is the main agent of change. However, the relevant institutions and cost structures are not given 
but need to be discovered. The State should facilitate this process and play a catalytic role in stimulating market 
forces; and it should perform a coordinating function based on an agreed strategic vision of country-level priorities for 
technological development. There are significant private sector risks in undertaking pioneer investments which involve 
setting up activities that are new to a country. Moreover, there are significant spillover effects which are beneficial to 
the country but which the private entrepreneur cannot capture. This implies the need for a partnership and synergies 
with the public sector to socialize risks and promote positive externalities. The State stimulates and coordinates private 
investment through market-based incentives aimed at reducing risks and sharing benefits. 
STI GOVERNANCE
There are many who would argue that the types of STI policies described above can work hypothetically, but they 
are inappropriate for LDCs because State capacities are simply too weak. But the PRSPs in which the LDCs are currently 
engaged are as complicated as the type of STI policies envisaged here. There are major deficiencies in governmental 
capacity in LDCs, particularly with regard to long-neglected STI issues. However, the problem of State capacity needs 
to be seen in dynamic rather than static terms. Just as firms learn over time by doing, Governments also learn by doing. 
The key to developing State capacity in relation to STI issues is therefore to develop such capacity through policy 
practice.  Policy space is required in order to pursue independent and experimental policies in line with countries’ 
development objectives.
Government bureaucracy must not only be competent and independent. An important lesson from successful catch-
up experiences is that the Government does not act as an omniscient central planner, but formulates and implements 
policy through a network of institutions which link government to business. The establishment of intermediary 
government–business institutions should be a priority in the good governance of technological learning and innovation. 
A basic condition for success is that policies to promote technological learning and innovation do not favour or protect 
special interest groups, or support particular firms (“cronyism”). 
Finally, good governance of technological learning and innovation is likely to require organizational restructuring within 
the State apparatus itself owing to the cross-sectoral nature of technological learning and innovation. Some countries 
have started to establish ministries of science and technology to take a lead on S&T issues. But the mere establishment 
of such a ministry can be counterproductive, as it can lead to an overemphasis on science and an underemphasis on 
innovation at the enterprise level. The appropriate organizational structure for integrating technological development 
issues into policy processes needs careful consideration. 
Intellectual Property Rights and
Other Incentive Mechanisms for Innovation 
A number of difficult issues arise with respect to the role of IPRs in the LDCs. Economists have found it notoriously 
hard to measure the costs and benefits of IPRs, particularly at different stages of development. It seems clear, however, 
that IPRs do not automatically lead to learning and innovation, and may even jeopardize the latter in an LDC context. 
In that regard, important lessons for LDCs’ learning strategies can be drawn from the successful development 
experiences of countries that have achieved catch-up, such as a number of East Asian countries. In the first, initiation
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stage of their technological development, the basic conditions for patents to operate as incentives for innovations, 
namely large R&D investments and capacity for reverse engineering and low-cost production, do not exist. In the 
second, internalization stage, local firms can learn through imitation under a flexible IPR regime; technology owners 
face a growing risk of imitation and tensions between domestic and foreign firms increase. It is only in the third, 
generation stage that local innovative firms in the most dynamic sectors aim at a more stringent IPR regime to protect 
greater R&D investments and accumulate IPRs as a defensive strategy, as well as to improve their bargaining position 
vis-à-vis competitors. 
In the light of that, IPRs are unlikely to play a significant role in promoting local learning and innovation in the 
initiation stage, the point in the catch-up process where most LDCs are now located. Moreover, technology transfer 
through licensing is unlikely to provide great benefits for LDCs. Even if under certain conditions IPRs were to positively 
encourage technology transfer through licensing, LDCs are unlikely to become significant recipients of licensed 
technology. The  low technical capacity of local enterprises constrains their ability to license in technology, while the low 
GDP per capita in LDCs is not likely to stimulate potential transferors to engage in such arrangements. IPRs, particularly 
patents, promote innovation only where profitable markets exist and where firms possess the required capital, human 
resources and managerial capabilities. Similarly, licensing is out of reach for firms without a certain level of absorptive 
capacity, particularly in countries with low GDP. As firms’ capability increases, patents may increasingly perform their 
incentive, transactional and signalling functions and the information contained in patent applications may be more 
useful for planning and undertaking innovative activities.
CASE STUDY OF BANGLADESH
The case study of Bangladesh, which is one of the most advanced LDCs in terms of its technological development, 
confirmed those theoretical and historical observations. The study, which is the first on IPRs in least developed countries 
and was commissioned specially for this Report, focused on three sectors: agro-processing, textiles and garments, 
and pharmaceuticals. It showed that innovative capacity within local firms remains very low across all three sectors. 
Moreover, irrespective of the presence of intellectual property rights, in the local context those rights do not play a role 
either as a direct incentive for innovation or as an indirect incentive enabling knowledge spillovers (through various 
technology transfer mechanisms such as licensing, imports of equipment or government–firm technology transfer). 
Currently, intellectual property rights are benefiting mostly the TNCs operating in the local market, as the local firms 
are not sufficiently specialized to protect their innovations under the current IPR regime, which in any case may not be 
appropriate for the types of incremental innovations in which most firms engage. For the large majority of local firms 
there was no observable positive impact of intellectual property rights on licensing, technology transfer or technology 
sourcing through foreign subsidiaries. The only important sources of innovation at the firm level are the firms’ own 
innovation efforts and innovation through imitation/copying.
Although the study found that intellectual property rights do not contribute to new product/process development 
in any of the three sectors, domestic entrepreneurs had serious concerns regarding the impact of intellectual property 
rights on their inputs, such as seed availability and seed price. Larger firms tended to view IPRs differently and in a more 
benevolent light than the smaller firms, as a tool through which they could protect their products and secure benefits. 
Others, which regarded IPRs as detrimental to innovation, based their assessment largely on the indirect impact of 
IPRs on increasing prices of seeds and other inputs. In the textiles and ready-made garment sector, most of the firms 
interviewed were of the view that IPRs did not play any role as an inducement for innovation, because they simply 
assembled the final output according to precisely given, buyer-determined specifications, since they did not possess any 
indigenous design-related capabilities.  The firms in the pharmaceutical sector were very concerned that since foreign 
firms can obtain patents on their products in the country, this might adversely affect their efforts to venture into reverse 
engineering of active pharmaceutical ingredients. The patents on pharmaceutical products (approximately 50 per cent 
of the 182 granted in 2006) are not on local innovations, and this point to the presence of other reasons for patenting, 
such as strategic use, monopoly profits and prevention of parallel imports. 
It will be important conduct more studies of this type. But many experts in the area of IPRs now argue that “one 
size does not fit all’, implying that the design and implementation of IPR policies need to consider the impact of varying 
levels of development and countries’ initial conditions. IPR protection has historically followed rather than anticipated 
economic and technological development. There is thus a significant movement towards thinking about how to add a 
development dimension to IPR regimes. As the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, put it, when 
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speaking at the opening of ECOSOC’s session on 16 April 2007, “The rules of intellectual property rights need to be 
reformed, so as to strengthen technological progress and to ensure that the poor have better access to new technologies 
and products”. 
LDCS IN THE MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK
The current IPR regimes can be adapted in order to provide a more supportive multilateral governance regime that 
is needed to ensure that low-income countries are assisted in building their knowledge base and technological and 
productive capacities. There are two major types of improvements that can be made: (i) fine-tuning and calibrating of 
norms and standards, namely, improved adaptation, in line with needs and specific initial conditions; and (ii) enhancing 
TRIPS flexibilities. Simultaneously, LDCs, in collaboration with their development partners, should explore the full 
panoply of non-IP options available to enhance incentives for innovation in an LDC context. 
Developing countries are entitled under the TRIPS Agreement to the same minimum standards of protection 
applicable to developed countries, subject only to transitional periods. The same treatment was granted to the LDCs; 
only longer transitional periods, renewable upon request, were permitted. In many cases, TRIPS-plus regulations in 
bilateral and regional agreements impose on LDCs even higher standards and greater obligations than on other WTO 
members. However, a differential approach for LDCs was recognized by the TRIPS Agreement (Article 66.1), and this is 
reflected in the lack of LDC obligations for IP protection under the Agreement, so that LDCs can develop “a sound and 
viable technological base” (Preamble to the TRIPS Agreement).  Until 2013, LDCs still have the opportunity to undertake 
an imitative path of technological development, as developed countries had in the past (and until 2016, in the case of 
pharmaceutical products and processes). However, such a window of opportunity may close in a period shorter than that 
enjoyed by the majority of developed countries, and although LDCs may have the  freedom to imitate, foreign markets 
will be closed to their products, as higher standards of IPR protection have almost become universal. As interactive 
learning is a time-consuming, cumulative and historical process involving many agents, the major recommendation of 
this Report is that the transitional period for LDCs should not be subject to an arbitrarily predetermined deadline, but 
become only enforceable once those countries have achieved “a sound and viable technological base”.
Furthermore, Article 66.2 requires the granting of incentives to promote transfer of technology to LDCs by developed 
countries. Those incentives should be accorded to enterprises and institutions that specifically aim at facilitating the 
transfer of technology to LDC enterprises (such as through tax breaks and subsidies). This obligation cannot be met 
merely through cooperation provided by public agencies.  It is also recommended that the concept of “transfer of 
technology”, for the purposes of compliance with Article 66.2, be elucidated by the WTO, so as to make it clear that 
developed countries’ Governments should provide firm-based incentives for the transfer of IPRs and non-IPR-protected 
technology, and that “technology” should be understood as manufacturing methods, formulae, designs, basic and 
detailed engineering –– that is, knowledge that may be effectively applied to upgrade the technological capacity of LDC 
recipients, rather than merely transfer of general training and technical assistance or scientific cooperation. 
With regard to technical assistance, it is recommended that the supply of technical assistance by WIPO and other 
organizations be inter alia unbiased and  development-focused, and clearly inform LDCs about all the flexibilities 
allowed by the TRIPS Agreement. The content and forms of delivery of IPR-related technical assistance should be 
defined by the recipient Government, in accordance with its own priorities and development objectives and in full 
consultation with other stakeholders, including public-interest-oriented NGOs. Moreover, independent studies should 
be carried out, assessing the economic impact of IPR regimes on the development of productive capacities in LDCs, 
with the assistance and cooperation of all relevant partners, including those from the wider international community, for 
example UNCTAD and public-interest oriented NGOs.
The LDCs that are currently in the process of accession to the WTO should not be required to provide accelerated 
and TRIPS-plus protection, and should be granted the same transitional periods as for other LDC members. Additionally, 
it is recommended that LDCs use to the fullest extent possible the flexibilities allowed by the TRIPS Agreement (such 
as parallel imports, compulsory licences, permissible exceptions to exclusive rights and fair dealing), and seek to avoid 
the erosion of such flexibilities through FTAs, BITs or bilateral trade and investment agreements, or in the context of 
accession to the WTO. Moreover, it is recommended that the inclusion of IPRs as “covered investments” be reviewed 
in any bilateral or regional agreement. 
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Furthermore, the international community should reconsider the development dimension of the TRIPS Agreement, 
with a view to meeting the need for a balanced approach and pro-development IPR regime, especially with regard 
to LDCs, and particularly concerning LDC-specific standards relating to novelty, the nature of inventions, terms of 
protection and calibrated disclosure. For example, the full use of exceptions and limitations should be granted to 
LDCs, especially in research and fair use. In order to reverse the trend for imposing TRIPS-plus requirements, it is 
recommended that IPR provisions be excluded from any future FTAs and BITs. In drafting national legislation, LDCs 
would be well advised to develop their own guidelines in patent offices with respect to patentability criteria, –– that 
is, to examine applications carefully rather than simply copy international standards. With a view to increasing their 
bargaining position in multilateral forums, the LDCs are advised to pool LDC-based resources and knowledge in the 
search for economies of scale and collective efficiency solutions in all IPR-related institutional arrangements.
As regards alternative non-proprietary mechanisms for knowledge governance, the LDCs, in collaboration with 
the international community,  should explore the panoply of existing mechanisms that are being successfully used 
in many other countries in order to stimulate learning and knowledge governance –– for example, patent buy-outs, 
price discrimination mechanisms, public–private partnerships,  subsidizing research (directly and indirectly) via  grants, 
tax credits, fiscal measures to support R&D and other types of innovative activities, developing prizes, government-
based advanced market commitments, open source collective mechanisms, information and knowledge commons, 
joint research initiatives of various kinds, local as well as regional technology-sharing consortia, joint research ventures, 
licensing agreements with technology transfer clauses and compensatory liability regimes. Moreover, improving 
linkages between S&T institutions and the enterprise sector is highly recommended.  In order to encourage institutional 
diversity for enhanced knowledge ecology (the institutional framework that enables access to and production and 
use of, knowledge for learning and innovation), a plurality of options should be explored with a view to accelerating 
technological learning and innovation.
In conclusion, the main challenge that policymakers in LDCs need to address is how to devise supportive policy 
frameworks to enhance learning and to consider the plurality of options available with a view to better managing and 
benefiting from the LDCs’ own as well as already available knowledge resources. Establishing proprietary IPR systems 
and creating property rights are but one, among various responses, to a more generic and fundamental problem, which 
is how to create and improve LDCs’ knowledge ecology. This challenge goes beyond fine-tuning the existing intellectual 
property rights regime. 
International Migration of Skilled Labour
BRAIN DRAIN AND BRAIN GAIN
The cross-border movement of persons possessing a particular type of knowledge is a means of international 
technology diffusion. Countries may either gain or lose from the permanent (or long-term) international migration of 
skilled persons. International migration of skilled persons in principle contributes to building the recipient countries’ 
skills endowment, while entailing a loss in the origin country’s stock of human capital (at least immediately). Those 
two processes are commonly referred to as “brain gain” and “brain drain” respectively. The most important issue for 
countries’ long-term development is the net effect of migratory flows.
LDCs have a low skill endowment. Therefore, the international migration of skilled persons from and to those 
countries can have a strong impact on their human capital stock. The human capital endowment of an economy 
is a fundamental determinant of its long-term growth performance, its absorptive capacity and its performance in 
technological learning. It is also a requirement for the effective working of trade, FDI, licensing and other channels 
as means of technology diffusion. In LDCs the major migratory flow of qualified professionals is that of skilled people 
settling mainly in developed countries.
On the other hand, if emigrants are unemployed before leaving the country, the immediate loss for the latter is 
less great. Moreover, the costs of emigration can in principle be (partly) offset by other developments, including higher 
enrolment in tertiary education, an increase in remittances and the eventual brain gain through the return of emigrants, 
brain circulation by means of temporary return, and creation of business and knowledge linkages between emigrants 
and home countries (leading to technology flows, investment, etc.). These increased flows in knowledge, investment and 
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trade are more likely to occur in the case of industries producing tradable products than those producing non-tradables. 
Many of those positive effects, however, occur only once countries have reached a certain level of development and 
income growth. That implies the existence of considerably improved economic conditions in home countries, which 
provide incentives for temporary or permanent return of emigrants and for the establishment of stronger knowledge and 
economic flows. Moreover, an improved domestic environment entails lower out-migration pressure. That situation is 
obviously not the one prevailing in LDCs. Those countries are therefore the most likely to suffer from brain drain, rather 
than benefiting from brain circulation, brain gain or the other positive effects possibly associated with emigration. 
CAUSES OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
International migration of skilled persons is driven by both supply pressures in home countries and demand forces in 
destination countries. In countries of origin, the main reasons for emigration of qualified persons are limited employment 
possibilities, poor working conditions and/or weak career paths, slow economic growth and political instability, as well 
as the low level of pay and the huge and widening gap between earnings in LDCs and those in developed countries for 
the same careers (in some cases amounting to 20 times in PPP terms). 
At the same time, demand pressure for greater deployment of skilled migrants from developing countries (including 
LDCs) has grown in industrialized countries, despite their rapidly rising numbers of tertiary graduates. Opportunities 
for work among professionally qualified immigrants in developed countries have greatly increased since the 1990s. 
While skill shortages have been experienced across the board in many increasingly technologically advanced developed 
countries, three sets of factors have been especially important in influencing renewed demand for skilled manpower. 
First, the ageing of developed country populations, especially in Europe and later in Japan, has contributed to slow 
growth in labour supply and increased demand for skill-intensive non-tradable services, particularly in health and aged 
care. Second, the information technology revolution has greatly increased the demand for skilled manpower in the 
production of computer software and the demand for computer and ICT engineers. Third, shortages of lower- to 
middle-level skilled manpower — technicians, electricians, plumbers, nurses and teachers — have been especially 
marked, as developed country workers shun difficult blue-collar and related jobs, and the output of those countries’ 
educational institutions has failed to keep pace with demand. The major labour-importing economies, particularly 
the United States, the EU and its member States, Canada and Australia, have reacted to increasing shortages of skilled 
manpower by implementing more open policies to attract qualified immigration. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN LDCS
Three main features of skilled emigration from LDCs since the 1990s stand out: 
• Emigration rates were generally high among tertiary-educated persons by international standards, with an unweighted 
mean for LDCs of 21 per cent in 2000. That was much higher than for all lower-middle-income and low-income 
countries, whose skilled emigration rate was below 8 per cent (weighted).
• There was considerable variation in the total rates of emigration among tertiary–educated persons by and within 
country groups among the LDCs. They were close to 25 per cent (unweighted) in the island LDCs, West Africa 
and East Africa, and lowest in the generally more populated Asian LDCs (6 per cent), with Central Africa falling 
in between (14 per cent). Apart from in island LDCs, out-migration rates were especially high in countries that 
had experienced political instability in the 1980s and 1990s (Sudan, Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia and Eritrea) 
and in some of the poorest countries (e.g. Sierra Leone). By contrast, emigration rates were lowest in all the 
more populous Asian countries (especially Nepal, Myanmar and Bangladesh) and in some of the larger countries 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Niger and Malawi).
• Out-migration among tertiary-educated persons from LDCs to OECD countries has accelerated over the last 15 
years. The unweighted mean emigration rate rose from 16 per cent in 1990 to 21 per cent 10 years later. That 
intensification of emigration among skilled persons was much stronger than among all emigrants from LDCs.
Emigration of highly educated persons with more than basic tertiary training tends to be much greater than for 
the tertiary-educated population as a whole. It is estimated that as many as 30–50 per cent of the developing world’s 
population trained in science and technology (including those from LDCs) live in the developed world. This has a direct 
impact on those countries’ skills base, their absorptive capacity and their technological catch-up possibilities.
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
It is not possible to halt the emigration of qualified persons from LDCs to developed countries. Therefore, policies 
in both sending and receiving countries should be targeted at reducing the flows that are shown to be most detrimental 
to national development, and at increasing the benefits deriving from all types of skilled out-migration. Those policies 
should be implemented by destination countries and origin countries, and at the international level.
The main policy actions to be considered in destination countries are as follows:
• Favouring the temporary entrance of qualified professionals from LDCs, rather than permanent immigration;
• Establishing development assistance programmes that help LDCs to retain their professionals (e.g. in academia or 
in the health sector) through better pay, redesign of career paths and better working conditions;
• Creating programmes of assistance for skilled emigrants returning to their home countries, which support their 
professional reinsertion and their gainful employment by making use of their skills; and
• Refraining from recruiting LDC professionals in those careers where it is clear that emigration has negative 
consequences for home countries.
Home countries have three basic lines of policy alternatives for dealing with the emigration of skilled persons: 
• Retention.  Preventing immigration requires that professionals be offered more job opportunities, better working 
conditions and career paths. This depends on general economic conditions, but targeted government initiatives 
in sectors such as education, research and health can have an immediate impact. 
• Return.  LDCs gain more from the permanent return of skilled emigrants than from short-term stays. However, 
policies to that end are more difficult to devise and implement. Therefore, in the short run they should focus more 
on the short-term return of emigrants. This can involve teachers and professors giving crash courses, engineers 
providing specific inputs in sectors relevant to their field of expertise, doctors returning to assist with specific 
health-care campaigns, and so forth. Such programmes can eventually lead to permanent return.
• Diaspora.  Countries of origin can benefit from diaspora professionals by maintaining contact with them and 
attracting them to specific activities and projects. This requires that databases of emigrated skilled persons be 
established and maintained, so as to engage them in those activities and projects. 
International action by donors, international organizations and/or developing countries themselves should 
concentrate on:
• Supporting LDCs in attracting back emigrants on both a permanent and a temporary basis by establishing target 
programmes;
• Providing assistance to LDCs in enhancing the gains from diaspora links; and
• Establishing regional initiatives that facilitate temporary movement of professionals so as to enable LDCs to benefit 
from brain circulation.
Knowledge Aid
The justification for foreign aid is usually articulated within a framework which stresses the limited ability of most 
LDCs to mobilize the domestic financial resources needed to meet a range of pressing economic, social and political 
objectives. But equally important, and actually even more fundamental, aid can help to build up the knowledge 
resources and knowledge systems of LDCs. This is particularly important for the LDCs because their level of technological 
development is so low and technological learning through international market linkages is currently weak. Aid can play 
an important role in developing a minimum threshold level of competences and learning capacities which will enable 
LDCs to rectify that situation. Indeed, the provision of more knowledge aid, if directed towards the right areas and 
appropriate modalities, may be the key to aid effectiveness. 
There is no agreed definition of knowledge aid. Since the 1990s, there have been an increasing number of 
knowledge-based activities designed to increase aid effectiveness by strengthening the knowledge base of the donors 
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themselves –– for example, through internal reforms to increase intra-organizational knowledge-sharing, better 
knowledge management and IT system development. But in the present Report, knowledge aid is defined as aid that 
supports knowledge accumulation within partner countries. Knowledge aid is provided in two ways: either through 
supplier-executed services, where, for example, donors provide consultants who advise on, or design and develop, 
projects, programmes and strategies; or through strengthening the knowledge resources and knowledge systems of the 
partners themselves, a process which may be called partner learning. In either case, those activities might be designed 
to increase knowledge resources for institutional, regulatory and policy development, or to support the development 
of productive capacities through technological learning. Aid to build science, technology and innovation capacity is 
a particular form of knowledge aid. Aid for STI should support (i) the development of productive capacities through 
building up domestic knowledge resources and domestic knowledge systems, and (ii) the development of governmental 
capacities to design and implement STI policies. 
It is very difficult to quantify the scale of aid for STI to LDCs. But the available evidence indicates that this is a low 
priority in LDCs. Reported aid disbursements for research and the development of advanced and/or specific human 
skills (including agricultural education and extension), constituted only 3 per cent of total aid disbursements during 
the period 2003–2005, with 90 per cent allocated to building human skills, particularly higher education. Reported 
aid disbursements for agricultural research to all LDCs were equal to only $22 million per year during 2003–2005 and 
LDCs received only $62 million for vocational training, $12 million per year for agricultural education and training and 
$9 million per year for agricultural extension. The non-agricultural sector was also neglected, with disbursements for the 
development of advanced technical and managerial skills constituting only $18 million per year, while disbursements 
for what is described in the reporting system as “technological research and development” –– which covers industrial 
standards, quality management, metrology, testing, accreditation and certification –– received only $5 million per year 
during 2003–2005.
It may be argued that those low levels of reported aid reflect the weak treatment of STI issues in PRSPs. But in practice, 
for the one STI area that is emphasized in the PRSPs, namely agricultural research and extension, aid commitments 
to LDCs have actually fallen rather than risen since the late 1990s. Donor priorities are starkly evident in the fact that 
annual technical cooperation commitments to improve governance (in the widest sense) in 2003–2005 were $1.3 
billion, which may be compared with annual aid commitments for agricultural extension during the same period of $12 
million. Of course, improving governance is vital. However, it will be impossible to achieve this sustainably unless LDC 
governments strengthen their fiscal base through the development of the productive base of their economies.
A qualitative survey of the types of STI projects and programmes which are being supported in LDCs found that 
there needs to be stronger coordination between STI human resource capacity projects and sector development 
projects, and that projects and programmes need to be more integrated, rather than disjointed, and embedded within 
a systemic approach. Only one project that sought to develop STI policy capacity in LDCs was identified. Similarly, 
global linkage initiatives, such as scientific networks and business-to-business matchmaking schemes, tend to exclude 
LDCs. Furthermore, the provision of global and regional public goods in the form of scientific research is not sufficiently 
responsive to LDCs’ research needs.
STRENGTHENING AID FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION
There are a number of new initiatives by donors to elaborate a coherent strategic perspective on aid for STI, 
including by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada, the United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development (DFID), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the African Development 
Bank and the World Bank. It is important that the role of STI in LDCs is not neglected in those initiatives. However, 
beyond that, the Report makes a number of specific recommendations, which are set out below.  
Firstly, there is a need for a rapid increase in ODA for agricultural R&D for the LDCs. Although agriculture is the 
major livelihood in the LDCs, the current agricultural research intensity –– expenditure on agricultural research as a 
share of agricultural GDP –– is only 0.47 per cent. That compares with 1.7 per cent in other developing countries. The 
LDC agricultural research intensity is far below the 1.5 to 2 per cent recommended by some international agencies. 
Moreover, the low level reflects a serious decline in the agricultural research intensity in the LDCs since the late 1980s, 
when the figure stood at 1.2 per cent.
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Secondly, the effectiveness of ODA for non-agricultural technological learning and innovation has been severely 
compromised because donors typically do not support this activity. Although agriculture is still the major source of 
employment and livelihood in the LDCs, the employment transition which they are undergoing means that this position 
is not tenable if development partners wish to reduce poverty sustainably and substantially. There are, however, difficult 
issues regarding how aid should be used to support technological learning and innovation outside agriculture. One 
important recommendation is that donor-supported physical infrastructure projects should all include components use 
the construction process to develop domestic design and engineering capabilities. In addition, there is a need for public 
support for enterprise-based technological learning, which should be in the form of grants or soft loans for investment in 
the relevant types of knowledge assets. Such support should be undertaken as a cost-sharing public–private partnership 
for creating public goods, particularly in relation to the development of design and engineering skills through enterprise-
based practice. These STI capacity-building activities could be particularly useful if they are linked to value chain 
development schemes, FDI linkage development and the facilitation of South–South cooperation.
Thirdly, LDC development partners have expressed strong support for “Aid for Trade” and there is widespread 
support for scaling up this kind of aid.  Experiences show that technological learning and innovation are central to 
successful cases  of trade development. However, technological learning and innovation have been conspicuously 
absent from past efforts to provide Aid for Trade for LDCs through the Integrated Framework and are neglected within 
current attempts to define the scope of the subject. It is recommended that aid for technological learning and innovation 
for tradable sectors be a key component of Aid for Trade, and LDC development partners should adopt best practices 
which are evident from successful cases of trade development, such as palm oil in Malaysia and Nile perch in Uganda. 
In that regard, technological development should be seen as an integral part of the definition of “supply-side capacities”, 
as it was in the Monterrey Consensus. 
Finally, there has been some discussion of ways in which trade preferences for LDCs could be enhanced not simply by 
extending their depth and coverage but also by linking them to supply-side support, for example through complementary 
measures to encourage FDI. From the point of view of technological assimilation, it is clear that trade preferences, in 
particular in relation to garments, have successfully stimulated the initial implementation of manufacturing activities 
within some LDCs. However, they do not explicitly facilitate the diffusion of best practices to domestic firms within a 
country and do not encourage technological upgrading. Against this background, it is worth examining whether trade 
preferences can be supplemented with some kind of technology fund that seeks to leverage the technological learning 
effects of the productive activities that are stimulated through such preferences, in particular through diffusion of best 
practices and encouragement of upgrading. In the current context, as transitional arrangements associated with the 
ending of the Agreement on Clothing and Textiles come to an end, this is likely to be particularly important in order to 
ensure the sustainability of existing activities in a number of countries. Work should be done on the possible design of 
such a fund.
*          *          *
This Report does not provide all the answers to the issues which it raises. It is intended to provoke fresh thinking 
about development strategies and poverty reduction in the LDCs by both LDC Governments and their development 
partners. There is at the present time a search for alternatives to the current development paradigm, and the role 
of knowledge in development is critical for the formulation of new approaches. The LDCs should not refrain from 
exploring new paths of knowledge-based development through technological learning and innovation. We hope that 
this Report will open up avenues for further policy-oriented research and policy innovation. Our common goal is to 
ensure that a positive future scenario for the LDCs prevails. 
There is a choice.
Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi
Secretary-General of UNCTAD

Introduction:
Why Technological 
Learning and Innovation 
Matter for LDCs
A.  Introduction
 This Report explores how national and international policies can promote
more effective technological learning and innovation in the least developed
countries (LDCs). It extends and deepens the analysis in The Least Developed 
Countries Report 2006.
 The Least Developed Countries Report 2006 advanced three major
propositions:
• First, sustained economic growth and substantial poverty reduction in the
LDCs require the development of their productive capacities in such a
way that the population of working age becomes more and more fully and
productively employed.
• Second, productive capacities develop through three closely interrelated
processes –– capital accumulation, technological progress and structural
change.
• Third, thedevelopmentofproductivecapacities,andtheassociatedexpansion
of productive employment opportunities, should be at the heart of national
and internationalpolicies topromotesustainedeconomicgrowthandpoverty
reduction in the LDCs.·
The present Report extends and deepens the earlier analysis by focusing on
policies to promote technological progress with a view to achieving sustained and
accelerated economic growth and substantial poverty reduction.
The basic argument of the Report is that unless the LDCs adopt policies to
stimulate technological catch-up with the rest of the world, they will continue to
fall behind other countries technologically and face deepening marginalization in
the global economy.  Moreover, the focus of those policies should be on proactive
technological learning by domestic enterprises rather than on conventionally
understood technological transfer, and on commercial innovation rather than on
pure scientific research.
B.  Technological development in LDCs in
a comparative international perspective
The level of technological development in the LDCs is very low. This is apparent
in various indices that measure the technological capabilities and knowledge
assets of countries. There are a growing number of such indices (Archibugi and
Coco, 2004, 2005). For LDCs, the data are incomplete. However, examination of
where LDCs are ranked with regard to some of the key indices commonly used
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for country-level comparisons reveals a uniform picture –– most of the LDCs are
at the bottom of the rankings:
• The UNDP Technological Achievement Index (TAI) classifies countries as
leaders, potential leaders, dynamic adopters and marginalized countries. All
the LDCs for which there are data are in the last category (UNDP, 2001).
• LDCs are near the bottom of the rankings of the UNIDO Competitive
Industrial Performance Index and, apart from Bangladesh and Nepal, their
rankings have been falling (UNIDO, 2002: 46).
• An analysis undertaken by the RAND Corporation classifies countries into
scientifically advanced, scientifically proficient, scientifically developing and
scientifically lagging countries, and of the 33 LDCs in the sample all except
Benin are in the scientifically lagging category (Wagner et al., 2001).
• LDCs are ranked at the bottom of UNCTAD’s Innovation Capability Index.
Moreover, for half the LDCs, their “innovation capability”, relative to the
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rest of the world, was worse in 2001 than in 1995, as shown in charts 1a
and 1b (UNCTAD, 2005).
It should be noted that there are limitations to the relevance of those
indicators in an LDC context (James, 2006). For example, industrial R&D is much
more important for technological progress in advanced countries than in LDCs.
Furthermore, none of the indices actually tells us how technological advances
are embodied in countries’ productive systems.  However, whatever way it is
measured, there is a strong sense that there is a major technological gap between
the developed and the developing world, and particularly the LDCs, and this
gap has grown over the years as a result of rapid technological advances in
the developed countries and the relatively slow advances in most developing
countries, and particularly the LDCs (Patel, 1995).
  Charts 2a and 2b provide a more disaggregated picture, which compares the
performance of LDCs, other developing countries and developed countries with
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regard to a number of different indicators. The charts illustrate the vast difference
in performance between the LDCs and other country groups. The widest disparity
is in the number of researchers per million population and patent applications
granted by the United States Patent Office per million. The charts also indicate
that the LDCs have inadequate access not only to information and communication
technology (ICT) infrastructure such as computers and the Internet, but also to
more simple forms of communication such as radios, televisions, newspapers and
telephones.
Table 1 shows a further disaggregation of the position of individual LDCs
with regard to the basic physical infrastructure needed to support technological
development, human capital and research and development (R&D). Some
island countries are doing much better than other LDCs. But both African and
Asian LDCs seriously lag behind other developing countries on those indicators.
Notable in this regard are the very low levels of basic human capital and physical
infrastructure.
It is unfortunately impossible to construct a picture of long-term changes in
technological development. However, discussion in The Least Developed Countries 
Report 2006 showed that, judged on the basis of various output indicators, many
LDCs are locked into primary commodity sectors and low-skill activities. Thus:
• The share of manufacturing value added in total GDP was only 11 per cent
in 2000–2003, and almost 40 per cent of the total manufacturing value
added of the LDCs as a group was located in one country, Bangladesh.
Over the 10 year period between 1990–1993 and 2000–2003, the share
of manufacturing in total value added declined in 19 out of 36 LDCs and
stagnated in another two. During the 1990s, the share of medium- and high-
technology manufactures in total manufacturing value added also declined
in half the LDCs for which data are available.
• Primary commodity exports accounted for approximately 70 per cent of
LDCmerchandiseexportsduring theperiod2000–2003. During thatperiod,
processed minerals and metals constituted a lower share of total mineral
and metals exports than 20 years earlier (down from 35 to 28 per cent) and
processed agricultural goods constituted a lower share of total agricultural
goods exports (down from 23 to 18 per cent).
• Low-technology, medium-technology and high-technology manufactures
exports from the LDCs are expanding much more slowly than such exports
fromotherdevelopingcountries.Their share in totalmerchandiseexportswas
only 4 per cent during 2000–2003, the same share as 20 years earlier.
During the last 20 years, most LDCs have undertaken deep trade liberalization
and they now have open trade regimes (UNCTAD 2004: 179–187). International
competitiveness depends on their having up-to-date technology, even in primary
production. In open economies this is not simply a matter of export development
but is also necessary for competing in the national market. Trade liberalization
means that policies to promote technological progress have now become a
necessity for the future economic viability of the LDCs. The challenge now is how
to increase the knowledge intensity of their economies.
 C.  The importance of innovation
and technological learning for LDCs
Effective policy to promote technological progress requires a good
understanding of how technological change occurs. For poor developing countries,
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Table 1. Selected S&T-related indicators for 
LDCs, other developing countries (ODCs) and high-income OECD countries, latest years available
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and
technical
journal
articles
School
enroll-
ment,
tertiary
(% of age 
group)
Tertiary 
students
in science, 
engineering
(% total 
tertiary)
Literacy rate, 
adult total
(% of people
ages 15 and 
above)
Average 
years of 
schooling
Fixed line 
and mobile 
phone sub-
scribers
(per 1,000 
people)
Internet
users
(per 1000 
people)
Electricity
consump-
tion p.c. 
(kwh)
2003a 1990-2003b 1999c 2004a 1999-2004b 2004 2000 2004a 2004a 2003
Afghanistan .. .. 0.0 1.1 .. 28.1 .. 22.7 0.9 ..
Angola .. .. 3.0 0.8 18.0 67.4 2.4 54.0 11.1 178.0
Bangladesh 0.6 .. 177.0 6.5 13.0 .. 4.2 37.0 2.2 145.0
Benin .. .. 20.0 3.0 25.0 34.7 2.3 38.2 12.2 82.0
Bhutan .. .. 1.0 .. .. .. .. 52.9 22.3 218.0
Burkina Faso 0.2 17.0 23.0 1.5 .. 21.8 0.9 37.4 4.1 32.0
Burundi .. .. 3.0 2.3 10.0 59.3 2.0 12.5 3.4 23.0
Cambodia .. .. 5.0 2.9 19.0 73.6 .. 39.5 3.0 9.0
Cape Verde .. 127.0 1.0 5.6 106.0 .. .. 281.1 50.5 100.0
Central African Republic .. .. 4.0 1.8 .. 48.6 2.9 17.6 2.3 35.0
Chad .. .. 2.0 0.8 .. 25.7 .. 14.4 6.4 11.0
Comoros .. .. 0.0 2.3 11.0 .. .. 26.5 13.6 32.0
Dem. Rep. of the Congo .. .. 6.0 1.3 .. 67.2 .. 37.0 .. 86.0
Djibouti .. .. 0.0 1.6 22.0 .. .. 43.4 11.6 455.0
Equatorial Guinea .. .. 1.0 2.6 .. 87.0 .. 106.2 10.2 ..
Eritrea .. .. 2.0 1.1 37.0 .. .. 14.0 11.8 62.0
Ethiopia .. .. 93.0 2.5 19.0 .. 1.9 7.8 1.6 33.0
Gambia .. .. 17.0 1.2 21.0 .. .. 99.0 33.2 101.0
Guinea .. 251.0 2.0 2.2 34.0 29.5 .. 15.3 5.0 89.0
Guinea-Bissau .. .. 6.0 0.4 .. .. .. 7.9 16.9 45.0
Haiti .. .. 1.0 .. .. .. 3.6 64.2 59.5 61.0
Kiribati .. .. 0.0 .. .. .. .. 52.5 20.4 ..
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. .. .. 2.0 5.9 11.0 68.7 .. 48.2 3.6 135.0
Lesotho 0.0 42.0 1.0 2.8 6.0 82.2 .. 109.1 23.9 ..  
Liberia .. .. 1.0 15.5 .. .. .. 2.8 0.3 ..
Madagascar 0.1 15.0 .. 2.5 20.0 70.7 3.7 19.5 5.0 50.0
Malawi .. .. 36.0 0.4 33.0 64.1 4.3 25.0 3.7 77.0
Maldives .. .. 3.0 0.2 .. 96.3 .. 450.7 59.2 ..
Mali .. .. 11.0 2.1 .. 19.0 1.1 36.2 3.8 38.0
Mauritania .. .. 2.0 3.5 10.0 51.2 .. 134.5 4.7 60.0
Mozambique 0.6 .. 14.0 1.2 24.0 .. 2.4 26.9 7.1 399.0
Myanmar 0.1 .. 10.0 11.3 42.0 89.9 4.4 10.3 1.3 126.0
Nepal 0.7 59.0 39.0 5.6 .. 48.6 3.3 21.8 6.6 91.0
Niger .. .. 21.0 0.8 .. 28.7 1.0 12.8 1.8 40.0
Rwanda .. .. 4.0 2.7 .. 64.9 .. 18.2 4.3 39.0
Samoa .. .. 3.0 7.5 14.0 .. .. 130.4 32.7 613.0
Sao Tome and Principe .. .. 0.0 1.0 .. .. .. 78.9 130.8 102.0
Senegal .. .. 62.0 4.9 .. 39.3 2.6 72.4 42.3 192.0
Sierra Leone .. .. 3.0 2.1 8.0 35.1 3.6 27.2 1.9 49.0
Solomon Islands .. .. 6.0 .. .. .. .. 17.0 6.4 69.0
Somalia .. .. 0.0 .. .. .. .. 87.9 25.1 ..
Sudan 0.3 263.0 43.0 6.1 .. 60.9 2.9 58.5 32.1 101.0
Timor-Leste .. .. .. 10.2 .. .. .. .. .. 301.0
Togo .. .. 11.0 3.6 .. 53.2 .. 48.1 36.9 91.0
Uganda 0.8 24.0 91.0 3.4 .. 66.8 3.3 44.4 7.2 59.0
United Rep. of Tanzania .. .. 87.0 1.2 .. 69.4 3.5 32.2 8.9 78.0
Vanuatu .. .. 3.0 5.0 .. 74.0 .. 83.3 36.2 ..
Yemen .. .. 10.0 9.4 .. .. .. 92.0 8.9 212.0
Zambia 0.0 51.0 26.0 2.3 .. 68.0 6.1 33.7 20.1 631.0
LDC 0.3 94.3 18.2 3.5 24.0 56.5 3.0 58.4 17.4 130.5
African LDCs 0.3 94.7 24.2 2.7 20.0 52.8 2.8 42.4 13.1 115.2
Asian LDCs 0.5 59.0d 30.5 6.1 21.3 61.8 4.0 40.6 6.1 133.7
Island LDCs .. 127.0e 2.0 4.5 43.7 85.2 .. 140.0 43.7 202.8
ODCs 0.8 313.0 628.8 23.0 21.5 86.1 7.1 425.5 97.6 527.5
High income OECD 2.4 3 728.1 532 308.0 68.7 24.7 92.2f 11.4 1 321.0 562.7 9 654.4
Source:  UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on UNDP, Human Development Report 2006; World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006, CD-ROM; and
Cohen and Soto, 2001.
a  Or latest available;   b  Data refers to the most recent year available during the period specified;  c   2001 for Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Senegal, Uganda and
United Republic of Tanzania; d Data refers to Bangladesh only; e Data refers to Cape Verde only; f Based on data for Italy and Switzerland.
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technological change occurs primarily through learning –– that is, the acquisition,
diffusion and upgrading of technologies that already exist in more technologically
advanced countries –– and not by pushing the global knowledge frontier further.
In short, the key to technological progress in the LDCs is technological catch-up
through learning rather than undertaking R&D to invent products and processes
which are totally new to the world.
From that perspective some might argue that innovation is irrelevant to
the LDCs. But that view is based on a definition of innovation sensu stricto,
as occurring only when enterprises introduce for the very first time products
or production processes which are new to the world. An LDC can hardly be
expected to be already knocking at the frontiers of technological breakthroughs.
Whilst this strict definition has wide currency, it is now common to recognize that
creative technological innovation also occurs when products and processes that
are new to a country or to an individual enterprise are commercially introduced,
whether or not they are new to the world (OECD, 2005). This Report adopts this
broader definition of innovation. With this broader view, innovation is a critical
aspect of technological catch-up even though it does not depend on inventions
which are new to the world. Innovation also occurs when a firm introduces a
product or process to a country for the first time. It occurs when other firms
imitate this pioneering firm. Moreover, it occurs when the initial or follower firms
make minor improvements and adaptations to improve a product or production
process, which lead to productivity improvements. In short, innovation occurs
through “creative imitation”, as well as in the more conventional sense of the
commercialization of inventions.
In the context of technological catch-up, innovation depends critically on the
linkages of a country with the rest of the world. However, there are divergent
views on how technological development in follower countries occurs.
In one extreme view, technological acquisition in follower countries depends
solely on the transfer of technology. In that process, access to foreign technology
is equivalent to its effective use. Such access can be maximized through openness
to trade and foreign investment, coupled with investment in education and
perhaps increasing access to the Internet and stimulating competition between
international telecom providers.
A basic problem with that view is that it largely treats knowledge in static
terms, as a commodity with almost instantaneous transformative properties that
can be transferred from one context to another quickly and with little cost.  From
that perspective, technology is seen as a blueprint which can be acquired off-the-
shelf by any producer seeking to put together a particular combination of inputs
dictated by a given factor endowment. That perspective assumes that knowledge
is like any other commodity, without geography or history. Information, knowledge
and learning are all collapsed into one simple input into the universal productive
process. In that approach, there is almost no discussion of how information is
converted into knowledge or how learning occurs in practice; indeed, learning is
not really understood or elucidated in any meaningful way. The complex dynamics
of knowledge accumulation are essentially excluded from the picture altogether.
This conception of knowledge ignores the fundamentally dynamic character and
plural aspects shaping knowledge production and generation, as knowledge is
perceived as socially disembodied and universally transferable. That perspective
essentially ignores the components and processes that shape the production and
generation of knowledge.
In practice, it is clear that the assimilation and the absorption of foreign
technology involve costs and risks, and that success depends on technological
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effort –– investments in technological change –– of various kinds, and the
development of competences and capabilities at the enterprise level. This applies
to both firms and farms.
For agriculture, the type of technological effort that is required reflects the fact
that a key feature of agricultural technology is its high degree of sensitivity to the
physical environment (circumstantial sensitivity). The strong interaction between
the environment and biological material makes the productivity of agricultural
techniques, which are largely embodied in reproducible material inputs, highly
dependent on local soil, climatic and ecological characteristics (Hayami and
Ruttan, 1985; Evenson and Westphal, 1995).
For industry and services, such circumstantial sensitivity is less important, but
nevertheless technological effort is required because technology is not simply
technological means (such as machinery and equipment) and technological
information (such as instructions and blueprints), but also technological
understanding (know-how). The latter is tacit and depends on learning through
training and experience. The whole process is complex because firms work
in an environment of uncertainty with imperfect knowledge; time, effort and
costly investment are required in order to learn to use technology efficiently; and
learning is cumulative and path-dependent.
The idea of tacit knowledge is particularly important. It is based on the fact
that knowledge is formed gradually, over time, through repetition, and recurrent
interaction, is situated in systems of ongoing practices and routines, and is a
product of social, cultural and economic and political conditions. While codified
knowledge is partly transferable and universal, tacit knowledge is embedded in
social and cultural practices –– that is, it is context-specific. Tacit knowledge that
represents the outcome of learning and experience is deeply rooted in the context
of social interaction, practices, routines, ideas, values and emotions. In short,
“it does not travel well” (Nonaka, Ryoko and Boysière, 2001: 7). Knowledge
can be acquired only through some form of participation in practice; and it is
transformed by the process of circulation itself. Knowledge is thus conceived as a
social learning process, which is situated in social institutions; hence it is socially
and culturally embedded, and context-specific.  The process of acquiring and
transforming knowledge is neither linear nor timeless, nor is it costless. Knowledge
itself is neither bounded nor fixed (Nelson and Winter, 1982).
Against that background, technological learning is critical for innovation in
LDCs.1 It is the development of the capabilities to use and improve technologies,
and encompasses:
• Core competences, which are the routine knowledge, skills and information
needed for operating established facilities or using existing agricultural
land, including production management, quality control, and repair and
maintenance of physical capital and marketing; and
• Dynamic capabilities, which refer to the ability to build and reconfigure
competences to increase productivity, competitiveness and profitability and
to address a changing external environment in terms of supply and demand
conditions.
The latter are particularly important for the process of innovation. The effective
absorption (or assimilation) of foreign technologies depends on the development
of such dynamic technological capabilities.
R&D can be part of those capabilities but it is not the only one. Design and
engineering capabilities are particularly important for establishing new facilities
and upgrading them. Moreover, technological capabilities are best understood
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not simply in the narrow sense of mastering “physical” technologies which are
associated with machinery and equipment, the properties of materials and
the knowledge possessed by engineers and scientists. Beyond this, production
processes involve various complex organizational processes related to the
organization of work, management, control and coordination, and the valorization
of output requires logistic and marketing skills. All of those can be understood as
part of “technological learning” in a broad sense.
The enterprise (firm or farm) is the locus of innovation and technological
learning. But firms and farms are embedded within a broader set of institutions
which play a major role in those processes. In advanced countries, national
innovation systems have been established to promote R&D and link it more
effectively to processes of innovation (OECD, 1997). In LDCs, what matter in
particular are the domestic knowledge systems which enable (or constrain) the
creation, accumulation, use and sharing of knowledge (UNCTAD, 2006). Those
systems should support effective acquisition, diffusion and improvement of
foreign technologies. In short, there is a need to increase the absorptive capacity
(or assimilation capacity) of domestic enterprises and of the domestic knowledge
systems in which firms and forms are embedded.2
D. Technological progress and poverty reduction
There is wide agreement that technological progress is a critical source of
economic growth.3 Technological change increases the productivity of land,
labour and capital, reducing costs of production and improving the quality of
outputs. It is through innovation, in the broad sense used here, that diversification
and structural transformation occur. Knowledge and creativity are also becoming
more and more important for competitiveness. They are now widely hailed as
the key engines driving growth in the new millennium.
Through its effects on economic growth, technological progress should have
long-term positive effects in reducing the incidence of poverty. However, if
economic growth is based solely on labour-saving technological progress, there
will be a strong tendency for jobless growth. Skill-biased technological change,
which increases demand for skilled labour only, will also be a cause of growing
income inequality.
The poverty-reducing impact of growth can be increased if more labour-using
technologies are adopted. Poverty reduction will occur if all opportunities for
labour-using technology are exploited, and if the negative employment effects
of technological change in some sectors are offset by positive effects in other
growing parts of the economy. If technological progress leads to a reduction
of the demand for labour in some sectors, this will not necessarily worsen
unemployment, underemployment and poverty if technological progress is at the
same time leading to the introduction of new growing sectors into which the
labour which is released from the declining sectors can be absorbed.
Promoting technological progress should thus not be seen as something that
is different from promoting poverty reduction. The achievement of inclusive
development (or pro-poor growth) depends on technological choices and
technological development trajectories.4
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E.  Organization of the Report
The Report examines various aspects of the policy challenge of promoting
technological learning and innovation in the LDCs. Chapter 1 discusses the
extent to which technological learning and innovation are currently taking place
through international market linkages, and in particular international trade, FDI
and licensing. Chapter 2 focuses on national policies to promote technological
learning and innovation. It discusses the way in which science, technology and
innovation (STI) issues are currently treated in the LDCs, focusing on their Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), and explores how the idea of technological
catch-up can be applied within an LDC context. Chapter 3 explores the current
controversies about how stringent IPR regimes affect technological development
processes in LDCs, and policy options for improving incentives for innovation
and learning. Chapter 4 looks at the loss of skilled human resources through
emigration and at policy options for dealing with that issue.    Chapter 5 examines
how ODA is supporting technological learning and innovation in the LDCs and
ways to make it more effective.
The Report does not provide all the answers to the issues which it raises. It
is intended to provoke fresh thinking about development strategies and poverty
reduction in the LDCs by both LDC Governments and their development
partners. There is at the present time a search for alternatives to the current
development paradigm, and the role of knowledge in development is critical for
the formulation of new approaches. The Report should open up policy dialogue
and avenues for policy innovation and further policy-oriented research.
Notes
1. Thenotionof technological learninghasbeenmostappliedextensively to thedevelopment
of technological capabilities for manufacturing in developing countries (see Lall, 1992;
UNIDO,2002;UNIDO,2006).But it is also relevant for agriculture (OmamoandLynam,
2003; Lele and Ekboir, 2004) and services. In the present Report it encompasses both
firms and farms, and includes services as well as industrial activities.
2. The idea of “absorptive capability” derives from Abramovitz (1986), who speaks of
the “social capability” for technological advance during catch-up. Cohen and Levinthal
(1989: 569) define “absorptive capacity” as “the firm’s ability to identify, assimilate
and exploit knowledge from the environment”, whilst Rogers (2004: 578) defines
“absorptive capability” as “the capability to access, learn and absorb relevant overseas
technology”. For analyses of East Asian development success in terms of the ability of
countries to assimilate and absorb foreign technology, see Nelson and Pack (1999) and
Kim (1995).
3. For a review of different perspectives on technological change and economic growth,
see Nelson and Winter (1982), Nelson (1998) and Verspagen (2004). The importance of
innovation for structural change and economic growth is argued in Ocampo (2005). Like
the LDC Report 2006, this Report is based on evolutionary and structuralist approaches
to economic growth.
4. For a discussion on bridging the gap between policies for technological change and
policies for poverty reduction, see Mackintosh, Chataway and Wuyts (2007).
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Chapter
1
Building Technological 
Capabilities through 
International Market 
Linkages
A.  Introduction
Technological catch-up for least developed countries requires access to the 
international knowledge pool and the ability to learn, master and adapt foreign 
technologies and thereby benefit from international technology diffusion. This 
process includes transfer of technology, which takes place through several channels. 
These can be formal (e.g. licensing, foreign direct investment) or informal (e.g. 
movement of people) and/or market (e.g. interaction with upstream suppliers or 
downstream customers) or non-market (e.g. technical assistance programmes of 
official development agencies or NGOs). 
The importance of those different channels cannot be established precisely and 
it varies according to different stages of development, as do developing countries’ 
ability to take advantage of them. Nevertheless, the channels that involve 
continuous interaction between the acquirer and the supplier of technology are 
the most likely to be effective channels for knowledge diffusion. The main reason 
for this is that tacit knowledge is a component of virtually all technologies, but 
at the same time it is the most difficult to transmit between different agents. 
Therefore, it is mainly through continuous interaction between agents that tacit 
knowledge is transmitted. It can thus be assumed that the channels of technology 
diffusion that involve constant interaction and exchange are more important for 
LDCs than the others. 
The most widespread international market mechanisms that involve 
continuous interaction between agents leading to knowledge flows are trade and 
foreign direct investment (FDI). From this, the major channels for international 
technology diffusion to LDCs can be derived from: 
Imports of technology embodied in machinery and other capital goods; 
Interaction with international customers (i.e. exports), particularly through 
the integration of LDC firms into global value chains;
Foreign direct investment;
Imports of disembodied technology (i.e. licensing). 
The working of those four market mechanisms as channels for diffusion of 
technology to LDCs is analysed successively in sections to B to E of this chapter.1
The critical issue is how effective these channels are in an LDC context. LDCs 
have over the past 20 years actively integrated into the global economy through 
trade and investment. Nevertheless, those countries are still at the initial levels 
of technological development. Their low income levels and the prevalence of 
poverty entail low levels of physical and human capital. Their national knowledge 
systems are not well articulated or efficient (UNCTAD, 2006b). Those countries 
are far away from the world technological frontier. Most domestic firms and farms 
1.
2.
3.
4.
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operate with rudimentary technologies and carry out little, if any, autonomous 
research and development (R&D). In these circumstances the working of 
international market linkages as channels of international technology diffusion 
may be severely constrained. The evidence presented in this chapter shows the 
extent of it. Section F summarizes and concludes.
B.  Imports of capital goods
By far the most important source of technological innovation in LDCs, as 
perceived by firms, is new machinery or equipment, according to a large-scale 
survey of firms in developing countries (chart 3). This is true of domestically 
owned firms and of foreign affiliates operating in LDCs (Knell, 2006).2 Machinery 
and equipment were also found to be the major source of innovation by firms 
from other developing countries (ODCs).3
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Chart 3. Three most important sources of technological innovation in LDCs and ODCs, 2000–2005
Source: Knell (2006), based on World Bank, Investment Climate Surveys, 2000–2005.
Note:   Percentage of replies to the question asking firms to identify the first, second and third most important sources of technological innovation 
for them. The question was part of a survey questionnaire given to firms located in LDCs and other developing countries, as part of the 
World Bank’s Investment Climate Surveys. In the case of the LDCs, interviews with 2,500 firms were carried out between 2000 and 2005 
in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mali, Senegal, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia.
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It is likely that most of the machinery and equipment operated in LDCs is 
imported, since those countries have very little capital goods manufacturing 
capacity. Hence, imports of capital goods are the main source of innovation for 
firms in LDCs and are a major feature of their technological effort. The presence 
of a national capital goods industry would reduce the dependence of LDCs on 
imports. However, the development of domestic capital goods manufacturing 
capacity typically takes place only at a much later stage of technological catch-
up (Justman and Teubal, 1991). Therefore, at the present stage of technological 
development of LDCs imports remain the main source of capital goods. 
This section analyses the development in LDCs imports of technology 
embodied in machinery, equipment and other capital goods between 1980 and 
2005. It compares them with those of other developing countries in order to 
put LDCs in perspective. An analysis is made of different types of capital goods, 
according to their general characteristics and main end-use (whenever possible), 
so as to study which types of embodied technologies LDCs have been acquiring 
internationally over the last 25 years.4 The trading partners of origin for capital 
goods are both developed countries and the group of the 20 most technologically 
advanced developing countries.5
1.  TRENDS AND ORIGIN
Imports of capital goods (in nominal terms) by LDCs expanded only moderately 
during the 1980s and 1990s. Since 2003, however, they increased sharply to 
reach more than $20 billion in 2005 (chart 4). The strong increase in the more 
recent years was highly concentrated on oil-exporting countries and Bangladesh, 
the largest LDC economy. 
A significant part of the capital goods imported by LDCs consists of second-
hand equipment. Although trade data do not show the extent of this practice, 
Chart 4.  LDC imports of capital goods, 1980–2005
(Current $, millions)
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on data from UNDESA Statistics Division.
Note:   LDCs exclude Lesotho, Liberia and Timor-Leste. For the definition of capital goods and methodological notes, see the annex.
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Imports of capital goods are 
the main source of innovation 
for firms in LDCs and are 
a major feature of their 
technological effort.
Imports of capital goods 
by LDCs expanded only 
moderately during the 1980s 
and 1990s, but since 2003 
they increased sharply.
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cursory evidence attests it. In the textile and garment industry, foreign investors 
often transfer used capital goods from other countries to LDCs when establishing 
themselves in the new host country (see subsection D.4 of this chapter). It is likely 
that junior mining companies do the same to some extent.
The sourcing of LDCs’ capital goods imports has changed markedly over 
the last 25 years. While in the 1980s most of them (92 per cent) originated in 
developed countries, during 2000–2005 this proportion fell to 59 per cent, this 
reflecting the rise of technologically advanced developing countries as exporters 
of capital goods. The shift towards this type of South–South trade was driven by 
the Asian LDCs, which sourced more than half of their capital goods imports from 
other developing countries in 2000–2005 (table 2). This is mostly explained by 
the growing regional integration of Asian LDCs not only in terms of international 
trade, but also in terms of foreign direct investment. 
2. INTENSITY OF CAPITAL GOODS IMPORTS
In order to assess the intensity of capital goods imports in LDCs and its 
development over time, a series of indicators are presented in table 3. They 
consist of capital goods imports as a share of GDP, gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF), total merchandise imports and total merchandise exports. Lastly, per 
capita capital goods imports are also shown. 
Capital goods imports as a share of GDP and GFCF remained approximately 
constant during the 1980s and 1990s in the LDCs, but rose marginally in 2000–
2005 thanks to higher import values in 2003–2005.6 Nevertheless, the levels 
were substantially lower than in other developing countries and the gap widened 
considerably during the last 25 years (table 3).  The share of GDP of capital 
goods imports was similar in LDCs and ODCs during the 1980s, but it more than 
doubled to 12 per cent by 2000–2005 in ODCs, while in LDCs it rose to just half 
that level. On a per capita basis, capital goods imports of LDCs less than doubled 
to $18 between the 1980s and 2000–2005, while in the ODCs the ratio rose 
fivefold to $207, a level 11 times higher than in LDCs.
The part of national fixed investment that was dedicated to imported 
machinery and equipment in the 1980s was higher in the LDCs (27 per cent) 
Table 2. Imports of capital goods, by origin, in LDCs and ODCs, 1980–2005
(Percentage ot total capital goods imports)
1980–1989 1990–1999 2000–2005
Developed
countries
Developing
countries
Developed
countries
Developing
countries
Developed
countries
Developing
countries
LDCs 91.5 8.5 75.4 24.6 59.0 41.0
Africa and Haiti 95.0 5.0 88.6 11.4 66.3 33.7
Asia 81.7 18.3 51.2 48.8 43.4 56.6
Islands 92.0 8.0 84.4 15.6 73.8 26.2
Other developing 
countries (ODCs)
89.4 10.6 72.3 27.7 57.5 42.5
Africa 97.4 2.6 90.8 9.2 83.5 16.5
America 94.4 5.6 85.8 14.2 82.9 17.1
Asia 85.9 14.1 67.2 32.8 51.1 48.9
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on data from UNDESA Statistics Division.
Note:   LDCs and the regional subgroupings exclude Lesotho, Liberia and Timor-Leste. For the 
definition of capital goods, capital good groups and country groups, and methodological 
notes, see the annex.
While in the 1980s 92 
per cent of LDCs’ capital 
goods imports originated 
in developed countries, 
during 2000–2005 this 
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cent, this reflecting the rise 
of technologically advanced 
developing countries as 
exporters of capital goods.
Relative to GDP, capital 
goods imports in the LDCs 
were lower than in other 
developing countries and the 
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during the last 25 years.
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than in ODCs (23 per cent). In 2000–2005, by contrast, this was completely 
reversed. ODCs devoted almost half of their GFCF to imported capital goods, 
but LDCs less than one third (table 3). It is likely that this is an indirect indicator 
of the changing composition of fixed investment, with an increasing share of 
machinery and equipment in total GFCF of ODCs. This, in turn, possibly points 
to the increasing technological content of fixed investment in those countries 
and to their firms’ strengthening technological effort. By contrast, comparable 
technological upgrading of GFCF does not seem to have taken place in LDCs.
Other indicators of the effort to acquire foreign technology embodied in capital 
goods are provided by their ratios to total merchandise imports and exports. 
The first ratio points to the priority given to capital goods, as opposed to other 
imports, such as consumer goods or food. This indicator has been approximately 
constant at about around 23 per cent in LDCs since 1980, as has the structure of 
imports of this group of countries. ODCs, by contrast, have strongly redirected 
their imports towards embodied technology since then, so that the share rose 
from 28 per cent in the 1980s to almost 40 per cent in 2000–2005 (table 3). 
Capital goods imports as a share of total exports indicates one possible use of 
foreign exchange earnings obtained through merchandise trade. It is competing 
with other uses, such as imports of other goods and payment of foreign debt. 
Thus, a rising share indicates foreign exchange earned through merchandise 
exports is increasingly being earmarked for building the productive capacity of 
the importing country. This indicator has taken opposite (and almost symmetrical) 
paths in LDCs and ODCs during the last 25 years. In the LDCs capital goods 
imports declined from 37 per cent of total exports to 27 per cent between the 
1980s and 2000–2005. In the other developing countries they rose from 26 per 
cent to 36 per cent over the same period. Their foreign exchange earnings have 
been progressively used for building domestic technological capabilities. In LDCs, 
by contrast, the considerable increase in export earnings in 2000–2005 was 
not used to finance additional imports of capital goods to a comparable extent 
(except for oil-exporting economies), because of the only marginal rise in their 
investment rate. 
Country data reveal that the value of capital goods imports is related to the 
economic weight of national economies and/or to the fact of being a petroleum 
exporter. Thus, the largest importers are Angola, Bangladesh, Sudan, Myanmar 
and Yemen (table 4). This reflects a size effect and large capital goods imports 
associated with the sharp increase in FDI inflows in the oil extractive industry 
Table 3. Indicators of the importance of capital goods imports in LDCs and ODCs, 1980–2005
(Percentage, unless otherwise indicated)
Capital goods imports/ 
GDP
Capital goods imports/ 
Gross fixed capital 
formation
Capital goods imports/ 
Total merchandise 
    imports
Capital goods imports/
Total merchandise 
   exports
Capital goods imports
per capita
(Current $)
1980–
1989
1990–
1999
2000–
2005
1980–
1989
1990–
1999
2000–
2005
1980–
1989
1990–
1999
2000–
2005
1980–
1989
1990–
1999
2000–
2005
1980–
1989
1990–
1999
2000–
2005
LDCs 4.5 4.5 5.9 27.0 26.0 29.5 23.6 22.1 22.4 37.4 32.9 26.5 11 12 18
Africa and Haiti 5.0 4.7 6.8 32.1 29.0 35.6 25.8 22.6 24.6 34.0 29.7 27.1 14 12 19
Asia 3.3 3.7 4.5 18.0 20.3 21.4 18.7 19.5 18.6 47.8 36.1 23.9 7 10 15
Islands 15.2 19.4 15.2 51.8 70.9 65.2 33.3 41.0 31.7 84.3 134.1 141.9 88 168 159
Other developing 
countries (ODCs)
5.3 8.5 11.9 22.5 34.4 48.6 28.1 34.6 39.2 26.3 34.6 35.9 46 115 207
Africa 5.5 6.2 7.3 25.6 35.3 43.7 29.1 30.0 30.9 28.7 28.7 27.4 87 74 97
America 3.8 5.4 7.1 17.8 27.3 38.0 33.1 37.6 35.5 28.9 40.2 34.6 81 187 270
Asia 6.2 10.7 14.6 24.9 37.6 52.4 27.3 35.1 41.1 25.8 34.5 37.2 37 110 213
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on data from UNDESA Statistics Division. 
Notes:   As for table 2.
Data point to the increasing 
technological content of fixed 
investment in ODCs and to 
their firms’ strengthening 
technological effort. By 
contrast, comparable 
technological upgrading of 
fixed investment does not 
seem to have taken place
in LDCs.
In the LDCs capital goods 
imports declined from 37 
per cent of total exports to 27 
per cent between the 1980s 
and 2000–2005. In the other 
developing countries they 
rose from 26 per cent
to 36 per cent over the
same period. 
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Table 4. Indicators of the importance of capital goods imports
for LDCs, by country, 2000–2005
(Period averages)
Value Capital goods
imports/
GDP
Capital goods
imports/GFCF
Capital goods
imports
per capita
(Current $ 
millions)
(%) (%) ($)
Angola 2101 13.2 112.0 136.8
Bangladesh 1792 3.2 13.5 12.2
Sudan 1026 5.7 30.0 28.7
Myanmar 730 7.9 70.7 15.5
Yemen 720 5.9 31.7 36.3
Ethiopia 617 8.3 39.3 8.2
United Rep. of Tanzania 521 4.8 24.8 14.3
Senegal 451 7.6 34.9 40.6
Zambia 383 8.5 40.4 34.7
Mozambique 369 7.7 33.4 18.9
Cambodia 352 7.9 38.5 26.2
Equatorial Guinea 326 10.9 25.2 702.6
Afghanistan 283 5.8 35.4 12.0
Madagascar 233 5.1 27.9 13.3
Benin 229 7.2 38.3 29.1
Nepal 225 3.8 19.6 8.8
Uganda 213 3.1 14.6 7.9
Mauritania 209 17.4 132.2 74.8
Mali 204 5.4 26.7 18.8
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 188 3.1 27.3 3.4
Guinea 173 5.3 34.7 20.0
Lao PDR 161 7.3 43.6 29.3
Chad 149 6.0 15.0 15.9
Malawi 133 7.1 69.2 10.7
Burkina Faso 133 3.6 14.6 10.2
Haiti 126 3.8 29.4 14.1
Togo 126 7.3 36.1 21.3
Djibouti 122 19.6 154.3 158.5
Sierra Leone 119 11.7 100.1 23.0
Maldives 100 14.2 50.1 348.0
Niger 92 3.9 26.2 7.5
Cape Verde 80 10.8 39.2 165.6
Vanuatu 79 28.8 140.4 387.2
Eritrea 75 9.6 37.8 18.0
Samoa 60 21.6 170.9 331.0
Rwanda 56 3.1 16.2 6.3
Bhutan 52 7.8 12.1 84.6
Gambia 49 11.9 58.0 32.4
Comoros 38 15.3 157.3 51.8
Burundi 33 4.6 37.9 4.5
Central African Republic 27 2.5 40.5 6.8
Solomon Islands 23 7.7 41.0 50.6
Lesotho 20 2.0 4.6 10.3
Sao Tome and Principe 15 27.1 80.5 103.6
Guinea-Bissau 15 6.3 34.5 10.0
Timor-Leste 12 3.6 11.2 12.9
Kiribati 12 21.3 49.4 135.0
Somalia 10 0.5 2.3 1.3
Tuvalu 6 31.7 56.7 587.3
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on data from UNDESA Statistics Division.
Note:  For the definition of capital goods and methodological notes, see the Annex. Countries 
are ranked according to import values. Data for Liberia not shown due to due to lack of 
reliable data.
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since the 1990s (see section D of this chapter). Relative indicators reveal that the 
economies importing incorporated technology most intensively are islands, small 
economies and, again, oil producers (table 4). This reflects opposite size effects 
(since the impact of capital goods imports on small economies is greater) and the 
importance of petroleum extraction. By contrast, the countries with the lowest 
capital goods import intensity are not only those that have recently experienced 
armed conflict and therefore have a low investment rate. More surprisingly, some 
of the major LDC exporters of manufactures (e.g. Bangladesh, Nepal, Haiti and 
Madagascar) also have very low imports of embodied technology, a fact that 
indicates their firms’ weak technological efforts, which could be expected to be 
stronger in view of their export structure.
3.  TYPES OF CAPITAL GOODS IMPORTED
For the purpose of our analysis capital goods have been classified in two 
different ways.7 The first classification groups them mainly into two broad 
categories: machinery and equipment, and transport equipment.8 The remaining 
capital goods consist of scientific and measuring instruments, which have always 
accounted for less than 6 per cent of capital goods imports of both LDCs and 
ODCs.
The large majority of LDC’s capital goods imports over the last 25 years 
have consisted of machinery and equipment, and their share has increased over 
time. In 2000–2005 they accounted for over two thirds of LDCs’ total capital 
goods imports, while transport equipment amounted to slightly more than one 
fourth (table 5). Regionally, the Asian LDCs import machinery and equipment 
most intensively, as those goods account for more than three fourths of their total 
capital goods imports. The share is much lower for African and island LDCs.9 The 
stronger weight of this type of capital goods in imports of Asian LDCs reflects their 
higher level of industrialization as compared with other LDCs.
Likewise, in other developing countries capital goods imports are dominated 
by machinery and equipment and their importance has grown over time. The most 
important difference between the two groups of developing countries, however, 
is that the share of imports of transport equipment in ODCs is much lower than 
in LDCs. This is due, on the one hand, to the higher level of industrialization of 
the former and, on the other hand, to the presence of domestic industry that 
produces transport equipment in most of the technologically more advanced 
developing countries. This means that part of the domestic demand for transport 
capital goods is met domestically rather than by imports.
The second classification of capital goods focuses on machinery and equipment 
and scientific and measuring instruments (i.e. excluding transport equipment) 
and endeavours to identify the type of industry that uses them. This is possible 
for specialized machinery, but not for general-purpose technologies or for the 
residual category “other industrial machinery”.10
Among specialized machinery, the most important category for LDCs is 
construction, mining and metal crushing, which in 2000–2005 accounted for 
13 per cent of their total capital good imports (table 6). This category is relatively 
more important for African LDCs.11 Here the share of this type of equipment 
increased over the last 25 years, while it remained approximately constant in 
other LDCs and declined in all ODC subregions.  At the same time, the share of 
industrial machinery12 in African LDCs’ capital goods imports declined from 26 
per cent in the 1980s to 23 per cent in 2000–2005. The changing composition of 
African LDCs’ capital goods imports reflects the changing patterns of specialization 
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have very low imports of 
embodied technology, a fact 
that indicates their firms’ 
weak technological efforts. 
The large majority of LDC’s 
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has increased over time.
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machinery and equipment 
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of those countries over the last 25 years, particularly the de-industrialization 
that followed trade liberalization and the re-specialization in natural resource 
extraction (UNCTAD, 2004, 2006b). 
Asian LDCs, by contrast, import textile and leather machinery more intensively 
than any other developing region. This type of equipment accounted for 9 
per cent of their total capital goods imports in 2000–2005, while in all other 
developing regions the corresponding share was below 2 per cent (table 6). In 
Asian LDCs the proportion of those capital goods has more than doubled over 
the last 25 years, a fact that reflects the expansion of the garment and textile 
industry (see subsection D.4 of this chapter). 
The most striking difference between the composition of imports of capital 
goods of ODCs and LDCs is the importance of information and communication 
technology (ICT) capital. In the former that category accounted for one fourth of 
total capital goods imports already in the 1980s, and this share doubled to half 
in 2000–2005. In the LDCs, by contrast, in the early 21st century ICT amounted 
to just one fifth of total capital goods imports. Although the share of ICT in those 
imports doubled as compared with the 1980s, it was still 30 percentage points 
lower than in ODCs. This reflects LDCs’ slower pace of adoption of the new ICT 
technologies and, more generally, those countries’ lower technology intensity. 
Table 5. Imports of capital goods, by broad categories, in LDCs and ODCs, 1980–2005
(Percentage of total capital goods imports)
1980–1989 1990–1999 2000–2005
Machinery
&
equipment
Transport
equipment
Scientific &
measuring
instruments
Machinery
&
equipment
Transport
equipment
Scientific &
measuring
instruments
Machinery
&
equipment
Transport
equipment
Scientific &
measuring
instruments
LDCs 62.2 34.0 3.8 66.6 28.8 4.5 68.5 26.9 4.5
Africa and Haiti 60.9 35.4 3.7 65.6 29.6 4.8 65.0 30.5 4.6
Asia 67.8 27.9 4.3 70.8 24.9 4.3 76.8 18.8 4.4
Islands 45.3 51.8 2.9 50.9 45.6 3.5 56.5 39.7 3.8
Other developing countries (ODCs) 73.4 21.4 5.2 80.2 14.9 4.9 82.9 11.2 5.9
Africa 69.3 25.9 4.8 70.5 23.9 5.6 69.6 24.9 5.5
America 64.2 30.9 4.9 67.9 27.1 5.0 71.0 23.7 5.4
Asia 75.4 19.4 5.2 83.1 12.2 4.7 85.5 8.5 6.0
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on data from UNDESA Statistics Division. 
Notes: As for table 2.
Table 6. Imports of capital goods, by type of end-use, in LDCs and ODCs, 1980–2005
(Percentage of total capital goods imports)
Agricultural
machinery
Construction,
mining,
metal-
crushing
Power-
generating
machinery
Textile and 
leather
machinery
Metalworking
machinery
Food-
processing
machinery
Paper, pulp 
and
publishing
machinery
Other
industrial
machinery
ICT capital
1980
–89
1990
–99
2000
–05
1980
–89
1990
–99
2000
–05
1980
–89
1990
–99
2000
–05
1980
–89
1990
–99
2000
–05
1980
–89
1990
–99
2000
–05
1980
–89
1990
–99
2000
–05
1980
–89
1990
–99
2000
–05
1980
–89
1990
–99
2000
–05
1980
–89
1990
–99
2000
–05
LDCs 3.3 2.1 1.5 10.5 11.5 13.0 13.9 14.1 12.7 2.8 3.6 3.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.8 20.2 20.3 19.3 11.9 16.6 19.8
Africa and Haiti 3.7 2.3 1.2 11.3 12.4 15.5 12.1 13.2 11.0 2.5 1.9 0.8 1.3 1.2 0.8 1.5 1.6 1.2 0.6 0.7 0.6 20.0 20.8 19.9 11.7 16.6 18.0
Asia 2.3 1.8 2.0 9.0 10.8 8.9 19.2 15.7 15.7 3.9 7.1 9.2 1.8 1.6 1.9 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 21.3 20.1 18.5 12.4 16.7 23.1
Islands 1.7 0.9 0.6 5.6 5.8 5.1 10.3 13.9 15.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 15.5 15.8 17.0 13.1 16.0 20.4
Other developing 
countries (ODCs)
1.6 0.6 0.4 8.6 6.9 5.7 14.5 13.0 12.1 3.1 2.6 1.4 2.9 2.6 2.0 0.6 0.4 0.2 1.1 1.3 0.8 20.2 18.3 16.3 26.6 40.5 50.0
Africa 2.9 1.8 1.3 10.1 9.6 9.0 14.6 13.2 14.0 3.0 2.9 1.7 2.6 2.0 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.3 23.4 22.8 20.6 15.9 21.4 24.8
America 2.0 1.1 0.9 7.7 6.6 5.2 13.9 13.3 14.8 2.6 1.9 1.1 3.2 2.1 1.6 0.7 0.6 0.4 1.3 1.4 0.9 17.4 17.9 17.6 20.9 28.2 33.9
Asia 1.1 0.4 0.2 8.3 6.6 5.5 14.2 12.6 11.3 3.2 2.7 1.5 2.9 2.7 2.0 0.4 0.3 0.2 1.0 1.2 0.7 19.8 17.7 15.6 30.0 44.6 54.3
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on data from UNDESA Statistics Division. 
Notes: As for table 2.
The share of ICTs in LDC 
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points lower than in ODCs. 
This reflects LDCs’ slower 
adoption of the new ICT 
technologies and, more 
generally, those countries’ 
lower technology intensity. 
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To a certain extent, the fact that ICT capital imports by LDCs are lower 
than those by ODCs is to be expected, given the lower level of technological 
development of the former group. Nevertheless, the low uptake of some of those 
technologies (particularly telecommunications) deprives many of those countries’ 
firms and households of an important tool for economic integration and market 
efficiency. While the early enthusiasm about the potential contribution of ICTs to 
development has not been borne out by recent experience, it is widely recognized 
that those technologies can make a positive contribution to technological 
upgrading and associated benefits, even in an LDC context (Konde, 2007). 
The share of agricultural machinery in LDCs’ total capital goods imports is low 
(1.5 per cent in 2000–2005) and less than half of its level during the 1980s (table 
6). The relative contraction in those imports was driven by African LDCs, where 
the share declined by 2.5 percentage points, while there was less of a decline in 
the other LDCs. Those developments are apparently contrary to expectations. 
First, given the higher share of agriculture in total GDP in LDCs as compared with 
ODCs, it could have been expected that they would import agricultural machinery 
more intensively.13 This is not the case, however, because the agriculture in LDCs 
is still largely carried on by smallholders on a non-commercial basis and with 
extremely low levels of automation.  Second, it is likely that a Green Revolution 
(see chapter 2) would lead to greater imports of agricultural machinery in LDCs. 
4. IMPLICATIONS
Total capital goods imports by LDCs have lost momentum over the last 25 
years. While expanding in nominal terms, they have either been stagnant or risen 
only marginally when compared with macroeconomic variables or the population. 
Moreover, they have dramatically fallen behind when compared with imports 
by other developing countries. The technological effort of ODC firms (in all the 
subregions) has decisively increased the resources devoted to the acquisition 
of foreign embodied technology in both absolute and relative terms. While the 
technological effort to acquire foreign embodied technology was comparable 
in LDCs and ODCs in the 1980s, the gap has widened considerably since that 
time. In the LDCs, imports of capital goods have been hampered by structural 
change, the slow progression of the investment rate and balance-of-payments 
restrictions.
The composition of capital goods imports by LDCs to a large extent mirrors 
changes in their productive structure and trade specialization and their overall 
level of technological development. That explains the relatively high and growing 
share of imports of machinery and equipment destined for the extractive industry 
in African LDCs (construction, mining and metal-crushing equipment) or for low-
value-added manufacturing in Asian LDCs (textile and leather machinery). 
Developments in capital goods imports are, moreover, partly associated 
with the type of FDI that those countries have been attracting in recent years. 
Therefore, the impact of such imports on the technological capability-building 
of LDCs depends also on the technology-diffusing effects of the associated FDI 
projects and on the patterns of TNC insertion in host LDC economies (see section 
D of this chapter). Imports of capital goods and equipment for mineral resource 
extraction by African LDCs, for example, have since 2000 been boosted by the 
surge in investment in this sector (driven mainly by FDI) and by the changes in 
mining policy. Policy reforms have facilitated access to foreign finance and reduced 
the cost of importing the equipment and spare parts needed to rehabilitate and 
expand existing mines and develop new ones (Campbell, 2004). 
The low uptake of 
ICTs (particularly 
telecommunications)
deprives many LDC firms and 
households of an important 
tool for economic integration 
and market efficiency.
While the technological effort 
to acquire foreign embodied 
technology was comparable 
in LDCs and ODCs in the 
1980s, the gap has widened 
considerably since that time. 
Capital goods imports are 
associated with the type of 
FDI that LDCs have been 
attracting in recent years. 
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In summary, imports of capital goods could be expected to play a major role 
in LDCs’ learning of foreign technology and in the domestic accumulation of 
their firms’ technological capabilities. However, this potential is being fulfilled to 
only a very limited degree for two main reasons. First, the growth in capital goods 
imports by those countries has been sluggish, in sharp contrast to their dynamic 
expansion in other developing countries. Second, the types of equipment and 
machinery imports that have increased most have accentuated the specialization 
in natural resource extraction and low-value-added manufacturing into which 
LDCs are locked. By contrast, greater imports of other types of capital goods 
could have been expected in view of the early stage of technological catch-up 
of most LDCs (as a Green Revolution would require more agricultural machinery 
imports) or if a broader diffusion of telecommunication technology were taking 
place (leading to higher ICT capital goods imports).
Importing relatively few capital goods implies that LDC firms are forgoing the 
possibility of technological learning and adaptive innovation potentially associated 
with greater imports of technology embodied in those goods. Moreover, beyond 
the quantities imported, the crucial issue is whether these firms can make efficient 
use of these embodied technology imports. However, this is constrained by their 
low absorptive capacities (see section F of this chapter). 
C.  Exports and the role of global value chains
The possibilities available to LDC firms for developing their technological 
capabilities through exports depend on the linkages they develop with their 
downstream foreign customers and on the technological effort that they make 
to learn through those linkages. This is especially true given the changes in 
international production systems, distribution channels and financial markets, 
accelerated by the globalization of product markets and the spread of information 
technologies. The global value chain (GVC) approach emphasizes the importance 
of international linkages and the increasing varieties of inter-firm arrangements. It 
helps to explain the strategic role of relationships with key external actors. Thus, 
it sheds light on how LDC firms can enhance their technological capabilities by 
exporting (learning-by-exporting) or, alternatively, they can become marginalized 
from GVCs (Pietrobelli, 2007).
Global value chains are increasingly present in developing countries, also as 
a result of changes in national and international regulatory frameworks. They 
often represent one of the very few options — or perhaps the only one — for 
local firms and suppliers to secure access to larger (international) markets and to 
innovative technologies. Participation in GVCs may be associated to the upgrading 
of firms. In this perspective, four types of upgrading have been distinguished for 
enterprises (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000):
• Process upgrading is transforming inputs into outputs more efficiently by 
reorganizing the production system or introducing superior technology. 
• Product upgrading is moving into more sophisticated product lines in terms 
of increased unit values. 
• Functional upgrading is acquiring new, superior functions in the chain, such 
as design or marketing, or abandoning existing lower-value-added functions, 
so as to focus on higher-value-added activities. 
• Intersectoral upgrading is applying the competence acquired in a particular 
function to move into a new sector.
Importing relatively few 
capital goods implies that 
LDC firms are foregoing the 
possibility of technological 
learning and adaptive 
innovation potentially 
associated with greater 
imports of technology 
embodied in those goods.
The global value chain 
approach emphasizes the 
importance of international 
linkages and the increasing 
varieties of inter-firm 
arrangements.
Global value chains often 
represent one of the very few 
options for local firms and 
suppliers to secure access 
to larger (international) 
markets and to innovative 
technologies.
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However, whether LDCs’ firms and farms will benefit from the relationships 
with foreign buyers depends on a number of circumstances that may or may 
not arise. The upgrading process is fraught with difficulties and obstacles, which 
are particularly great for LDC firms. The following two subsections explain how 
that process can in principle take place and its applicability to LDCs. An analysis 
of those exports countries’ then highlights how LDC firms have been able to 
position themselves in GVCs. 
1.  THE CHANGING NATURE OF GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS
The value chain describes the full range of activities that firms and workers 
carry out to bring a product from its conception to its end-use and beyond. That 
includes activities such as design, production, marketing, distribution and support 
to the final consumer. Chart 5 provides the example of the textile and garments 
value chain (whose presence in Asian LDCs is analysed in subsection D.4 of 
this chapter). Rarely do individual companies alone undertake the full range of 
activities required in order to bring a product from conception to market. The 
design, production, and marketing of products involve a chain of activities that 
are often divided among different enterprises, often located in different places 
and sometimes even in different countries. All activities contribute to total value, 
but it is crucial to identify those activities providing higher returns (i.e. “premia”) 
along the value chain in order to understand the global distribution of value 
added. “Rents” often emerge in GVCs, whenever non-competitive structures 
emerge and the balance of power is unevenly distributed among actors.
At any point in the chain, some degree of governance and coordination is 
required. This governance may occur through arm’s-length market relations 
or through non-market relationships with different hierarchies: network 
(implying cooperation among firms of more or less equal power that share their 
competencies within the chain), quasi-hierarchy and hierarchy (Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 2000; Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2004, 2006a).14
The GVC literature also stresses the role played by the GVC leaders, particularly 
the buyers, in transferring knowledge along the chains. Buyers and retailers 
Chart 5. The textile and garments value chain
Source: Rasiah (2006a).
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increasingly play a role in product development, branding, supplier selection 
and distribution, and that is especially true for agricultural and fresh produce 
(Dolan and Humphrey, 2001, 2004; Humphrey, 2005). The increasing “buyer-
drivenness” of value chains allows leaders to transfer the so-called low-profit 
functions to firms in other functional positions along the chain in order to obtain 
enhanced organizational flexibility (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). In fact, today the 
overall process of driving appears to be related to the relations between lead 
firms and first-tier suppliers, and between first- and second-tier suppliers, and to 
the allocation of control over the definition of the functions that first-tier suppliers 
should play. The rise of buyer-driven chains has been facilitated by developments 
in the national and international regulatory frameworks, trade liberalization, 
increasingly stringent food (and sanitary) safety regulation, increased currency 
convertibility, transport market liberalization and improvements, and reduced 
costs of international communications and transport.
Those changes open up opportunities for firms in developing country firms 
(Humphrey, 2005), such as the following:
• Increased processing, much of it close to growing sites.15 Retailers are 
often willing to outsource value chain functions to suppliers, providing new 
opportunities along the chain;
• Increasing product differentiation and investment in innovation;
• Improved systems within supplying countries to respond to the demand for 
greater emphasis on freshness and agility within the logistics system;
• Emphasis on parts of the supply relationships such as reliable delivery, trust, 
flexibility in supply and ability to innovate that increase the switching costs 
for buyers, and may increase the length of contractual relationships for 
sellers.
For small firms in less developed countries, participation in value chains is 
moreover a means of obtaining information about the needs of global markets 
and gaining access to those markets. Although this information has high value 
for local small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), it is less clear what role the 
leaders of the GVCs play in fostering and supporting SMEs’ upgrading process. 
Although the lead firm may be the driver for change, it is not necessarily the agent 
that implements change or provides support to deal with change. It may set the 
target and the rules to win an order (e.g. by setting a standard or a performance 
that needs to be achieved) and, insofar as the cost of switching to source from 
another supplier is not excessive, it may well source elsewhere. Evidence suggests 
that insertion in a quasi-hierarchical chain may offer favourable conditions for 
process and product upgrading but hinder functional upgrading (Humphrey 
and Schmitz, 2000; Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2006a; Giuliani, Pietrobelli and 
Rabellotti, 2005); networks offer ideal conditions for all forms of upgrading, but 
they are the least likely to occur among producers in developing countries. 
As innovation studies have shown, in some sectors vertical relations with 
suppliers of inputs may be particularly important sources of product and 
process upgrading, as in the case of textiles and most traditional manufacturing. 
However, in other sectors the major stimuli for technical change may be provided 
by technology users, organizations such as universities or the firms themselves, 
as, for example, with software or agro-industrial products (Pavitt, 1984). Table 
7 provides relevant information for two types of sectors prevalent in LDCs: 
resource-based activities and low-tech manufacturing.
The rise of buyer-driven 
chains has been facilitated 
by trade liberalization, 
increasingly stringent 
food (and sanitary) safety 
regulation, increased currency 
convertibility and reduced 
costs of international 
communications and 
transport.
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and process upgrading, as in 
the case of textiles and most 
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2. PARTICIPATION OF LDCS IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS
Access to the fastest-growing market segments depends upon satisfying the 
demands of retailers and competing with other suppliers. Large retailers become 
gatekeepers to markets, hindering and/or fostering access. These difficult changes 
represent opportunities but may also threaten exclusion for those suppliers that 
are unable to respond to the challenge.
Since the mid-1980s lead firms have required more functional capacities (i.e. 
the range of activities, and the related conditions and skills, that suppliers are 
required to carry out) from first-tier suppliers in all cases, and sometimes also 
from second- and third-tier suppliers. At the same time, lead firms require higher 
performance levels from second-tier suppliers (i.e. compliance with standards for 
carrying out those activities). These increasing demands by buyers differ by sector 
and by specific value chain.
Buyers and chain leaders are becoming more and more demanding, but they 
do not necessarily provide support or transfer knowledge and capabilities. The 
key agents for knowledge transfer and organization vary from chain to chain. 
The “lead” firm may not be responsible for ensuring technical competence 
along the supply chain. In fact, much of the work of value chain organization 
and management is being outsourced by lead firms, which establish a first tier of 
suppliers and push responsibility towards them to an increasing extent. First-tier 
suppliers in turn increasingly rely on a series of second- and third-tier suppliers. 
Firms from LDCs rarely qualify — that is, they do not have the capacity, skills 
and volumes — to become first-tier suppliers, and in the best case may become 
second- or third- tier suppliers.
According to most recent empirical evidence, by far the most demanding entry 
barrier increases have been for first-tier suppliers (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). This 
is perhaps less worrying for LDCs, as no firms from those countries play the role 
of leader, and very few that of first-tier (or often even second-tier) supplier.  
What are the consequences of those increasing demands by buyers for 
second-tier suppliers in LDCs? The risks involved have been described as the risks 
of marginalization and exclusion (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). The former refers to 
the possibility of downgrading within the same GVC and being relegated to less 
remunerative and more vulnerable segments of activity, while the latter refers to 
the eventual inability to enter, and being utterly excluded from global chains. 
The processes of exclusion and marginalization differ in different value 
chains and countries, but the risks have become a standard typical characteristic. 
However, those risks do not necessarily imply marginalization and exclusion: 
Table 7. Patterns of learning and innovation in selected sectoral groups
Groups Industries Learning patterns Description
Traditional 
manufacturing
Textiles and 
apparel,
footwear, 
furniture,
tiles
Mainly supplier- 
driven
Most new techniques originate from machinery and chemical industries
Opportunities for technological accumulation are focused on improvements and
modifications in production methods and associated inputs, and on product design
Most technology is transferred internationally, embodied in capital goods
Low appropriability, low entry barriers 
•
•
•
•
Resource-
based activities
Sugar, 
tobacco,
wine, fruit, 
milk, mining 
industry
Supplier-driven, 
science-based
Importance of basic and applied research led by public research institutes due to low 
appropriability of knowledge
Innovation is also spurred by suppliers (machinery, seeds, chemicals etc.)
Increasing importance of international sanitary and quality standards, and of patents
Low appropriability of knowledge, but high for input suppliers
•
•
•
•
Source: Giuliani, Pietrobelli and Robellotti (2005); Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2006a).
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the evidence reveals that it is not easy to escape from marginalization, but it is 
indeed possible, and domestic firms’ efforts to build technological capabilities are 
essential. In some cases, clever strategic alliances with the lead firms may help, 
as there are specific circumstances where the private sector has direct business 
motives for investing resources in transferring knowledge and upgrading suppliers. 
These tend to be time-limited, and are usually directed towards strengthening the 
ability of suppliers to meet buyers’ requirements. However, in some instances 
public policies explicitly directed to favouring SME inclusion may help (Gomes, 
2006).
Analyses on a chain-by-chain basis are necessary in order to identify the 
consequences for LDC enterprises of the increasing demands made by buyers. To 
that end, it may be useful to examine the specific opportunities to get a “reward” 
(i.e. an advantage or a return) and the concrete roles that suppliers may play in 
getting those rewards (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). That also helps explore the 
extent to which LDC producers have attempted to perform those roles, and the 
opportunities they may have had in that respect. Table 8 presents the structures of 
rewards in selected GVCs in sub-Saharan Africa, and the roles that local suppliers 
may play in capturing them.
One of the few cases of detailed studies of specific GVCs in sub-Saharan 
Africa analyses cotton, clothing, citrus, coffee, cocoa, and fresh vegetables 
GVCs, concluding that there have been relatively few examples of clearly 
successful upgrading (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). Acquiring larger volumes — and 
economies of scale — appears central in most cases, and this sometimes suggests 
an interesting scope for regionalization (large regionally integrated markets) and 
for SMEs growing to medium-sized status.
Several Kenyan exporters consolidated their supply of fresh vegetables 
to United Kingdom supermarkets in the late 1990s by expanding their scale 
Table 8.  Structures of rewards in selected global value chains in sub-Saharan Africa
Sector Reward Means of obtaining these rewards
Clothing Security of contracts, ability to compensate for secularly 
falling prices through larger volumes
Sales ordered in advance by trading houses and direct sales 
to retailers
Become a recognized producer of a product type
Meet special delivery conditions (delivery on call-off)
•
•
•
Coffee Achieve reference prices
Medium- and long-term purchasing commitments
Considerable premia (direct sales, long-term purchase 
commitments, multi-season prices)
Become a non-anonymous seller (typically from large 
exporter — in Latin America)
Specialize in specialty coffees within the Arabica market 
In general, limited opportunities to upgrade in tropical 
countries (it depends on coffee’s physical properties, and 
most coffee roasters use blends of various origins)
•
•
•
Fresh 
vegetable
citrus
No premium for quality but for producing specific varieties 
(changing over time)
Security of contracts, stability of prices (3–9 months). This 
in turn allows longer-term planning, planning of larger 
volumes, economies of scale and cross-subsidization of new 
product development
Essentially available to suppliers serving large supermarket 
chains (mostly in the United Kingdom)
•
Cocoa Traditional reward structures for primary producers have 
disappeared
Second-tier suppliers (smallholders and cooperatives) 
can upgrade only by taking on first-tier supplier roles, i.e. 
engaging in international trading and/or grinding, but this is 
difficult
•
Cotton GVC is less buyer-driven, and rewards reflect global supply/
demand balance, including subsidies
Premia attached to form of sale (forward, tender) and timing 
of sale (early market window)
International cotton trade as a single non-anonymous market 
bifurcated between coarser and finer cottons — defined in 
terms of quality and national origins. 
Reputational dimensions of national origins matter (difficult to 
measure and prove quality otherwise)
Upgrading requires improvements in reputation
•
•
•
Source: Gibbon and Ponte (2005), and the cases therein.
It is not easy to escape from 
marginalization, but it is 
possible, and domestic firms’ 
efforts to build technological 
capabilities are essential.
In sub-Saharan Africa, there 
have been relatively few 
examples of clearly
successful upgrading.
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(including through investments in the United Republic of Tanzania), improving 
quality assurance, and diversifying into snow/snap peas and cut flowers. 
Regarding cotton, the experiences from the United Republic of Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe are the opposite. While the former experienced downgrading in the 
1990s, the Zimbabwean company Cottco consolidated its minor first-tier supplier 
status by vertically integrating into spinning of cotton knitting yarn, acquired a 
cotton concession in Mozambique and gained economies of scale in the regional 
market.
In the coffee value chains the general trend has been one of downgrading of 
local export companies, now working for foreign-owned exporters (Ponte, 2002a, 
2002b). Nevertheless, the few examples of upgrading among second- and third-
tier suppliers relate to the following specific instances:
• Participation by mainly private and foreign-owned estates in specialty coffee 
sales;
• Smallholder cooperatives selling new quality content through fair trade and 
organic channels;
• In the United Republic of Tanzania, smallholder farm groups selling directly 
at auction;
• Few local traders establishing wet processing plants, and improving the 
quality profile of their coffee.
In the clothing sector in Mauritius, many producers upgraded in processes 
and products (diversification) by increasing their operational scale through 
investments in Madagascar.16
The examples above show how some LDCs have integrated into selected 
GVCs through FDI from other developing countries, by occupying an upstream 
position in the chain. In those cases LDCs produce low-value-added goods and 
occupy the position of third-tier suppliers or further away from final markets.
In some instances, however, foreign buyers have offered interesting potential 
for upgrading through product differentiation (Lewin, Giovannucci and Varangis, 
2004; Linton, 2005), and some lessons may be drawn:
• Finding the right buyer can be an important part of promoting agricultural 
exports, because of the marketing outlet and support for farmers that buyers 
may provide.
• Value can be added to products in a variety of ways (e.g. for coffee through 
organic production, environmental sustainability, origin and characteristics 
of the produce).
• The buyer may in some cases provide technical assistance (directly or through 
third parties) to ensure that the quality and consistency of the coffee meet 
the premium market targeted.
• The link to a specific buyer remained important for achieving certification 
(e.g. organic and bird-friendly) and identifying the product as a premium 
product.
The benefits to the producers of a relationship with the buyer are, however, 
not to be taken for granted, and depend on a host of conditions. Clearly, one 
of the major risks is suppliers’ dependence on a single buyer, which often ends 
increasing the fragility and vulnerability of suppliers to buyer decisions (IFAD, 
2003).
Some LDCs have integrated 
into selected GVCs through 
FDI from other developing 
countries, by occupying an 
upstream position in the 
chain. In those cases LDCs 
produce low-value-added 
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The uncertain support provided by global buyers and their variable engagement 
with local suppliers lead some authors to argue that LDCs-based firms should 
aim at “trading down” (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). This means consolidating their 
suppliers’ role, focusing on economies of scale, high specialization, and simple 
and labour-intensive technologies, and aiming at mass markets via large-scale 
retailers. However, if trading down implies withdrawing from the attempts to 
develop, strengthen and deepen technological capabilities, it should clearly not 
be the strategy for LDC suppliers. The search for specific market niches to exploit 
advanced capabilities always offers potential benefits. However, if technological 
capability development comes together with “trading down” –– that is, a focus on 
high specialization, economies of scale and firm-size expansion –– this may be an 
option to choose on the basis of a very pragmatic and ongoing assessment. The 
following subsection examines how LDC firms have fared collectively in terms of 
trading up/down in international markets.
3. UPGRADING AND DOWNGRADING IN LDC EXPORTS
Hereafter countries’ changing integration into global value chains has been 
approximated through changes in their world export market shares. An expansion 
of countries’ share in world exports of a product that is associated with the upper 
end of a value chain (e.g. refined petroleum) means that they have upgraded 
their specialization within that value chain. Conversely, an expansion of their 
share in world exports of a product at the lower end of the value chain (e.g. crude 
petroleum) implies that they have downgraded their specialization in GVCs. 
An analysis has been made of LDCs’ participation in 24 value chains that 
cover two thirds of the total merchandise exports of LDCs in 2000–2005. The 
changing integration into those chains thus has substantial implications for those 
countries. The value chains analysed are characterized by a relatively high resource 
intensity, as they refer either to primary products (unprocessed and processed) 
and/or resource-intensive manufactures. Table 9 shows the integration of LDCs 
and ODCs into the value chains that were most important for LDC exports during 
that period.17
A focus on all products regardless of processing stage shows whether country 
groups have increased or decreased their specialization in a particular value 
chain. Between 1995–1999 and 2000–2005 the specialization of LDCs increased 
only in petroleum, sugar and a few tropical primary commodities (tobacco and 
cocoa), given their growing world market shares in those product groups. The 
specialization of other developing countries, by contrast, grew in 19 of the value 
chains analysed. With the exception of petroleum, LDCs tend to have a low level 
of specialization and a relatively small expansion of their specialization in more 
lucrative value chains (e.g. horticultural products and fish), and at the same time 
they continue to have a relatively high level of specialization and a rather small 
expansion in the more traditional value chains (e.g. tobacco, cocoa and sugar). 
But it is not just important in which type of value chains countries specialize; 
it is also important which products within value chains they produce; whether 
they specialize in products at low processing stages, which are associated with 
relatively low value added; or whether they specialize in products at higher 
processing stages, which generally imply higher value added.
LDCs achieved an upgrading of exports between 1995–1999 and 2000–
2005 in only seven out of the 24 value chains analysed. In 12 they experienced 
downgrading, while in three others (plastic, pulp and milk) there was no change. 
Upgrading in different value chains was achieved by different means:
If trading down implies 
withdrawing from the 
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technological capabilities, 
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• Aluminium, iron/iron products, artificial fibres and nickel: increased 
specialization at the upper end of value chain and decreasing specialization 
at the lower end;
• Fruit: increasing specialization at the upper stages of the value chain and 
unchanged specialization at the lower end; 
• Cotton and wheat: relatively large increase in specialization at the upper 
end of the value chain and a relatively weak increase in specialization at 
the lower end.
In the case of two other value chains (livestock/food and cork) the “apparent 
upgrading” was reached as a result of the decreasing specialization in products at 
a lower processing stage.
At the same time LDCs experienced downgrading of their exports in 12 value 
chains:
• Fish, copper and vegetables/fats: increasing specialization at the lower end 
of the value chain and decreasing specialization at the higher stages;
• Petroleum, vegetables/food, sugar, cocoa, rubber and fur skin: increasing 
specialization at the lower stages of the value chain and unchanged 
specialization at the upper end;
• Wood, livestock/leather and tobacco: relatively strong increase in 
specialization at the lower end of the value chain and a relatively weak 
increase in specialization at the upper end.
In sum, LDCs rapidly increased their specialization in only a few value chains 
and they did not manage to significantly upgrade their specialization within value 
chains. Exports of products in which upgrading occurred amounted to 18 per cent 
of the total merchandise exports of LDCs in 2000–2005 (including the two cases 
of “apparent upgrading”). By contrast, the value chains in which downgrading 
took place accounted for a much higher 52 per cent of those countries’ total 
exports. Hence, those countries’ economies have been significantly more 
affected by downgrading than by upgrading. The increasing consolidation at 
the lower end of value chains is also reflected by the fact that many LDCs have 
experienced a collapse of processed primary commodity exports since the 1980s 
(measured as a share of total merchandise exports) (UNCTAD, 2002), and that 
many LDCs have experienced a premature de-industrialization since the early 
1980s (UNCTAD, 2006b). While the increasing specialization of LDC economies 
at the lower end of value chains is in line with theories of comparative advantage, 
it may be considered problematic from the viewpoint of more development-
oriented theories, which stress that technological progress and upgrading are 
preconditions for catching up.
The changing specialization of the group of LDCs sometimes hides considerable 
differences for geographical subgroups. Between 1995–1999 and 2000–2005 
African LDCs upgraded only in cotton, aluminium, wheat and nickel (in the two 
last products they have only a very weak specialization). Over the same period, 
Asian LDCs upgraded in cotton, copper, iron/iron products and artificial fibres (in 
the latter products they have a very limited specialization). 
4. IMPLICATIONS
The changing nature of global value chains has led to higher entry barriers 
for LDC firms that aim at integrating into those chains. The increased power of 
downstream lead firms and buyers allows them to set the standards (technical, 
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Table 9. Integration of LDCs and ODCs into selected global value chains, 1995–2005
(Shares in world exportsa, period averages)
Value chains LDCs ODCs World 
exports
Value  chain/ 
Processing stages
Product SITC code 1995–
1999
2000–
2005
Change 1995–
1999
2000–
2005
Change ($ billion)
2000–2005
(A) (B) (B) – (A) (C) (D) (D) – (C)
Petroleum (40.13)b
All products 2.1 3.0 0.9 62.6 57.2 -5.4 690.6
Stage I Petroleum oils, oils from bitumen. 
materials, crude
333 2.8 4.1 1.3 70.3 62.8 -7.6 478.7
Stage II All 0.4 0.5 0.0 46.2 44.7 -1.5 211.9
Petroleum oils or bituminous minerals 
> 70 % oil
334 0.5 0.5 0.0 47.6 45.6 -2.0 198.1
Residual petroleum products, n.e.s., 
related materials
335 0.1 0.2 0.1 27.2 30.6 3.4 13.8
Cotton (14.06)b
All products 2.6 3.7 1.1 54.8 60.2 5.4 195.8
Stage I Cotton 263 10.8 10.9 0.1 23.9 22.8 -1.1 9.1
Stage II Textile yarn 651 0.5 0.6 0.1 43.3 50.7 7.4 35.5
Stage III Cotton fabrics, woven 652 0.2 0.3 0.1 50.0 51.8 1.9 22.1
Stage IV All 2.8 4.6 1.8 62.6 67.0 4.4 129.1
Men’s clothing of textile fabrics, not 
knitted
841 4.2 6.0 1.8 61.2 64.0 2.8 43.6
Women’s clothing, of textile fabrics 842 2.0 3.7 1.8 61.4 67.1 5.7 54.8
Men’s or boy’s clothing, of textile, 
knitted or crocheted
843 2.9 5.3 2.4 70.7 72.9 2.1 10.9
Women’s clothing, of textile,
knitted or crocheted
844 1.7 3.7 2.0 64.3 70.0 5.7 19.7
Aluminium (2.54)b
All products 0.8 1.4 0.5 17.5 22.0 4.5 94.8
Stage I Aluminium ores and concentrates
(including alumina)
285 8.9 7.5 -1.5 29.5 31.5 2.0 8.3
Stage II Aluminium 684 0.0 1.2 1.2 17.7 21.1 3.4 58.8
Stage III Flat-rolled products of alloy steel 675 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.8 21.1 8.3 27.7
Wood (2.30)b
All products 0.9 0.9 0.0 27.6 35.9 8.3 139.0
Stage I Wood in the rough or roughly squared 247 5.8 7.5 1.7 30.2 23.2 -7.1 10.8
Stage II All 0.6 0.7 0.1 24.1 27.4 3.3 47.8
Wood simply worked, and railway 
sleepers of wood
248 0.8 1.0 0.1 20.3 22.4 2.1 31.4
Wood manufacture, n.e.s. 635 0.1 0.1 0.0 33.3 36.8 3.5 16.5
Stage III Furniture & parts; bedding & similar 
stuffed furniture
821 0.0 0.1 0.0 29.9 42.6 12.7 80.4
Fish (2.19)b
All products 2.5 2.5 0.1 39.7 43.2 3.5 44.5
Stage I Fish, fresh (live or dead), chilled or 
frozen
34 2.9 3.1 0.2 34.6 38.1 3.5 30.0
Stage II All 1.6 1.3 -0.3 49.7 53.9 4.2 14.5
Fish, dried, salted or in brine; smoked 
fish
35 2.3 2.2 -0.2 17.3 22.6 5.3 3.0
Fish, aqua. invertebrates, prepared, 
preserved, n.e.s.
37 1.4 1.1 -0.3 59.3 62.1 2.8 11.5
Vegetables (1.70)b
Vegetables/ food
Base product
Stage I Vegetables; roots & other edible 
vegetable products
54 1.5 1.8 0.3 31.0 32.5 1.5 27.2
Food products
Stage II All 0.5 0.3 -0.1 45.7 47.9 2.3 37.3
Margarine and shortening 91 0.1 0.3 0.3 20.9 27.1 6.1 1.7
Fixed vegetable fats & oils, crude, 
refined or fractionated
421 0.8 0.6 -0.2 34.9 37.1 2.1 12.6
Fixed vegetable fats & oils, crude, 
refined or fractionated
422 0.5 0.3 -0.2 86.1 86.7 0.6 10.7
Vegetables, roots, tubers, prepared, 
preserved, n.e.s.
56 0.1 0.1 0.0 28.0 28.4 0.5 12.3
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quality, environmental) that must be met in order to participate in the chain. 
Chain leaders, however, rarely help producers to upgrade their technological 
capabilities so as to become able to fulfil those requirements. 
Although LDCs have increased their specialization in some value chains since 
the mid-1990s, they did not manage to significantly upgrade their specialization 
within those chains. In quantitative terms, downgrading has been more prevalent 
than upgrading. In almost all cases LDCs have increased their specialization in 
relatively basic products at a low stage of processing. This also reflects processes 
of structural changes and re-specialization that these countries have been 
undergoing since the 1980s. 
These export patterns indicate that little technological upgrading has taken 
place recently among LDC firms, irrespective of their participation in GVCs. 
They seem to have responded to growing worldwide demand for raw materials 
by exporting larger quantities of unprocessed goods whose production entails 
little value added and limited technological learning. Policies to foster further 
processing of raw materials have been mainly absent, with some exceptions, as in 
the case of fisheries exports in Uganda (Kiggundu, 2006). 
Table 9 (contd. )
Value chains LDCs ODCs World 
exports
Value  chain/ 
Processing stages
Product SITC code 1995–
1999
2000–
2005
Change 1995–
1999
2000–
2005
Change ($ billion)
2000–2005
(A) (B) (B) – (A) (C) (D) (D) – (C)
Vegetables/ textile 
fibres
Base product
Stage I Vegetables; roots & other edible 
vegetable products
54 1.5 1.8 0.3 31.0 32.5 1.5 27.2
Textile fibres
Stage II Vegetable textile fibres, not spun; waste 
of them
265 3.1 2.3 -0.8 29.5 22.5 -7.0 0.7
Copper (1.61)b
All products 1.8 1.7 -0.1 40.1 49.1 9.0 48.8
Stage I Copper ores and concentrates; copper 
mattes, cement
283 0.2 1.5 1.2 73.8 78.8 5.1 9.2
Stage II Copper 682 2.1 1.8 -0.4 34.0 42.2 8.3 39.6
Livestock (1.37)b
Livestock/ food
Base products
Stage I Live animals other than animals of 
division 03
1 2.3 2.1 -0.3 16.4 17.6 1.1 10.1
Food products
Stage II All 0.1 0.1 0.0 15.3 16.4 1.1 45.7
Meat of bovine animals, fresh, chilled 
or frozen
11 0.1 0.0 -0.1 12.5 18.3 5.9 16.1
Other meat and edible meat offal 12 0.1 0.1 0.0 17.0 15.4 -1.7 29.7
Stage III All 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.4 26.2 6.8 9.6
Meat, edible meat offal, salted, dried; 
flours, meals
16 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 11.6 7.5 2.3
Meat, edible meat offal, prepared, 
preserved, n.e.s.
17 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.2 30.8 6.6 7.3
Livestock/ leather
Base products
Stage I Live animals other than animals of 
division 03
1 2.3 2.1 -0.3 16.4 17.6 1.1 10.1
Leather products
Stage II Hides and skins (except furskins), raw 211 1.6 1.9 0.3 8.3 8.5 0.3 5.5
Stage III Leather 611 1.8 1.9 0.1 43.7 46.5 2.8 17.6
Stage IV Manufactures of leather, n.e.s.; 
saddlery & harness
612 0.1 0.1 0.0 40.8 41.4 0.6 1.8
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UNCTAD, GlobStat database.
Notes: The value chains have been identified on the basis of SITC 3-digit level data. The identification of value chains and processing stages 
involves some judgement. All calculations are based on trade data in current values.
  a  The numbers in the table have been estimated by calculating the total imports of the world from either LDCs or ODCs as a share of 
total world imports. b  The numbers indicate the value of all products in the value chain as a share of total LDC exports (2000–2005).
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D.  Foreign direct investment
The present section examines the contribution of FDI to technological 
capability-building in the LDCs. It first describes the mechanisms through which 
the former can in principle contribute to the latter. According to the composition 
of FDI, it can have different impacts on technological accumulation in host 
countries. Therefore, the second subsection examines general trends of FDI in 
LDCs alongside its sectoral composition.18 Following the same reasoning, the 
third and fourth subsections analyse the contribution of FDI to LDC knowledge 
accumulation in two major industries of destination: mining of minerals and 
garment manufacturing. The final subsection concludes.
1.  FDI AND TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION
It is generally contended that FDI in developing countries contributes to 
the latter’s capital accumulation19 and to their productivity, as transnational 
corporations (TNCs) have specific advantages (e.g. production methods, 
marketing, management) that are generally superior to those of domestic firms. 
It is moreover argued that the arrival of TNCs leads to technological upgrading 
of domestic firms through technological spillovers20 via imitation, competition, 
labour mobility and exports (which entail exposure to the technology frontier). 
These spillover effects have the potential to increase the productivity of other 
firms.
Kokko (1994) identifies at least four ways in which technology might be diffused 
from TNCs to domestic firms in the host economy: (i) demonstration-imitation; 
(ii) competition; (iii) foreign linkage; and (iv) training. Javorcik (2004) suggests 
that backward linkages are the most likely channel through which spillovers 
are transmitted — through (i) direct knowledge transfer from foreign customers 
to local suppliers; (ii) superior requirements for product quality and on-time 
delivery introduced by TNCs, which provide incentives to domestic suppliers to 
upgrade their production management or technology; and (iii) TNC entry into the 
domestic economy, which increases demand for intermediate inputs, allowing 
local suppliers to reap the benefits of scale economies.21 Damijan et al. (2003) 
argue that the presence of TNCs in the host economy can increase the rate of 
technical change and technological learning in the economy through knowledge 
spillovers, which occur as a consequence of introducing new technologies and 
organizational skills that are typically superior to those in domestic firms. To the 
extent that domestic firms and TNCs operating in the same sector compete with 
one another, the latter have an incentive to prevent technology leakage and 
spillovers from taking place; this can be done using patents, trade secrecy and/or 
paying higher wages. Görg and Greenaway (2003) argue that TNCs usually do 
not hand over the source of their advantages voluntarily. On the other hand, 
they may benefit from improved performance from inputs provided by domestic 
suppliers, and so they can foster the upgrading of the production of local firms.
However, the materialization of the potential positive impacts of FDI on 
knowledge accumulation in host countries hinges on a number of conditions, 
including structural characteristics of host economies, the type of insertion of 
TNCs in those economies and the job-generating impact of TNCs. First, the 
structural characteristics of host countries are associated with their absorptive 
capacity, which in turn depends on the stock of human capital, the dynamism 
of entrepreneurship, the quality of institutions and the desire for progress 
(Abramovitz, 1986), as well as infrastructure development. Second, the more 
TNCs are integrated into host economies, particularly through backward and 
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forward linkages, the more spillover effects are likely to happen. Mutatis mutandis,
TNCs are not expected to impact positively on microeconomic efficiency and 
productivity if they operate in enclaves, having minimal contact with domestic 
firms (Görg and Strobl, 2005; Lall and Narula, 2004; Moss, Ramachandran and 
Shah, 2005).22 Third, circulation of knowledge is more likely if the number of 
jobs generated by TNCs is high, if they are skill-intensive and if there is high 
labour turnover between foreign affiliates and domestic firms. Fourth, if TNCs 
simply displace pre-existing domestic firms, the upgrading through competition 
cannot take place. 
Two opposing arguments on technological distance and spillovers have 
appeared in the literature on FDI and technology transfer. One argument 
contends that the wider the technology gap between foreign and domestic firms, 
the more the scope for spillovers (Findlay, 1978). The other argument states that 
the narrower the technology gap, the easier the technology transfer is (Glass and 
Saggi, 1998). Görg and Greenaway (2003) and Kokko (1994) suggest that the 
latter argument is more plausible than the former. 
2.  TRENDS AND SECTORAL COMPOSITION OF FDI
FDI inflows into LDCs have increased markedly since the early 1990s (chart 
6). Between 2000 and 2005 annual inflows were three times higher than during 
the preceding 10 years (table 10). On average, 39 of the 50 LDCs received higher 
annual inflows during the early years of the new century than in 1990–1999. 
LDCs still account for a marginal part of total FDI flows towards developing 
countries, but their share rose to 3.5 per cent in 2000–2005, as compared with 
2.1 per cent in 1990–1999 and 1.6 per cent in 1980–1989. In the same vein, 
LDCs accounted for 2.7 per cent of the total FDI stock of developing countries 
in 2005, up from 1.7 per cent in 1990. On a global scale, FDI inflows in LDCs 
accounted for 1 per cent of world inflows in 2000–2005 and 0.7 per cent of the 
world stock in 2005.
In order to put value figures in perspective, indicators of FDI flows and stocks 
relative to GDP, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) and population are presented 
in table 10. They invariably show a continuous deepening of FDI in the LDCs 
since the 1980s, a trend that has accelerated sharply since 2000. This was more 
marked than in other developing countries, which also experienced some FDI 
deepening. FDI inflows as a share of both GDP and GFCF in the LDCs doubled 
between the 1990s and 2000–2005. While those indicators had been lower than 
or close to the corresponding ones for other developing countries in the 1980s 
and 1990s, during the early years of the 21st century LDCs largely surpassed 
other developing countries on these accounts. 
Per capita FDI inflows are lower in LDCs than in other developing countries 
(table 10). Moreover, the difference between the former and the latter has 
increased since the 1980s. The reason is that although the rise in FDI flows to 
LDCs was greater than the rise in flows to other developing countries, this was 
partly offset by the former’s more rapid demographic growth. 
The FDI stock as a share of GDP in LDCs rose continuously since 1990 and 
reached 26 per cent in 2005. This level is similar to that of other developing 
countries (table 10). These indicators reveal that the surge in FDI into LDCs is a 
more recent development, as compared with ODCs.
FDI inflows in LDCs are highly concentrated geographically. While African 
LDCs accounted for 66 per cent of total inflows in the 1990s, this share rose to 
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87 per cent in 2000–2005. During this period Asian LDCs received 12 per cent 
and island LDCs just 1 per cent. The increase in the African share in 2000–2005 
was brought about by a small number of recipients of additional FDI flows in that 
period. Just four petroleum-producing countries — Angola, Sudan, Equatorial 
Guinea and Chad — received 56 per cent of all FDI inflows during that period. 
The top 10 FDI recipients accounted for 81 per cent of total inflows, while the 
other 40 LDCs received the remaining 19 per cent. In other words, the surge in 
FDI in LDCs in recent years has been led by foreign investment in oil extraction, 
although most countries have received higher inflows in recent years. 
The values and relative indicators of FDI flows and stocks for individual LDCs 
are presented in table 11. They show that the economies that have attracted FDI 
most intensively are the four petroleum exporters mentioned above, some island 
States (Kiribati, Tuvalu and Vanuatu) and Liberia. At the other extreme, with very 
Table 10. Indicators of the importance of FDI in LDCs and ODCs, 1980–2005
FDI inflows FDI stock
Value ($ millions) FDI / GDP (%) FDI / GFCF (%) FDI per capita ($) Value ($ millions) FDI stock / GDP (%)
1980-
1989
1990-
1999
2000-
2005
1980-
1989
1990-
1999
2000-
2005
1980-
1989
1990-
1999
2000-
2005
1980-
1989
1990-
1999
2000-
2005
1980 1990 2000 2005 1980 1990 2000 2005
LDCs  507 2 517 7 830 0.4 1.6 3.5 2.6 8.8 17.6 1 4 11   4 318 9 426   38 029  76 669 4.1 6.3 21.6 26.4
Africa  468 1 669 6 839 0.6 1.8 5.5 3.9 11.0 28.98 2 4 16   3 692   8 329   27 473   62 739 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Asia  25  780  926 0.1 1.2 1.0 0.3 6.6 4.7 0 3 3    557    861   9 600   12 660 1.6 1.7 12.0 11.1
Islands  13  68  65 1.3 3.5 2.4 4.5 13.0 10.4 8 31 25    69    235    956   1 269 8.5 16.4 41.8 37.4
Other developing 
countries (ODCs) 19 912 111 415 210 022 0.7 2.1 2.8 3.1 8.3 11.6 6 29 49 134 388 377 570 1 684 327 2 632 623 5.4 10.4 26.1 27.3
Africa 1 739 4 915 11 292 0.5 1.1 1.9 2.3 6.2 11.4 6 13 26   43 389   84 151   209 688   373 263 9.7 20.4 41.3 48.0
America 6 401 38 061 62 531 0.8 2.2 3.1 3.6 11.0 16.7 17 79 119   32 986   101 178   420 740   720 652 4.3 9.1 21.1 29.2
Asia 11 772 68 439 136 199 0.8 2.1 2.8 3.1 7.5 10.1 5 23 41   58 014   192 241  1 053 898  1 538 708 4.5 9.1 26.6 24.1
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on data from UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database; and UNDESA Statistics Division.
Note:  Indicators of FDI inflows are period averages. All values are in current dollars. LDCs and Islands exclude Timor-Leste.
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Chart 6. FDI inflows in LDCs, 1980–2005
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Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database.
FDI inflows in LDCs are 
highly concentrated. Just 
four petroleum-producing 
countries received 56 per 
cent of the LDC total in 
2000–2005.
Building Technological Capabilities through International Market Linkages 33
low FDI intensity, are some other island States (Samoa and Solomon Islands) and 
some Asian LDCs (Afghanistan, Bhutan and Nepal). 
Data on the sectoral destination of FDI in LDCs are fragmentary. Table 12 
presents the sectors targeted by foreign investors in selected countries in given 
years for which data are available. They give the impression that the tertiary 
sector is the major recipient of FDI inflows in LDCs, as is the case worldwide. 
Nevertheless, fragmentary evidence indicates that over many years services 
dominate FDI inflows mainly in island LDCs. In other LDCs FDI is relatively more 
directed towards the primary sector in the African LDCs and towards industry in 
the Asian LDCs. 
The motivation for FDI in LDCs differs therefore among different regional 
groupings. The bulk of foreign investment in African LDCs is of the resource-
seeking type, while FDI directed towards Asian LDCs is mostly efficiency-seeking 
and quota-seeking. Market-seeking FDI in LDCs is marginal (given the small size 
of those countries’ markets) as compared with total FDI inflows. It drives mainly 
FDI in the tertiary sector (e.g. telecom).
Given that mineral extractive industries and garments have accounted for 
most of FDI inflows into LDCs over the last 15 years, the following subsections 
analyse the contribution of FDI to domestic technological capability accumulation 
through TNC activities in those two industries. 
3. FDI IN MINERAL EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES
The strong increase in FDI in mineral extraction in LDCs (as well as in other 
developing countries) since the turn of the century was spurred by the sustained 
and strong rise in the prices of commodities, particularly mineral ones. The 
upward phase of the price cycle in turn was caused by the imbalance in the 
commodities market. Starting in the late 1990s, world demand for raw materials 
rose at a significantly greater pace than previously (mainly owing to the steep 
rise in consumption in some Asian developing countries, including China), but 
the supply response was slow. In order to react to the higher pace of demand 
expansion and take advantage of strong prices, international mining companies 
actively sought new locations for mineral exploration and extraction. Africa was a 
major destination for those investments.23
Most foreign companies investing in mining in LDCs have traditionally 
originated in developed countries (mainly Europe, North America and Australia) 
and they remain the main host countries of mining TNCs operating in LDCs. Since 
the late 1990s, however, a few developing countries have emerged as a significant 
source of outward investment in the mineral industry of LDCs, particularly South 
Africa and China. 
Apart from petroleum extraction, since 2000 international companies have 
also targeted African LDCs for natural resource exploration and extraction in hard 
rock mining (mainly metals). They have established operations in many countries, 
including Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Sierra Leone, the United Republic of 
Tanzania and Zambia. 
On the recipient side mineral-rich countries, particularly in Africa, have striven 
to attract higher FDI inflows by radically changing their policies and regulations for 
the mineral sector since the 1980s. Frequently adopted in the context of structural 
adjustment programmes, most of those reforms have resulted in privatizing State-
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Table 11. Indicators of the importance of FDI in LDCs, by country, 2000–2005
Country FDI inflows, 2000–2005 (period averages) Country FDI stock, 2005
Value
($ millions)
FDI/
GDP (%)
FDI/
GFCF (%)
FDI per 
capita ($)
Value
($ millions)
FDI stock/
GDP (%)
Angola 1 604 13.6 106.2 109.0 Angola 13 413 46.5
Sudan 1 141 6.4 33.6 32.5 Sudan 7 850 31.8
Equatorial Guinea 1 055 32.4 73.4 2172.2 Equatorial Guinea 7 351 130.1
Chad 566 22.2 52.3 62.3 United Rep. of Tanzania 6 029 46.6
Bangladesh 461 0.8 3.5 3.4 Myanmar 4 862 44.5
United Rep. of Tanzania 442 4.1 21.9 12.0 Liberia 4 031 719.0
Ethiopia 326 4.6 22.6 4.4 Chad 3 857 78.0
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 290 4.3 39.1 5.1 Bangladesh 3 508 5.5
Myanmar 239 2.6 22.9 4.8 Zambia 3 183 43.5
Mozambique 239 5.3 23.3 12.7 Ethiopia 2 752 29.6
Uganda 200 2.9 14.2 7.5 Cambodia 2 471 45.8
Cambodia 173 3.9 19.1 12.8 Mozambique 2 386 35.7
Zambia 158 3.3 15.2 13.9 Dem. Rep. of the Congo 2 333 32.4
Mali 140 3.8 19.0 11.1 Uganda 1 830 20.1
Liberia 134 28.0 295.6 40.2 Senegal 1 126 13.6
Mauritania 97 8.5 64.7 34.0 Yemen 983 6.3
Madagascar 63 1.4 7.9 3.7 Mali 915 17.7
Senegal 59 1.0 4.8 5.4 Togo 686 31.4
Guinea 54 1.6 11.4 5.9 Mauritania 684 40.9
Togo 50 3.1 15.5 8.7 Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 669 23.3
Benin 41 1.3 7.2 5.3 Madagascar 651 13.2
Lesotho 38 3.8 8.9 19.6 Guinea 578 18.9
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 24 1.2 7.7 4.4 Lesotho 527 39.5
Gambia 24 5.9 30.7 17.7 Malawi 503 23.5
Yemen 21 0.3 1.4 1.3 Vanuatu 430 130.6
Burkina Faso 18 0.5 2.1 1.5 Eritrea 395 36.7
Cape Verde 18 2.6 9.1 37.5 Benin 290 6.6
Sierra Leone 18 2.1 23.0 3.6 Gambia 289 60.2
Kiribati 17 29.9 69.3 175.4 Rwanda 279 13.2
Timor-Leste 16 4.3 10.9 18.4 Cape Verde 247 23.8
Djibouti 14 2.2 14.0 18.4 Maldives 184 24.0
Eritrea 14 2.1 7.6 3.7 Timor-Leste 167 42.4
Vanuatu 14 4.9 23.8 67.1 Kiribati 151 210.6
Niger 13 0.6 3.9 1.0 Solomon Islands 135 45.3
Maldives 13 1.9 6.9 42.5 Nepal 129 1.7
Malawi 12 0.7 5.7 1.0 Haiti 128 3.3
Haiti 9 0.3 2.0 1.1 Niger 127 3.9
Somalia 7 0.3 1.7 0.9 Central African Republic 112 8.4
Rwanda 6 0.3 1.7 0.7 Djibouti 108 15.3
Nepal 6 0.1 0.5 0.2 Sierra Leone 108 9.3
Tuvalu 6 33.3 59.3 533.0 Burkina Faso 68 1.3
Guinea-Bissau 3 1.3 6.6 2.2 Guinea-Bissau 58 19.4
Sao Tome and Principe 3 5.0 14.4 18.8 Somalia 48 2.2
Burundi 2 0.2 2.3 0.2 Burundi 45 5.3
Central African Republic 1 0.2 0.9 0.4 Samoa 40 9.8
Afghanistan 1 0.0 0.1 0.0 Tuvalu 33 127.2
Comoros 1 0.2 2.2 0.8 Sao Tome and Principe 24 33.4
Bhutan 1 0.1 0.1 0.3 Comoros 24 6.3
Solomon Islands -2 -0.7 -3.9 -5.2 Afghanistan 22 0.3
Samoa -3 -0.7 -6.0 -13.7 Bhutan 16 1.7
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on data from UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database; and UNDESA Statistics Division.
Note:  All values in current dollars. Countries are ranked according to FDI inflows and FDI stock values.
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owned companies, enhancing geological data, lowering taxes and royalties, 
granting temporary tax exemptions, eliminating restrictions on the entry of TNCs, 
introducing import-tax exemptions for equipment, eliminating national content 
and employment provisions, establishing liberal immigration laws for expatriates, 
scrapping restrictions on profit and dividend remittances, granting other incentives 
(e.g. land allocation) and so forth. Examples of this type of policy reform among 
the LDCs are the mining codes adopted by Guinea (1995), the United Republic 
of Tanzania (1998), and Mali and Madagascar (1999) (Campbell, 2005). 
The sweeping changes in African LDCs’ mining policy in the 1980s and 1990s 
were aimed at attracting FDI and increasing exports, in which they have been 
successful. Total FDI inflows into African LDCs rose fourfold from an annual 
average of $1.7 billion in the 1990s to $6.8 billion in 2000–2005 (table 10), the 
bulk of which was directed to mineral extractive industries (including petroleum). 
Those countries’ mineral exports (including ores, metals, petroleum and related 
products) increased almost fivefold from $8 billion in 1995 to $38 billion in 
2005. The share of those exports in total merchandise exports of African LDCs 
rose from one quarter in 1995 to almost half 10 years later.24 This accentuated 
the re-specialization of those countries in primary extraction. 
The dominance of the mineral industry’s FDI inflows into LDCs since the 1990s 
has consequences for the impacts that they can have on domestic technological 
capability accumulation. Typically, TNCs’ mineral extraction activities in those 
countries are capital-intensive, have little impact on employment, are highly 
concentrated geographically, have high import content and result in exports of 
their output as unprocessed raw materials.25 Most of those operations are totally 
owned by foreign investors (rather than joint ventures) and a large share of their 
foreign exchange earnings is retained abroad. Those operations are strongly 
integrated internationally, but weakly embedded into domestic economies, as 
they have few forward and backward linkages in host economies (UNCTAD, 
2005). In other words, they tend to operate as enclaves. 
This type of insertion of FDI projects in domestic economies means that some 
of the main channels of potential knowledge circulation between TNCs and 
domestic firms are largely absent: linkages, joint ventures and labour turnover.26
The arrival of foreign companies tends to displace small- and medium-scale 
local miners to marginal areas, rather than establish links with them. This is 
especially the effect of the entry of medium-sized TNCs, which tend to target 
older abandoned properties, waste dumps or already known deposits, which are 
Table 12. Inward FDI inflows in selected LDCs, by sector, 1995–2005
Country Year   $ millions Percentage
Primary Secondary Tertiary Total Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Bangladesh 2002 17.1 69.5 188.5 275.1 6.2 25.3 68.5
Cape Verde 1995 .. 4.6 23.3 27.9 .. 16.5 83.5
Cambodia 2002 .. 68.9 86.2 155.1 .. 44.4 55.6
Ethiopia 2000 40.5 83.7 10.4 134.6 30.1 62.2 7.7
Lao PDR 2001 3.0 13.9 7.0 23.9 12.6 58.2 29.3
Mozambique 2005 45.8 16.5 94.9 157.2 29.1 10.5 60.4
Myanmar 2004 127.9 13.1 4.2 145.2 88.1 9.0 2.9
Nepal 1997/98 5.4 1.7 20.5 27.6 19.6 6.2 74.3
Solomon Islands 1996 130.3 0.6 75.9 206.8 63.0 0.3 36.7
Vanuatu 2002 .. .. 6.3 6.3 .. .. 100.0
Source:  UNCTAD (2006a).
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frequently being worked by artisanal miners or by local companies using semi-
mechanized methods.
The potential of those FDI inflows to contribute to domestic technological 
capability-building in host countries is, therefore, very limited. In fact, there is 
little evidence that the entry of TNCs into mining in those countries is leading 
to the technological upgrading of domestic firms in the same industry. Where 
some intermediate technology potentially useful for small- and medium-scale 
miners has been developed for secondary processing purposes, its distribution 
and assimilation within the mining community have been limited (Abugre and 
Akabzaa, 1998).
The changes in mining policy adopted by African LDCs have neglected wider 
objectives such as articulating the mining sector into broader developmental 
objectives, for example through backward and forward linkages or domestic value-
added processing of minerals. Additionally, they have resulted in weakening State 
capacity to influence the development process and the developmental impact of 
mining (Campbell, 2005). 
Enhancing the contribution of the mining industry and its TNCs to knowledge 
accumulation in host countries has not been among the objectives of host 
countries, owing to the narrow sectoral focus adopted (as opposed to a broader 
developmental perspective). The goal of generating technology spillovers has 
generally not been actively pursued, nor has it been an unintended consequence 
of increased TNC activity. There are few indications that increasing FDI inflows 
into the oil and hard rock mining industry of African LDCs have been accompanied 
by greater knowledge flows to those countries beyond the activities of the TNCs 
themselves.
4. FDI IN GARMENT MANUFACTURING
Foreign direct investment has played an important role in several Asian LDCs 
in recent years. Bangladesh has since the mid-1990s been the main destination of 
FDI among those countries. Cambodia and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
have been very successful since the 1990s in attracting larger foreign investment 
inflows. Myanmar received relatively high levels of FDI inflows in 1996–1998, 
but they fell thereafter, because of political uncertainty and foreign economic 
sanctions.27 Poor infrastructure, political instability, being landlocked and/or lack 
of cross-border synergies have restricted FDI inflows into Afghanistan, Nepal and 
Bhutan (Rasiah, 2007a).
Garment manufacturing remains the most promising sector for attracting FDI 
in a wider range of economies — a consequence of both the industry’s flexibility 
in adjusting to unskilled labour,28 low precision standards and long delivery times, 
and the preferential access that has emerged from post-MFA developments.29
The Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) was phased out from 1995 to 2004, but this 
coincided with the granting of preferential access agreements to LDCs: bilateral 
trading arrangements between the United States and some Asian LDCs were 
introduced in 1999 and the Everything But Arms initiative was adopted by the 
European Union in 2001.30 This attracted foreign investors seeking export quotas 
and stimulated local subcontractors to enter garment manufacturing.  
FDI has brought scarce capital with superior access to export markets and 
links with buyers driving value chains. Most Asian LDCs have relied extensively 
on FDI to drive investment, employment and exports in the garment industry, 
particularly through foreign firms located in export processing zones (EPZs). 
There is little evidence that 
the entry of TNCs into mining 
in LDCs is leading to the 
technological upgrading of 
domestic firms.
Enhancing the contribution 
of the mining industry and 
its TNCs to knowledge 
accumulation in host 
countries has not been
among the objectives of
host countries. 
Most Asian LDCs have relied 
extensively on FDI to drive 
investment, employment 
and exports in the garment 
industry. 
Building Technological Capabilities through International Market Linkages 37
Where local firms are important, as in Bangladesh, they participate only in low-
value-added subcontracted activities.31
The introduction of preferential access to LDCs has influenced FDI inflows of 
Chinese capital to those countries, as happened in Cambodia. Chinese investment 
in garment manufacturing in Cambodia amounted to 40 per cent of total FDI 
in that industry in 2000–2005, with Taiwan Province of China and Hong Kong 
(China) accounting for 21 per cent. Exports of garments under the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP) accounted for 64 per cent of GSP-related exports 
from Cambodia in 2004, a sharp rise from 3 per cent in 1995. The impact of 
garment FDI and exports on Cambodia has been dramatic, with the industry 
accounting for 72 per cent of manufacturing value added and 15 per cent of 
GDP in 2004 (Rasiah, 2006b).
As the MFA was phased out, China’s exports grew by an average annual rate 
of 15.5 per cent in 2000–2005, which led to its attaining a world market share of 
27 per cent in 2005 (table 13). China’s penetration into global garment markets 
seems to have accounted for a contraction in production in several economies, 
with export growth slowing down or exports falling in several Asian economies. 
Preferential market access conditions offered to LDCs have, however, ensured 
that their garment exports grew after 2000. Those of Cambodia expanded by 
17.8 per cent annually and those of Bangladesh by 10.4 per cent. Exports from 
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic only grew by only 1.8 per cent per annum, 
while those of Myanmar contracted by 16.2 per cent over the same period (table 
13).
The rapid expansion of garment exports from Bangladesh and Cambodia augurs 
well, suggesting that the industry could act as a good platform to generate jobs, 
foreign exchange and technological learning to support development. Garments 
accounted for over 70 per cent of those countries’ total exports in 2005. The 
slow growth in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic reflects additional costs 
involved in carrying out operations in a landlocked country as well as its small 
labour force. The severe contraction in Myanmar following foreign sanctions is 
likely to continue unless political circumstances change significantly. 
However, unless the embedding environment for higher technology activities 
is strong, firms will participate little in learning and innovation activities, which 
are pivotal for upgrading and long-term sustainability of garment operations in 
the LDCs. The analysis below focuses mainly on the impact of FDI inflows on 
technological learning in garments in Bangladesh, Cambodia, the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic and Myanmar. A comparison is drawn with other Asian 
developing economies.32 The analysis reviews the insertion of those countries’ 
firms in international value chains, upgrading and their technological effort and 
achievements.
Global value chains and upgrading. When the textile and garment industry 
in Asian LDCs is analysed from the point of view of global value chains and 
upgrading, it is seen that none of their firms can be expected to have integrated 
activities in all processing stages shown in chart 5. In the upstream stages of 
processing among the Asian LDCs examined only Bangladesh has textile firms, 
including spinning, weaving, dying, printing and finishing firms. By contrast, 
firms in Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar are 
engaged only in garment manufacturing (Rasiah, 2007b forthcoming; Myint, 
2007; Yviengsay and Rasiah, 2007, forthcoming). Their fabric inputs are mainly 
imported and constitute between 60 and 70 per cent of their production costs. 
These four economies are net importers of textiles and net exporters of garments, 
and they reap a trade surplus from the combined textile and garment trade.
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Nazneen (2007, forthcoming) and Myint (2007), suggest that even Bangladesh 
and Myanmar are not ready to participate in higher-value-added activities. Foreign 
firms in Myanmar showed positive signs of upgrading, but this was interrupted by 
the imposition of sanctions in 2001 (Myint, 2007).
In the downstream stages, Bangladesh, Cambodia, the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic and Myanmar have no domestic brand names sold in major 
markets. Local brands are sold in Bangladesh, but the huge barriers to entry into 
world garment markets obviously discourage the extension of those brands into 
larger markets. The country’s garment firms could sell own brands in developing 
economies, but those from Cambodia and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
are certainly not ready to invest in building brand recognition.
Lead times — the time taken between the placement of orders by essentially 
brand-holding buyers and the delivery of orders by contract producers — provide 
an indicator of competitiveness. It is a combination of throughput time and 
logistics coordination time, which depends on both the technological capabilities 
Table 13. Garment exports of selected LDCs and other countries, 1990–2005
Value
($ millions)
Share in domestic exports
(%)
Average annual 
growth (%)
1990 2000 2003 2004 2005 2000  2005a 2000–2005
LDCs:
Bangladesh 643 3 907 4 912 5 686 6 418 77.6 74.2 10.4
Cambodiab 0 970 1 600 1 981 2 199 69.8 70.9 17.8
Haiti 63 245 275 303 335 76.9 71.2 6.5
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 0 98 87 99 108 1.8
Lesothob .. 261 290 235 .. 77.7 32.4 ..
Madagascarb 7 309 360 552 530 37.4 69.7 11.4
Myanmar                                 12 800 692 568 331 48.6 11.3 -16.2
Nepal 50 209 226 .. .. 26 34.1 ..
Other countries:
China c 9 669 36 071 52 061 61 856 74 163 14.5 9.7 15.5
European Union (25)              - 53 273 68 447 76 887 80 354 2.2 2 8.6
Hong Kong        15 406 24 214 23 158 25 097 27 292 11.9 9.3 2.4
Indiab 2 530 6 178 6 625 6 632 8 290 13.7 8.2 6.1
Indonesia 1 646 4 734 4 105 4 454 5 106 7.6 6 1.5
Mexicoc 587 8 631 7 343 7 490 7 271 5.2 3.4 -3.4
Pakistan    1 014 2 144 2 710 3 026 3 604 23.8 22.6 10.9
Philippinesc 1 733 2 536 2 250 2 157 2 276 6.4 5.5 -2.1
Sri Lankab 638 2 812 2 513 2 776 2 877 51.8 45.3 0.5
Thailand                             2 817 3 757 3 615 3 985 4 085 5.4 3.7 1.7
Tunisiab 1 126 2 227 2 722 3 289 3 332 38.1 31.8 8.4
Turkey    3 331 6 533 9 962 11 193 11 818 23.5 16.1 12.6
United States 2 565 8 629 5 537 5 059 4 998 1.1 0.6 -10.3
Vietnamb .. 1 821 3 467 4 441 4 805 12.6 15.2 21.4
World      108 129 197 782 232 557 259 147 275 639 3.2 2.7 6.9
Memo item: 
Chinese share in world (%) 8.9 18.2 22.4 23.9 26.9
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on WTO (2006: IV. 83).
a  Nearest year; b  Includes WTO secretariat estimates;  c  Includes significant exports from export processing zones.
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of firms and country infrastructure. Long lead times mean that producer–customer 
coordination of demand and supply is underdeveloped. Short lead times give 
producers the flexibility to absorb customization far more than long lead times. 
That is increasingly important in this industry owing to the quickening pace of 
fashion changes. 
Table 14 indicates the lead times for garments in selected Asian LDCs and 
ODCs. The former have the longest lead times among the countries shown. 
Firms from the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar were the most 
disadvantaged, taking 90 to 130 days. Cambodia and especially Bangladesh 
perform better (60–120 days), but lag significantly behind firms from ODCs. 
Poor logistics coordination and heavy dependence on imports are a major 
reason why delivery times are high in the four Asian LDCs. The long lead times 
mean that circular knit garments produced particularly in Cambodia, the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar are confined to very low margins 
where fashion changes are not so critical for driving competitiveness. By contrast, 
firms in China are able to deliver garments faster (40–60 days) than the other 
economies shown in table 14. 
Skills utilization. The skill intensity in Myanmar is the highest among the 
LDCs examined. It exceeds levels in Indonesia and Thailand and is close to 
that of China (table 15). Myanmar has invested substantially in education, but 
now faces demand constraints where labour and human capital supply tends to 
exceed demand. Hence the skilled labour shares are high, but wages have been 
lower than those in Cambodia, Indonesia and China. The skill intensity level in 
Cambodia and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, by contrast, is extremely 
low. Despite their low skill intensities, those countries’ wages are not that much 
lower than those of China. 
Training.  Among the sample of garment firms of the Asian countries surveyed, 
those located in LDCs have the lowest spending on training: around 0.2 per cent 
of their payroll. That level is considerably lower than that of the other developing 
countries mentioned in table 15. Garment firms in the Philippines, Indonesia and 
China reported similar mean training expenditure, amounting to 0.4 per cent of 
the payroll. 
Table 14. Garment lead times in selected Asian LDCs and ODCs, 2004
(Days)
Woven Circular knit
LDCs
Bangladesh 90–120 60–80
Cambodia 90–120 90–120
Lao People’s Dem. Republic 100–130 100–130
Myanmar 90–130 90–130
ODCs
China 40–60 50–60
India 50–70 60–70
Indonesia 60–90 60–70
Malaysia 60–90 50–60
Sri Lanka 60–90 60–70
Thailand 60–90 50–60
Viet Nam 60–90 60–70
Source: Rasiah (2006a, 2007a).
Note:   Lead time is the time taken between the placement of orders (essentially by brand-holding 
buyers) and the delivery of orders by contract producers.
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Chinese firms in Cambodia — which account for the bulk of the garment firms 
in the country — hardly use any of the training institutions in the country to train 
employees. That suggests that the engagement of Chinese firms in the country 
would be seriously affected when the existing preferential access openings in the 
United States and EU were closed. In Myanmar the contraction in garment exports 
has discouraged the opening of training centres (Myint, 2007). In the absence of 
such centres, training in garment firms in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
is carried out only in-house in firms. Training centres exist in Bangladesh, but they 
are focused on reducing injury and downtime rather than on driving upgrading. 
Other countries have successfully adopted policies to induce training in garment 
firms, for example Viet Nam, Malaysia and Singapore. But there have been no 
similar mandatory training policies in Bangladesh, Cambodia, the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic or Myanmar.
Foreign machinery suppliers have also participated in training local firms 
engaged in knitting in Bangladesh and Cambodia. However, the lack of proactive 
promotion of such avenues of learning has restricted technology absorption in 
those countries.
The training evidence suggests none of the LDCs examined seem to be 
equipping themselves effectively to sustain expansion in the garment industry if 
the preferential access instruments are removed. This has been the case in other 
countries. In the Philippines and Thailand dwindling employment and exports 
since the removal of MFA quotas, together with low levels of training expenditure, 
suggest that garment manufacturing is hollowing out in those countries.33
Process technology.  Process technology consists of machinery and equipment, 
layouts, inventory and control techniques, and firm organization, which are 
important indicators of technological intensity in firms. None of the four Asian 
LDCs examined is engaged in the manufacturing of machinery and equipment 
used in the garment industry, hence the role of machinery and equipment imports 
(section B of this chapter).
The evidence from Bangladesh, Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic and Myanmar shows that equipment and machinery used in those 
economies have either been relocated after use in China, Hong Kong (China), 
Taiwan Province of China, Malaysia and Thailand or imported second-hand by 
domestic producers. Only independent knitting machinery and equipment (weft 
Table 15. Comparative technological intensity levels of garment firms
of selected LDCs and ODCs, 2001–2005
(Percentage, unless otherwise indicated)
LDCs ODCs
Lao PDR Cambodia Myanmar China Indonesia Sri Lanka Philippines Thailand
Skill intensity 8.7 12.1 29.7 30.2 25.2 36.3 35.3 29.1
Wage ($) 22.5 21.8 20 25.3 20.2 44.6 41.4 83.3
Training 0.21 0.26 0.2 0.4 0.35 0.29 0.4 0.4
Process technology 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.58 0.32 0.31 0.42 0.48
Adaptive engineering 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.022 0.012 0.017 0.019 0.022
Source: UNCTAD compilation based on UNU-MERIT (2004-2005); NERI (2006); Myint (2007); 
Rasiah (2007a).
Notes: Data for Cambodia, Myanmar and Lao PDR are for 2005, those for Sri Lanka are for 2002 
and those for the other countries are for 2001.
  Skills intensity: share of skilled, technical and professional personnel in total workforce (%); 
wages: mean monthly wage (dollars); training: share of training expenditure in payroll (%); 
process technology: share of expenditure on changes to organization, layout and processes 
in total sales (%); adaptive engineering: share of expenditure on product and equipment 
adaptation in total sales (%).
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and warp knitting) from Germany and Taiwan Province of China were imported 
by some firms in Bangladesh and Cambodia. Importing depreciated machinery 
and equipment was also common earlier in Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines 
and Indonesia. Therefore, the much lower process technology intensity in firms 
from the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Cambodia and Myanmar (table 15 
should not be of concern at the moment. What is crucial is whether learning 
can be driven fast enough for firms in the latter countries to be able to import 
and use precision equipment and machinery to manufacture higher-value-added 
garments, as well as support more reliable and quicker logistics coordination with 
final markets. 
Adaptive engineering. Interviews suggest that in Bangladesh and Cambodia 
firms only invest in automation, machinery and equipment modification and plant 
layouts to reduce defects and increase yield rates. This type of investment in the 
LDC garment firms is invariably lower than in the ODCs (table 15), particularly 
in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar. While foreign sanctions 
have been reported as the prime cause of the decline in investment in upgrading 
in Myanmar, the structural features of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic are 
seen as the prime deterrent to embedding in the domestic economy.
Anchoring. Evidence suggests that the rapid growth in garment-related FDI 
inflows, employment and exports has not been accompanied by a corresponding 
development of the technological capabilities of firms in Bangladesh, Cambodia, 
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar. The Governments of those 
countries have not devised and implemented an effective policy to develop 
garment manufacturing and foster its anchoring in the domestic economy, 
although the industry plays a major role in those economies. Their policy actions 
have been limited to liberalizing foreign investment regulations, promoting 
private enterprise, and coordinating investment approvals, customs and basic 
infrastructure to stimulate the growth of the different segments of activities in the 
value chains. None of those economies has even imposed training levies on firms 
to stimulate upgrading. 
Governments in Asian LDCs must formulate strategies that will lead to the 
proactive embedding and diversification of the textile and garment manufacturing 
activities. Bangladesh has massive labour reserves and hence has the largest 
garment industry among the LDCs, but unless the infrastructure is improved 
the size of the industry is unlikely to expand that much more. The political 
environment in Myanmar has constrained access to the United States market, 
and thus its higher skills intensities have failed to revive a once promising industry. 
Cambodia must strengthen governance mechanisms to stimulate learning, which 
is critical if the garment industry is to follow the direction of Viet Nam. The small 
labour force and being landlocked have imposed limits on further expansion of 
the garment industry in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic.
5. IMPLICATIONS
There is little evidence of a significant contribution by FDI to technological 
capability accumulation in LDCs. This is not due to those countries’ insufficient 
“opening” to foreign investors, given the policy changes that they have made since 
the 1980s and the sharp growth of FDI penetration since the 1990s, which in 
some respects has become greater than in other developing countries. Rather, its 
limited contribution is due to the type of integration of TNCs into host countries’ 
economies, the sectoral composition of FDI, the priorities of policies enacted by 
LDCs and the low absorptive capacity of these countries. 
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LDC Governments have liberalized FDI policy regimes and have thus been 
successful in attracting higher FDI inflows and achieving increases in exports. 
National Governments have not, however, tried to enhance the impact of 
higher FDI inflows on domestic technological capability-building or on domestic 
enterprise development. Consequently, recent inflows into LDCs have led to 
enclave-type development, with few linkages to the domestic economy. This is 
true of both natural resource investment –– predominant in FDI in African LDCs –
– and of light manufacturing, which is more prevalent in Asian LDCs. Although the 
latter has a higher employment impact, it does not entail technological diffusion 
through the training and movement of labour, since the type of manufacturing in 
LDCs is labour-intensive, but involves few skills. Additionally, the establishment 
of foreign subsidiaries is not accompanied by active training measures that could 
create knowledge spillovers. 
For LDCs to reap some of the technological spillovers usually attributed to the 
presence of TNCs in host economies, active policy initiatives to that end must 
be implemented. In addition to attracting FDI, LDCs should introduce policies 
aimed at maximizing the development and technological learning impacts of 
foreign investment (see chapter 2 of this Report). 
E.  Licensing
The use of licensing as a channel for accessing the international knowledge pool 
(through imports of disembodied technology) is usually considered to be directly 
related to the income level and technological sophistication of economies. The 
reason for this is that using this technology diffusion channel effectively requires 
engineering skills and R&D programmes for adaptation and learning, to a much 
higher degree than other channels such as capital goods imports (Hoekman, 
Maskus and Saggi, 2005).
Licensing should therefore be less relevant to LDCs than to other developing 
countries as a channel for foreign technology diffusion. The data on imports 
of disembodied technology in table 16 confirm that expectation. Royalty and 
licence fee payments in these countries are extremely low. Between 2000 and 
2005 foreign disbursements amounted to 0.02 per cent of the GDP of the 24 
LDCs for which data were available, as compared with 0.36 per cent in other 
developing countries. On a per capita basis, spending on imports of disembodied 
technology by LDCs amounted to $0.07 per inhabitant, while in ODCs it was 
90 times higher. Imports of disembodied technology by LDCs have grown only 
moderately since the late 1990s. In 2000–2005 they were on average 14 per cent 
higher than during the period 1996–1999, but the relative indicators remained 
stagnant. In other developing countries, by contrast, licence fee payments almost 
doubled between those two periods, and there was a similar development with 
regard to the relative indicators (table 16).
 Licence fee payments are also associated with TNC presence in the country, 
since most transfer of disembodied technology occurs within multinational 
corporations (Mendi, 2007). However, it is particularly TNCs in knowledge-
intensive sectors that generate that type of intra-firm payments, for example, the 
information technology and pharmaceutical industries. Since that is not the type 
of FDI that arrives in LDCs, the strong presence of foreign investment in LDCs (as 
analysed in section D above) has not entailed a corresponding strengthening of 
licensing activity in those countries.
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F.  Conclusions
The diffusion of foreign technology to LDCs through market mechanisms 
is taking place to a very limited degree, there being very little technological 
development in those countries, despite the high exposure of LDCs to international 
trade and capital flows. The main reasons for this lie in the way in which those 
channels of knowledge diffusion are being accessed by LDCs. The latter are either 
using market channels too little or they are accessing them intensively, but not in 
a way that allows their potential for technological learning to develop. The former 
is true of capital goods imports and licensing, which have virtually stagnated at 
low levels (in relative terms) in LDCs over the last 25 years. The latter is the case 
with foreign direct investment and exports: LDCs are quite open to both, but are 
not capable of using them as effective channels for technology diffusion. 
The only moderate growth of capital goods imports and licensing in LDCs is 
in sharp contrast with other developing countries, which have greatly intensified 
their use of those channels for access to the international knowledge pool. Little 
licensing activity can be expected in the early stage of technological catch-up, with 
this channel typically becoming more relevant only in the later stages. Low capital 
goods imports, by contrast, are a matter of concern, since they are expected to 
play a major role in diffusion of foreign technologies to LDCs. The sluggishness 
of those imports means that domestic firms are upgrading their processes and 
products only marginally. Their technological learning and innovative activity is 
therefore constrained. The main reasons for the low level of capital goods imports 
are the de-industrialization of the LDCs since the 1980s, the only moderate rise 
in the investment rate of those economies and the composition of their fixed 
capital formation (a relatively small share of which is devoted to machinery and 
equipment, including ICTs). Nevertheless, even the intensification of capital 
goods imports and licensing will not on its own guarantee that these international 
market linkages will work effectively as channels of knowledge diffusion. Policy 
action is required to make this happen.
Table 16. Indicators of the importance of licensing in LDCs and ODCs, 
1996–2005
(Royalty and licence payments, period averages)
Value
($ thousands)
Licence payments/
 GDP (%)
Licence payments 
 per capita ($)
1996–1999 2000–2005 1996–
1999
2000–
2005
1996–
1999
2000–
2005
LDCs 29 044   33 250 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.07
Africa   20 231   23 308 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.07
Asia   8 605   9 779 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.07
Islands    207    163 0.03 0.01 0.34 0.24
Other developing 
countries (ODCs)
11 771 543  22 543 234 0.23 0.36 3.55 6.36
Africa  785 767  1 020 422 0.24 0.27 3.72 4.43
America  2 698 636  3 253 528 0.15 0.17 5.82 6.53
Asia  8 287 140  18 269 284 0.28 0.47 3.14 6.49
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on data from World Bank, World Development 
Indicators online and UNDESA, Statistics Division.
Note:   LDCs and regional aggregates are composed of the following countries: Angola, Bangladesh, 
Benin, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Lesotho, Madgascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo, 
Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia.
The diffusion of foreign 
technology to LDCs through 
market mechanisms is taking 
place to a very limited 
degree, there being very little 
technological development 
in those countries, despite 
the high exposure of LDCs to 
international trade and capital 
flows.
LDCs are either using 
market channels too little 
or they are accessing them 
intensively, but not in a way 
that allows their potential 
for technological learning to 
develop.
The intensification of capital 
goods imports and licensing 
will not on its own guarantee 
that these international 
market linkages will work 
effectively as channels of 
knowledge diffusion. Policy 
action is required to make 
this happen.
The Least Developed Countries Report 200744
The levels of FDI inflows and stock of LDCs, as well as their merchandise 
exports, relative to their economies are comparable to those of other developing 
countries. Nevertheless, the positive effects of technology spillovers, upgrading 
or learning-by-exporting that occur in some ODCs (particularly in the late phase 
of technological catch-up) are mostly absent from LDCs. In the case of FDI, the 
reasons for this are: (i) the type of foreign investment that those countries have 
attracted; (ii) the limited linkages of TNCs with domestic economies; and (iii) the 
lack of policy action aimed at anchoring those activities in the domestic economy 
or at enabling their potential as technology diffusion channels to unfold. Difficulties 
in using exports and downstream linkages with international customers as means 
of technological learning are linked to the changing nature of global value chains, 
the growing entry barriers and the scarcity of measures taken by chain leaders 
to help their suppliers to upgrade. Thus, the growing integration of LDCs into 
international trade and investment flows since the 1980s has not prevented their 
marginalization from technology flows, as evidenced by the widening knowledge 
gap and the low-level development of their firms’ technological capabilities. 
LDCs’ limited and ineffective use of international market linkages to build 
domestic technological capabilities is worrying since it is precisely those 
mechanisms ––particularly international trade and FDI –– that are expected to 
play a major role in technology diffusion to LDCs in the early stage of catch-up. 
Despite the enhanced contribution that should be made by knowledge aid (see 
chapter 5 of this Report), market mechanisms will remain the main channels for 
the diffusion of knowledge to LDCs, provided their presence is accompanied by 
adequate policy action. Their technology diffusion effects will not occur merely 
because of the existence of –– or even increase in –– trade and investment 
flows, as shown by the experience of LDCs over the last 25 years. Therefore, the 
recommendations, commonly made, that developing countries (including LDCs) 
increase their opening to foreign trade and FDI are not pertinent or are at least 
insufficient. Apart from the questionable effectiveness of such policy lines for 
technology diffusion, they generally do not apply to most LDCs, since they have 
already opened up strongly to foreign trade and investment.
For policy-makers in all developing countries, including in LDCs, it is important 
to realize that the learning associated with these international transactions does 
not occur automatically. There is, for example, no “fixed quotient” of learning 
that arrives in developing countries with every “unit” of, say, exports or FDI. 
Consequently, measures to increase the volume of exports or FDI inflows do 
not guarantee any increase in learning. Instead, the learning-intensity of such 
transactions is variable, and the key issue is to raise that learning intensity – to 
increase the magnitude of knowledge and skill that is acquired “per unit” of 
exports, imports or inward FDI.34 In other words, the learning potential of these 
international transactions is something that can be exploited more or less fully. 
It is on that variability that policy should focus, and not just on the scale of the 
transactions (Bell, 2007).
Leveraging international market mechanisms to strengthen their role as 
channels for the diffusion of technology to LDCs requires active policy at 
the national level, as well as at the regional and international levels. This is 
particularly required in the early stage of technological catch-up, when policy 
action must actively pursue the goal of fostering technological capability-building. 
Although those interventions comprise S&T policy, they must be part of broader 
development strategies geared towards the development of productive capacities 
in all its dimensions, including strengthening domestic absorptive capacity. This 
issue will be discussed in chapter 2 of this Report.
The positive effects of 
technology spillovers, 
upgrading or learning-by-
exporting that occur in some 
ODCs are mostly absent from 
LDCs.
LDCs’ limited and ineffective 
use of international market 
linkages to build domestic 
technological capabilities is 
worrying since it is precisely 
those mechanisms that are 
expected to play a major 
role in technology diffusion 
to LDCs in the early stage of 
catch-up.
Leveraging international 
market mechanisms to 
strengthen their role as 
channels for the diffusion 
of technology to LDCs 
requires active policy at 
the national level as part 
of broader development 
strategies geared towards the 
development of productive 
capacities.
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Notes
  1 Diffusion of technology through these four channels derives from interactions between 
different firms in the context of market transactions. Chapters 4 and 5 of this Report 
analyse other potentially effective channels for technology transfer to/from LDCs: 
migration of skilled persons (which usually does not result from market transactions 
between firms) and knowledge aid (which is a non-market mechanism), respectively.
  2 The next major sources of innovation are key personnel, internal R&D and collaboration 
with customers (see chart 3 and UNCTAD, 2006b: table 35).
  3 The crucial importance of capital goods as a source of innovation even in developed 
countries is confirmed by a survey of European enterprises, which shows that 50 per 
cent of total innovation expenditure is embodied in plant, machinery and equipment 
purchased by industrial firms, with own R&D accounting for just 20 per cent (Evangelista 
et al., 1998, quoted by UNIDO, 2002).
  4 The working of trade as a channel for technology diffusion is gauged in different studies 
through trade openness or total imports (Edwards, 1998; Helliwell, 1992), but these are 
imprecise proxies for imports of embodied technology. This Report examines capital 
goods and their main categories in order to gain a better assessment of technology 
flows through merchandise imports.
  5 The Annex provides the list of countries of origin of capital goods. 
  6 Trends in the intensity of LDCs’ capital goods imports are driven by the African and 
Asian countries. The corresponding indices for island LDCs are substantially higher, 
due to the small size of these economies (table 3). 
  7 The precise definition of each category (including its trade classification) is provided in 
the Annex.
  8 Automobiles are dual-use goods and can be either consumer goods or capital goods. 
Our category of capital goods includes only transport equipment used mostly for 
production purposes by firms and therefore excludes passenger cars. 
  9 “African LDCs” refers to most African LDCs plus Haiti. The Annex provides the list of 
countries included in this grouping, as well as the list of countries that make up the 
two other groupings: Asian LDCs and island LDCs.
10 The category “scientific and measuring instruments” is reclassified mostly as ICT capital 
in the second classification of capital goods. Hence the groups presented in table 6 
are mainly a further specification of the broad “machinery and equipment” category 
shown in table 5.
11 Ideally, it would be desirable to separate mining and metal-crushing machinery from 
construction machinery, so as to highlight the role of natural resource extraction in 
total capital good imports. These two types of equipment fall, however, into the same 
category at the 5-digit SITC level (i.e. the most detailed in this trade classification). This 
is partly due to the fact that in some cases the same types of machinery can be used 
by both the mining and the construction industries (e.g. earth-moving equipment). 
Therefore, it was not possible to disentangle them in the trade data set used here.
12 Comprising the following capital good groups: textile and leather machinery; metalworking 
machinery; food-processing machinery; paper, pulp and publishing machinery; other 
industrial machinery.
13  In other developing countries, the share of agricultural machinery in total capital goods 
imports was lower than in LDCs and it has also declined since the 1980s. This, however, 
mirrors the much lower share of agriculture in GDP and the expansion of domestic 
supply capacity of agricultural machinery.
14 Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005) identify five different GVC governance 
patterns.
15  For example, transfer of post-harvest processing of fresh vegetables to producer countries 
has been observed in Kenya (Humphrey, McCulloch and Ota, 2004).
16 The relocation of activities to Madagascar has led to a strong increase in the country’s 
exports of garments between 2000 and 2005 (table 13).
17 Apart from the value chains shown in table 9, the analysis considered the following: 
tobacco, iron, fruit, sugar, rubber, plastics, cocoa, pulp, wheat, artificial fibres, milk, 
fur skin, nickel and cork. 
18 The approach is analogous to the one followed in section B of this chapter, which 
considers the sectoral breakdown of capital goods imports.
19 It is the greenfield part of FDI that brings additional capital to the host economy, but 
not brownfield investment. 
20 Spillovers from FDI occur when the entry or presence of TNCs increases the productivity 
of domestic firms in a host country and the TNCs do not internalize the value of these 
benefits.
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21 Horizontal spillovers refer to the technology transfer from TNCs to local firms in the 
same industry. Vertical spillovers take the form of positive externalities via value chains. 
Backward linkages are contacts between TNCs and their local suppliers. Forward linkages 
spillovers arise when domestic firms become more productive as a result of gaining 
access to new, improved or less costly inputs produced by TNCs in upstream sectors.
22 In LDCs natural resource extraction typically develops as enclaves, but this may also 
be the case of manufacturing and even service projects (e.g. in some cases of industry 
located in EPZs or tourist facilities) that have little backward or forward linkages with 
the domestic economy.
23 In this subsection mining refers to the extraction of minerals, including metals and fuels, 
as well as other minerals.
24 These developments in export values reflect both prices changes (given the cyclical rise 
in commodity prices just mentioned) and volume increases. 
25 The first three features of mining activities are common to most modern mining 
operations throughout the world, while the two last ones are prevalent in developing 
countries (including LDCs), but usually not in developed countries (Eggert, 2001). 
26 Abugre and Akabzaa (1998) claim that in Africa the “bulk of the investment in the 
mining sector goes to metallic and precious minerals. There is very limited investment 
in the non-metallic ores such as lime, phosphate, clay products and salt, all of which 
require relatively little capital to process but which have the greatest horizontal linkages 
to, and a higher multiplier effect on, the domestic industry”. 
27  The United States imposed sanctions on Myanmar in 2001 and by 2004 had terminated 
all direct imports from the country.
28 The garment industry can operate at both extremes of the skill-wage spectrum (at the 
low skill-low wage end and at the opposite high skill-high wage end), as well as at 
intermediate points.
29 Asian LDCs mostly lack the infrastructure and the skills endowments to attract a wide 
range of industries.
30 The United States and the European Union accounted for about 76 per cent of world 
garment imports in 2005, while Japan’s imports totalled only 8 per cent. Therefore, 
preferential access to those two markets is very important for LDCs.
31 Although FDI also played a key role in Myanmar, the imposition of sanctions in 2001 
led to a contraction in foreign investment and in exports. Domestic capital accounted 
for 79 per cent of the total number of firms in 2004–2005.
32  The analysis draws on the original findings on technological learning, domestic anchoring 
of industries and FDI that Rasiah (2007a) prepared for this Report on the basis of data 
from a series of surveys containing firm-level data on Asian LDCs and ODCs. That paper 
provides details on the different surveys that have been compiled.
33 The contraction of the garment industry in the Philippines and Thailand might lead 
to the relocation of firms to the Asian LDCs. Cambodia arguably remains the most 
appealing of the LDCs examined as regards attracting those firms, but only if further 
upgrading can be achieved, since the market in the really low-value-added niches is 
saturated.
34 The same reasoning applies to ODA flows, analysed in chapter 5 of this Report.
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Annex
THE DATA SET ON IMPORTS OF CAPITAL GOODS BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Definition of capital goods and groups.  The definition of capital goods is mostly based on the BEC (Broad Economic 
Categories) Rev.3 classification of the United Nations. It comprises the following categories (with the respective BEC 
Rev.3 codes):
41 Capital goods (except transport equipment)
42 Parts and accessories (of Capital goods under heading 41)
521 Industrial (Transport equipment)
53 Parts and accessories (of Industrial transport equipment under heading 521)
Capital goods have been loosely classified in two ways. The first is a general classification that divides them into the 
following groups (with the respective SITC Rev.3 codes):
1. Machinery and equipment (612.1, 629.2, 657.7, 657.9, 692, 695, 711, 712, 713, 714, 716, 718, 721, 722, 
723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 731, 733, 735, 737, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 751, 752, 
759, 761.2, 762.8, 763.8, 764, 771, 772, 773.2, 776, 778, 812.1, 821.3, 881.2, 881.3, 894.6, 895.1)
2. Scientific and measuring instruments (774, 871, 872, 873, 874, 897.4)
3. Transport equipment (625.2, 625.3, 782, 783, 784, 786, 791, 792, 793)
The second classification singles out (whenever possible) capital goods by their main end-users or by type of general-
purpose technology. It divides them into the following groups (with the respective SITC Rev.3 codes):
1. Agricultural machinery (721, 722)
2. Construction, mining, metal crushing (723, 728)
3. Power-generating machinery (711, 712, 713, 714, 716, 718, 771, 772,  773.2, 812.1)
4. Textile and leather machinery (724)
5. Metalworking machinery (731, 733, 735, 737)
6. Food-processing machinery (727)
7. Paper, pulp and publishing machinery (725, 726)
8. Other industrial machinery (612.1, 629.2, 657.7, 657.9, 692, 695, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 
749, 778, 821.3, 871, 881.2, 894.6, 895.1, 897.4)
9. ICT capital (751, 752, 759, 761.2, 762.8, 763.8, 764, 774, 776, 872, 873, 874, 881.3)
10. Transport equipment (as above)
Definition of country/territories groups.  The following country groups have been used:
1. Developed countries/territories: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Channel Islands, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Faeroe Islands, Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Holy See, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Isle of Man, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
2. Technologically advanced developing countries/economies: the 20 developing  countries/economies with 
the highest ranking in UNIDO’s ITA (index of industrial and technological advancement): China, Hong Kong 
(China), India, Indonesia, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan 
Province of China, Thailand, Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, South Africa, Tunisia 
(source: UNIDO, 2005).  
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3. LDC subregional groupings:
3.1. Africa and Haiti: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Sudan, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia.
3.2. Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Nepal, 
Yemen.
3.3. Islands: Cape Verde, Comoros, Kiribati, Maldives, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Timor-
Leste, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.
Methodological notes.  Mirror trade data have been used to estimate capital goods imports, with developed countries 
and technologically advanced developing countries (as defined above) as reporters and developing countries as partners. 
Raw data were downloaded from UNDESA Statistics Division, Comtrade database, in January 2007.
Chapter
2
National Policies to 
Promote Technological 
Learning and Innovation
A.  Introduction
This chapter examines the role of national policy in promoting technological 
learning and innovation in the least developed countries (LDCs). Section B 
considers briefly what the Governments of the LDCs are currently doing to 
promote science, technology and innovation. It does so by examining how science 
and technology issues are treated in poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) 
and analyzing the findings in the context of current development policy thinking. 
The evidence shows that, although the LDCs are concerned with promoting 
sustained economic growth as the basis for poverty reduction, the treatment of 
technological change as a source of economic growth is generally weak. The rest 
of the chapter proposes how LDC Governments might rectify this deficiency.
The analysis is based on the commonly accepted insight that processes of 
technological change in rich countries, where firms are innovating by pushing 
the knowledge frontier further, are fundamentally different from such processes 
in developing countries, where innovation primarily takes place through 
enterprises learning to master, adapt and improve technologies that already exist 
in more technologically advanced countries. Science, technology and innovation 
(STI) policies to promote technological development should be different in 
technologically leading countries from in follower countries, including LDCs. In 
short, STI policy in LDCs, as in all developing countries, should be geared to 
technological catch-up with more technologically advanced countries through 
technological learning and innovation. Innovation in this context occurs when 
firms commercially apply knowledge which is new to them, even if it is not new 
to the world or to the country.
The rest of the chapter seeks to clarify what this implies for the design 
and implementation of STI policy in LDCs. Section C sets out some general 
considerations on the nature and scope of STI policy. Sections D and E suggest 
how the catch-up concept can be applied in an LDC context by firstly outlining 
typical learning and innovation trajectories during catch-up, and secondly 
considering the implications of those trajectories for LDCs, which are at the early 
stages of the catch-up process. Section F raises some issues regarding the capacity 
of LDC Governments to design and implement policies of the types proposed in 
the chapter. The conclusion summarizes the major messages of the chapter. 
B.  How science and technology issues
are treated in PRSPs: Recent country
experience in comparative perspective
1. RECENT COUNTRY EXPERIENCE
It is difficult to construct a systematic picture of policies to promote science, 
technology and innovation in the LDCs. However, many LDC Governments 
Science, technology and 
innovation (STI) policies 
to promote technological 
development should be 
different in technologically 
leading countries from
in follower countries, 
including LDCs.
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prepare PRSPs and these documents give a good indication of the priority which 
is given to science and technology issues in national policy. Analysis of the PRSPs 
prepared during the period 2004–2006 in 11 LDCs –– including six African 
LDCs, four Asian LDCs and Haiti –– indicates that the incorporation of science 
and technology issues in PRSPs is generally weak (Warren-Rodriguez, 2007). 
Nevertheless, some attention has been paid to a number of specific issues, notably 
applied agricultural research and extension, technical and vocational training, 
investment in electricity and telecommunications networks, and increased use of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs), particularly for use of ICTs 
for better governance.
In particular, the analysis (table 17) shows that:
• Only four of the 11 countries include science and/or technology as priority 
policy for poverty reduction, with the United Republic of Tanzania and 
Uganda focusing on the importance of science, and Mozambique and 
Bangladesh focusing on the importance of technological development.
• Only three of the 11 countries (Bangladesh, Mozambique and the United 
Republic of Tanzania) include a specific section or paragraph on science 
and technology issues.
• Only three of the 11 countries (Bangladesh, Lesotho and Sierra Leone) 
include explicit and specific science and technology initiatives to enhance 
technology transfer and acquisition through either international trade or 
foreign direct investment (FDI). 
• Only three of the 11 countries (Bangladesh, the United Republic of Tanzania 
and Uganda) include specific initiatives to support basic research.
• Only four of the 11 countries (Bangladesh, Sierra Leone, Uganda and the 
United Republic of Tanzania) include specific initiatives for applied research 
outside agriculture.
• Only four of the 11 countries (Bangladesh, Cambodia, Lesotho and the 
United Republic of Tanzania) make explicit reference to the need to expand 
business development services that support technological upgrading efforts 
by local firms.
• Only three of the 11 countries (Bangladesh, Lesotho and Uganda) include 
specific science and technology initiatives in all three levels of education 
– primary, secondary and higher.
• Only six of the 11 countries include policies to promote best practices and 
quality standards by local firms, typically though the creation and capacitation 
of local standards and metrology institutions.
There are nevertheless some science and technology-related areas which the 
PRSPs do address, most notably: 
• Seven of the 11 countries include some reference to initiatives aimed at 
agricultural research, including some, such as Burkina Faso, which include 
a detailed breakdown of intended activities by crop.
• Nine of the 11 countries include initiatives to promote agricultural 
extension.
• All 11 countries include specific initiatives to expand technical and vocational 
education, and all mention its importance.
• All 11 countries identify the need to extend and upgrade electricity networks, 
and 10 of them also stress the importance of rural electrification.
• Six of the 11 countries acknowledge the importance of improving general 
telecommunications networks, but only five mention the importance of 
extending this infrastructure to rural areas.
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as a priority policy for
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• However, nine of the 11 countries include specific initiatives to apply ICT 
to improve public administration and public service delivery. 
• Seven of the 11 countries intend to promote renewable energy resources 
(e.g. solar and wind power).
These results are important, as the sample of PRSPs is representative of the 
latest generation of PRSPs in LDCs. As shown in the Least Developed Countries 
Report 2004, the PRSP approach has evolved considerably since it was first 
introduced at the end of 1999. In particular, there has been a shift away from an 
exclusive emphasis on increasing social sector expenditures in the context of debt 
relief, towards poverty reduction strategies whose first pillar is to ensure strong 
and sustainable growth (see UNCTAD, 2004: 272–273). With this renewed focus 
on economic growth as the basis for poverty reduction, there is greater concern 
with sources of economic growth. One would expect that this would logically 
lead to consideration of the role of technological progress. As we shall discuss in 
more detail below, most major growth theories identify technological change as 
being at the heart of growth processes. But as the evidence above shows, this has 
not occurred. In short, the new focus on economic growth as the basis of poverty 
reduction in the latest generation of PRSPs has not generally been associated with 
a focus on technological progress as a key source of economic growth.1
Table 17. How S&T is treated in the PRSPs of selected LDCs
Bangladesh Bhutan Burkina
Faso
Cambodia Haiti Lao
PDR
Lesotho Mozambique Sierra
Leone
Uganda United Rep. 
of Tanzania
Was S&T considered a priority 
area in the PRSP document?
Y N N N N W N Y N Y Y
Is there a specific section/
paragraph covering S&T issues?
Y N N N N N N Y N N Y
Are specific S&T initiatives included at the level of:
trade policies• Y N N N N N N W Y W N
FDIs• Y N N N N W Y W N N W
Does the PRSP include specific S&T initiatives in
primary education• Y N N N N W Y N N Y N
secondary education• Y N Y N N W Y Y Y Y N
higher education• Y N N N N W Y Y Y Y Y
Are infrastructural technology concerns treated  in the PRSP?
electricity networks•
    -  general Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
    -  rural Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y
telecommunication networks•
     - general Y W Y Y Y W Y W W Y W
     - rural Y N Y Y N W Y N W Y N
ICT extension•
     - general Y N N W W W Y Y Y W Y
     - rural Y N.A. N.A. N N W N N Y N N
Are there projects aiming at increasing technological awareness through:
basic R&D activities• Y N N N N N N N N Y Y
applied R&D activities in 
agricultural research
• Y W Y W N Y N Y Y Y Y
applied R&D in industrial/
engineering research
• Y N N N N N N N Y Y Y
technical and vocational 
education training
• Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Are there sector-specific technology extension programmes:
in agriculture• Y Y Y W W Y Y Y Y Y Y
in business development 
services
• Y W W Y N N Y N N W Y
in product standards and
best practices
• Y N N Y N Y N Y Y Y N
Source: UNCTAD secretariat based on Warren-Rodriguez (2007).
Note:   Y = yes, N = no, W = weak, N.A. = not available.
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2. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
The weak treatment of technological change reflects the marginalization of 
technology policies within structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 
1990s, and the omission of technology issues from the PRSP approach which 
replaced such programmes in 2000. 
Most LDCs began their structural adjustment a little later than other 
developing countries. However, since 1988, two thirds of the LDCs have been 
intensively engaged in reform processes (UNCTAD, 2000: part II, chapter 4). 
Although there were some problems of implementation, the process of economic 
liberalization was pushed by policy conditionality associated with aid and debt 
relief programmes, and pulled by the belief of many policymakers in the 1990s 
that liberalization was the best way to ensure the benefits of globalization reached 
LDCs. Whatever the balance of impulses, many LDCs have undertaken rapid and 
comprehensive reforms, which have continued during the PRSP era. This has 
created a totally different policy environment from that at the end of the 1980s. A 
telling indicator of the depth of reforms is the fact that two thirds of the LDCs had 
an open trade regime according to the International Monetary Fund’s index of 
trade restrictiveness in 2002, and the LDCs had actually undertaken more trade 
liberalization than other developing countries (UNCTAD, 2004: part II, chapter 
5).
Technological development was an integral, though very imperfect, aspect of 
efforts to promote development in LDCs prior to structural adjustment. Thus, for 
example, many LDCs had agricultural marketing boards which were intended to 
serve a variety of functions, including research and the provision of services which 
supported technological upgrading of export crops. But technology policy was 
not considered as part of structural adjustment programmes. Key institutions and 
incentives for agricultural and industrial development which were created prior 
to the1980s as part of development plans were dismantled as economic policy 
moved decisively in the direction of economic liberalization and privatization. 
The decline and fragmentation of science and technology infrastructure 
(research institutes, universities and technology policy coordination bodies) 
were particularly severe in African LDCs in the 1990s (see UNESCO, 2005). In 
Bangladesh, a broad set of publicly funded research and development (R&D) 
institutes has been maintained, and Nepal, which established a Ministry of Science 
and Technology in 1996, has continued to support technological development in 
its five-year planning process. But in both cases, low levels of public funding for 
research institutes are a problem (UNESCO, 2005: 257–259), and in Bangladesh, 
as the case study in chapter 3 of this Report shows, the disarticulation between 
public research and development institutes and productive sectors remains a key 
constraint on learning at the enterprise level.2
The introduction of the PRSP approach in late 1999 has reinforced the 
marginalization of science and technology issues in LDC policy processes. The 
approach is based on the important principle of domestic ownership and there 
has been a genuine effort to encourage the emergence of home-grown policies 
which can provide the basis for a more effective partnership with donors. However, 
given weak state capacity and also the tension between policy conditionality 
and domestic ownership, most PRSPs tend to be concerned with strengthening 
and deepening the earlier economic reform processes. They embody so-called 
second generation reforms, which pay particular attention to social allocation of 
public resources and seek improved governance, including reducing corruption 
and promoting an overall improved investment climate. Promoting technological 
change is not part of the vision, and it is conspicuously absent from the PRSP 
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Source Book of the World Bank, which is intended as a guide to policymakers 
(Klugman, 2002). 
It is important that LDC Governments give much more attention to 
technological progress as a source of economic growth. This requires a more 
radical rupture from past structural adjustment policies. As the World Bank (2005) 
recognizes, the key lesson from economic reforms of the 1990s was not that they 
failed to integrate social considerations and poverty reduction issues. Rather, it 
was that they failed to promote economic growth. In particular: 
• Economic reforms “enabled better use of existing capacity but did not 
provide sufficient incentives for expanding that capacity” (ibid., 10).
• They “often mistook efficiency gains for growth” (ibid., 11).
• They “exaggerated the gains from improved resource allocation and their 
dynamic repercussions, and proved to be both theoretically incomplete and 
contradicted by the evidence” (ibid., 11).
• “Expectations that gains in growth would be won entirely through policy 
improvements were unrealistic” (ibid., 11). 
• “Means were often mistaken for goals – that is, improvements in policies 
were mistaken for growth strategies, as if improvements in policies were an 
end in themselves” (ibid., 11). 
From this diagnosis, it is argued that:
• “Going forward, the pursuit of policy reforms for reform’s sake should be 
replaced by a more comprehensive understanding of the forces underlying 
growth” (ibid., 11).
• “Removing the obstacles that make growth impossible may not be enough: 
growth-oriented action, for example, on technological catch-up, or 
encouragement of risk-taking for faster accumulation, may be needed” 
(ibid., 11).
From the perspective of this Report, it is important that LDC Governments 
elaborate development strategies which are designed to promote sustained 
economic growth and poverty reduction through the development of their 
productive capacities. PRSPs, which often now function as medium-term public 
expenditure frameworks, can be embedded within such long-term development 
strategies. Technological development issues, as well as trade development 
issues, should be integral aspects of the broader development strategy and can 
be integrated within poverty reduction strategies through the development 
strategies.
If LDCs ignore the need for adopting policies to promote technological 
progress as a basic source of economic growth, they are likely to be increasingly 
marginalized within the global economy. The problem of marginalization is not 
simply a question of the very low level of technological development in LDCs 
indicated in the introduction of this Report. It also reflects the fact that promoting 
technological change is at the heart of Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) efforts to promote economic growth in LDCs (Weiss, 
2005). It also has been a central component of development strategies in the 
most successful developing countries and is becoming important in more and 
more developing countries.
Policies to promote technological catch-up were an integral component of 
developmental success in East Asian developing countries (UNCTAD, 1994; 
Akyuz, 1998; Nelson and Pack, 1999), and successful models are being adapted in 
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follower countries such as Malaysia and Viet Nam. In Latin America, science and 
technology policies were marginalized in the early period of structural reforms. 
But the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has, 
since 1990, been advocating the adoption of mesolevel and microlevel productive 
development policies alongside macroeconomic reforms (see for example, ECLAC, 
1990, 1995, 2004). These ideas are now taking concrete shape as more and 
more countries are adopting productive development policies, including policies 
to promote STI (Peres, 2006). Some argue that what is emerging is a new “open-
economy industrial policy”, in which proactive measures are used to promote 
infant export industries rather than infant import-substitution industries (see Melo, 
2001; Schrank and Kurtz, 2005). A recent review of these new industrial policies 
has concluded that although these policies are very widespread in Latin America, 
they are as yet “timid and inconsistent” (Melo and Rodriguez-Clare, 2006: 54), 
partly owing to negative associations with old-style import-substitution industrial 
policy and partly owing to budgetary constraints and institutional weaknesses. 
Moreover, the effectiveness of the new open-economy science and technology 
policies has also been questioned (Cimoli, Ferraz and Primi, 2005). However, 
Schrank and Kurtz (2005, 2006) provide empirical evidence which suggests that 
the new open-economy industrial policy is actually accelerating export growth 
rates in countries where they are being most intensively applied. Moreover, Melo 
and Rodriguez-Clare (2006: 57) argue that the current phase is best understood 
as a policy learning phase through which “productive development policies 
can develop their potential to effectively contribute to the goals of growth and 
modernization”. 
Similarly, in Africa there has recently been an important surge of interest at 
the regional level in science and technology issues, with the New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Union both promoting new 
regional initiatives to revive science and promote centres of excellence (NEPAD, 
2005). Technological development was actually at the heart of the African solution 
to the economic crisis of the 1970s –– as set out in the Lagos Plan of Action –– 
before it was overtaken by the structural adjustment programmes, which focused 
on getting price incentives right. These initiatives are thus returning to a promising 
road already identified but not yet travelled.
In retrospect, it is clear that, although structural adjustment programmes 
addressed some real policy failures, they threw out the baby with the bathwater. 
The broad revival of interest in policies to promote technological change, partly 
inspired by the East Asian success, is indicative of wide restlessness to find a 
new, post-Washington-Consensus policy model as well as of the intuition that 
it is in this area –– promoting technological change –– that it is possible to find 
more effective policies to promote growth and poverty reduction. If LDCs do not 
participate in this policy trend, they will be increasingly marginalized in the global 
economy, where competition increasingly depends on knowledge rather than the 
simple possession of natural resources. 
C.   The nature and scope of STI policies 
Although the weak focus on technological change within national policies 
to promote economic growth and poverty reduction is striking, some might 
argue that STI policies are a luxury which LDCs cannot afford at their stage of 
development. This view may partly be based on a misunderstanding of the role 
of technological change in development. But it also could be founded on a 
narrow conception of a science, technology and innovation policy. In the past, a 
science policy was often associated with the funding of scientific research and the 
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training of scientists. Similarly, technology policy has been closely associated with 
the development of specific technologies, particularly to support new high-tech 
industries. However, these notions of science and technology policies have now 
been superseded by a broader notion of what STI policy is and how it can be 
implemented. This section sets out features of this broader notion.
1. LINEAR VERSUS SYSTEMS MODELS OF INNOVATION
In the past, the scope of STI policy has been highly influenced by a linear 
model of innovation which suggests that basic science leads to applied science, 
which in turn causes innovation. The policy implication of this science push 
model of innovation is simple. According to Arnold and Bell (2001: 5), “If you 
want more innovation (and therefore economic development), you should fund 
more science”.
This science-push model of innovation was very influential in the design of 
technology policies in OECD countries in the 1950s and 1960s, and it has also 
influenced the approach to science and technology in developing countries and 
LDCs. For example, in the 1960s many African LDCs established research and 
development (R&D) institutes as a means of acquiring technology. At the same 
time, they set up policy institutions such as national research councils or ministries 
for science and technology, and money budgeted for science and technology 
was spent on these R&D institutes and policy institutions. In this approach, “S&T 
policy was interpreted to mean R&D policy” (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006: 45).
There are various problems with the science-push model of innovation. One 
glaring weakness has been the lack of relevance of public research institutions to 
the needs of the productive sectors and the irrelevance of scientific research efforts 
to commercial market needs. This weakness is quite apparent in the LDCs, where 
“sparse, often disconnected R&D activities have little if any links with the needs of 
domestic enterprises or farmers organizations” and where the dearth of linkages 
between formal public research institutes and domestic production dissipate the 
considerable inputs already invested over the years” (UNCTAD, 2006a: 251). 
Evidence from investment climate surveys indicates that in recent years only 0.4 
per cent of the companies considered universities or public institutes the most 
important channel for technology acquisition, and only 3.4 per cent of the firms 
reported that universities and public institutes were their first-most, second-most 
or third-most important source of technology acquisition (ibid., table 35).
The weakness of the supply-push model has led to an alternative approach 
–– a demand-pull model of innovation. In essence, this retains a linear model of 
innovation but the initial impulse for innovation does not come from science-
push but rather from demand-pull. Instead of the public sector being the main 
science and technology provider, the expressed demands of the private sector 
are meant to provide the motor for technological change. Recent technology 
policies in Latin America reflect this approach (Cimoli, Ferraz and Primi, 2005) 
and illustrate an attempt to achieve greater articulation between public sector 
technological agencies and the private sector. This has involved a shift in the 
science and technology priorities of the public agencies from basic research to 
the provision and commercialization of technological services, mainly oriented 
to support production process management and quality control. Moreover, 
technology funds have been established to subsidize technological development 
projects of private firms and training. They have also been used to promote the 
development of private-sector technological services providers, thus facilitating 
the emergence of a technological services market. 
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Both the supply-push and demand-pull models of innovation are now viewed 
as oversimplified views of how innovation occurs (Arnold and Bell, 2001). 
As a result, a different model of innovation has emerged which suggests that 
innovation depends on the existence of a variety of agents and institutions (much 
greater in scope than technology providers and technology users) and that the 
effectiveness of innovation depends on the interactions between these agencies 
and institutions. 
In this systems model of innovation, the ability and propensity of an enterprise 
to innovate not only depends on its access to knowledge from research institutes 
or technology services centres (pushed or pulled), but also on many other factors 
including: access to finance; access to human resources; adequate basic physical 
infrastructure; firm-level capabilities; inter-firm linkages and collaboration; general 
business services; demand conditions; and the framework conditions including 
the investment climate, general cultural propensity towards entrepreneurship 
and levels of literacy. There is no longer a single source of innovation (scientific 
research) but multiple sources, including interactions among enterprises and 
sectors.
The systems approach to innovation has become widely accepted within 
OECD countries (OECD, 1997). The focus for STI policies is upon improving 
“national innovation systems”. Such systems are defined as “that set of distinct 
institutions which jointly and individually contributes to the development of 
diffusion of new technologies and which provides a framework within which 
Governments form and implement policies to influence the innovation process. 
As such it is a system of interconnected institutions to create, store and transfer 
the knowledge, skills and artifacts which define new technologies” (Metcalfe, 
1995). The main elements of such a system are illustrated schematically in chart 7.
Framework conditions
• Financial environment
• Taxation and incentives
• Propensity for innovation and entrepreneurship
• Trust
• Mobility
• Education, literacy
Business system
• Companies
• Farms
• Health care, etc.
Education and 
research system
• Professional
education and
training
• Higher education
and research
• Public sector
research
Infrastructure
• Banking, venture
capital
• IPR and
information
system
• Innovation and
business support
system
• Standards and
norms
Demand
• Consumers (final demand)
• Producers (intermediate demand)
Intermediate
Organizations
• Research
institutes
• Brokers, etc.
Chart 7. Major components of a national innovation system
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Box 1. Chilli production in Bangladesh: how the innovation system works in practice
The fertile Jamalpur chars — temporary islands formed by siltation in river deltas — in Bangladesh are well known for their 
high-quality chilli production. Although the chars are very fertile, there is a lack of basic infrastructure and the chilli-growers 
often lack market information and have weak linkages with external actors. 
To strengthen the sustainable innovation systems linked to local chilli production, the United Kingdom Department for In-
ternational Development is funding the Crop Post-Harvest Research Programme, which aims to identify and strengthen linkages 
among all actors involved in the chilli supply chain.
Box chart 1 shows that all the actors involved in enhancing the local innovation systems are closely related. The arrows 
in the chart refer to the flows of goods and knowledge among these actors. The strongest links between the char-dwellers and 
the mainland actors are to be found in the private sector. Information from the private sector and the public extension services 
is passed on to the local char-dwellers by so-called input dealers. Local middlemen provide market access for local products, 
although national chilli processors and retailers are also starting to develop direct links with the char-dwellers (highlighted by the 
dashed line). Non-governmental organizations act as promoters, while the research team builds linkages between the public and 
private sectors and locals. The research team bridges the gap between the private-sector research institute, which is currently 
introducing new chilli seed varieties, and the other actors. It is also providing training to private- and public-sector agents to 
make this system viable and sustainable on its own.
The actors need to be: (a) flexible, in order to adapt to the evolving needs of the partners; (b) accountable to other actors; 
and (c) interactive, as the evolution of activities over time and among the actors is considered to be key to the success of inter-
vention in technology markets. 
Source: Biggs, S. and Hatsaert, H., 2004.
It is important that, in their approach to the design and implementation of 
STI policy, LDC Governments also adopt a systems approach. But in this Report, 
it is suggested that it may be premature to seek to establish national innovation 
systems. Rather, the aim should be to develop local and sectoral innovation 
systems, as illustrated in box 1, and to increase the absorptive capability of 
domestic knowledge systems. The latter idea will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
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Box chart 1. Key actors in the innovation system
for Bangladesh chilli production
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2.  EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT INSTRUMENTS OF STI POLICY
The systems model of innovation has important implications for the scope 
of public action. The supply-push model of innovation leads to a narrowly-
defined STI policy which focuses on scientific research. The systems approach 
to innovation rather suggests that innovation depends upon a large number of 
policies and institutions. It implies that the instruments of STI policy should not 
only include measures to stimulate the supply side of technology development, but 
also measures to stimulate the demand for technology development, measures to 
strengthen the links between supply and demand, and measures which address 
framework conditions. 
Table 18, which builds on Dodgson and Bessant (1996), summarizes some of 
the relevant STI policy tools. At the top of the table are explicit measures which 
are concerned with human resources development for science and technology, 
public science and technology infrastructure, and policies to affect technology 
imports. Public science and technology infrastructure includes such institutions 
as public research centres, technology advisory centres, agriculture and industrial 
extension agencies, and business support services, which are all concerned with 
the supply of knowledge within domestic knowledge systems. At the bottom 
of the table are implicit measures which affect the willingness and ability to 
undertake the investments, in both physical capital and human skills, necessary 
for innovation.
The implicit measures are fairly standard and include public physical 
infrastructure investment; financial and fiscal policies which increase the 
incentive for investment and innovation; trade policy and competition policy; 
public enterprises and public procurement; and regulation, notably in relation to 
intellectual property rights. 
What is particularly critical in this regard for LDCs is that both physical 
infrastructure and financial policies are central implicit STI policy instruments. 
With regard to physical infrastructure, public investment is necessary to crowd in 
Table 18.  Explicit and implicit instruments of STI policy
Explicit policy instruments Examples
Human resource development General education systems, universities and polytechnics, technical and vocation, education and 
training, apprenticeship schemes
Science and technology infrastructure Public research laboratories, research associations, research grants, technology centres
Information Networks, advisor centres, consultancy services, specialist libraries, databases
Technology import policy FDI policy, licences
Implicit policy instruments Examples
Physical infrastructure Power, roads, communication
Direct financial support Grants, subsidies, loans, provisions of equipment or services, loan guarantees
Indirect financial support Schemes encouraging investment in innovation, venture capital
Trade Trade agreements, tariffs, currency regulation
Public procurement Central or local government purchasing and contracts, R&D contracts
Taxation Company, personal, indirect and payroll taxation, tax allowances
Regulation Patents, regulations (e.g., in environmental control), inspectorates, monopoly and anti-trust 
legislation
Public enterprise Innovation by publicly-owned industries, use of these as pioneering facilities, establishment of 
new industries
Political Planning, regional policies, honours and awards for innovation, encouragement of mergers or 
joint ventures
Public services Procurement, maintenance, supervision, and innovation in public services such as 
telecommunications, transport and health care
Source: Based on Dodgson and Bessant (1996).
The systems approach to 
innovation suggests that 
innovation depends upon
a large number of policies 
and institutions.
It is important that, in their 
approach to the design and 
implementation of STI policy, 
LDC Governments also adopt 
a systems approach.
National Policies to Promote Technological Learning and Innovation 61
private sector investment and innovation. But innovation is a risky process which 
often involves capital investment and resource mobilization. Access to finance and 
adequate financial incentives are conditions without which innovation will not 
take place. In this regard, development banks are particularly important at early 
stages of a catch-up process and venture capital funds become important later. A 
variety of fiscal policies are used to stimulate pioneer investments, including tax 
holidays, accelerated depreciation allowances, investment tax credits, duty-free 
imports of capital goods and reduced capital goods. Moreover, beyond measures 
to ensure that entrepreneurs have access to finance –– which might involve, for 
example, special agencies for SMEs or even the establishment of technology 
banks for bigger projects –– pioneer investors can benefit from credit subsidies or 
loan guarantees, which partially socialize risks. 
Trade policy is also important for the innovation process. In the classic case 
of technology acquisition in the Republic of Korea, protectionist measures using 
temporary tariff barriers were combined with export promotion measures to 
support initial acquisition of technology and implementation of production and 
then to encourage upgrading (Kim, 1980). More recently, there are important 
lessons for LDCs from the cases of Viet Nam and Mauritius and a number of 
other successful developing countries which have adopted a gradual approach to 
trade liberalization. Competition policy also matters, and policy may be designed 
to achieve a balance between the beneficial effects of competitive pressures 
together with those arising from coordination. Thus, the creation of dynamic and 
innovative clusters of economic activity is now regarded as a critical feature of 
innovation policies in many countries. Regulation policy, in particular in relation 
to intellectual property rights (IPRs), is also important, and will be discussed 
in chapter 3. Public procurement can be a powerful source of demand for 
innovation and public sector enterprises can play a role in stimulating innovation. 
This can occur, for example, in the example which public service organizations set 
in their innovative practices. Sometimes, too, Governments may have to set up 
demonstration enterprises, which can show the viability and profitability of new 
activities. The activity of the Chilean Economic Development Agency (CORFO) 
and Fundación Chile all exemplify this.
3.  OLD INDUSTRIAL POLICY VERSUS NEW INNOVATION POLICY
Articulating this array of instruments of STI policy in a way which stimulates 
firms and farms to undertake innovation, in the sense of introducing products 
and production processes which are new to them, is a complex task. In the past, 
explicit technology policies were often implemented as part of an industrial 
policy which sought to develop strategic sectors through a combination of tariff 
protection, direct subsidies and prohibitions on certain kinds of technology 
transfer. These policies worked well in some successful East Asia countries, where 
firms were subject to performance criteria or effective monitoring in line with 
specified development targets (see Amsden, 2001). But in many other cases, 
industrial policy – and the associated technology policy – became hostage to 
special interest groups and resulted in wasted scarce resources. Nevertheless, as 
noted earlier in this chapter, there has been a revival of interest in industrial policy 
in recent years. The new industrial policy is very different from the old industrial 
policy, in that it focuses on promoting entrepreneurship and innovation through 
a mixed, market-based model with the Government and private sector working 
closely together. This new approach to industrial policy can offer significant 
insights for Governments in the design and implementation of STI policies, which 
are relevant not only within manufacturing, but more generally in agriculture, 
industry and services.
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 In the new industrial policy –– which is sometimes renamed an entrepreneurial 
policy or an innovation policy –– the State acts as a facilitator of learning. The 
private sector is perceived as the main agent of change. But the Government 
facilitates the process of entrepreneurial search and discovery for viable new 
economic activities (see Rodrik, 2004; Kuznetsov and Sabel, 2005). There are 
significant risks involved, which implies the need for a partnership and synergies 
with the public sector to socialize risks. Coordinated action is also often necessary, 
as returns from the investment of one entrepreneur depend on investments 
in other sectors. The state catalyzes and coordinates private investment and 
innovation through market-based incentives aimed at reducing risks and sharing 
benefits.
This approach to STI policy has a number of features. First, it is based on a 
strategic vision of national priorities for economic and technological development, 
which must be elaborated within the broader context of social and economic 
objectives.
Second, Government policy is directed towards addressing systemic failures 
which occur in knowledge accumulation and technology development. 
Important sources of market failure – incomplete appropriability, uncertainty and 
indivisibilities –– have long been recognized in processes of scientific research 
(Arrow, 1962). But the systems approach to innovation draws attention to wider 
systems failures in both market and non-market institutions. The most basic one 
is the low level of firm capabilities. But low levels of non-market interactions 
between actors in the system may also contribute to poor innovative performance. 
Against this background, public action should seek to enhance the performance 
of the market system and to create the conditions needed to ensure that the 
economic system achieves socially desirable goals which would be unobtainable 
through market forces alone. Such socially desirable goals might include the 
endogenization of certain technological activities (such as R&D or training in 
design and engineering) within private firms, or the promotion of economic 
diversification so that the economy is not locked into unstable economic structures 
which do not generate sufficient job opportunities. For countries at the earliest 
stages of the catch-up process, the case for public action is particularly strong. 
There are various system failures: 
• Investment and innovation are discouraged by fundamental uncertainty. 
The costs of investment and innovation are high but benefits are uncertain 
and come later.
• Investment and innovation are also discouraged when all costs are borne by 
the firm itself but externalities mean that others gain part of the benefits.
• There are also major coordination risks when the profitability of investment 
and innovation by one economic agent depends on other agents also 
undertaking investment.
Third, government policy should play a catalytic role in the sense that policies 
should over time increasingly stimulate market forces to promote innovation 
and learning. Such policies have been called “market-stimulating” technology 
policies (Lall and Teubal, 1998: 1382). They encompass measures to stimulate 
the development of markets for technology support services. 
Fourth, technology policies should encompass a mixture of functional, 
horizontal and vertical policies (ibid., 1370). Functional policies are intended to 
improve the working of markets economy-wide, in particular in factor markets, 
without favouring particular sectors or activities. Vertical policies are sectoral-
specific, and seek to promote technological learning and innovation within 
particular sectors. Horizontal policies are concerned with promoting generic 
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technological learning and innovation activities within firms that are socially 
desirable and cross-sectoral (Teubal 1996). 
Finally, incentives and public institutions which promote learning and 
innovation should be carefully designed to ensure their effectiveness. Rodrik 
(2004) summarizes a number of good practices as follows: 
• Incentives should be provided only to activities which are new to the national 
economy (that is, pioneer activities) and which thus fosters diversification.
• There should be clear benchmarks/criteria of success and failure, and winners 
should be rewarded and losers abandoned.
• There must be a built-in sunset clause; thus, public support will be withdrawn 
after an appropriate amount of time has elapsed.
• Public support should target activities (such as learning design and engineering 
skills), not sectors, and although these activities may be sector-specific, they 
should be cross-cutting as far as possible.
• Any activities that are subsidized must have a clear potential of providing 
spillovers and demonstration effects.
• Support measures should be designed, implemented and monitored by 
agencies with demonstrated competence.
• Such agencies should be politically accountable and closely monitored.
• The agencies must maintain clear lines of communication with the private 
sector.
• Mistakes will be made, so transparency is important.
• Support measures must be adaptable to take account of the evolution of 
the industries concerned.·
D. Applying the catch-up concept
in an LDC context:
Typical learning and innovation trajectories 
STI policies in LDCs need to be founded on a strategic vision for national 
economic development and integrated within their national development 
strategies. In general terms, such strategies will involve concerted efforts to 
increase domestic value-added, productivity and international competitiveness 
by increasing the knowledge content of economic activity and to promote 
diversification through learning and innovation. But this Report argues that the 
underlying strategic objective of policymakers should be to promote technological 
catch-up with more technologically advanced countries. 
The focus on technological catch-up as a basic objective can help policymakers 
because “the “gap” with the state of technology in leader countries helps define 
the capabilities that are needed and the direction in which resources should be 
allocated” (Arnold and Bell, 2001:19). But policy analyses of the catch-up process 
have gone further and identified typical trajectories of learning and innovation 
which occur during the catch-up process. This is particularly important for LDCs, 
as catch-up is a process which takes time and involves cumulative learning in 
which earlier, simpler capabilities and activities provide the basis for developing 
more advanced capabilities and activities. An important lesson from successful 
experience is that development strategies should adopt this step-by-step process, 
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and STI policies which are an integral part of such strategies should evolve during 
the process of technological catch-up as business capabilities and domestic 
knowledge systems develop and as the structure of the national economy 
changes. The typical learning and innovation trajectories during catch-up provide 
the basis for identifying how strategic priorities, incentives and institutions of STI 
policy can change over time as technological catch-up occurs. 
In broad terms, analysts have identified two different stages of the catch-up 
process: (a) an early catch-up stage in which simple technologies are adopted in 
mature low-tech, and medium-tech industries; and (b) a late catch-up stage in 
which more complex technologies are adopted in medium and high tech industries 
which are in a consolidation phase where process technology is still changing 
rapidly (see Kim and Dahlman, 1992; Pack, 2000; Amsden and Chu, 2003). The 
late catch-up stage is relevant for countries which have already established simple 
industries but do not operate at the world technological frontier and no longer 
can compete on the basis of low wages and unskilled labour.
The two stages of the catch-up process are distinguished by the complexity of 
the types of industries which are developing. However, by focusing on individual 
industries within each stage, analysts have gone further and identified three 
broad phases of learning and innovation through which a new sector develops 
within a country. These are: firstly, the initiation of production by importing 
foreign technology and implementing production; secondly, local diffusion of 
new products and processes as more firms adopt the technology; and thirdly, 
industrial upgrading through incremental technological improvements to process 
and product design, and also associated marketing improvements. For some 
industries, such industrial upgrading is associated with a shift from producing 
for local markets to producing for export markets. This three-phase sequence 
was initially observed by Kim (1980) and has been found to apply in a range of 
industries in East Asia, such as garments, machine tools and motorcycles (Otsuka, 
2006) (see chart 8). It should be noted that the phases can overlap somewhat and 
that they “are not necessarily sequential” (Kim and Dahlman, 1992). However, 
successful assimilation of foreign technologies within a country involves all 
three phases –– initial implementation by pioneer investors, local diffusion and 
upgrading. 
Typical process of developmentPhase
Initiate
Quantity
Expansion
Improvement
Quality
1.  Pioneer imitates
foreign technology
5.  Decline in profit
6.  Upgrading
7.  Quality competition
3.  Emergence of followers
(imitation of pioneer)
2.  Pioneer's success
in business
4.  Expansion of
production quantity
Chart 8. Phases of development of an industry during catch-up
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Source: Based on Otsuka (2006).
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From a policy perspective, what is important is that appropriate policies to 
promote technological learning and innovation are different during the early 
stage of the catch-up process from the late stage, and different policy measures 
are required to promote initial acquisition of foreign technology, local diffusion 
and upgrading. How policy does and should change over time during the catch-
up process has been most fully elaborated by Linsu Kim on the basis of the case 
of the Republic of Korea (Kim 1980; Westphal, Kim and Dahlman, 1985; Kim 
and Dahlman, 1992), and by Morris Teubal, who has sought to generalize on the 
basis of Israel’s experience (Avnimelech and Teubal, 2006, 2008 forthcoming; 
Sercovitch and Teubal, 2007). Box 2 summarizes how policy changed from the 
early to the late part of the catch-up process in the Republic of Korea. 
The assimilation and absorption of existing technologies involve costs and 
risks, and their success depends on technological efforts of various kinds and 
the development of various technological capabilities at the level of the firm 
and the farm. For agriculture, learning involves inventive adaptation of material 
inputs to local ecological conditions, often blending knowledge and techniques 
from elsewhere with traditional knowledge. For industry and services, learning 
is required to develop tacit technological know-how. Tacit knowledge develops 
through training, experience and watching. Such tacit knowledge is important 
because various adaptations are required in establishing and operating new 
facilities. The development of firm-level capabilities and support systems is thus 
vital for successful assimilation of foreign technology.3
Analysis within East Asia has indicated that, in the early stages of catch-up, the 
development of production and investment capabilities at the firm level is vital 
(see table 19). As Dahlman, Ross-Larson and Westphal (1987: 774) succinctly put 
it: “The central issue of technologically developing countries is not acquiring the 
capability to invent products and processes. It is acquiring the capability to use 
existing technology –– to produce more efficiently, to establish better production 
facilities, and to use the experience gained in production and investment to 
adapt and improve the technology in use. This requires technical and operating 
Table 19. Elements of production and investment capability
Production capability
Production management - to oversee the operation of established facilities
Production engineering - to provide the information required to optimize the operation of established facilities, including:
Raw material control - to sort and grade inputs, seek improved inputs
Production scheduling - to coordinate production processes across products and facilities 
Quality control - to monitor conformance with product standards and upgrade
Troubleshooting - to overcome problems encountered in the course of operation
Adaptations of processes and products - to respond to changing circumstances and to increase productivity
•
•
•
•
•
Repair and maintenance of physical capital - according to regular schedule or when needed
Marketing - to find and develop uses for possible outputs and to channel outputs to markets
Investment capability
Manpower training - to impart skills and abilities of all kinds
Pre-investment feasibility studies - to identify possible projects and to ascertain prospects for viability under alternative design concepts
Project execution - to establish or expand facilities, including:
Project management - to organize and oversee the activities involved in project execution
Project engineering - to provide the information needed to make technology operational in a particular setting, including:
- Detailed studies - to make tentative choices among design alternatives
- Basic engineering - to supply the core technology in terms of process flows, material and energy balances, specifications of principal 
equipment, plant layout
- Detailed engineering - to supply the peripheral technology in terms of complete specifications for all physical capital, architectural and 
engineering plans, construction and equipment installation specifications
Procurement - to choose, coordinate and supervise hardware suppliers and construction contractors
Embodiment in physical capital - to accomplish site preparation, construction, plant erection, manufacture of machinery and equipment
Start-up of operations - to attain predetermined norms
•
•
•
•
•
Source: Westphal, Kim and Dahlman (1985).
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Box 2. The evolution of technology policy during catch-up: the case of the Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea has achieved a phenomenal rate of economic growth and poverty reduction through rapid capital ac-
cumulation and technological change associated with employment expansion and rising labour productivity. Technology poli-
cies were adopted to accelerate the acquisition of technological capabilities. These policies sought to influence the supply of 
technology and the demand for technology and to lubricate the linkages between supply and demand. The policies, and their 
effectiveness, evolved over time in the course of continuous technological change. 
During the early stage of catch-up, when domestic firms started developing technological capabilities in relatively simple indus-
tries with mature technologies, the most important policies for technology acquisition were implicit policies: both trade policy 
and financial policy stimulated demand for technology. Trade policy involved a combination of tariff protection to stimulate do-
mestic business start-ups and export promotion to push firms to become internationally competitive, as well as some protection 
for the domestic machinery industry to enable capital goods to be imported at international prices. The financing of purchases 
by supplier’s credits which carried lower rates of interest than those on the domestic market also increased the attractiveness 
of capital goods imports. Another factor that was basic to the whole process of technology acquisition, diffusion and upgrading 
was heavy early investment in human resource development, in addition to encouraging the emergence of large firms (chaebols) 
which could take advantage of economies of scale as well as take the lead in developing technological capabilities in succes-
sively more complex industries.
Public research institutes were set up but played a minimal role in technology development: rather, they helped local firms 
strengthen their bargaining power in relation to foreign technology suppliers. The Government also encouraged the develop-
ment of local consulting engineering firms by stipulating that the major contractors for all engineering projects should, if possible, 
be local firms, with foreign partners as minor participants. In the early stages of catch-up, these engineering service firms did not 
play a major role in the local diffusion of technology, although inter-firm mobility of personnel was important. The scientific and 
technological information centre set up by the Government was not very well utilized either, as mature technologies were easily 
imitated through reverse engineering. The Government also took initiatives to strengthen public-sector research and develop-
ment by means of tax incentives and preferential financing. However, these measures were broadly ineffective during the early 
stage of catch-up, as the major technological task was to reverse-engineer mature foreign products. The Ministry of Science and 
Technology was created, but “its activities were largely ignored by action-oriented ministries that shaped industrial policies in 
promoting production and exports in labour-intensive mature industries” (Kim and Dahlman, 1992: 441). 
In short, in the early stages, “in the absence of demand for technological change, the direct instruments to strengthen the supply 
of technological capability and to provide linkages [between supply and demand] were ineffective” (Kim and Dahlman, 1992: 
445): indirect technology promotion measures, which stimulated demand, were more important.
   During the later stages of catch-up, from the 1980s onwards, when firms from the Republic of Korea were importing more 
complex technologies in medium- and high-tech industries that were in a consolidation phase in the sense that process tech-
nologies were still changing rapidly, this situation changed. Policies affecting the domestic supply of technology, and in particular 
the Republic of Korea’s own research and development programme, assumed more importance, and policies to stimulate de-
mand, increase supply and link the two all worked effectively together.
The demand side of technology acquisition and upgrading was stimulated through government procurement. The Government 
liberalized foreign direct investment and foreign licensing, put more pressure on domestic firms to increase competitiveness 
through gradual trade liberalization and revised intellectual property laws to pre-empt imitative product development. The Gov-
ernment also established an effective technology transfer centre and technical information centres, which became increasingly 
popular with users. Measures to promote the development of capital goods producers were also taken (quantitative restrictions, 
import licensing and domestic content requirements) and this induced local producers to develop technological capabilities to 
meet the increasing demand for capital goods. Technology extension services were also important for the diffusion of best prac-
tices, particularly to small and medium-sized enterprises. 
The Government of the Republic of Korea also actively promoted R&D activities at this stage of catch-up, and achieved a major 
increase in private-sector R&D efforts. The instruments used by the Government included: (a) tax incentives (reduced tariffs on 
imports of R&D equipment; the deduction of annual non-capital R&D expenditure and the cost of human resource develop-
ment from taxable income; accelerated depreciation on industrial R&D facilities; and a tax credit for investment in R&D facili-
ties); (b) preferential financing for R&D activities (from a technology fund within the National Investment Fund, the Industrial 
Development Fund, the Korea Development Bank’s Technology Development Fund, industrial technology funds earmarked 
specifically for automation and the development of new material, and the Small and Medium Industry Promotion Fund); (c) di-
rect R&D grants; and (d) venture capital creation. In 1987, preferential financing accounted for 64 per cent of total expenditure 
on research and development in the manufacturing sector.
Box table 1 summarizes the different roles of the private sector, universities and government research institutes in R&D activities 
through the early to late stages of catch-up.
Source:  Kim and Dahlman (1992); Kim and Yi (1997).
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capabilities and also, in particular, design and engineering skills (see Bell, 2007). 
Successful latecomer firms successively develop more complex technological 
capabilities and associated organizational and marketing skills.4 This begins with 
simple assembly operation and graduates towards more complex tasks such as 
process adaptation and R&D as the firm moves closer towards the technology 
frontier of leading firms (Hobday, 1995). Relationships with foreign buyers can 
be an important source of technological learning. In such cases, successful firms 
graduate over time from original equipment manufacture, to given production 
specification, to own-design manufacture and finally own-brand manufacture 
(table 20)5.
Over time, technological development through catch-up depends not simply 
on the deepening of these capabilities at the enterprise level, but also on the 
widening of these capabilities through their development and application in an 
increasing variety of economic activities. Typically, as a poor economy gets richer, 
its economy is likely to become more diversified through the introduction of new 
sectors of economic activity. Recent research has shown that there is a strong 
association between the level of sectoral diversification within an economy and 
its level of per capita income (Imbs and Waczairg, 2003). 
In this process, the relative importance of agriculture generally declines as 
economies develop. There are multiple patterns of economic change. However, 
Box table 1.  Evolution of R&D activities in the Republic of Korea
Initial stage Intermediate stage Knowledge-intensive stage
Business R&D Little R&D investment
Imitative reverse-engineering
Limited engineering
•
•
•
Formative stage
Advanced reverse engineering
Development and engineering
•
•
•
Dominant role in the nation’s 
R&D
Globalization of R&D
Research, development and 
engineering
•
•
•
University R&D Minimal role
Undergraduate teaching oriented
•
•
Formative stage
Informal links with industry
•
•
Basic research being 
strengthened
Stronger formal links with 
industry
•
•
Government
research institute 
R&D
Strengthening industry’s bargaining 
power in technology transfer
Training experienced researchers
Reverse engineering of advanced 
technologies
Leading role in the nation’s R&D
•
•
•
•
Expansion of government-
supported research institutes
network
Incubating experienced researchers
Leading role in national R&D 
policies
•
•
•
Leading role in national R&D 
projects
Technical support for SMEs
•
•
Source:  Kim and Yi (1997).
Box 2 (contd.)
Table 20.  Learning trajectories of latecomer firms in East Asia (1950s–1990s):
process technology, product technology and marketing
1950s–1990s – Simple activites        Complex activites
Marketing Simple OEM/sub-contracting           ODM       OBM
Process
technology
Simple assembly Process adaptation Incremental improvements Process development Applied
research
Process
R&D
Product
technology
Assessment
selection
Reverse engineering Prototype development Design for
manufacturing
New design Product
R&D
Source: Hobday, 1995.
Note:   OEM is original equipment manufacture; ODM is own-design manufacture; OBM is own-brand manufacture.
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accumulated capabilities and experience enable the emergence of more 
technologically complex and knowledge-intensive activities. Moreover, there is 
also a strong directionality to the widening of technological capabilities which 
arises because of dynamic inter-sectoral linkages. These may reflect technological 
interdependencies among sectors of economic activity in which technological 
capabilities in one sector can be used in another sector. More important than 
this, however, is the stimulus for innovation which comes through backward 
and forward linkages, in which technological change which lowers prices or 
improves quality in one sector opens new profitable investment and innovation 
opportunities in the linked activities.
One such development trajectory has been identified in relation to the 
development of clusters of productive activity associated with the development of 
natural resources. This sequence of structural change may develop from agricultural 
farming activities, forestry or mining. The typical pattern of development of a 
mature production cluster has been described as having four stages:
• Phase 1: The natural resource is extracted and exported with minimum 
essential processing. Inputs, machinery and engineering services are all 
imported.
• Phase 2: Processing export activities are initiated. Import substitution 
with local production of some inputs and equipment is begun (typically 
under license for the domestic market). Domestic production engineering 
capabilities develop.
• Phase 3: Exporting of goods and services originally produced for import 
substitution purposes (for example, basic machinery for undemanding 
markets) is begun. More sophisticated processed goods are exported. 
Engineering services are of domestic origin.
• Phase 4: Processed goods of great variety and complexity, inputs and 
machinery for demanding markets, design engineering services and 
specialized consultancy services are all exported.
Another typical pattern of structural change which has been identified involves 
a transition from primary and light industry to large-scale processing industries 
(such as steel, cement and petrochemicals), the emergence of a capital-goods 
sector and its transformation into a key sector, and the emergence of high-
technology industry (Justman and Teubal, 1991). These three types of structural 
change are not necessarily sequential or all relevant for small countries. A capital-
goods sector can emerge from primary production, and not necessarily stem from 
the demands of large-scale processing industries. However, the development 
of the latter provides a strong stimulus to the former. The transformation of the 
capital goods into a key sector occurs when capital goods industries become 
the locus of accumulated knowledge and experience in a particular group of 
technologies, accelerating their diffusion across industries. The emergence of high-
tech industries requires more complex technological capabilities than the other 
two phases, and it is thus likely to emerge after strong engineering capabilities 
have been established and these skills built upon.
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 E. Applying the catch-up concept
in an LDC context:
Some strategic priorities
Policies to promote technological learning and innovation need to be adapted 
to the specific context of LDCs. They are in the early stage of a process of 
technological catch-up and are generally at the start of the learning and innovation 
trajectories which typically occur during catch-up. This has particular implications 
for both strategic priorities and instruments of STI policy. 
Technological catch-up will require a pro-growth macroeconomic framework 
which can ensure adequate financial resources for sustained technological learning 
and innovation, as well as a pro-investment climate which stimulates demand for 
investment. Technological catch-up in LDCs will also require the co-evolution 
of improvement in physical infrastructure, human capital and financial systems, 
along with improved technological capabilities within enterprises and more 
effective knowledge systems supporting the supply of knowledge and linkages 
between creators and users of knowledge. Improving physical infrastructure, 
human capital and financial systems is absolutely vital because many LDCs are at 
the very beginning of the catch-up process and have major deficiencies in each 
of these areas. 
The following statistics stand out from the Least Developed Countries 
Report 2006:
• Basic human capital is very weak in the LDCs. The average length of schooling 
for the adult population in 2000 was three years. This is less than half the 
2000 average level for other developing countries (7.1 years) and is less than 
the level of schooling was in other developing countries in 1960. Although 
the level of formal education in LDCs is almost double the 1980 level, the 
education gap between LDCs and other developing countries is larger than 
it was in 1960. In 2002, 34 per cent of the total population aged 15–24 
and 41 per cent of the female population aged 15–24 was illiterate.
• Physical infrastructure necessary for modern and mass production is also 
very weak in the LDCs. In 2003, the level of telephone mainlines and 
fixed and mobile phones per capita was 11 per cent of the level in other 
developing countries and 3 per cent of the level in OECD countries. In 
2002, electricity consumption per capita in the LDCs was 7 per cent of the 
level in other developing countries and 1.6 per cent of the level in OECD 
countries. Only 16 per cent of the LDC population is estimated to have had 
access to electricity that year, compared with 53 per cent in other developing 
countries and 99 per cent in OECD countries.
• The domestic financial systems are also very weak and characterized by 
dualistic and segmented structures. The formal financial system is not working 
to support long-term productive investment in most LDCs. Between 1980 
and 2003, a period in which most LDCs undertook financial liberalization, 
domestic credit to the private sector stagnated at around 14 to 15 per cent 
of GDP. In contrast to other developing countries, domestic credit as a share 
of GDP almost doubled, from 30 per cent to 60 per cent, over the same 
period.
Without improvement in these foundations for development, it is difficult 
to see how technological change will take place. But it is important that LDC 
Governments and their development partners go beyond this. In this regard, it 
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is possible to identify six major strategic priorities for LDCs at the start and early 
stages of catch-up:
1. Increase agricultural productivity, in particular by promoting a Green 
Revolution in basic staples.
2. Promote the formation and growth of domestic business firms.
3. Increase the absorptive capacity of the domestic knowledge system.
4. Leverage more learning from international trade and FDI.
5. Foster agricultural growth linkages and natural resource-based production 
clusters.
6. Upgrade export activities.
In order to ensure poverty reduction, these strategic priorities should be 
articulated with a view to promoting economy-wide expansion of productive 
employment opportunities. This means that there is need for technological change 
in both agricultural and non-agricultural activities. Attention should also be given 
to innovation in non-tradable activities as well as tradables. As Sachs (2004a, 
2004b) has pointed out, the choice of more labour-intensive techniques is much 
easier for non-tradables than for tradables, as the latter have to be internationally 
competitive.
1.  PROMOTING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN BASIC STAPLES
Agricultural activities are the major source of livelihood in most LDCs and 
also constitute a significant portion of GDP. Sustainable agricultural intensification 
is becoming a necessity in more and more LDCs, as rural population density 
rises and the opportunities for agricultural growth through expansion of the 
agricultural land area are becoming exhausted. The productivity gaps with other 
countries also indicate that there are major potentials for income generation 
through agricultural productivity growth. Technological advances in small-scale 
agricultural production and trade are often critical in initiating a catch-up process. 
In this regard, promoting a Green Revolution in basic staples should be a top 
priority of STI policy in many LDCs. 
As has been seen from past experience, the first stage in promoting a Green 
Revolution should be to establish the basics for agricultural productivity growth 
(see chart 9). These include: investing in rural physical infrastructure, particularly 
roads and (where appropriate) irrigation systems; establishing adaptive and 
experimental research stations; investing in extension; and, where necessary, 
pursuing land reforms (Dorward et al., 2004). After establishing the basics for 
a Green Revolution, policies should widen the uptake of the new technology. 
In order to do so, it is necessary to kick-start markets through government 
interventions to enable farmers access to seasonal finance and seasonal inputs 
and output markets at low risk and low cost. This often involves subsidies and 
also special agencies which provide a bundle of services. The importance 
of government interventions to kick-start markets is evident in the historical 
experience of the Green Revolution. However, once farmers become used to 
the new technologies, when volumes of credit and input demand build up, then 
the private sector can take over. Such state withdrawal should take place in late 
catch-up stage, though the Government may start to prepare for this in the later 
phases of early catch-up.
Getting the agricultural knowledge and information system right is a key 
ingredient of establishing the basics. It is important that LDCs in very early catch-
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up phase not only develop their adaptive research capabilities for agriculture, but 
also seek to capitalize on the potentials of the traditional knowledge of farmers. 
Public research efforts within national agricultural research systems should thus 
seek to be more closely integrated with farmers’ needs and experience. Adaptive 
research should include development of modern varieties which are suitable for 
diverse ecosystems and can be integrated into local farming systems. This has 
in the past proved difficult in Africa. But Otsuka (2004)  suggests that it may be 
possible to promote an organic Green Revolution in East Africa based on organic 
fertilizer (manure and compost) through keeping cross-bred dairy cows and goats 
and by using trees with nitrogen-fixing capacity for nutritious fodder. He also 
suggests that the New Rice for Africa (NERICA), a primarily upland rice, could 
be developed if rice research programmes were strengthened in West Africa and 
East and Southern Africa. These programmes could develop second-generation 
upland NERICA, which would be resistant to pests and diseases, as well as lowland 
NERICA. Byerlee and Eicher (1997) also indicate the importance of revitalizing 
maize research capacity for re-energizing Africa’s emerging maize revolution. In 
many countries, agricultural extension systems were expanded through donor 
support but, as this support has declined, it has been impossible to sustain these 
systems. This has led to experimentation with different public-private sector mixes 
in the delivery of extension services. The effectiveness of these experiments is a 
critical issue which needs close attention (Chapman and Tripp, 2003).
Addressing coordination failures which arise in adoption of new commercial 
practices requires institutional innovations. In the past, commodity marketing 
boards were the key institutional innovation which provided multiple functions. 
They obviously had numerous deficiencies. However, current agricultural market 
liberalization policies have been premature in most LDCs. They have sought 
to dynamize rural economies before domestic markets for credit, inputs and 
technology are adequately established, and even, in some cases before the basic 
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Chart 9. Policy phases to support agricultural transformation in favoured areas
Source:  Dorward et al. (2004).
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physical infrastructure, research and extension efforts have taken place. The 
challenge which many LDCs now face is to devise new institutional innovations 
which can enable the spread of the Green Revolution and which do not fall into 
the traps of the old marketing boards, but also fill the institutional vacuum which 
many poor farmers and low-density and remoter regions face.
Broad-based agricultural productivity growth in basic staples –– a Green 
Revolution –– is the surest base for substantial poverty reduction. But an important 
condition for success for such a Green Revolution is that there is a market for 
increased output. Given the rising rates of urbanization in many LDCs, there is 
a potential domestic market. However, there is also an increasing tendency for 
food consumption in LDCs to be met by food imports, including subsidized food 
imports from rich countries. It may be necessary therefore for LDCs to consider 
temporary protection in agricultural sectors against subsidized food imports. This 
should only be temporary and designed to enable the build-up of competitiveness 
by domestic farmers and the wide uptake of Green Revolution technologies. In 
successful cases, for example with the introduction of modern varieties of rice in 
Viet Nam, countries have moved from being a net food importer, to being self-
sufficient, to being able to meet domestic demand and also export.
2.  FORMATION AND GROWTH OF DOMESTIC BUSINESS FIRMS
Whereas LDC Governments recognize the importance of promoting technical 
change in agriculture, there is a general failure to recognize the importance of 
promoting technological learning and innovation in non-agricultural activities. 
But this is an important aspect of sustained development trajectories. Moreover, 
it is becoming critical in the LDCs because of the growing non-agricultural labour 
force and the concomitant need to generate productive employment outside 
agriculture.
At the start of the catch-up process, business firm formation is critical for 
initiating technological learning and innovation. Business firms are the basic locus 
of non-agricultural technological learning and innovation, and a major problem 
facing many LDCs is the lack of such firms. The business sector is characterized by 
a missing middle. At one end of the spectrum, there are a multitude of informal 
microenterprises, most of which are characterized by the use of basic and 
traditional technologies, and cater to the basic consumption needs of restricted 
and relatively small local markets. At the other end of the spectrum are a few 
large firms, which are mainly capital intensive, resource based, import dependent 
or export assembly oriented. These firms are often wholly or minority-owned 
foreign affiliates or state-owned enterprises. They are not large by international 
standards but they dominate the business landscape in most LDCs. Between these 
extremes, there are very few formal-sector SMEs and those small firms which exist 
do not tend to grow into medium and large firms (UNCTAD, 2006a).
Many informal microenterprises only enable people to subsist. But there 
are some more dynamic petty activities and their transformation into organized 
small-scale enterprises can be achieved through “upgrading skills and managerial 
capacities and improving their managerial capacities and improving their systemic 
competitiveness through a set of converging affirmative actions such as preferential 
access to credit, technology and markets” (Sachs, 2004b: 14). Essentially, the 
key capabilities which are required are building core competences, in particular 
operating, craft and technician capabilities, as well as business management 
capabilities. In this regard, technical and vocational education and training can 
play a key role. 
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Collective entrepreneurship can also be a powerful mechanism for both 
diffusing and upgrading best practices. This can build on existing collective 
entrepreneurship practices, such as saving and credit rotation associations, or 
sectoral and territorial groupings of producers and traders who seek economies 
of scale, e.g. by sharing capital equipment. How collaborative action in the 
fields of technology, design and marketing can be promoted is a key issue. The 
encouragement of clusters of activity, e.g. through public infrastructure provision, 
is likely to be an important field for public policy. 
It is important to recognize that whilst informal microenterprises provide 
an important safety net against destitution for many households, investment and 
innovation are carried out by formal firms. Moreover, large firms are often more 
innovative than small firms. Thus, beyond encouraging the transformation of 
microenterprises into small firms, efforts should be made to ensure that those 
firms can grow. Fostering linkages between large firms and SMEs can be very 
important for this process. 
3.  INCREASING THE ABSORPTIVE CAPABILITY OF
THE DOMESTIC KNOWLEDGE SYSTEM
The domestic knowledge systems which constitute the technological 
infrastructure supporting technological learning and innovation are dualistic 
and segmented. The production activities which create most employment and 
livelihoods in the LDCs are based on traditional or indigenous knowledge and 
traditional knowledge systems. These have great potential as a reservoir of 
creativity, but are largely de-linked from the modern knowledge systems. The 
latter, like the formal financial institutions, also have major weaknesses, notably: 
(a) there are weak linkages within the system between different specialized 
suppliers of knowledge (national laboratories, research institutes, universities, 
technology transfer agencies, etc.); (b) knowledge creators are de-linked from 
the local productive apparatus and creating knowledge on the basis of a R&D-
centered linear model of innovation rather than responding to demand, which in 
any case is very weak; (c) the modern knowledge system has often been donor-
driven; and (d) modern knowledge systems in LDCs are not well connected with 
international knowledge systems (UNCTAD, 2006a).
Increasing the absorptive capability of domestic knowledge systems requires 
three major types of policy measure. Firstly, there is a need for education and 
training which increases the pool of relevant human skills. Secondly, there is a 
need for incentives to promote the development of technological learning and 
innovation routines within domestic firms. Thirdly, there is a need for the creation 
of a set of institutions which increase knowledge linkages among domestic firms, 
between foreign firms who have invested in LDCs and domestic firms, and 
between domestic firms and the rest of the world. In the early stage of catch-up, 
this is likely to involve the creation of specialized, publicly-funded agencies which 
act as intermediary organizations in various ways, as well as the development of 
dynamic local clusters of economic activity. However, a long-term goal should be 
to foster the development of engineering firms, intermediate goods producers and 
capital goods suppliers. The development of these specialized agents is possible 
when there is demand for technology services (for example, local technology 
consultancy firms or engineering contractors). 
(a)  Human capital and skills 
With regard to education and training, it is important that basic skills related 
to technology use, operation and maintenance, and business management are 
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strengthened. This requires attention to technical and vocational education and 
training. But advanced human capital is also very weak in the LDCs. In recent 
years, tertiary enrolment has been only 6 per cent of the population aged 20 to 
24, compared with 23 per cent in other developing countries. Within tertiary 
enrolment, the share of enrolments in science and agriculture is approximately the 
same as in other developing countries, but the share of engineering enrolments 
is just over half the level in other developing countries (UNCTAD, 2006a). LDCs 
need to develop their pool of design and engineering skills. This will require 
enterprise-based learning as well as formal education. 
Outmigration of high-skill workers is also a problem in many LDCs. This issue 
will be taken up in chapter 4. 
(b)  Financial incentives for learning and innovative investment 
The second major area of policy to increase the absorptive capability of 
the domestic knowledge system is the provision of incentives for technological 
learning and innovation by domestic firms. This goes beyond basic firm formation. 
Undertaking innovation is a risky and costly activity, and the technological effort 
entailed in search, acquisition, introduction and upgrading of technology may 
entail significant sunk costs. As a result the promotion of technological learning 
and innovation by domestic firms requires financial resources and incentives. As 
will be discussed in chapter 3, there are major limits to the relevance of IPRs as 
an incentive mechanism for innovation in the context of catch-up. Indeed, they 
may have a damaging effect in discouraging informal mechanisms of technology 
acquisition. Against this background, other incentive mechanisms are important.
Financial incentives are often necessary to endogenize learning routines 
and dynamic technological capabilities within firms. These are provided in rich 
countries for R&D. Moreover, they have been an important instrument in all 
countries which have successfully pursued a catch-up strategy (see, in particular, 
Amsden, 2001). They should not be ignored by countries in the early catch-
up stage. Such incentives have taken various forms, including credit subsidies, 
various types of fiscal allowances and matching grants for innovation projects. But 
it is important that their provision is based on competitions and that they are also 
linked to achievement of certain technological goals. Moreover, the aim of these 
incentives should be to endogenize learning routines and innovation capabilities 
in domestic firms so that the financial support is no longer necessary. Box 3 
summarizes some key features of innovation funds operating in Nicaragua.
An important issue is what kinds of projects should be supported this way. 
This should be related to the capabilities one seeks to develop at the firm level. 
Whereas R&D in the form of adaptive invention is absolutely vital for agriculture, 
enterprise-level design and engineering capabilities are much more important 
during this stage in non-agricultural activities. What matters are capabilities 
learned through the act of investment. In this regard, financial incentives for 
pioneer investments may be justified because of their spillover effects. 
(c)  Increasing linkages in the domestic knowledge system
Whilst the development of the technological capabilities of domestic firms must 
be the foundation of efforts to increase the absorptive capability of the domestic 
knowledge system, it is also important to increase linkages among domestic firms, 
between domestic firms and foreign firms who have undertaken FDI in LDCs, 
and also between domestic firms and the rest of the world. At the start of catch-
up, increasing the linkages in the domestic knowledge system is likely to involve 
the creation of specialized, publicly-funded agencies, which act as intermediary 
organizations in various ways, and the promotion of innovative clusters. Later, the 
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development of domestic specialized technological agents –– engineering firms, 
machinery producers, business consultancy firms –– is important. 
Public technology centres can play an important role in both stimulating 
demand and providing technological services before a commercial market for 
the provision of such services exists. Such centres should stimulate demand from 
the private sector for developing technological capabilities and assist search and 
acquisition of technology. As Justman and Teubal (1995:  266) put it in describing 
the key role of basic technology infrastructure: 
“At initial stages of the development of a traditional (low-tech or mid-
tech) industry there may be neither supply nor demand for essential 
skills, and a cooperative effort may be necessary to articulate the needs of 
local industry and to elicit a mutual commitment to a path of progressive 
development. The role of basic TI [technology infrastructure] is to mediate 
between the technological needs of the industry and potential sources of 
supply...[It does so] by providing information and advising local industry 
regarding the availability of foreign technology…stimulating local demand 
for foreign technology by helping local industry redefine its needs in terms 
of possibilities that the new technology offers i.e. ‘user-need determination’; 
Box 3.  An Innovation Fund for small and medium-sized enterprises: the Nicaraguan example
Aiming at upgrading domestic innovative capacity and relaxing the constraints faced by small and medium-sized enterprises 
— notably, high interest rates, short repayment terms and a lack of alternative financing methods — the Nicaraguan Govern-
ment introduced the Innovation Fund. The Innovation Fund covers three agents: (a) enterprises; (b) technology service provid-
ers, such as research and educational institutions and laboratories; and (c) Government policymakers. The relation among these 
three agents is key to the process of technology diffusion and to the successful working of the fund. 
The Innovation Fund is a financing mechanism that provides incentives to SMEs to invest in technological innovations. The 
incentives, in the form of subsidies, are given to: (a) SMEs (defined as firms with less than 100 employees), where they cover 
60 per cent of the cost of the innovation project, up to a maximum of $30,000; (b) associations of up to five SMEs, where they 
cover 80 per cent of the innovation project, up to a maximum of $100,000; and (c) technological service providers, where they 
also cover 80 per cent of the innovation project, up to a maximum of $100,000.
The innovation projects financed with the help of these subsidies mainly cover four technology-related areas: (a) tech-
nological innovation; (b) innovation in information and communications technologies; (c) organizational innovation; and (d) 
commercial and market development activities. While the first two areas contain “traditional” innovative activities such as 
technology upgrading, R&D design, product development, software development and the management of information systems, 
the remaining two areas cover new technology-related activities that range from new management models and engineering 
and associated managerial capabilities to technology acquisition, metrology, the implementation of standards, market research, 
technological monitoring and participation in international technological fairs. 
The role of technological service providers is particularly important as they help small and medium-sized enterprises to 
identify needs and formulate their technology-upgrading proposals, which are then sent to the Government for approval. After 
the projects have been submitted to the Government for funding, the SMEs contract the necessary services and purchase the 
necessary technology and submit a request for reimbursement of the costs incurred. The entire process, from planning to reim-
bursement, takes an average of 9–12 months.
An ex post analysis of the validity and applicability of the Innovation Fund shows that all the SMEs that received financial 
support developed new products, new markets and quality control measures. They also introduced new information and com-
munications technology equipment and trained their employees, and expected to see their sales increase.
The Nicaraguan experience shows that Governments have the capacity not only to promote technological innovation but 
also to stimulate the supply of technological services and specialized technical assistance to SMEs. The SMEs themselves dis-
played two key qualities: dynamism and flexibility. 
In view of the role played by technological service providers, there is a need to facilitate the establishment of technologi-
cal service centres that provide needs-based services to SMEs — including training, quality controls, designing and engineering 
capabilities and market studies during the preparatory and maturity phases of the domestic technological upgrading process.
Source:   Oyanguren, 2007.
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and increasing the effective supply of technology inputs by stimulating 
investment in adapting them to local needs and promoting local sources of 
supply (including technical consultants).”
The UNCTAD Centres for Innovation and Enterprise Development provide 
one example of such agencies (box 4).
One focus of policy action should be to foster the establishment and 
development of dynamic clusters of firms. Such clusters help to remedy the 
problem of the “missing middle”. Clustering can be considered a major facilitating 
factor for a number of subsequent developments, including division of labour and 
specialization, the emergence of a wide network of suppliers, the appearance of 
agents who sell to distant national and international markets, the emergence of 
specialized producer services, the emergence of a pool of specialized and skilled 
workers, and the formation of business associations. These are the so-called 
external economies deriving from clustering. 
These positive developments in cluster do not necessarily take place 
automatically. Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and McCormick (2007) study several African 
clusters, and suggest that, although they are all geographically and sectorally 
bounded groups of producers, some are continuously learning and innovating, 
while others appear to be trapped in a pattern of poor markets, low-quality 
products, and lack of imagination. It is therefore the role of policy to foster the 
establishment of institutions that favour collective action among the firms and 
institutions of the cluster. This may include supporting the creation of backward 
ties with suppliers and subcontractors and forward ties with traders and buyers, or 
within bilateral horizontal linkages between two or more local producers, through 
joint marketing of products, joint purchase of inputs, order sharing, common use 
of specialized equipment, joint product development, and exchange of expertise 
and market information (Nadvi and Schmitz, 1999). 
Over time, policy should also seek to build domestic markets for the 
services associated with technology centres as well as spin off commercially 
viable innovations to a country. This may not be achieved in the early catch-up 
phase. But marketization of basic technological services and the development 
of specialized technological agents should be a long-term goal. These agents 
–– engineering firms, intermediate goods producers, machinery producers, 
business consultancy firms –– are very important for facilitating rapid diffusion of 
knowledge among producers and their local proximity facilitates adaptation and 
innovation in ongoing operation and in new investments. Dahlman, Ross-Larson
and Westphal (1987) identify the emergence of these agents as a key part of 
the success of newly industrializing economies, and draw the conclusion that, 
“It is thus necessary to foster an environment that promotes the formation and 
growth of local technological agents and their interaction with local users of their 
services so that technological possibilities are matched to local conditions and 
requirements in an efficient way” (p.773). 
4. LEVERAGING MORE LEARNING FROM INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FDI 
As discussed in the previous chapter, international market linkages are not 
presently functioning well as channels of technological acquisition by domestic 
firms in the LDCs. Policy action is required to leverage more learning from 
international trade and FDI. To this end, the following goals should be pursued:
• Strengthening the embeddedness of transnational corporation activity in the 
domestic economy by stimulating the creation of backward and forward 
linkages.
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• Fostering development of SMEs so as to enable them to supply both 
transnational corporations active in the domestic market and export markets, 
and to integrate into global value chains.
• Using investment projects in natural resource-based activities (particularly 
mining) as growth poles by diversifying economic activity vertically and 
horizontally around one given project.·
These goals can be achieved through a series of policy mechanisms, 
including:
• Negotiating with transnational corporations for commitments on minimum 
levels of local sourcing. This should be decided on a case-by-case basis, 
taking into account the supply capacity of domestic firms. In some cases, such 
Box 4. Centres for Innovation and Enterprise Development 
Centres for Innovation and Enterprise Development (CIEDs) represent a novel institutional response to the challenge of pro-
moting innovation in manufacturing firms in developing countries. CIEDs constitute an emerging network of change-generating 
agencies designed to promote technological innovation in manufacturing SMEs and to stimulate the development of networks 
for innovation among firms and between firms and local knowledge-producing institutions (universities, R&D institutes, engi-
neering consultancy firms, etc.) In Africa, CIEDs are now operational in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, the United Republic of Tanzania, 
and Zimbabwe.
CIEDs focus mainly on: (a) building and sustaining awareness of the need for innovation; (b) strengthening the ability of 
firms to identify weaknesses in strategy and operations, as well as bottlenecks in production; and (c) serving as the link between 
firms and a network of support structures and suppliers who can help firms overcome their problems.
Indigenous small and medium-sized enterprises form the primary clientele of CIEDs. In some cases the latter work with 
larger firms, especially where such work could promote innovation at the level of small and medium-sized enterprises. CIEDs 
help their clients to locate appropriate sources of expertise and provide assistance in negotiations and project preparation. Typi-
cal projects include: industrial and management audits; work studies and process re-engineering; maintenance management; 
materials management and sourcing of raw materials, equipment and spare parts; technical training; market analysis for existing 
or new products; and upgrading product quality to meet local and external market requirements. 
The nature of the innovation process — even at the level of the firm — requires very close cooperation between CIEDs and 
existing business support structures, as well as technology development organizations in each country. At the local level, strategic 
partnerships will be formed with organizations like Empretec, which have already established strong links with manufacturing 
enterprises and their associations. Linkages will also be forged with other organizations which have experience in promoting 
enterprise innovation.
Technology is the main point of departure for engaging with manufacturing firms, and CIEDs work primarily with enterprise-
level personnel to generate and implement innovative solutions to problems encountered within firms. Any external inputs from 
consultants or experts drawn from the science and technology, R&D or other institutions in the country are complementary to 
efforts within the firms. This is a cardinal principle that distinguishes CIEDs from most other business-development service pro-
viders and helps to ensure the sustainability of CIED initiatives.
CIEDs’ focus on firms helps to stimulate demand for business development services. As firms begin to define their prob-
lems and enhance their ability to identify and implement technological innovation projects, they also begin to recognize those 
resources which must be sourced externally. This helps to strengthen the market for technical and other business development 
services and also to ensure that such services respond to the real needs of the firms.
In order to improve the learning experience at firm level, participatory approaches to project identification and implemen-
tation are used to the fullest extent possible, to ensure that knowledge acquisition and deployment are maximized within the 
firm. High-impact and lower-cost projects are tackled first so as to minimize financial burdens on firms. Higher-cost projects are 
phased in gradually as firms build up their internal knowledge and confidence and hence their capacity to handle more capital-
intensive activities.
CIEDs seek to generate a continuous process of analysis and action within their client firms. To this end, they use three diag-
nostic tools at various stages of their interaction with manufacturing firms. The first of these diagnostic tools, known as a change 
assessment and screening tool (CAST), is designed to help in the selection of potentially innovative firms. The second and third 
diagnostic tools, known as a general information-seeking tool (GIST) and an in-depth enterprise assessment system (IDEAS), are 
used to assist firms in analysing their problems and identifying possible solutions.
Source:  UNCTAD, 2002.
Policy action is required to 
leverage more learning from 
international trade and FDI.
The Least Developed Countries Report 200778
efforts to establish local sourcing are pursued by transnational corporations 
themselves or by pressure from international financial institutions that co-
finance projects.
• Negotiating with transnational corporation objectives of local further 
processing of primary products, particularly in the case of natural resource 
extraction.
• Favouring the establishment of joint ventures with domestic firms when 
transnational corporations establish themselves in the countries.
• Negotiating with transnational corporations on minimum levels of employment 
of nationals, so as to foster domestic skills accumulation.
• Imposing training levies and establishing training centres, particularly those 
related to clusters centering on a given type of activity.
• Providing technical assistance to small firms and farms, in order to raise 
their awareness on standards (technical, environmental, hygienic, etc.) so 
as to enable producers to meet higher requirements from domestic and 
international downstream buyers. This can be done at the cluster level and 
through collective institutions and joint actions, involving small producers 
together with buyers, chain leaders and transnational corporations.
• Using public procurement as a means of fostering SME development.
• Supporting the development of national standards infrastructures, especially 
for certification and testing.
• Establishing stakeholder coordination councils to facilitate strong and 
horizontal interfaces between all critical economic agents (SMEs, other 
domestic firms, transnational corporations, and training and research 
institutions) in the development of industries to connect and coordinate 
all critical economic agents relevant to upgrading and improving the 
competitiveness of their activities.
Access to capital goods should be facilitated by reducing their total cost to 
domestic firms. This can be achieved through trade and fiscal policy mechanisms 
(e.g. tax rebates, accelerated depreciation, etc.). These types of measures have 
been part of the mining code reforms adopted in several African countries (see 
chapter 1, section B of this Report) and should be extended to other sectors, 
including industry and agriculture.
The increasing share of developing country partners in flows of both trade and 
FDI of LDCs points to another area of intervention for the purpose of increasing 
technological capabilities of LDCs. Given the smaller technological distance of 
LDCs from other developing countries (as compared with developed countries), 
the impact of technological imports from the latter on LDCs may be higher, 
as they require less developed domestic absorptive capability. Equally, inflows 
of FDI from ODCs are likely more conducive to technological learning in host 
economies. The reasons for this are not only the already-mentioned shorter 
technological distance, but also the fact that these inflows tend to take more the 
form of joint ventures with local partners and create more linkages (UNCTAD, 
2006b).
South–South links should be actively pursued by LDCs as a means of 
contributing to national technological catch-up. This may take place in the 
context of regional integration schemes or through the joint undertaking of 
supra-national development projects that try to exploit the complementarities of 
different economies in the same region.
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5.  PROMOTING DIVERSIFICATION THROUGH
DYNAMIC INTER-SECTORAL LINKAGE EFFECTS
Besides deepening technological capabilities, a strategic priority of early catch-
up should be to promote economic diversification through the development 
of new activities. This should be an essential element of STI policy in LDCs. 
Diversification can emerge in unexpected ways if policy facilitates entrepreneurial 
search and discovery in general. But inter-sectoral linkage effects also mean that 
there are certain economic activities for which supply and demand conditions 
are likely to be more propitious. In this regard, there are two areas which are 
particularly appropriate for LDCs. These are: (a) the development of agricultural 
growth linkages, and (b) the development of natural resource-based production 
clusters.
(a)  Agricultural growth linkages
In association with promoting agricultural productivity growth, policy should 
encourage industries and services spurred by agricultural growth linkages. Past 
experience shows that agricultural growth linkages are a powerful mechanism 
through which more dynamic informal-sector microenterprises have been 
transformed into organized small firms. The development of local food processing 
industries through forward linkages from agriculture is a major mechanism for 
developing manufacturing experience and skills. Moreover, increasing demand 
for local consumer goods and simple capital goods, which stems from the rising 
incomes associated with agricultural productivity growth, provides a major 
stimulus for microenterprises to transform into small firms. The focalization of 
physical infrastructure development as well as organizational delivery of public 
services on market towns can encourage the development of clusters of rural 
non-farm activities linked to growing agricultural activities.
(b)  Natural resource-based production clusters
Efforts should also be made to develop natural resource-based production 
clusters through adding value to natural resources and exploring the possibilities 
for import substitution with local production of some inputs and equipment and 
the development of domestic production engineering capabilities. 
The following measures have been suggested to develop natural resource-
based production clusters:
• Identify, in conjunction with the private sector, the development potential 
of the activities linked to simple natural resource extraction, including the 
supply of inputs and equipment, processing activities of growing complexity, 
and related services, including in particular engineering and consultancy 
services;
• Identify the activities of the production cluster which require more foreign 
investment, because of the advanced nature of their technology and their 
access to international markets, to guide national efforts to attract the most 
suitable transnational corporations to the country;
• Identify key technologies for developing the production cluster, promote the 
local mastery and updating of those technologies through selective design 
and engineering policies and, if necessary, research and development, 
both in domestic enterprises and in research institutes, and promote the 
updating and adaptation of technology through missions abroad, licenses, 
joint ventures and programmes for co-financing consultancy activities in 
respect of key technologies; and
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Box 5.  The value chain of the leather goods industry in Ethiopia
Ethiopia has a comparative advantage in semi-processed leather, finished leather and leather products. The goal of the Ethiopian 
Government is to make use of this comparative advantage to transform the raw material into finished products. 
Box chart 2 summarizes the three main stages of the value chain in the production of finished leather goods, namely, (a) the sup-
ply of livestock, (b) tanning and (c) the manufacture of leather products. Growth and competitiveness in the leather sector can 
only be achieved if the bottlenecks and constraints found at each stage of the value chain are tackled efficiently. 
Having the largest livestock population in Africa, Ethiopia has a plentiful supply of raw material: hides and skins have been its 
second-largest export, preceded only by coffee. The marketing chain for trade in hides and skins stretches from the rural farmer 
and rural markets to small dealers, town traders and tanneries. The hides and skins produced in slaughterhouses are auctioned 
to big traders and tanneries. Potential improvements at this stage of the value chain include better preservation and handling of 
the hides and skins, the prevention of livestock disease, better quality and the introduction of incentive schemes and a pricing 
structure.
The 1975 ban on the export of raw hides and skins led to an increase in the number of hides and skins processed in Ethiopia. 
Several new tanneries are currently being built with a view to increasing the production of finished leather. Small and medium-
sized tanneries exist alongside large ones. Improvements in quality did not match progress in speeding up the processing of 
hides and skins during the import-substitution period. Poor manufacturing capabilities, little innovation, heavy indebtedness and 
poor production capacity are some of the constraints on expansion of manufacturing in this sector.
To improve the learning and technological capabilities of local firms, national actors should intervene to provide services to 
enterprises and should continuously interact with them. The Ministry of Agriculture initially coordinated all the efforts to make 
improvements in this sector and checked that Ethiopian standards for hides and skins were met. In 1999, these functions were 
transferred to the Ethiopian Livestock Marketing Authority, an independent organization. The other agency involved in stand-
ard-setting in this area is the Quality and Standards Authority of Ethiopia. Horizontal linkages between these organizations are 
essential if the value added of the exports of hides and skins is to be increased. Other agencies are responsible for providing 
incentives: the Ministry of Trade and Industry, for example, is responsible for setting up training institutes to raise the level of 
Identify short-, medium- and long-term infrastructural needs of the cluster, 
including physical infrastructure, science and technology infrastructure and 
human resources (Ramos, 1998: 124–125).
Promoting diversification through dynamic inter-sectoral linkage effects is likely 
to require targeted policies which include financial incentives. As the example of 
the development of the leather industry in Ethiopia shows, it may also involve a 
complex institutional arrangement involving multiple actors (see box 5). 
6.  UPGRADING EXPORTS
An important feature of most LDCs is the non-dynamic nature of their exports. 
Thus, a final strategic priority should be upgrading their exports. Technological 
support for export development requires targeted policies. From past experience, 
successful cases may be initiated either by Governments who identify potential 
new opportunities where sustainable comparative advantage can be created, or 
by entrepreneurs who initiate activities which are new to the country without any 
initial support from the Government (Chandra and Kolavalli, 2006). However 
they start, their consequent development is supported by public action to 
promote both the diffusion and upgrading of technology. These activities may be 
directed to support traditional agricultural exports, such as cotton or coffee; new 
niche agricultural products, such as pineapples or cut flowers; labour-intensive 
industries, such as garments or leather products; or the tourism industry. 
There is intense global competition in all these activities, so upgrading is 
particularly important. One of the most important developing sectors has been 
garments, and in that sector the trigger for initiating the process has come through 
trade preferences. This has supported the acquisition of technology and also some 
diffusion. However, a critical weakness is the lack of upgrading. This threatens 
the sustainability of these activities.
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qualifications of workers in the leather sector, and a “productivity improvement centre” is engaged in training activities and in 
work to improve quality and upgrade leather-processing techniques. Unfortunately, the centre is not subsidized by the Govern-
ment and, as a result, is poorly equipped and has only a limited impact.
The leather sector has enormous potential for development. Some key institutions and support structures already exist, but the 
services provided are not always of very high standard. All improvements in quality and productivity must take place across all 
stages of the industry’s value chain. It is not enough to focus only on upgrading the processing and manufacture of leather for 
export purposes: the quality of the raw material also needs to be improved.
Source:   UNCTAD, 2002.
Notes: MOA - Ministry of Agriculture; QSAE - Quality & Standards Authority of Ethiopia; ESA - Ethiopian Standards Authority; MOTI - Ministry 
of Trade & Industry; LLPTDI - Leather and Leather Products Training Development Institute; PIC - Productivity Improvement Centre; 
ELMA - Ethiopian Leather Manufacturers’ Association; EIA - Ethiopian Investment Authority.
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Box chart 2. Ethiopian leather sector: value chain and existing linkages to support institutions
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F.  The question of state capacity
1.  THE IMPORTANCE OF POLICY LEARNING
The sceptics would argue that the types of STI policies described above can 
hypothetically work, but they are inappropriate for LDCs because state capacities 
are simply too weak. Their formulation and implementation require an effective 
developmental state and many would argue that this is impossible in an LDC 
context (see Mkandawire, 2001, for various impossibility theses). Any attempt to 
design and implement such policies would inevitably lead to massive government 
failures and make the situation worse.
This argument has some substantive basis in that it is true that at present there 
are major deficiencies in governmental capacity in LDCs, particularly with regard 
to long-neglected STI issues. Many institutions simply lack the technical and 
financial means to undertake the tasks that they are mandated to achieve. In this 
regard, Mozambique is indicative. In 2004, that country’s National Standards and 
Quality Institute had a staff of only 13 people, of which only five had university 
degrees, and were earning about $200 a month. The agency had no laboratory 
or calibrating facilities. Of the 100 people working at the National Engineering 
Laboratory, only 10 had university degrees, and most of these held management 
positions, whilst 15 others had technical secondary education qualifications. On 
top of the lack of qualified technicians, these institutions are heavily underfunded 
(Warren-Rodriguez, 2007: 41). 
However, the problem of state capacity needs to be seen in dynamic rather 
than static terms. The static perception that LDCs have weak state capacities 
ignores the possibility of learning through policy practice. The Republic of Korea 
and Taiwan Province of China are now regarded as exceptional cases whose 
exceptionally competent bureaucracies enabled the successful formulation and 
implementation of catch-up policies. But the Koumintang bureaucracy that 
initiated and sustained rapid catch-up growth in Taiwan Province of China was 
notorious for its corruption and incompetence until the 1950s and the Republic 
of Korea was actually sending its bureaucrats to Pakistan and Philippines for extra 
training until the late 1960s (Chang and Cheema, 2001). Thus, very successful 
development experiences did not begin with ideal state capacities. 
There is certainly a need to build a highly competent bureaucracy and to 
build governmental capacity in relation to STI issues, which should encompass 
human resource development, institution building and adequate financing. But 
from a dynamic perspective, just as firms learn over time by doing, Governments 
also learn by doing. The key to developing state capacity in relation to STI issues 
is therefore to develop such capacity through policy practice. 
From this perspective, Teubal (1996) suggests that in relation to innovation and 
technology policy, there is a policy cycle which must begin with experimentation 
and search for what works best. As he puts it, “Policy formulation is a gradual 
process requiring actual experience in implementation (learning by doing). As 
with innovation, its optimum characteristics cannot be planned initially but 
must be learned, in part in interaction with the real world” (p.1180). Because 
it is a process of learning, mistakes are inevitable. But Governments should not 
be seeking some unique economy-wide optimum but making a smaller set of 
incremental choices and establishing mechanisms to evaluate outcomes and 
react to what has been learned. Teubal argues that in the initial infant stage of 
technology policy, horizontal policies should predominate and that, over time, as 
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policy experience is gained, it becomes more possible to successfully implement 
vertical policies.
The incremental learning approach to policy formulation and implementation 
should apply to all government policies (Moreau, 2004). But it is notable that 
with regard to technological catch-up, there are a significant number of models of 
what works, mainly derived from Japan and East Asian development experience. 
These models provide a fund of experience which can be drawn on in the 
learning process. They cannot, of course, be transferred without adaptation to 
other contexts. But what is significant is that there is a diverse range of experience, 
including pioneer late industrializers such as the Republic of Korea and Taiwan 
Province of China, and also followers such as Malaysia, China and Viet Nam. The 
availability of these policy models for successful catch-up experience contrasts 
markedly with the lack of models for successful poverty reduction strategies. 
Governments that are expected to be competent to formulate and implement 
these poverty reduction strategies, which are policy experiments totally new to 
the world and without any prior working examples of sustained success, should 
be expected to be competent enough to formulate and implement policies for 
technological catch-up. 
2.  GOVERNMENT–BUSINESS RELATIONS
Government bureaucracy should be competent and independent. But 
beyond this, an important lesson from successful catch-up experiences is that the 
Government does not act as an omniscient central planner, but rather formulates 
and implements policy through a network of institutions which link Government 
to business. The establishment of intermediary government-business institutions 
should be a priority in good governance of technological learning and innovation. 
A good model for this is the deliberation council system established in Japan in 
the 1950s for the implementation of its industrial policy (see UNCTAD, 1994: 
part II, chapter 1). This system consisted of a set of industry-specific councils 
(or boards of enquiry) which consisted of business leaders, former government 
officials, academics, journalists and representatives from consumer groups, as 
well as the worlds of labour and finance. Their role was information-gathering, 
interest coordination and persuasion, and through their operation, policies were 
not unilaterally decided and enforced by the Government. Such institutions were 
widely adopted in East Asia in countries seeking technological catch-up, including 
the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand (World Bank, 1993: 181–187).
The establishment of government-business links can ensure that the 
Government has access to information. But it is important that despite this, 
Government retains its independence. Financial incentives and other forms 
of support to the private sector must be given on the basis of merit, through 
competitive selection processes and monitored in relation to specified results-
oriented performance standards. In this framework, governmental support is not 
a giveaway but rather provided in return for the achievement of results by the 
private sector which support the achievement of the societal goals embodied in 
the strategic vision. Amsden (2001) identifies this “reciprocal control mechanism” 
as the key institutional innovation in successful catch-up. Similarly, Chandra and 
Kolavalli (2006) show that in all cases of successful establishment of new export 
industries, Governments played an important role in supporting technological 
learning and innovation. However, “the practice of providing support to favourite 
firms within an industry was not followed” (ibid. 16). 
Corruption will simply sabotage an effective STI policy of the type discussed 
here. A basic condition for success is that policies to promote technological 
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learning and innovation do not favour or protect special interest groups 
(“cronyism”). In this regard, it is worth noting that, as well as performance 
standards and structured competition for government support, the strategic vision 
plays an important function. It is not simply a coordination framework but also 
“a conceptual framework for resisting partisan efforts to bend industrial policy 
in their favour” (Justman and Teubal, 1988: 246). Making the strategic vision 
explicit is thus very important.
3.  THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF STI POLICY
Good governance of technological learning and innovation is likely to require 
organizational restructuring within the state apparatus itself owing to the cross-
sectoral nature of technological learning and innovation. As a result of this feature, 
many agencies are required to be involved in promoting innovation (see box 5). 
Many countries have started to establish ministries of science and technology to 
take a lead on science and technology issues. But the mere establishment of a 
ministry of science and technology can be counter-productive, as it can lead to 
an overemphasis on science and an underemphasis on innovation at the sectoral 
level (Juma, 2007). Warren-Rodriguez (2007) illustrates well how the cross-
sectional nature of technological development coupled with inter-ministerial 
fragmentation of decision-making lead to the marginalization of the science and 
technology issues in the PRSP action matrix, despite a strong general commitment 
to technological learning and innovation.
The appropriate organizational structure for integrating technological 
development issues into policy processes needs careful consideration. One 
model, suggested by Forsyth (1990: 173) is to have a technology policy unit 
within the Ministry of Planning (or senior policy coordination unit), together 
with technology experts in relevant sectoral ministries, including trade, industry, 
agriculture and education. The technology policy unit should also be in close 
contact with the ministry of finance with regard to fiscal measures and financial 
provision of technological activities. Another model is provided by the Nordic 
countries’ approach to innovation policy, such as the establishment of national 
technology agency and Science and Technology Policy Council in Finland 
(Nordic Industrial Fund, 2003). Whatever the precise format, this institutional 
issue must be addressed, once again through a learning approach, as a condition 
for successful design and implementation of policies to promote technological 
learning and innovation. 
4.  THE IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL POLICY SPACE
A final condition for successful design and implementation of policies to 
promote technological learning and innovation is the existence of national policy 
space in the sense that Governments have sufficient room to manoeuver to adopt 
independent economic policies in line with their development objectives. In this 
regard, there are two critical issues. 
Firstly, as they are more aid-dependent, LDCs are much more subject to 
conditionality or the pressure of expectations on what is regarded as reasonable 
policy. The PRSP approach aims to enhance domestic ownership, but in practice 
the tension between conditionality and ownership has not been resolved, and only 
a few LDCs have started to elaborate home-grown policies. LDC development 
partners should facilitate experimentation required by the types of STI policies 
proposed here and facilitate policy learning. This should include improved 
policy coherence between macroeconomic and microeconomic development 
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objectives, as too stringent macroeconomic stabilization may undermine the 
evolution of the conditions necessary for innovation and learning. 
Secondly, whereas the international trade regime may not be highly binding, 
the international IPR regime is potentially a major problem for technological 
development in all developing countries seeking to catch-up, including LDCs. 
This issue is taken up in more detail in the next chapter. 
G.  Conclusions
The basic message of this chapter can be summarized in seven basic points.
Firstly, LDC Governments are concerned with promoting sustained economic 
growth as a basis for poverty reduction, but the treatment of technological change 
as a source of economic growth is generally weak in their PRSPs. 
Secondly, the weak treatment of technological change reflects the 
marginalization of technology policies within structural adjustment programmes, 
which have been particularly intensely implemented within the LDCs, the omission 
of technology issues from the PRSP approach, and the failure to embed PRSPs 
— which are essentially three-year public expenditure plans — within broader 
development strategies that include actions to promote technological change. It 
is vital that LDCs now devise such development strategies. There is widespread 
restlessness in many developing countries, including LDCs, to find a new, post-
Washington consensus policy model. A focus on promoting technological change 
as a sequential, cumulative process can be at the heart of a new approach. 
Priority actions in three-year poverty reduction strategies can be derived from the 
broader development strategy. Thus, LDC Governments should integrate an STI 
policy into their development and poverty reduction strategies.
Thirdly, the STI policy should focus on promoting technological learning 
and innovation within enterprises, both firms and farms. This is best achieved 
with a systems model of innovation rather than a linear model which focuses 
on scientific research and expects that to generate technological development 
and innovation. It is also best achieved with a mixed market-based approach in 
which the Government and the private sector work closely together. Public action 
should facilitate entrepreneurial search and discovery, catalyse private investment 
and innovation through market-based incentives, and address coordination 
failures where the profitability of investment depends on interrelated action in 
different sectors.
Fourthly, the basic strategic objective of STI policy should be to promote 
technological catch-up with more advanced countries. Successful developing 
countries have adopted policies to promote technological learning and innovation 
which are geared towards achieving technological catch-up with more advanced 
countries. There is no reason why LDC Governments should not do likewise. 
Indeed, unless the LDCs adopt policies to stimulate technological catch-up 
with the rest of the world, they will continue to fall behind other countries 
technologically and face deepening marginalization in the global economy. 
Fifthly, policies to promote technological catch-up need to be appropriate to 
the level of technological development, economic structure and capabilities of the 
Governments and business sector of the LDCs. Most LDCs are in the early stage of 
a process of catch-up and are generally at the start of the learning and innovation 
trajectories which typically occur during catch-up. Technological catch-up in LDCs 
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will require the co-evolution of improvement in physical infrastructure, human 
capital and financial systems together with improved technological capabilities 
within enterprises and more effective knowledge systems supporting the supply 
of knowledge and linkages between creators and users of knowledge. Catch-up 
involves both the deepening of technological capabilities at the enterprise level 
and the widening of those capabilities through their development and application 
in an increasing variety of economic sectors.  In that regard, it is possible to 
identify six major strategic priorities which will be relevant for many LDCs:
• Increase agricultural productivity in basic staples, in particular through 
promoting a Green Revolution;
• Promote the formation and growth of domestic business firms; 
• Increase the absorptive capacity of domestic knowledge systems;
• Leverage more learning from international trade and FDI;
• Foster diversification through agricultural growth linkages and natural- 
resource-based production clusters;
• Upgrade export activities. 
Sixthly, those priorities should be articulated with a view to economy-wide 
expansion of employment opportunities in order to ensure poverty reduction. 
That will require technological change in agricultural and non-agricultural 
activities, and in tradables and non-tradables.
Seventhly, LDC Governments currently have weak capacities to formulate 
and implement STI policies within development strategies. But this does not 
mean that such capacities cannot be developed. Governments should adopt an 
incremental learning approach to policy formulation and implementation. They 
should also ensure that there is a network of intermediary government–business 
institutions to ensure good governance of technological learning and innovation. 
Finally, attention should be given to the administrative organization of STI policy 
as it is a cross-cutting issue which cannot be left to a ministry of science and 
technology alone. 
Notes
1  Box, Ulmanen and Steinhauer (2004) reach a similar conclusion in relation to science 
and technology plans in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. Although the 
Cotnou Partnership Framework encourages the development of scientific, technological 
and research infrastructure, science and technology issues are rarely referred to in the 
Country Support Strategy papers of ACP countries. 
2  For further discussion of the state of science and technology in Nepal, see Nepal and 
Karki (2002). Waast (2002) provides a very revealing discussion on the state of science 
in Africa, whilst the status of science and technology infrastructure is discussed in Akin 
Adubifa (2004), Khalil-Timany (2002) and Lall and Pietrobelli (2003). 
3  Within LDCs, there are many examples of failures of assimilating and operating transferred 
industrial technology because of weak firm-level capabilities. The typical symptoms 
are repeated breakdowns of machinery, a high incidence of down time, low product 
quality standards, failure to reach rated capacity of equipment, carrying large margins of 
unplanned excess capacity and excessive unit costs. The causes of these failures include: 
“(i) the inability to hire labour with the required manual skills; (ii) unforeseen complexity 
of the process stemming from the failure to make an adequate prior technical appraisal 
of equipment; (iii) lack of local repair and maintenance facilities; (iv) unsuitability of the 
process for the assigned task; (v) failure of machinery manufacturer to provide adequate 
after-sales service and to supply spare parts when needed; (vi) inherent faults in the 
equipment; (vii) inexperience of management in organizing and running an industrial 
operation; and (viii) poor financial appraisal” (Forsyth, 1990: 127). 
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4. For further discussion of these technological capabilities, see Lall (1992, 2004), UNIDO 
(2002).
5. Under original equipment manufacture (OEM), the latecomer firm produces a finished 
product to the precise specification of a foreign buyer. The foreign firm then markets 
the product under its own brand name, through its own distribution channel and often 
involves the foreign partner in the selection of capital equipment and the training of 
managers, engineers and technicians as well as providing advice on production, financing 
and management.
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3
Intellectual Property 
Rights and Other 
Incentive Mechanisms 
for Learning and 
Innovation
A.  Introduction
Building strong domestic productive capacities is central to faster economic 
growth and diversification in LDCs. The objective of this chapter is to explore the 
current controversies about how a strong intellectual property rights (IPR) regime, 
as encouraged by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), affects the economic development processes of LDCs and the 
range of policy issues related to facilitating technological development, through 
the lens of development economics rather than a narrow legalistic perspective.  It 
will begin with an overview of some of the general global IPR trends, seen through 
the prism of LDCs (section B), and discuss the “knowledge trade-off” underlying 
the rationale for IPRs and its applicability to LDCs (section C). It will then examine 
some of the available secondary evidence regarding the impact of IPRs on learning 
and innovation and present the findings of an original case study on the impact of 
IPRs on innovation in the domestic processing sector in Bangladesh (section D). 
The chapter will also assess the impact of TRIPS and TRIPS-plus obligations on 
the learning trajectories of LDCs and whether prescribed flexibilities for LDCs are 
working as promised. Section E, on policy implications, will revisit some widely 
used incentive and policy mechanisms and section F will consider several new 
proposals for improving knowledge governance. Conclusions and main policy 
recommendations are set out in section G.
B.  Trends in intellectual property protection
1.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION AND THE GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE
The term “intellectual property rights” (IPRs) refers to those legal rules, norms 
and regulations that prevent the unauthorized use of intellectual products. IPRs 
cover a broad range of subjects, inter alia, patents, copyrights, trademarks, 
geographical indications, industrial designs and trade secrets. The chapter will 
focus, however, on patents and copyright. Intellectual Property (IP) essentially 
consists of two domains: one deals with industrial products (which includes 
patents, trademarks, industrial designs and geographical indications of source) 
and the other with artistic products (which are covered by copyright and related 
rights). Once IPRs are  established, its owner enjoys certain specified rights in 
terms of its duration (20 years for patents and life plus 50 years for copyrights). 
IPRs can be issued on products and processes: patents are usually issued for a 
technical device, or engineering principle after an investigation into its anteriority, 
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and in exchange for the public divulging of the technical details. Patents can 
also be granted, inter alia, for crops, genes, and drugs. A patent confers negative 
rights, i.e., the right to exclude others from certain activities (TRIPS Article 28). 
The copyright is granted for the expression of an idea, not the idea itself. 
It essentially provides the “right to copy”  an original creation, such as poems, 
theses,  plays, literary works, choreographic works, musical compositions, audio 
recordings, paintings, drawings, sculptures, photos, software,  radio and television 
broadcasts, and sometimes industrial designs. 
The boundary between those domains has, in some respects, been eroding in 
recent years, owing to the fast rates of diffusion of  scientific innovations that blur 
the boundaries between patentable and copyrightable subject matters and its 
more widespread use as a source of corporate profits, as well as to the convergent 
use of new technologies across sectors in what is increasingly being referred to as 
the “knowledge economy” (OECD, 1999).1 Measuring the knowledge economy 
is subject to methodological and statistical shortfalls of various kinds, not least the 
limits of existing economic categories and classifications (Foray, 2000: chapter 
1). The “copyright industries” have not only grown significantly in recent years, 
but have also expanded beyond their traditional core to encompass a wider set 
of activities in which knowledge is an important input in the production process. 
According to recent estimates for the United States, copyright industries contribute 
between 7 and 11 per cent of output and between 4 million and 8.5 million jobs. 
At the same time the number of patent applications has been growing rapidly, 
and licensing and cross-licensing (section B of this chapter) are being used more 
frequently. 
These trends, which attest to the growing economic importance of intellectual 
property, have been accompanied by more qualitative changes in intellectual 
protection, all of which point to a considerable tightening of the rules governing 
access to knowledge. The 1990s witnessed a series of major changes in the patent 
system that reduced patentability thresholds for patents and expanded the scope 
of legitimate subject matter to include genetically modified organisms (GMOs), 
software and business methods. The reform of the United States copyright law in 
the late 1990s, which extended the duration (term) of copyright to a life plus 70 
years model,2 culminating in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (1998), was 
followed by the European Union Copyright Directive (EUCD) in 2001. There 
have also been other legislative changes in the advanced economies to strengthen 
enforcement, such as the EC Database Directive, which provides exclusive 
rights on non-creative databases. Moreover, concerns are intensifying as regards 
increased use of “defensive patents” or strategic use of patents (Hall, 2005), as 
well as over increasing  restrictions on statutory private use exceptions or “fair 
use”(Burk and Cohen, 2001; UNCTAD and ICTSD, 2003a; Musungu, 2005). The 
process of tightening intellectual property protection has been reflected in the 
increased control over knowledge, information and culture by a small number 
of very large corporations often operating in highly concentrated markets (Teece, 
1995; Macmillan, 2005; David and Foray, 2003). Indeed, the protection of 
intellectual property has in recent years moved from a defensive to an offensive 
corporate strategy, including deterring entry of potential rivals (Robledo, 2005), 
as patents and copyrights are increasingly seen as a unique means of generating 
value from intangible assets. 
However, efforts to tighten protection have not been confined to domestic 
legislation. Over the last two decades, as a result of strong corporate lobbying 
in some key sectors, together with policy advice from donors and multilateral 
organizations, developing countries, including LDCs, have been strongly 
encouraged to broaden the scope of IP protection, irrespective of their own 
needs and conditions. This pressure has been channelled through multilateral, 
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regional and bilateral obligations: the TRIPS Agreement, the WIPO Internet 
treaties (1996), regional free trade agreements, bilateral investment treaties and a 
number of other international trade agreements.
Advocates of stringent IPRs have insisted that they will encourage technology 
transfer, stimulate innovation and bring collateral benefits by strengthening the 
investment climate and attracting more foreign direct investment (FDI), which 
in turn will improve welfare (Pires de Carvalho, 2002; Sykes, 2002; Fisch and 
Speyer, 1995).  Consequently, intellectual property has been labeled a “power 
tool for economic development and wealth creation” (Idris, 2003). But there are 
strong opposing arguments.
2.  SOME TRENDS IN IP PROTECTION, WORLDWIDE AND IN LDCS
Although patent systems diverge significantly across countries, patent statistics 
can be regarded as one measure of a country’s inventive activity and related 
technology flows (WIPO, 2006). Recent patenting trends indicate that patent 
filings worldwide have grown on average by 4.8 per cent per annum over the 
past 10 years (reaching 1.6 million in 2004); and patents granted have also 
increased at a similar rate. However, while some emerging economies (India, 
Brazil and Mexico) are making increasing use of the patent system, it remains 
highly concentrated with the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, China 
and the European Patent Office accounting for 74 per cent of all patents granted 
(WIPO, 2006).
The available data on patenting trends in LDCs from WIPO and the World 
Bank (World Development Indicators online) are not totally consistent (tables 21 
and 22). However, they both show similar patterns, namely:
• LDCs share of global patents is insignificant; and
• Overall in LDCs patent applications by non-residents exceeded those by 
residents.
The World Bank data also show that there was a downward trend in domestic 
patenting activity by LDC residents (chart 10 and table 21).
According to available data, between 1998 and 2004, trademarks and 
industrial designs played a far greater role than patents for LDC residents. Data 
on industrial design applications suggest that in Bangladesh, residents made 680 
applications, compared with 251 in Yemen and 123 in Madagascar (table 22). 
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Chart 10. Patent applications in LDCs by residents and non-residents,
1990–2004
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, online, 2007.
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Table 22. Industrial property applications in LDCs, by residents and non-residents, latest years
Country Year Patent
applications
Trademark
applications
Industrial design 
applications
Residents Non-residents Residents Non-residents Residents Non-residents 
Bangladesh 2003 58 260 4 085 1 310 680 10
Benin 1998 .. .. 20 908 3 008 .. ..
Bhutan 1997–2002 .. .. 7 2 020 .. ..
Burundi 2002 .. .. 20 132 .. ..
Cambodia 2003 .. .. 297 1 559 .. ..
Djibouti 2000 .. .. 408a .. .. ..
Gambia 2001 .. 55 .. .. .. 9
Haiti 1999 1 5 150 1306 .. ..
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 2002 .. .. 19 672 .. ..
Lesotho 2001 1 54 .. 19 .. 1
Madagascar 2002 4 .. 162 293 123 ..
Malawi 2002 .. 1 138 440 10 12
Mauritania 2002 6 .. 9 .. 0 ..
Mozambique 2001 1 52 .. .. .. 12
Nepal 2001 3 11 1 148 418 3 18
Rwanda 1999 .. 4 5 124 .. ..
Samoa 2000 .. 15 16 357 0 0
Sierra Leone 2001 1 51 .. .. .. 9
Sudan 2001 1 54 .. .. .. 9
Uganda 2001 2 58 .. 14 .. 9
United Republic of Tanzania 2001 2 54 .. 16 .. 11
Yemen 2004 63 788 6 865 24 169 251 50
Zambia 2001 6 25 213 582 7 9
Source: UNCTAD secretariat compilation based on WIPO, Guide To Intellectual Property Worldwide, Country Profiles, last updated September 
2006.
Note:   Data are available only for the above-reported LDCs.
a Denotes figure for non-residents and residents combined. Data on the composition of patents are not available.
Table 21. Patent applications by LDC residents and non-residents, 1990–2004
Year Patent applications, non-residents
Patent applications,
residents
1990 179 39
1991 168 47
1992 210 86
1993 171 63
1994 109 53
1995 260 110
1996 102 25
1997 26 2
1998 18 39
1999 95 16
2000 117 13
2001 372 7
2002 22 4
2003 26 3
2004 24 16
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators, online, 2007.
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Non-resident applications were not as significant, with the exception of Yemen 
(50 applications made). As regards trademark applications by residents, 20,908 
applications were made in Benin, compared with 6,865 in Yemen and 1,148 in 
Nepal, while non-resident applications were sizeable in several LDCs (table 22). 
The low level of patenting activity by LDC residents mirrors low levels of R&D 
expenditure. According to the most recent data, gross domestic expenditure 
on R&D (GERD) in Burkina Faso amounted to 0.17 per cent of GDP, while the 
percentage was 0.0064 per cent for Lesotho, 0.12 per cent for Madagascar, 0.67 
per cent for Nepal, 0.34 per cent for Sudan, 0.81 per cent for Uganda, 0.0081 
per cent for Zambia and 0.6 per cent for Bangladesh (chapter Introduction to this 
Report, table 1). This compares with, for example, 1.3 per cent in China and 0.98 
per cent in Brazil.
As regards licensing activities in LDCs, available data indicate that licensing has 
not increased  on a per capita basis since the conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement: 
licence payments on a per capita basis were the lowest in the world ($0.07) 
between 2000 and 2005, and have remained unchanged since the period 1996–
1999. The comparable figure in other developing countries was $6.36 per capita 
(in 2000–2005), which was almost double the figure for the previous period 
(1996–1999): $3.55 (chapter 1,  table 16). 
3. LDCS IN THE TRIPS-BASED POLICY REGIME
It is generally accepted that the issue of intellectual property entered 
multilateral trade negotiations in the Uruguay Round largely as a result of the 
concerted pressure of the United States, European and Japanese pharmaceutical 
and international entertainment companies (Shukla, 2000; Drahos and 
Braithwaite, 2004). 
  In line with their WTO obligations under the TRIPS agreement, WTO 
members must also comply with most provisions of the Paris Convention on 
Industrial Property and the Berne Convention on Literary and Artistic Works, 
and particularly provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of 
Integrated Circuits.  Currently, 35 LDCs are parties to the Paris Convention and 
29 are parties to the Berne Convention (table 23). As a result, LDCs are obliged to 
apply the same “minimum” IP standards as soon as the transitional periods expire 
or upon graduation. In many cases, TRIPS-plus regulations impose on LDCs even 
higher standards and obligations than on other WTO members. 
The 1994 TRIPS Agreement obliges all signatory countries to grant patents 
for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, 
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of 
industrial application, without discrimination as to the place of invention, the 
field of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced 
(Article 27). Since the conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement, IP protection has been 
extended to include items that were previously unprotected in most developing 
countries, such as computer programmes, integrated circuits, plant varieties and 
pharmaceuticals. The original transition period granted to all LDC members 
of the WTO (until 2006) was extended until 1 July 2013, and until 2016 for 
pharmaceutical products and related processes.
The TRIPS Agreement5 recognized that the implementation of high standards 
of IP protection would be difficult for LDCs to implement immediately, granting 
a 10-year transition period and providing for technical assistance for “the 
preparation of laws and regulations on the protection of intellectual property 
rights as well as for the prevention of their abuse”.
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Table 23. LDC membership in selected intellectual property conventions, 
as at February 2007
Paris Convention
(Industrial Property) 
Berne Convention 
(Literary and 
Artistic Works)
WIPO
Copyright
Treaty
WTO LDCs 
Angola
Bangladesh X X
Benin X X
Burkina Faso X X X
Burundi X
Cambodia X
Central African Republic X X
Chad X X
Dem. Rep. of the Congo X X
Djibouti X X
Gambia X X
Guinea X X
Guinea-Bissau X X
Haiti X X
Lesotho X X
Madagascar X X
Malawi X X
Maldives
Mali X X X
Mauritania X X
Mozambique X
Myanmar
Nepal X X
Niger X X
Senegal X X X
Sierra Leone X
Solomon Islands 
Togo X X X
Uganda X
United Rep. of Tanzania X X
Zambia X X
Non-WTO LDCs
Afghanistan
Bhutan X X
Cape Verde X
Comoros X X
Equatorial Guinea X X
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Kiribati
Lao PDR X
Liberia X X
Rwanda X X
Sao Tome and Principe X
Samoa
Somalia
Sudan X X
Timor-Leste
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Yemen
Total 35 29 4
Source: UNCTAD secretariat compilation based on http://www.wipo.org.
IPRs and Other Incentive Mechanisms for Learning and Innovation 97
The TRIPS Agreement incorporates a number of flexibilities — such as 
compulsory licensing6, parallel imports7 and fair use/fair dealing (or statutory 
private use, as employed in European continental copyright law, e.g. France, 
Germany, Italy, etc.)8 — that the LDCs can utilize in order to make possible 
the use of TRIPS-compatible norms in a manner that enables them to pursue 
their own regulatory policies. However, this does not imply that flexibilities are 
necessarily utilized.  Firstly, TRIPS flexibilities are not utilizable in the LDCs unless 
legislation is drafted to incorporate them into national laws.  Secondly, under 
regional arrangements for IP protection, many of those flexibilities cannot be 
utilized owing to membership of regional IP organizations, such as Organisation 
Africaine de la Propriété Intellectuelle (OAPI) (12 out of whose 16 members are 
LDCs; table 24) and the African Regional Intellectual Property Office (ARIPO). 
Thirdly, those flexibilities cannot be used because of commitments undertaken at 
the bilateral level9 (table 25).
Other flexibilities include exceptions to patent rights such as the Bolar 
exception, government use and experimental use exceptions. Developing 
countries are advised to interpret the flexibilities in the widest way possible, and to 
incorporate explicit provisions into their national patent laws (CIPR, 2002). With 
respect to exceptions to patent rights,10 under TRIPS, LDCs have considerable 
flexibility as regards promotion of transfer of technology, prevention of abuse 
of intellectual property rights and protection of public health. However, TRIPS-
plus regulations limiting flexibilities, already operative in many LDCs, are likely to 
have an adverse impact on their access to the global pool of knowledge, which 
may further constrain national policy. When the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs) (which discourages local content requirements) 
is also taken into account, it is clear that LDC prospects for effective industrial 
policy and learning are greatly diminished (UNCTAD, 2006c).
Table 24. LDC membership in regional intellectual property organizations, 2007
LDC ARIPO OAPI
Benin X
Burkina Faso X
Central African Republic X
Chad X
Equatorial Guinea X
Gambia X
Guinea X
Guinea Bissau X
Lesotho X
Malawi X
Mali X
Mauritania X
Mozambique X
Niger X
Senegal X
Sierra Leone X
Somalia X
Sudan X
Togo X
Uganda X
United Republic of Tanzania X
Zambia X
Total 10 12
Source: UNCTAD secretariat compilation based on African Regional Intellectual Property 
Organization (ARIPO), http://www.aripo.org; and Organisation Africaine de la 
Proprieté Intellectuelle (OAPI), http://www.oapi.wipo.net.
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Table 25. Intellectual property requirements in bilateral agreements
between the United States and selected LDCs
TRIPS-plus area Definition of Investment includes Intellectual property 
Bilateral United States–LDC BIT Agreements
United States–Bangladesh 
Bilateral Investment Treaty
(1986)
Requirement to accede to the Budapest Convention
(micro-organisms)
Article 1c) “Investment” means every kind of investment owned 
or controlled directly or indirectly, including equity, debt;
 and service and investment contracts; and includes….
(iv) Intellectual property, including rights with 
respect copyrights and related patents, trade marks and trade names,
industrial designs, trade secrets and know-how, and goodwill;
United States–Democratic 
Republic of the Congo
Bilateral Investment Treaty
(1984)
Article I c) “Investment” means every kind of investment, owned or 
controlled directly or indirectly, including equity, debt, and service 
and investment contracts; and includes: 
(iv) intellectual and industrial property rights, including rights with 
respect to copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade names,
 industrial designs, trade secrets and know how, and goodwill;
United States–Mozambique 
Bilateral Investment Treaty
(1998)
Article 1 d) ”investment” of a national or company means every 
kind of investment owned or controlled directly or indirectly by that 
national or company, and includes investment consisting or taking 
the form of:
(v) intellectual property, including:copyrights and related rights, 
patents, and confidential business information,
trade and services markes, and trade names;
rights in plant varieties, industrial designs,  rights in semiconductor 
layout  designs, trade secrets, including know how
(vi) rights conferred pursuant to law, such as licences and permits;
(e) “covered investment under this treaty” means an investment of a 
national or company of a Party in the territory of the other Party;
United States–Senegal
Bilateral Investment Treaty
(1990)
Article I (c) “Investment” means every kind of investment, owned or 
controlled directly or indirectly, including equity, debt, and service
and investment contracts; and includes:
(iv) intellectual and industrial property rights, including rights 
with respect to copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade names,
 industrial designs, trade secrets and know-how, and goodwill;
Bilateral United States–LDC Trade Agreements
United States–Cambodia 
Trade Relations and
Intellectual Property
Rights Agreement
Article 11(1)d : Requirement to join UPOV Convention 
Article 13(5) Extension of TRIPS copyright  terms of duration 
from 50 to 75 years.a
Article XVIII (1) a. Requirement for patenting in all fields of
technology.  
TRIPS-plus because no exclusion for animals or plants, as pos-
sible under TRIPS Article 27 (3) b.
Each Party shall make patents available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, pro-
vided that such inventions are new, result from an inventive step 
and are capable of industrial application. 
For the purposes of this Article, a Party may deem the terms 
inventive step and capable of industrial applications” to be syn-
onymous with the terms non-obvious and “useful,” respectively.
United States–Laos Bilateral
Trade Relations Agreement 
Includes Intellectual Property Chapter 
Article 13 (2)d: Requirement to join UPOV Convention
Article 18 (5) : Patenting in all fields of technology . 
TRIPS-plus because no exclusion for animals or plants,
as possible under TRIPS Article 27 (3) b.
”Patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without
 discrimination as to the field of technology or 
whether products are imported or locally produced”.
Article 15 (4):  Extension of TRIPS copyright terms of 
duration from 50 to 75 yearsb
The Agreement includes a specific chapter on Intellectual 
Property Rights. Definition of Intellectual property rights: 
Article 28 1 (d): “‘intellectual property rights´ refers to copyrights 
and related rights, trademarks, patents, protection of integrated
 circuit layout designs and encrypted satellite signals,
trade secrets, and protection of plant breeders’ rights” 
Sources: UNCTAD secretariat compilation based on Agreement between the United States and the Kingdom of Cambodia on Trade Relations and Intellectual Property 
Rights Protection done at Washington, in duplicate, October 4, 1996. Agreement between the United States and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic on 
Trade Relations, 1997 (http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/indexasp).
Notes: a Article 13(5): “Whenever the term of protection of a work, other than a photographic work or work of applied art, is calculated on a basis other than the 
life of a natural person, such term shall be no less than 75 years from the end of the calendar year of first authorized publication…”
b Article 15 (4): “Each Party shall provide that, where the term of protection of a work is to be calculated on a basis other than the life of a natural person, the 
term shall be no less than 75 years from the end of the calendar year of the first authorized publication of the work or, failing such authorized publication 
within 25 years from the creation of the work, not less than 100 years from the end of the calendar year of the creation of the work”.
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The inclusion of TRIPS-plus clauses in regional arrangements, in addition to 
BITs, FTAs and other preferential agreements, can limit the use of flexibilities.11
The stringent TRIPS-plus standards required, either at the time or immediately 
following accession to the WTO, are yet another example of the asymmetric 
treatment accorded in multilateral forums to the most vulnerable and weakest 
members of the international community.
Even with its inbuilt flexibilities, the TRIPS Agreement is highly problematic for 
LDCs owing to the high transaction costs involved in complex and burdensome 
procedural requirements for implementing and enforcing appropriate national 
legal provisions. LDCs generally lack the relevant expertise and the administrative 
capacity to implement them. Furthermore, although the Doha Declaration of 
2001 was an improvement over TRIPS, especially in the area of health and access 
to medicines, it does not address the building of technological capacity. Since 
most LDCs lack sufficient awareness about the full use of flexibilities, WIPO, in 
cooperation with UNCTAD, should play a more active role in informing those 
countries about the full range of their possible use.
The majority of non-African LDCs seem to confer patent protection for 
pharmaceutical products by applying the legislation of the countries whose 
colonies they once were (Correa, 2007).  Despite the extension period, practically 
all African LDCs have followed suit, and this includes the granting of patents 
for pharmaceuticals.  In the spirit of Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement and 
paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration (2001), which exempt  LDCs from both 
making available and enforcing patents, and test data protection, they have the 
option of not enforcing granted patents and allowing competition in the relevant 
product market. 
Various flexibilities allow LDCs to use TRIPS-compatible norms in a manner 
that enables them to pursue their own public policies, and to establish economic 
conditions supportive of their economic development objectives.  While these 
flexibilities are mainly defined in terms of more generous implementation times, 
they also include exemptions in areas such as public health, where rules on 
compulsory licensing, parallel imports and experimental use are more relaxed. 
Table 25 provides a non-exhaustive list of selected examples regarding the 
nature of TRIPS-plus requirements in both bilateral investment agreements and 
bilateral trade agreements between a number of LDCs and their partners. For 
example, Article 11 D of the trade relations and intellectual property agreement 
between the United States and Cambodia (1996) limits Cambodia’s scope for 
flexibility with respect to adopting a particular type of sui generis system for plant 
protection, which requires Cambodia to join the International Convention for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (the UPOV Convention).12
Similarly, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Bangladesh have 
entered into bilateral agreements with the United States that contain TRIPS-
plus requirements (table 25). Moreover, the European Union and Bangladesh 
Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development (1999) encourages 
Bangladesh’s adoption of the UPOV Convention by 1 January 2006. The 
EU Cotonou Agreement (2000) with ACP countries includes patenting for 
biotechnological inventions and plant varieties, as well as legal protection of 
databases, as part of its list of intellectual property rights falling within the scope 
of the Agreement.13 All African LDCs belong to the ACP group.
(a)  Free trade agreements and TRIPS-plus obligations
Owing to the TRIPS Agreement’s inbuilt flexibilities, more stringent IP 
requirements have been negotiated in regional and bilateral agreements. The 
inclusion of these so-called TRIPS-plus clauses further limits the use of the 
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flexibilities negotiated at the multilateral level, as witnessed in the mushrooming 
of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), whose number has increased sixfold in just two 
decades (Roffe and Vivas, 2007). For example, some FTAs require that countries 
not make use of parallel imports, extend the duration of the copyright, while 
others restrict the grounds for compulsory licences. Some FTAs also impose data 
exclusivity clauses which restrict the use of the patent holder’s test data as the 
basis for granting safety approval of the generic versions of the same drug.14  For 
example, compliance with TRIPS and “going beyond TRIPS”15 are one of the 
eligibility requirements for benefits under the preferential scheme of the United 
States’ African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).16
(b)  Regional cooperation and regional intellectual property systems in the LDCs 
Regional cooperation may offer some advantages as regards lower 
transaction costs and regional harmonization, but also disadvantages if regional 
commitments are of a TRIPS-plus nature, implying a higher level of commitments 
than stipulated under the TRIPS Agreement (table 24). LDC members of OAPI 
cannot take advantage of an extended transition period or a longer extension 
on pharmaceutical product protection (granted at Doha) unless the Bangui 
Agreement is amended specifically for that purpose (CIPR, 2002).  The Bangui 
Agreement includes TRIPS-plus commitments that require TRIPS compliance 
prior to the agreed LDC extension deadline. The Bangui Agreement furthermore 
contains no exclusions from patentability. Unless amended, the Bangui Agreement 
will continue to restrict the issuance of compulsory licences to a greater extent 
than required by TRIPS.17 The LDCs concerned should seriously consider the 
implications of that restriction. 
4. CALLS FOR REFORM
After two decades of steadily increasing IP protection there are growing 
concerns about how far that process has gone. Increasingly, developing countries, 
including the LDCs, are concerned that the development dimension is not 
sufficiently integrated into global IP policymaking. In 2004, WIPO launched 
discussions on a Development Agenda, prompted by the recognition of global 
knowledge asymmetries and the need for greater integration of a development 
dimension into global IP policymaking. (CIPR, 2002; WIPO, 2007b). 18
Recently, the Committee on Proposals Related to a WIPO Development 
Agenda (WIPO, 2007b) called for reform of the current IPR regime that would 
promote a better-balanced international system adapted to the requirements of 
developing countries. That reform would emphasize “the transfer of technology 
and access to knowledge and information, crucial to developing countries in 
stimulating innovation and creativity” (WIPO, 2007b: 15). During  recent  WIPO 
meetings on the Development Agenda (February 2007),  various developing 
countries, including several LDCs,  expressed their concerns about the possible 
adverse impact of stringent IPRs on the condition of the poor and strongly 
emphasized the need for impact assessment before the implementation of new 
IP instruments. The philosophy underlying the Development Agenda at WIPO is 
that IP protection should be enacted in accordance with the level of development 
of different countries and that protection of private interests should be balanced 
with that of the larger public interest (section E of this chapter). In a similar vein, 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, has stated that 
“[t]he rules of intellectual property rights need to be reformed, so as to strengthen 
technological progress and to ensure that the poor have better access to new 
technologies and products” (www.un.org/ecosoc).
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Similar concerns reflect the fact that in a world where most developing 
countries, and just about all LDCs, are net importers of technology and depend 
on externally generated knowledge, the current IPR regime may hinder or prevent 
catch-up strategies. This locks poorer countries even more firmly into a low-
technology, low-valued added growth path and further widens the knowledge 
divide between those countries and developed countries, where 97 per cent of 
the world’s patents are currently held (UNESCO, 2005).  Accordingly, assessing 
the impact of growing Intellectual Property Protection (IPP) on the learning 
process in LDCs cannot be divorced from its overall impact on development. 
Moving beyond current arrangements means seeing IPRs not as an end in 
themselves, but as a means for development, growth and poverty reduction. 
Three options are currently under consideration.  The first of these recognizes 
that current agreements still leave some room to achieve objectives with respect 
to the promotion of the transfer of technology, and seeks to design strategies that 
can make full use of that space (UNCTAD, 2006c). The second option suggests 
that given the technological constraints facing developing countries, some 
degree of roll-back (or opting out) is needed in the TRIPS agreement to better 
accommodate development needs (Rodrik, 2001; South Centre, 2002).  The 
third option seeks to create new modalities for IPP that will better accommodate 
developing country needs.  Those options, which need not be mutually exclusive, 
will be taken up in greater detail in section E. 
C.  Economics of IPRs and its applicability to LDCs
1.  IPRS AND THE KNOWLEDGE TRADE-OFF
Ideas are among the most complex creations of human endeavour. 
Understanding what exactly they are and the creative processes behind them has 
alternately fascinated and frustrated philosophers and social thinkers for millennia. 
Economists tend to take a more prosaic perspective.  Ideas matter to the extent 
that they fuel innovations and enhance economic growth and welfare. The 
positive impact of innovation on economic growth has been widely accepted in 
the economic literature, as far back as Adam Smith’s pin factory.  Indeed, in many 
accounts innovation is the primary engine of long-term development; to borrow 
the title of an article by two leading historians of technological development, 
innovation is “how the west grew rich” (Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986). Certainly, 
the greater the number of individuals, firms or countries that have access to 
superior products and processes, and the sooner they have such access, the more 
widespread and substantial will be the economic benefits (Baumol, 2002).  For 
poorer countries, seeking to initiate and sustain catch-up growth, access to the 
knowledge possessed by those higher up the development ladder is generally 
considered to offer a key ingredient in a virtuous circle of strong capital formation 
and technological progress.
That said, conventional economics has struggled to integrate innovation 
into its models, leaving it as at best a “sideshow…excluded from the central 
ring of the main performance” (Baumol, 2002). In part that is because of the 
determination of conventional economists to reduce innovation to the workings 
of the price mechanism. At its worst this leaves innovation as a deus ex machina
set of freely available and clearly codified instructions that shifts the production 
possibility frontier, and whose contribution to economic welfare can be easily 
traced through changes in relative prices. More constructively, innovation is seen 
as a profit-seeking activity linked, in particular, to R&D.  Accordingly, leaving the 
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market to produce and disseminate new ideas may not be desirable because 
information problems lead to too many or too few resources being devoted 
to innovative activity. In particular, because producing new ideas involves the 
commitment of time and money (often in the form of specialized assets) with an 
uncertain outcome, it tends to be a high-fixed-cost activity vulnerable to copying 
by competitors. However, unlike in the case of a public good, it is possible for 
the creator of an idea to exclude others from using it, although this may damage 
social welfare by stopping the flow of ideas from reaching those who could use it 
most effectively. By implication, managing this knowledge trade-off needs non-
market (social) mechanisms, of which (intellectual) property rights are seen as the 
most compatible with the working of market forces.
That perspective still tends to define innovation as pioneering activity to 
develop a new product or processes and is rooted in the rational behaviour of 
the firm. It also tends to assume that knowledge spills over rather easily from its 
original source. It thus underestimates the peculiar properties of knowledge as 
an economic good that makes innovation a much more complex process than is 
allowed in equilibrium models (Foray, 2000). In particular, it fails to acknowledge 
the tacit and local nature of much knowledge, which renders imitation arduous, 
since it underestimates the interactive and cumulative nature of the learning 
process that accompanies the production of knowledge. 
Strengthening incentives to innovate depends on a broad range of economic, 
social and political factors, including the knowledge ecology, or the set of 
institutions that enable access to, and production and use, of knowledge for 
learning and innovation (Dasgupta, 2007). The knowledge ecology represents the 
institutional framework devised to optimize access to, and production and use 
of, knowledge.  The existence of property rights and the rule of law are certainly 
amongst the inducement incentives, but they do not act alone.  A degree of 
political stability as well as clear-sighted leadership will also have a role in 
encouraging a climate where citizens are willing to invest in change, as will basic 
social factors such as health and safety standards and life expectancy.   However, 
a range of government policies with respect to taxation, competition, human 
capital and the investment climate will be important in establishing the incentives 
to encourage the development of absorptive capacity at both firm and national 
levels.  At the same time, the banking and financial system will have a pivotal role 
in releasing resources for capability building (Rogers, 2004).
Thus, the effectiveness of inducement mechanisms for innovation will largely 
depend on a country’s knowledge ecology, or the institutional framework devised 
to encourage the risk-taking involved in any innovative endeavour, and not merely 
R&D, and the level of its technological absorptive capacity, or the ability of a firm 
to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it and apply it to 
commercial ends (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
As discussed in chapter 2 of this Report, the market mechanism needs to be 
supported in order to generate the climate for Schumpeterian entrepreneurship 
and innovation.  The role of IPRs as inducement mechanisms for innovation 
can be evaluated adequately only in that context. Thus, unlike in conventional 
economics, the institutions associated with innovation are constantly evolving 
and adapting to unpredictable circumstances. In particular, the destructive 
consequences of innovation mean that it generates adjustments which can be 
disruptive and costly for (a not necessarily small) subset of citizens, while its 
intangible, cumulative and interactive dimensions mean that an array of “social 
capabilities” (Abramowitz, 1986) are implicated in the innovation process and 
in such a way that initial conditions have a very strong bearing on subsequent 
success. This also implies that innovation is a more coordinated process than 
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suggested by conventional models and one which rests on a socio-economic 
contract between the Government, firms and consumers based on the notion of 
balance between the rights of the inventors and those of the wider public, and 
which is, moreover, also committed to making considerable resources available 
to learning at the micro, meso and macroeconomic levels of innovative activity. 
2.  IPRS, LEARNING AND IMITATION
Catch-up growth is partly determined by the size of the technology gap which 
separates the developing from the more advanced economies, and partly by the 
capability of developing countries to discover new technologies and to absorb 
more advanced technology already available from abroad (Rogers, 2004). That 
makes learning a central factor in any successful productive system, but also one 
that must be calibrated to different levels of economic and industrial development. 
In the case of LDCs, learning will principally revolve around absorbing already 
existing techniques and adapting them to specific local conditions, namely by 
imitation. Such imitation ranges from illegal duplication of standard products 
to deriving inspiration from the latest cutting-edge gadgets.  But in most cases 
of imitation some kind of “reverse engineering” will be essential, based on a 
variety of skills and activities which would support a purposive search for relevant 
information and its development through effective interactions within and among 
firms and other institutions familiar with knowledge acquired from abroad.  In that 
respect, strong IPR protection is likely to hinder rather than to facilitate technology 
transfer and indigenous learning activities in the early stages of industrialization 
(Kim, 2000; CIPR, 2002; Teece, 2005). 
The leading channels for accessing technology from abroad include imported 
goods, FDI and foreign licensing (see chapter 1 of this Report). The kind of 
knowledge needed in each case is likely to be different and tailored, policies and 
institutions will have to be devised to handle the technology transfer challenge. 
Empirical studies seem to support the hypothesis that stronger IPRs favour 
licensing through easing the enforcement of contracts and raising imitation costs, 
and possibly increased FDI inflows (Yang and Maskus, 1998). This contention, 
however, remains to be tested in the LDCs and is the subject of further research. 
Moreover, given the broader determinants of FDI and licensing arrangements 
and recent trends in LDCs (section B of this chapter), it is likely that imitation, 
based on imported capital goods and informal channels of technology transfer 
will be crucial for technological progress in most LDCs. However, even here, 
various social capabilities or absorptive capabilities will be needed if local firms 
are to benefit from the potential spillovers from imported technology, as has been 
corroborated by the case study in Bangladesh (subsection D.3 of this chapter).
Firms’ capacity to tap into knowledge systems and build technological 
capabilities is determined by several factors, for example informal interactions 
with other actors in the knowledge system within which firms operate, such as 
universities (for human capital provision), financial institutions (for venture capital 
and financing of research), industrial infrastructure (for manufacturing products 
or acquiring information related to production) and entrepreneurial associations 
(for marketing and assessment of market-based conditions).  Other actors in the 
knowledge system provide incentives (or disincentives) for interaction, thereby 
facilitating (or limiting) a firm’s ability to build its technological capabilities 
(Chesbrough and Teece, 1996).  As a consequence, the learning efficiency of firms 
depends on numerous country-specific institutional, infrastructural and cultural 
elements that predetermine interactive capabilities, organizational efficiencies 
and mobility of skills, including a country’s knowledge ecology (OECD, 1999).
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Intellectual property rights can play an important role in stimulating R&D 
investments only where absorptive capabilities already exist, provided the 
compliance costs do not exceed the benefits. But in countries that lack absorptive 
capabilities, innovation is likely to remain, at best, underdeveloped in the 
face of greater protection. IPRs can be deemed as beneficial when they foster 
the development of firm-based innovative capabilities through diffusion of 
knowledge, technology transfer, foreign direct investments and licensing, among 
others. However, it is just as possible that patents can block technology transfer 
under certain circumstances. Firms may withhold technological information 
from particular countries for competitive reasons, a strategy that is facilitated 
by globalized IPRs (Gehl Sampath, 2006). The spectrum of anti-competitive 
deployment of patents that can hinder learning by firms through imitation and 
reverse engineering looms large in the context of weak competition enforcement 
in most developing economies (Maskus, 2005).  Even where there is no such 
blockage, the higher costs (for inputs, seeds and intermediate products) may act 
as a deterrent, particularly in some industries (Sampat et al. 2003). These findings 
are broadly corroborated by the case study in the domestic processing sector in in 
Bangladesh (Gehl Sampath, 2007a; subsection D.3 of this chapter). 
Making claims about the unequivocal impact of intellectual property on 
innovation is also rendered difficult by the fact that knowledge generation, 
accumulation and diffusion processes are different across sectors and technologies. 
Mansfield’s study on the comparative importance of patents in different industries 
showed that patents were most important for the development and introduction 
of products in two industries — the pharmaceutical and chemical industries — 
where they accounted for over 30 per cent of development activities (Mansfield, 
1998). In other sectors, firms tend to rely on a variety of other appropriability 
mechanisms to protect their innovations, such as secrecy and first-mover 
advantages, often far more than on patents (Cohen et al., 2001; Arundel, 2001).
Even within sectors where intellectual property is important, a variety of strategic 
motives prompt firms to use patents as an appropriability mechanism.  Such 
motives include the use of patents as negotiating levers or as tools for prevention 
of infringement suits, blocking innovations from competitors or capturing extra 
value for innovative efforts. Excessive market power accumulated through patents 
can be used by firms to control diffusion of inventions and research results (Gallini 
and Trebilcock, 1998), and/or to cover entire areas of research or preserve 
market shares by accumulating “sleeping patents” that help capture extra value 
for innovative efforts (Barton, 1998; Kanwar and Evenson, 2001; Dumont and 
Holmes, 2002). Not surprisingly, in a comparative survey of the manufacturing 
sectors in the United States and Japan, Cohen et al., (2001) found strategic uses 
of patents to be common in the manufacturing sectors in both countries, with a 
higher prevalence of strategic patenting in Japan. The electronics industry is also 
a good example of strategic patenting. Thumm (2004) notes from the results of a 
survey of the Swiss biotechnology industry that, apart from protecting one’s own 
technology from imitation, the second most prominent reason for patenting was 
to prevent competitors’ patenting and application activities. 
Recent attention concentrated on strengthening property rights as the way 
to establish the right innovation climate is likely to have been damaging for 
LDCs where the premium is on imitation.  That produces an environment that 
chokes off the kind of reverse engineering options that were successfully used in 
a previous generation of late industrializing economies. As illustrated by the case 
study in Bangladesh, without imitation, learning will be made extremely difficult 
for countries with low technological capacities that rely on licensing for technology 
transfer only to a very limited degree,19 (subsection D.3 of this chapter).  The 
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result, as recognized in a recent UNIDO report, may be a widening knowledge 
gap (UNIDO, 2006).
Property rights can be an obstacle to development insofar as their application 
directly imposes limits on access to ideas; restricts the policy space needed to build 
social capabilities; places a heavy burden on development budgets; increases 
the potential for anti-competitive activity; and reduces technology flows to the 
poorest countries. Although, these problems may not be immediately felt in low-
income economies as IPRs are tightened (Maskus, 2004), because innovation is 
a cumulative process linked to continuous learning at various levels of society, it 
would be misleading to conclude that they are absent.
Although a number of econometric studies on the relationship between IPRs 
and technology transfer indicate a positive association of both variables,20 there is 
little conclusive evidence about the positive impact of IPRs on technology inflows 
(Correa, 2007). In particular, there is no evidence to suggest that increased 
protection of IPRs in developing countries will lead to more opportunities for 
accessing the latest technologies,21 or that the local rate of innovation will 
increase. While the availability of IPRs reduces the risk for potential transferors 
and may encourage formal modes of transfer (such as licensing), the increased 
power that IPRs give leaves it within title-holders’ discretion whether or not to 
transfer the technologies they possess, and to determine the price and other 
conditions thereof.22
Empirical research on the East Asian economies (Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Taiwan Province of China) the most successful catch-up economies of the recent 
(and perhaps any) era, suggests that relatively weak IPR protection encouraged 
technological learning during the early industrialization phase (Kumar, 2002). 
The experience of the Republic of Korea’s technological development shows that 
during the implementation of its catch-up strategy, “foreign technology transfer 
played a vital role in building the existing knowledge base of Korean firms.  Simple, 
mature technologies could be easily obtained free of charge, through informal 
mechanisms, because they were readily available in various forms.  Even if such 
technology were patented, foreign patent holders were lenient in controlling such 
duplicative imitation, as it was no longer useful for sustaining their international 
competitiveness” (Kim, 2003).
If adequate protection and enforcement of IPRs are genuinely intended to 
enhance development, policymakers should seriously consider differentiation of 
IPP in line with countries’ level of economic and technological development. 
Otherwise the “one-size-fits-all” approach can be a recipe for disaster for 
developing countries, particularly for least developed countries. Developing 
countries should  strengthen their own absorptive capacity for long-term solutions 
that would enable them to identify relevant technology available elsewhere, 
strengthen their bargaining power in transferring technology on more favourable 
terms, assimilate that technology quickly once transferred, imitate and produce 
creatively and eventually generate their own IPRs (Kim, 2000).
3. PATENT EXCESS IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY
The traditional consensus on the benefits of stronger IPRs is breaking down. 
The current IPR regime has been associated with excessive extension of copyright 
and increasing “strategic use” of patents, both of which are welfare-reducing 
(Davis, 2002; Bennet, 2002; Robledo, 2005). In many industries, the increasing 
number of patent applications can be explained not by the need to promote more 
innovations but by purely rent-seeking purposes — for example, defensive use of 
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IP portfolios to deter litigation by other firms. This can be used against possible 
new entrants who might affect the oligopoly rents available to the incumbents, 
and, therefore, as a tool to deter or even block innovation (Robledo, 2005).
As a result, many industries and technological fields are now characterized by 
the formation of “patent thickets” — an expression that describes the proliferation 
of overlapping and not clearly delineated patents. Efforts and costs devoted to 
sorting out conflicting and overlapping IPR claims are increasing, as is uncertainty 
about the nature and extent of legal liability in the use of knowledge inputs. 
Moreover, because the current copyright system grants exclusive rights only to 
producers of knowledge, and not to users of ideas and knowledge, persistent and 
divisive disputes contribute to a growing hostility towards traditional IP systems 
(Steinmueller, 2003).
At the same time, there is growing recognition that patents may not even 
be necessary since other mechanisms may be more efficient in stimulating 
innovation, particularly for countries in the “initiation phase” of technological 
learning. The characteristics of knowledge as a semi-public good do not prevent 
the first inventor from generating sufficient competitive advantages if the supply 
of copies of the invention is not immediate — hence the fact that being first is 
an asset that can be converted into positive prices, even in a private competitive 
market (Boldrin and Levine, 2004). 
Certainly, historical experience confirms that copyright is not needed in order 
to stimulate creative activity (Gana, 1995). And those who have suggested that 
innovation is a much more collaborative process argue that the common heritage 
of information and knowledge (“the Republic of Science”) is being threatened 
and eroded through extended IP protection for works created many years ago.23
In the knowledge-intensive global economy, copyright’s capacity to limit 
access to knowledge will necessarily have an adverse impact on LDCs that need 
access in order to contribute to and benefit from the global research, information 
and communication system.  Knowledge is cumulative and excessive copyright 
protection is likely to have an adverse impact on LDCs, since they are primarily 
users of imported knowledge, rather than creators.  Developing countries are of 
the view that they are entitled to less restrictive access to all categories of works, 
without imposition of excessive technological protection measures (TPM) control 
mechanisms, especially as regards personal use, research and education (Knopf, 
2005; Smiers, 2005).
Moreover, where overprotection distorts the efficient operation of the market 
for knowledge and ideas, poorer countries are likely to be the biggest losers. 
The elasticity of supply of creativity should be considered important criteria for 
determining the appropriate level of protection in the market for ideas, as well as 
consumer response to the price of creative works (Johnson, 2005). 
D.  Evidence of the impact of IPRs on learning
1.  GENERAL EVIDENCE
A broad overview of the empirical literature strongly suggests that the effects of 
IPRs on technology transfers to developing countries depend on a country’s level 
of development, the specific technological fields involved, the level of individual 
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firms’ absorptive capacity, the lifecycle of technologies, the sector in which 
IPRs are applied, the type of technology used and general market conditions 
(UNCTAD and ICTSD, 2003a and 2006; UNIDO, 2006; Todo, 2002; Primo Braga 
and Fink, 1998).24  That view is corroborated by the case study in Bangladesh 
(Gehl Sampath, 2007a; subsection D.3 of this chapter). As countries’ capacity 
to innovate depends on a whole range of economic, social and political factors, 
including intellectual property rights, fiscal policies, competition and finance, 
macroeconomic and monetary factors (especially the banking and credit system), 
it is almost impossible to isolate the strength of certain inter-related variables in 
the innovative process. 
Indeed, the absence of IPP may be necessary in order to allow learning 
through imitation at the initial levels of technological development. IPRs may 
pre-empt duplicative imitation of foreign technologies which was crucial in the 
process of technological catching-up of the Republic of Korea and Japan (Kim, 
1997). Another telling example is the successful development of the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry. On the basis of a strong technological capacity in 
chemistry and pharmaceutical formulation, the Indian generics pharmaceutical 
industry became a global provider of low-cost medicines and active ingredients 
in the absence of product patent protection (Chaudhuri, 2005).
There seems to be broad consensus (as implied by Article 66.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement) that “in the early stages of their industrial growth, countries are 
primarily interested ‘in being able to imitate imported technologies freely, calling 
for limited protection” (Maskus, 2005: 60). In addition, internalized forms of 
technology transfer, (i.e. those taking place intra-firm) are likely to be preferred 
by technology holders or constitute the only viable option when the absorptive 
capacity in the recipient country is low and imitation by domestic firms is unlikely. 
Logically, IPRs will play a neutral role since the transferred technology remains 
under the foreign firm’s control and knowledge spillovers are not common in local 
firms, even in TNC subsidiaries (Correa, 2007). This was also found to be the case 
in the manufacturing sector in Bangladesh (Gehl Sampath, 2007a; subsection 
D.3 of this chapter). Moreover, studies by Glass and Saggi (2002) and Helpman 
(1993) suggest that the rate of global innovation declines with a reduction in the 
rate of imitation due to stronger IPRs.
The stated fundamental objective of the TRIPS Agreement is to encourage 
domestic innovation and international technology diffusion: however, since its 
adoption, the North South technological gap has continued to grow (Correa, 
2007), and the knowledge divide has increased between countries (UNESCO, 
2005). Empirical evidence of a causal relationship between stronger IPRs and an 
increasing level of technology transfer post-TRIPS is non-existent. Moreover, the 
evidence about whether stronger IPRs stimulate formal technology transfer via 
trade, FDI, and licensing is also mixed and inconclusive (UNCTAD and ICTSD, 
2003a). Benefits, to the extent that they exist, are more likely to come from 
acceleration in the domestic deployment of advanced technology by the affiliates 
of foreign firms (Branstetter, 2005). There is more evidence that stronger IPRs 
will hinder informal channels of inward technology transfer, for example reverse 
engineering and copying, because of their increased costs for developing countries 
(CIPR, 2002; UNCTAD and ICTSD, 2003a). Moreover, literature demonstrates a 
growing concern that stronger IPRs will increase monopoly positions in respect of 
knowledge, thereby restricting opportunities for learning and technology transfer 
(David, 2005; Gehl Sampath, 2006; Hoekman, Maskus and Saggi, 2005; Maskus 
and Reichman, 2005).
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An UNCTAD study of 87 countries found wide differences between developing 
countries with respect to the impact of strengthened TRIPS; the importance 
of patents fluctuates considerably according to the technological nature of the 
activity they are engaged in and the technological maturity of the economy (Lall, 
2003).  The econometric cross-section evidence suggests a U-shaped relationship 
between the strength of patents and income levels; the intensity of patenting 
initially falls with increasing income as countries build local capabilities by 
copying, and then rises as they engage in more domestic innovative efforts. The 
turning point is $7,750 per capita (in 1985 prices), a figure well above that found 
in LDCs.  The study suggests that weak patents can help local firms in the early 
stages to build their technological capabilities by permitting imitation and reverse 
engineering, as borne out by the experience of the newly industrializing South-
East Asian economies (Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China).  Similarly, 
research by Kim, based on the Korean experience, suggest that “stronger IPR 
protection will hinder rather than facilitate technology transfer and indigenous 
learning activities in the early stages of industrialization when learning takes place 
through reverse engineering and duplicative imitation of mature foreign product” 
and he argues that “only after countries have accumulated sufficient indigenous 
capabilities with extensive science and technology infrastructure to undertake 
creative imitation in the later stage does IPR protection become an important 
element in technology transfer of industrial activities” (Kim, 2003). 
The strengthening and the expansion of patent protection do not seem to 
have stimulated innovation in developing countries so far. In Mexico, a study 
found no increase in domestic patenting after the substantial changes made 
to the patent law (1991), while a significant increase in foreign patenting was 
observed (Aboites, 2003). In the case of Brazil, in the period 1990–2001 only 
27 patent applications were filed by domestic enterprises in the pharmaceutical 
sector — one of the most active in patenting worldwide — compared with 2,934 
applications made by foreign companies (Elias, 2004).
Another important consideration for the analysis of the role of IPRs in LDCs 
concerns the relationship between innovation and firm size: literature points 
to important asymmetries in the potential benefits of IPRs for small and large 
firms, even in developed countries — that is, patenting and enforcement of IPRs 
increase with firm size and the level of innovative activity (Curran and Blackburn, 
2000). Studies on the relationship between patenting and firm size indicate 
that patenting is rare among SMEs, which prefer to protect their innovations 
through informal means such as trade secrets, trust and contracts (Curran and 
Blackburn, 2000; Correa, 2003). The findings from the case study in Bangladesh 
also corroborate the hypothesis that innovation varies with firm size (subsection 
D.3 of this chapter). Poor managerial capacity and skill level of workers, poor 
financing or lack of access to financial capital, poor support services, weak 
industrial and social infrastructure, a poor marketing and distribution network 
and a poor technological knowledge base make the use of innovation-related 
IPRs illusory for most SMEs in LDCs (Correa, 2003). In addition, obtaining patents 
and maintaining them in force is a very costly process. The acquisition of a patent 
is generally subject to a fee and requires costly legal advice on how to draft the 
specifications and claims appropriately. In many LDCs there are few, if any, patent 
attorneys. Even when a patent is obtained, the maintenance fees (that prevent 
the patent from lapsing) are largely unaffordable for most SMEs (Kitching and 
Blackburn, 1998).25 Even more significant costs may be incurred in monitoring 
possible infringements and enforcing IPRs. Patent litigation may be extremely 
risky and expensive, especially if foreign grants have been obtained, and beyond 
the reach of most small and medium enterprises (SMEs).26
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Historical experiences from a number of East Asian economies (Japan, Republic 
of Korea and Taiwan Province of China) demonstrate that systems with weak 
IP protection are better able to promote and facilitate incremental innovation, 
absorption and diffusion of technology, particularly in SMEs. Evidence from 
countries such as Brazil, the Philippines, Japan and Switzerland suggests similar 
findings.  The Republic of Korea, for example, had almost no IP protection during 
the early stages of its industrialization (Amsden, 1989). The experience of late 
industrializers in Europe points to much the same conclusion (Chang, 2002).27
Similarly, in the United States international copyright was not respected until the 
1890s (Yu, 2007).
2. FIRM-LEVEL EVIDENCE
Mounting empirical evidence about the impact of IPR regimes on innovation, 
from studies that evaluated the reliance of the United States and European firms 
on IPRs as a method for acquiring better protection for their technical know-how, 
shows that firms prefer to rely on methods other than IPRs, such as trade secrecy 
and lead times, in protecting their intellectual assets.28 The most important 
surveys of United States firms indicate that patents are not a very important tool 
for capturing the benefits of innovation (except in the pharmaceutical industry), 
although their impact varies between sectors. The pharmaceutical industry is 
one of the few sectors where patents are an important part of the inducement 
mechanisms. More recent empirical studies tend to confirm those earlier  findings 
(Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000; Scherer, 2005). 
This type of evidence implies that an exclusive focus on patents as the solution 
to knowledge generation may be misplaced and that patents are only a small part 
of the “tool box” used to capture rents from innovation (Cowan and Harrison, 
2001), except with regard to the pharmaceutical industry and some high-tech 
industries.
Empirical evidence about the impact of IPRs in developing countries in general 
is scant and ambiguous (CIPR, 2002; UNCTAD and ICTSD, 2003a). A recent 
study on the impact of IPRs in Mexico found that they play no role in stimulating 
innovation in the maize-growing industry (Léger, 2005). Other studies from 
countries with lagging scientific and technological infrastructure suggest that IP 
protection has not been a significant determinant of growth (Maskus, 2005). The 
case study of 155 firms in Bangladesh finds that IPR protection, an inducement to 
innovation,  is better suited to TNCs operating in Bangladesh (conducive to rent-
seeking), than to technological learning and innovation in local LDC firms (Gehl 
Sampath, 2007a; subsection D.3 of this chapter). 
Competition, rather than IPR-based monopoly, can be a powerful incentive 
for innovation, as is illustrated by the Indian semiconductors industry (Jensen and 
Webster, 2006).  Other studies suggest that IPP is not usually the driving force 
behind R&D (Hart, 1994). In the area of software in particular, non-proprietary 
models such as “open source” schemes have been very effective in supporting a 
vibrant process of innovation. 
3. EVIDENCE FROM AN LDC: THE CASE OF BANGLADESH
Bangladesh, the country chosen for this study, is in many ways exceptional in 
the LDC category owing to its thriving domestic processing sector, which is actively 
engaged in exporting textiles and ready-made garments (RMGs), processed food 
products and generic drugs. For example, Bangladesh now exports a wide range 
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of pharmaceutical products (therapeutic class and dosage forms) to 67 countries. 
In order to evaluate the impact of IPRs on innovation in an LDC, an original in-
depth study on the impact of intellectual property rights as an incentive to innovate 
in the domestic processing sector in Bangladesh was commissioned by UNCTAD 
and conducted by Padmashree Gehl Sampath between October 2006 and May 
2007, for this Report (Gehl Sampath, 2007a). The study used both quantitative 
and qualitative techniques in order to explore the impact of intellectual property 
rights on three domestic processing sectors in Bangladesh: agro-processing, 
textiles and garments, and the pharmaceutical sector. The choice of sectors was 
prompted by their relative economic importance to the economy, the relative 
importance of IPRs and varying degrees of sectoral technological intensity. Both 
the agro-processing and textiles and garments sectors are low-technology, whereas 
the pharmaceutical sector is a patent-intensive, high- technology sector. 
The study had three main stages. In the first stage, a background report and a 
pilot survey on the state of innovation and the main incentives that play a role in 
driving innovation in the domestic processing sector were prepared jointly with a 
local research team in Bangladesh. The second stage consisted of 155 firm-level 
surveys using the data generated through the background report and pilot survey. 
A semi-structured questionnaire covering all three sectors was given to each firm. 
Of the firms surveyed, 50 were in the agro-processing sector, 60 were in the 
textiles and garments sector, and 45 were in the pharmaceutical sector. The third 
stage consisted of face-to-face interviews conducted with a cross-section of firms, 
as well as a variety of other actors, including leading professional associations, 
agencies and relevant government departments. Those interviews were used as 
case studies to interpret the results of the survey. More than 105 persons (including 
CEOs and top-level management) were interviewed for the study.
As a least developed country, Bangladesh is exempt from implementing the 
general provisions of the TRIPS Agreement until 2013, and has a further extension 
until 2016 for implementing its provisions on patents and clinical test data in the 
area of pharmaceutical products and related processes (in accordance with the 
Doha Declaration). However, the country is currently working towards gradual 
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, and has a bilateral agreement with the 
EU to comply with its provisions before 2013. The EU–Bangladesh Commission is 
negotiating several aspects of the latter agreement, a part of which also provides 
that Bangladesh will make its intellectual property institutions TRIPS-compliant. 
The Bangladeshi Parliament is expected to amend the country’s trademark, patent 
and copyright legislation, after a lengthy inter-agency approval and clearance 
process, in order to make it TRIPS-compliant.
Bangladesh’s knowledge infrastructure is very weak when judged by 
conventional indicators such as R&D investments as percentage of GDP, centres 
of excellence for basic and applied research in both the public and private sectors 
of the economy or scientists and researchers per million inhabitants (UNCTAD, 
2006b; chapter Introduction of this Report, table 1). Therefore, the study 
defined innovation not in the strict sense of that term, but as the application 
of new practices and production of all products and process technologies 
that are new to the firms in question (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993). Those 
incremental innovations ranged from small changes in process technologies that 
lead to significant improvements in production methods, to new organizational 
techniques that lead to improved delivery efficiency for existing products or to the 
production of new technologically improved products. Innovation was measured 
by the number of new product and process developments applied by the firms 
in the past five years.
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The study analysed the process of learning and innovation in the three 
domestic processing sectors and the various factors that influence innovation in 
Bangladesh.29 It considered a large range of firm-level factors and their impact on 
new product or process innovation in the three sectors, such as the contribution 
of scientific/skilled manpower, the quality of local infrastructure services for 
new product and/or process development, financial constraints and availability 
of venture capital, collaboration with local universities, local R&D institutes, 
intellectual property protection, participation in local SME development schemes, 
participation in government–firm technology transfer coordination councils, and 
the transfer of personnel between local firms or R&D institutions. It sought to 
measure both the direct impact of intellectual property rights on promoting R&D 
and enhancing the innovative performance of firms, and the indirect impact on 
innovative activities, in terms of technology transfer, licensing and technology 
sourcing through foreign subsidiaries. 
The survey covered large, medium-sized and small firms equally across all 
three sectors. A medium-sized firm employs between 300 and 500 workers in 
the textiles and garments sector and about 500 employees in the pharmaceutical 
sector. The agro-processing sector has a large number of very small home-based 
units (with fewer than 10 employees). In the textiles and garments sector, the 
survey covered specialized textile mills, ready-made garment firms and the 
traditional handloom sector (one of the oldest creative industries in the region). 
In the agro-processing sector, the focus was on the general food-processing 
industry, which uses, for example, spices, grains, cereal and flour to produce 
and market processed food products, as opposed to any specialized niche, such 
as shrimp farming or rice products. The pharmaceutical sector survey covered 
both indigenous pharmaceutical firms and subsidiaries of TNCs operating within 
Bangladesh.
(a)  Innovation incentives and the role of intellectual property rights
Innovative capacity within local firms is very low across all three sectors. The 
study finds that the presence of intellectual property rights in the local context 
does not play a role either as a direct incentive for innovation or as an indirect 
incentive enabling knowledge spillovers (through various technology transfer 
mechanisms such as licensing, imports of equipment and government–firm 
technology transfer). Currently, intellectual property rights within the country 
are benefiting mostly TNCs operating in the local market, as the local firms are 
not sufficiently specialized to protect their innovations. IPRs in any case may 
not be appropriate for the types of incremental innovations in which most firms 
engage.
Table 26 contains a summary table of the survey, based on descriptive 
statistics on innovation, contribution of technology transfer to new product/
process innovations and other potential indirect impacts of intellectual property 
rights on knowledge spillovers to local firms. It shows that a large number of local 
firms considered themselves to be involved in new product/process innovations. 
There was no observable positive IPR impact on licensing, technology transfer 
or technology sourcing through foreign subsidiaries. Half of the agro-processing 
firms, 96 per cent of pharmaceutical firms and 55 per cent of textiles and ready-
made garments (RMG) firms surveyed considered various sources of technology 
transfer, both public and private, to be of very little importance for new product/
process innovations at the firm level. Other benefits of IPR protection in the local 
context that are usually referred to in the general literature on the topic, such as 
licensing and technology sourcing through foreign subsidiaries, hardly play any 
role. Only 4 per cent of agro-processing firm, 2 per cent of pharmaceutical firms 
and 7 per cent of firms in the textiles and RMG sector considered IPR protection 
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to be of any use. The only important sources of innovation at the firm level 
are attributable to firms’ own indigenous innovation efforts, and imitation and 
copying from others (the “other sources” category in the table).
(b)  Sector-specific results
Sector-specific inquiry aimed at identifying the main drivers for innovation 
at the firm level and whether IPRs play a direct or indirect role for innovation, 
substantiated the results of the analysis in the previous sections of the study. 
Table 27 contains descriptive statistics on several variables, such as government 
incentives and skilled manpower for new product/process development at the 
firm level across the three sectors. The values contained are the mean between 
1 (very weak) and 5 (very strong); thus, any rating above 2.5 indicates that the 
variable is important for new product/process development at the firm level. 
The table shows that skilled manpower and good local infrastructure play a very 
important role as regards new product/process innovations. This validates the 
analysis in the previous sections of the study. Government incentives play an 
important role in respect of the textiles and RMG sector and the agro-processing 
sector, since both receive cash incentives for export performance. The table also 
shows that intellectual property protection does not play an important role as far 
as new product/process development is concerned.
Those explanatory variables were considered together with several other 
quantitative variables, such as employment and R&D investments, in order 
to estimate a bivariate probit model for a firm’s incentives to engage in new 
product/process innovations. The dependent variable is a dummy variable which 
distinguishes innovative from non-innovative firms, on the basis of new product 
and process development efforts carried out over the last five years. For an 
independent variable to be included in the set of regressors, it has to be present 
in the three data sets, so that its effect across the three sectors can be compared 
and its effect in the pooled model assessed.30
In addition to separate models for each sector, a pooled model was estimated. 
The poolability of the slope coefficients, that is those associated with the exogenous 
explanatory variables, was tested using a Chow-type likelihood ratio test, and the 
null hypothesis was not rejected. The results are set out in table 28, and the pooled 
model with different sector intercepts is thus the more preferred model. The first 
Table 26. Innovation, sources of knowledge and indirect effects of IPRs
at the firm level in Bangladesh
Agro-processing Pharmaceuticals Textiles
Number % of 
firms
Number % of 
firms
Number % of 
firms
New product development
No 9 18.0 2 4.4 11 18.3
Yes 41 82.0 43 95.6 49 81.7
New process development
No 10 20.0 31 68.9 6 10.0
Yes 40 80.0 14 31.1 54 90.0
Impact of various sources of knowledge on new product/process innovation
Technology licensinga 1 2.0 1 2.2 2 3.3
Tech sourcing from foreign subsidiaries 1 2.0 0 0.0 2 3.3
Firm’s own innovation efforts 18 36.0 7 15.6 25 41.7
Other sourcesb 30 60.0 37 82.2 31 51.7
Number of firms 50 45 60
 Source: Gehl Sampath (2007a) based on field survey, 2006–2007.
  a  Including through IP protection.
  b  “Other sources” was defined by the firms as mainly imitation and copying.
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three pairs of columns form the general model with different slope parameters, 
and the last pair of columns shows the more preferred restricted model (pooled 
data). The general model reported in the first three pairs of columns was first 
tested against an even broader general model where all the potential incentives 
for new product/process innovations at the firm level were considered, and the 
set of regressors included IPRs, intensity of collaboration, areas of government/
other institution support, education of staff and level of training, and financial 
support constraint variables. It was found that those variables do not play any 
role with regard to the likelihood of their being involved in new product/process 
development in the three sectors in Bangladesh, and they were thus excluded 
from the model.
 The results of the model can be interpreted as described below. 
Firstly, the results of the study indicate that R&D expenditures, expressed as 
a percentage of total sales, play a negative role in both new product and new 
process development, as all three sectors mainly engage in very low-value-added 
activities, which are labour-intensive rather than R&D-intensive.  The limited R&D 
that is being carried out is relatively removed from the needs of local production in 
all three sectors (see also UNCTAD, 2006b: chapter 6). The Government’s current 
policies may even exacerbate this situation, as they are too narrowly focused on 
limited areas (promotion of exports and macroeconomic stabilization) and mainly 
favour urban, large and middle-sized private entrepreneurs. Consequently, public 
policies should be expanded to promote learning at the firm level, which would 
assist firms in their efforts to engage more in knowledge-intensive, value-added 
production and processing activities. 
Secondly, larger firms (in terms of full-time employment) are less frequently 
involved in new product and new process development. That result can be 
explained by the fact that the data set is composed of a large number of small and 
medium-sized firms, (owing to the composition of the sectors, agro-processing 
and handloom production generally being small-scale). The smaller the firm is, 
the larger its relative R&D expenditure, and hence the result just mentioned.
Thirdly, intellectual property rights do not contribute to new product or process 
development in any of the three sectors (see also table 27). Most firms in the 
agro-processing sector did not believe that those rights played a major role either 
positively or negatively. They had major concerns about their impact on seed 
Table 27. Factors contributing to new product/process development in Bangladesh
Contribution to product development Pharma
biotech
Textiles & 
RMG
Agro-
processing
Government incentives 1.066 2.754 2.980
Skilled manpower 2.493 3.100 3.540
Collaboration with univs. 1.177 2.435 2.520
Collaboration with DRIs 1.087 2.364 2.400
Intellectual property protection 1.219 2.000 2.280
Good local infrastructure 1.980 2.799 2.860
Venture capital 1.581 2.017 2.240
Local SMIs 1.131 2.029 2.200
Mobility of staff between public and private sector 1.444 2.137 2.420
Loom & dye tech. contrib. - 2.398 -
Number of firms 45 60 50
Source: As for table 26.
Note:  Figures in table represent the mean of rankings between 1 (very weak) and 5 (very strong).
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availability and seed price. Larger firms tended to regard IPRs as more beneficial 
than did smaller firms, seeing them as a tool them which they could protect their 
products and secure economic benefits. Other firms, which considered IPRs to be 
detrimental to innovation, based their assessment on the indirect impact of IPRs 
on increasing prices of seeds and other inputs. However, at this stage it is difficult 
to assess with any conclusiveness the impact of rising seed prices on agricultural 
produce in Bangladesh resulting from application of IPRs. Most agro-processing 
firms do not produce agricultural inputs in-house, and the inefficiencies in post-
harvest techniques and lack of organized sale of agricultural produce within the 
country do not permit a rigorous assessment of the impact of increased seed 
prices on agricultural produce. 
In the textiles and RMG sector, most of the firms interviewed did not believe that 
IPRs played any role as an inducement to innovation, since they simply assembled 
the final output according to precisely given, buyer-determined specifications. 
Firms noted that that since they did not possess any indigenous design-related 
capabilities, IPRs could not be an inducement to innovation. Regarding whether 
they benefited from IPR protection in terms of increased collaboration with 
external firms, the general view was that the buyer firms did not help them in 
their efforts to upgrade technology or to enhance innovative capabilities since 
this would help them to create better backward linkages, especially in knitwear, 
and enhance the bargaining power of the local firms.  Most local firms considered 
that such knowledge-sharing would be inimical to the interests of the buyer firms, 
which benefited from the low prices in the market due to the local firms’ lack of 
bargaining power. 
The firms in the pharmaceutical sector are mainly engaged in the formulation 
of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs), (requiring manufacturing skills only), 
and are striving to build capacity in order to engineer APIs (requiring knowledge-
intensive chemical synthesis skills). Since foreign firms can obtain patents on their 
Table 28. New product/process development in Bangladesh: Bivariate probit ML estimation results
Variable Co-
efficient
(Std.
error)
Co-
efficient
(Std.
error)
Co-
efficient
(Std.
error)
Co-efficient (Std.
error)
Agro-processing Pharma biotech Textiles Pooled data
New product development
R&D intensity 2001–2005 (in log) -0.169 (0.114) 0.072 (0.195) -0.152** (0.064) -0.174*** (0.052)
Employment (FTEs in log) 2001–2005 -0.570** (0.252) 0.000 (0.412) -0.191 (0.121) -0.294*** (0.099)
Collaboration with industry association 0.934 (0.793) 0.000 (assumed) 0.417 (0.446) 0.874*** (0.337)
Agro-processing - - - - - - -2.414*** (0.548)
Textiles - - - - - - -1.643*** (0.456)
Intercept 2.180 (1.588) 2.150 (3.005) 1.141 (0.974) 3.600*** (0.894)
New process development
R&D intensity 2001–2005 (in log) -0.219** (0.089) 0.072 (0.195) 0.019 (0.108) -0.115** (0.053)
Employment (FTEs in log) 2001–2005 -0.336* (0.180) 0.000 (0.412) -0.703 (0.459) -0.353*** (0.114)
Agro-processing - - - - - - -2.317*** (0.521)
Textiles - - - - - - -0.895** (0.454)
Intercept 0.247 (1.191) 2.150 (3.005) 6.025 (3.944) 3.443*** (0.944)
Number of firms 50 45 60 155
Log-likelihood -17.095 -9.221 -26.947 -58.519
Source: As for table 26.
  Significance levels:  * 10%;  ** 5%; *** 1%.
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products in the country, the local firms were concerned that this might adversely 
affect their efforts to venture into reverse engineering of APIs. The patents on 
pharmaceutical products (approximately 50 per cent of the 182 granted in 2006) 
are not on local innovations. This points to the existence of other reasons for 
patenting, such as strategic use, monopoly profits, and prevention of parallel 
imports (Gehl Sampath, 2007a). This issue, however, needs to be explored 
further. As regards the indirect impact of IPRs on firms’ activities, most firms in the 
survey have been unsuccessfully engaged in negotiating technology transfer in 
order to increase their that API capacity, reverse engineering skills and other such 
know-how. However, even those firms that have been successful in negotiating 
agreements with foreign firms considered that IPRs were not a helpful factor in 
promoting foreign collaboration for access to technology.
Fourthly, firms that collaborate closely with industry associations are more likely 
to engage in new product development; however, the variable “collaboration 
with industry association” plays no role in new process development. That finding 
is consistent with the study’s analysis,  which indicates that firms mainly seek 
support and lobby for policy change through professional associations, so as to 
make up for the absence of an institutional and policy framework that could 
stimulate and support innovation. Finally, ceteris paribus, firms in the agro-
processing and textiles sectors are less frequently involved in new product and 
new process development than those in the pharmaceutical sector. Maximum-
value-addition activities are currently taking place in the pharmaceutical sector. 
The textiles and RMG sector, although a high foreign exchange earner, has 
relatively lower value-addition capacity.
As already mentioned, the broader general model where all the potential 
incentives for new product/process innovations at the firm level were considered, 
including IPRs, intensity of collaboration, areas of government/other institution 
support, education of staff and level of training, and financial support constraint 
variables, showed that such variables do not play any role with regard to the 
likelihood of their being involved in new product/process development in the 
three sectors in Bangladesh. That points to one of the most critical issues facing 
all three sectors equally: the underdeveloped state of the domestic knowledge 
system as a whole and firms’ low absorptive capacity. As noted above, the lack 
of engineering and scientific skills and public support for technological upgrading 
constitutes a significant barrier to learning. Strategic policy support that strengthens 
the absorptive capacity of firms, and enables them to move from labour-intensive 
to knowledge-intensive activities, is urgently needed to remedy that constraint on 
enhanced sectoral competitiveness.
In the agricultural sector, more research that meets the needs of the agro-
processing sector needs to be conducted, including adaptive research on 
enhancing variety and ensuring the availability of fruit and vegetables all year 
round, as well as livestock research, according to field interviews. The scope of 
the New Agriculture Extension Policy, which focuses mainly on extension services 
for cereal crops, needs to be broadened in order to benefit the agro-processing 
sector. Most importantly, there is a need for inclusive policy action that also 
caters to the needs of the majority of the rural agro-processing firms. Similarly, 
the survey indicates that more concerted policy effort is required to promote 
the build-up of API capacity in Bangladesh. Such policy responses extend 
beyond property rights. Strategic policy action is needed in order to improve the 
impact and conduct of public sector research in universities and public research 
institutes in particular, so as to upgrade technologically, as required in the globally 
competitive pharmaceutical sector. Similarly, low value-addition capacity in the 
textiles and RMG sector emphasizes the need for policy support institutions. For 
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all three sectors, the lack of government support to subsidize learning is a problem 
that should be addressed in the near future. Creation of human resources at the 
secondary and tertiary levels should be targeted. Policy incentives are required 
in order to translate individual capabilities into organizational capabilities so 
that human resources currently available in the three sectors can be harnessed 
appropriately.
Table 29 contains the survey firms’ rankings in critical areas of support for 
engaging in more knowledge-intensive activities. The figures present the mean of 
rankings between 1 (least important) and 5 (most important). As the table shows, 
firms across all three sectors consider policy support to be critical in several 
areas, including science and technology support institutions, testing and quality 
evaluation facilities, and financial support.
(c)  Summary of key findings
This study has conducted an in-depth investigation of innovation and 
competitiveness in three sectors of domestic processing in Bangladesh: the agro-
processing, the textile and RMG and the pharmaceutical sectors. The objective 
was to evaluate the relative importance of IPRs as a firm-level incentive. The 
findings seek to contribute to the growing literature on intellectual property rights 
and development, and also make the case for broadening the discourse on the 
nature of knowledge and learning activities in LDCs beyond IPRs. 
Innovative capacity within local firms remains very low across all three sectors. 
The survey finds that the presence of intellectual property rights in the local 
context does not play a role either as a direct incentive for innovation or as an 
indirect incentive enabling knowledge spillovers (through various technology 
transfer mechanisms such as licensing, imports of equipment or government–firm 
technology transfer). At the present time, intellectual property rights are benefiting 
mostly the TNCs operating in the local market, as local firms are not sufficiently 
specialized to protect their innovations under the current IPR regime. This regime 
in any case may not be appropriate for the types of incremental innovations in 
which most firms engage. The majority of local firms considered themselves to be 
involved in new product/process innovations; however, there was no observable 
positive IPR impact on licensing, technology transfer or technology sourcing 
through foreign subsidiaries. Over half of the agro-processing firms, and of the 
textiles and RMG firms (55 per cent in both cases) and the great majority of 
pharmaceutical firms surveyed (96 per cent) considered technology transfer from 
Table 29. Areas of policy support for enhancing
the innovative performance of firms
Areas of policy support
for innovative performance
Pharma
Biotech
Textiles & 
RMG
Agro-
Processing
Science and technology support institutions 3.734 3.651 3.940
Testing and quality evaluation facilities 4.179 3.785 3.620
Professional associations - 4.584 3.500
Market research and intelligence 4.023 4.232 3.400
Overseas market promotion 4.178 3.685 3.280
Export credit program 2.890 3.284 3.420
Financial incentives 4.176 3.850 3.320
SME support 1.419 2.931 2.960
Number of firms 45 60 50
Source: As for table 26.
Note:  Figures in table represent the mean of rankings between 1 (very weak) to 5 (very strong).
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external sources, whether public or private, to be of very little importance for new 
product/process innovations. Only a small number (4 per cent) of agro-processing 
firms, 2 per cent of pharmaceuticals firms and 7 per cent of firms in the textiles 
and RMG sector considered IPR protection to be of any use. The only important 
sources of innovation at the firm level are the firms’ own indigenous innovation 
efforts and innovation through imitation and or copying.
The firms in the pharmaceutical sector were very concerned that since foreign 
firms could obtain patents on their products in the country, this might adversely 
affect their efforts to venture into reverse engineering of APIs. As regards the 
indirect impact of IPRs on firms, most firms surveyed have been unsuccessfully 
engaged in the process of negotiating technology transfer in order to increase 
API production capacity, reverse engineering skills and other such know-how. 
Even those that have been successful in negotiating agreements with foreign firms 
considered that IPRs were not a helpful factor in promoting foreign collaboration 
for access to technology.
The domestic knowledge system is very weak in Bangladesh, characterized 
by weak industrial and scientific infrastructure, poor collaboration and sectoral 
interlinkages, and lack of skills and institutional support for technological 
upgrading. In that context, the study finds that the relative importance of IPRs 
for domestic processing sectors of varying technological intensity, as expected 
(on the basis of the experience in developed economies, and as indicated by 
economic literature), may not hold for LDCs. The overall finding is that IPRs are 
equally unimportant across the three sectors, largely owing to domestic firms’ 
inability to engage in knowledge-intensive activities.
In conclusion, the findings indicate that policy matters in reducing the 
collateral damage that occurs when nascent sectors in LDCs are exposed to 
global competition. Coherent national policies that focus strategically on enabling 
innovation in the three sectors will play a key role in transforming those sectors 
into more competitive modes and enable local firms to deal with any harmful 
effects of IP protection. Furthermore, the findings indicate that without proactive 
and strategic public policy, in support of learning and innovation, the granting 
of IPRs does not generate higher levels of technological learning in domestic 
processing firms in Bangladesh (Gehl Sampath, 2007a).
E.  IPR regimes and LDCs: Policy implications 
As knowledge becomes an increasingly important productive asset in today’s 
globalizing world, IP will play a more and more prominent role in the organizing 
of economic activity. But that role is not necessarily “development-neutral”. 
Indeed, expanded IPP is associated with the proliferation of legal monopolies 
and related barriers to entry, which makes it harder for developing countries to 
compete in innovation-based markets. In today’s knowledge-intensive global 
economy, those trends are accentuating the asymmetrical economic processes 
stacked against weaker participants.31
The expected beneficial impacts of change in policy regimes are predicated 
on the notion that knowledge is the same as information and is a transferable 
commodity. However, contrary to conventional wisdom, technical change, 
learning, innovation and knowledge accumulation are endogenous processes 
— that is, knowledge is not a downloadable commodity. Previously, there had 
been some hope that the combined effect of globalization and ICTs would be 
a powerful driver and facilitate the process of development strategies based on 
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catching up. Indeed, as the relevant data suggest, knowledge-based research 
and innovation activities (e.g. R&D, patents, licences and publications) are 
more unevenly distributed between the developed and developing countries 
than before; indeed, despite ICTs and stronger IPRs, there are clear signs of an 
increasing knowledge and technology divide (Johnson and Segura-Bonila, 2001; 
UNIDO, 2006). 
Equating “information” with “knowledge” may be the reason for exaggerated 
expectations regarding IPRs. But tacit knowledge cannot be transferred: it can 
occur only through the time-consuming process of interactive learning, learning 
by doing and learning by using. Furthermore, both tacitness and codification 
of knowledge is an obstacle to easy knowledge absorption, because of global 
knowledge asymmetries and “context specificities” that characterize knowledge. 
Knowledge is context-specific; it is socially and culturally embedded and 
dependent on the level of research and absorptive capacity in the recipient 
countries. Successful knowledge transfer presupposes the existence of domestic 
knowledge systems (i.e. a pro-innovation policy framework, infrastructure and 
appropriate institutional development, producer competence and learning, 
imitative capabilities and innovation capabilities at the firm level). The findings of 
the case study in Bangladesh corroborate the view that the local policy framework 
and a strategic vision have a critical role to play in the learning process (Gehl 
Sampath, 2007a).
Most LDCs do not yet have the above discussed prerequisites in place 
(UNCTAD, 2006b: chapter 6). Without an adequate knowledge infrastructure 
and institutional framework to capture the potential benefits of new ideas and 
information, the benefits claimed for IPR-induced technology transfer are not 
likely to be forthcoming. Effective absorption of imported technologies crucially 
depends on the learning capacity of the recipient firms. A growing body of research 
suggests that the promised benefits of harmonized IPR regimes — leading to 
increased (external) knowledge flows and enhanced innovation, leading in turn to 
income convergence and poverty reduction — have largely bypassed most LDCs. 
Indeed, the current pattern of IPP has undermined many countries’ short- and 
medium-term technological learning prospects. While TRIPS-based knowledge 
governance has provided a degree of confidence for foreign investors, in many 
LDCs this has been accompanied by sluggish domestic investment performance 
and a decline in their domestic technological performance. The expectation that 
property rights alone, without improvements in the wider knowledge ecology, 
would enhance their catch-up growth strategies has generally not been fulfilled. 
What is still missing is a credible relationship between incentives and outcome. 
Throughout history, a stronger IP system has tended to be the result of 
technological development rather than its precondition.  Available evidence 
suggests that stronger patent rights are likely to increase payments from 
developing to developed countries without having a favourable impact on 
domestic technological capacity. And while FDI may strengthen patent rights in 
middle-income and large developing countries, this is not the case in the poorest 
ones. This is confirmed by the case study of 155 firms in the domestic processing 
sector in Bangladesh (with the exception of the pharmaceutical sector as a whole, 
which is dominated by TNCs). The findings of the Bangladesh case study indicate 
that IPR policies are not considered to be of particular importance to local firms 
in LDCs, which are not yet capable of innovation in the strict sense of that term 
(subsection D.3). Rather, low-income countries should focus on strengthening 
their absorptive and learning capacities, enhance the efficacy of their domestic 
knowledge systems and improve their knowledge ecology.
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The TRIPS-based regulatory framework has transformed the conditions for 
learning in LDCs (most of which did not even have IP legislation prior to the 
adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, and many still do not) and unduly focused 
the attention of policymakers on the harmonization of IPP with what already 
exists in the advanced countries, but “the appropriate intellectual property 
regime for a developing country is different from that for an advanced industrial 
country”(Stiglitz, 2005: 2).
IPRs provide an incentive to innovate, but like any other incentive, it works 
only in certain contexts (Scotchmer, 2004). IPRs are not a magic tool that can boost 
innovation without other essentials, such as a critical level of skills, information, 
capital and markets.32 Generally, it seems clear that patents stimulate innovation 
only marginally, if at all, in countries with weak scientific and technological 
infrastructure (at the initiation stage of technological learning). As the findings of 
the Bangladesh case study indicate, IPRs play no role in stimulating innovation in 
the textiles and garments and food processing sectors.
IPRs are unlikely to play a significant role in promoting local learning and 
innovation in countries with low absorptive capabilities in the “initiation” phase, 
which is marked by an absence of  the basic conditions for patents to operate 
as incentives for innovations, namely high R&D investments and capacity for 
reverse engineering and low-cost production (Foray, 2004). In the second, 
“internalization”, stage, local firms can learn through imitation under a flexible IPR 
regime, while technology owners face a growing risk of imitation, and tensions 
between domestic and foreign firms increase. It is only in the third stage — the 
“generation” stage — that local innovative firms in the most dynamic sectors can 
fully benefit from intellectual property protection (Kim, 2003).33
Even if, under certain conditions, IPRs were to positively encourage technology 
transfer through licensing, LDCs are unlikely to become significant recipients of 
licensed technology. The low technical capacity of local enterprises constrains 
their ability to license in technology, while the low GDP per capita in LDCs is not 
likely to stimulate potential transferors to engage in such arrangements (Yang and 
Maskus, 2005; section E of chapter of this Report).
In that context, any policies directed at increasing the transfer and dissemination 
of technologies should be actively supplemented by complementary measures 
aimed at strengthening firms’ capacity to effectively absorb new knowledge 
through adaptation and knowledge expansion throughout society. 
Licensing, as a channel for technology transfer, is also likely to be of little 
importance to firms in LDCs, as IPRs, particularly patents, promote innovation in 
profitable markets only where firms have the required capital, human resources 
and managerial capabilities. Similarly, licensing is out of reach for firms without 
a critical level of absorptive capacity. However, only in the “generation” stage of 
technological development can the benefits of IPRs offset the costs and constraints 
imposed on domestic research and production capacities.
For LDCs, improving their knowledge ecology, namely the institutional 
framework that creates the capacity to access, produce and use knowledge 
throughout the economy, will require far more than IP protection. The process of 
knowledge transfer is complex, costly and time-consuming. Advocates of strong 
IP protection tend to underestimate the difficulties involved in learning and in 
the knowledge-transfer process. The standard assertion that thanks to strong 
IPRs, knowledge can now travel freely and cheaply between countries is simply 
not realistic, as it disregards the complex dynamics of knowledge governance. 
Available evidence indicates that the expectation that more stringent levels of IP 
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protection will necessarily stimulate learning has not been met, as illustrated by 
the case study in Bangladesh (subsection D.3).
The current transformation of the international IPR system exhibits inherent 
market failures which are not Pareto optimal, insofar as (i) it increases the 
“excludability” of R&D results and reduces knowledge diffusion and informational 
spillovers; and (ii) by focusing on licensing and patenting as the salient mechanism 
of technology transfer, the IPR regime imposes incentives that threaten to crowd 
out other (superior) mechanisms. Another cause for concern is that the diversity 
of institutional arrangements is threatened. The post-TRIPS perspective that 
IPRs are the only means of valorizing intangible capital, and should therefore 
be the commonly used  yardstick for the pricing of knowledge and ideas, is 
questionable.
The space for public research and knowledge-sharing is shrinking: functions 
that were previously assumed to be in  the public domain can no longer be so 
assumed, owing to  a growing trend toward commoditization of publicly-funded 
research outputs, including of  data and information resources (David, 2006d; 
Okediji, 2004, 2006; Nelson, 2004). No longer is it safe to assume that publicly 
funded research will be distributed freely. Privatized or restricted information 
flows will inevitably slow down developing countries’ learning capacities and pace 
of innovation; this will make it more difficult to improve on existing technologies 
and products, and thus slow down the process of technological upgrading 
(Sampat, 2003). Since technologies in the public domain can play an important 
role in the development of productive capacities in LDCs, restricting access to 
the existing pool of knowledge in the public domain, via strong IPRs, may hinder 
those countries’ learning potential. The shrinking of the public domain can only 
exert an adverse impact on the LDCs’ learning trajectories.
 Developing country firms largely rely on informal learning mechanisms, such 
as imports of capital goods and equipment, imitation and reverse engineering, as 
important mechanisms for knowledge access and learning. That fact is confirmed 
by the findings from the case study in Bangladesh (subsection D.3). This implies 
that if an LDC is seeking to attract more FDI or promote entrepreneurial activities 
at home, it should address constraints related to efficient knowledge governance, 
growth and technology infrastructure before dealing with IPR issues. The relevant 
policy question is to ask at what stage of development, economic and market-
based incentives (such as patents) start to “kick in”. Furthermore, a stronger patent 
system may create new problems for LDCs as it tends to increase the adverse 
effect of excessive IPRs elsewhere. In a globalised economy, the strengthening of 
IP protection in economies that are rapidly catching up may even create negative 
externalities for LDCs, thereby slowing down their catch-up growth processes.34
In addition, owing to increased copyright protection (life plus 50 years), 
information flows are constricted more generally. Access to copyrighted materials 
has become more limited, as has the right to make reproductions for educational 
purposes. That may have an adverse impact on access to copyrighted works for 
education, research and knowledge diffusion in general. Although the TRIPS 
Agreement allows some degree of unauthorized copying via the “fair dealing” 
exception, these exceptions are increasingly being eroded via technological 
protection measures (TPMs) or digital rights management systems used to 
control access to or use of their marks by authorized users. That implies that the 
application of stringent IP standards may impede access to textbooks, journals 
and other educational material in poor countries by requiring the consent of, and 
likely payment to, the IPR holders prior to copying (CIPR, 2002). Experts are even 
more concerned about its impact on the Internet, which, despite its enormous 
potential for broadening access to education and knowledge dissemination in 
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poor countries, can be constrained via application of encryption technologies that 
can override the principle of fair use or fair dealing by making every exception or 
limitation subject to the “three step test” (TRIPS Article 13). The principle of fair 
use needs to be preserved in cyberspace through both national and international 
regulation (Okediji, 2001, 2006).
1. ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL AND THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY IN IPR SYSTEMS
The fact that the costs and benefits of a stronger IPR system are unequally 
distributed between the users and producers of knowledge, and that the low-
income countries are likely to bear high costs without receiving much benefit in 
return (at least in the short and mid-term), creates a strong case for adapting the 
system to the particular country context. Given the countries’ heterogeneities 
and the differences in their knowledge ecologies, the one-size-fits-all principle 
is suboptimal (CIPR, 2002). Avoiding general solutions to IPR management is 
recommended.  The poorest nations clearly need flexibility as well as ad hoc 
mechanisms to build a sound and viable technological base.
2. WHAT KIND OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IS NEEDED?
Serious concerns have been expressed that the type of technical assistance 
provided to LDCs so far has not met the requirement contained in Article 66.2.,35
namely that “[d]eveloped country Members shall provide incentives to enterprises 
and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging 
technology transfer to least developed country Members in order to enable 
them to create a sound and viable technological base”. To date, the technical 
assistance provided to LDCs has focused on designing and implementing IPR 
legislation consistent with the TRIPS Agreement, and not on their needs with 
regard to building “a sound and viable technological base”.  As such, it responds 
far more to the interests of IP rights holders than to the fundamental development 
concerns of LDCs (Correa, 2007; Kostecki, 2006).
F.  Alternative knowledge governance models 
Given the social inefficiencies inherent in the post-TRIPS IP regime, related 
to excessive privatization and commoditization of knowledge, the challenge in 
the policy design of alternative mechanisms is how best to address the dilemma 
of the knowledge trade-off — that is, how to simultaneously support and 
encourage increased knowledge access, production and use? What is the design 
of “superior” solutions to the knowledge trade-off dilemma associated with 
proprietary models? How to preserve access to essential technological knowledge 
that can contribute to incremental improvements, local innovations and capacity-
building, and how to best create conditions for effective knowledge governance? 
What kind of catching-up mechanisms could substitute for imitation?  Which new 
policy mechanisms can better meet the objectives of simultaneously encouraging 
and supporting the production of new knowledge while facilitating broad and 
rapid access to new knowledge? Logically, solutions will depend on the nature of 
knowledge and the cost structure of the markets for ideas (Johnson, 2005). 
Providing broad and immediate access to information is important for two 
kinds of knowledge: essential knowledge for passive consumption (such as new 
molecules and compounds that enable the production of new drugs or vaccines); 
and cumulative knowledge or knowledge as productive capital (for active use), 
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such as new information technologies that would enable incremental innovation 
and new applications in traditional sectors (Machlup, 1983; Foray, 2000, 2007).
Five sets of “solutions” for alternative policy designs are proposed: they relate 
both to improving the efficiency of the global IPR system (proprietary solutions) 
and to the use of non-IP mechanisms (non-proprietary solutions).
1. The first set of solutions deals with the improvement of the patent system 
itself at a global level, which may be a necessary (but not sufficient) condition 
for LDCs to benefit from a fully harmonized IPR system (i.e. calibration of 
standards and norms for countries at varying levels of development). 
2. The second set involves using fully the internal flexibility offered by TRIPS 
to extend exclusion rights.  The key issue is providing countries with the 
capacity to fine-tune their system in line with their needs and conditions, 
including via: (i) limitation on exclusion rights (exceptions and compulsory 
licensing); (ii) limitation on exclusion rights in terms of subject matter; and 
(iii) inclusion of new subject matters (e.g. traditional knowledge) in the 
international policy agenda.
3. The third set is related to the use TRIPS’ external flexibilities, which consist 
of using the power of legal and regulatory institutions to reconstruct the 
research and information commons and support open source initiatives 
as a way of mitigating the adverse effects of the highly protectionist IPR 
environment by promoting the low-cost research and innovation model in 
LDCs.
4. The fourth set does not involve the direct manipulation of legal tools but is 
aimed at avoiding monopoly price distortions associated with IPRs (patent 
buy-outs and creation of incentives for price discrimination).
5. The fifth set of solutions is related to increasing R&D incentives in the 
area of neglected needs (public–private partnerships, advance purchase 
commitments).
Perhaps the most promising model for LDCs is offered by the open source 
mechanism, associated with the new knowledge economy paradigm. A shift 
in the nature of the innovation process is currently taking place in the most 
developed innovation systems (Von Hippel, 2005). The open source option 
involves a fast collaborative and incremental process, operating without patents 
but in a legally structured environment. The mechanism is mainly based on 
voluntary contributions of innovators to solve a problem collectively and then 
share it openly. While such models are not new, the Internet has greatly increased 
their productivity. As a result, this model has been widely diffused in many fields, 
such as software, biomedical technologies and consumer products, as illustrated 
by unprecedented incremental rates of innovation in software development, 
where high rates of innovation are correlated with rich information spillovers. 
The open nature of these projects emphasizes collaboration, lack of price-based 
competition and collective efficiency. Unrestricted access to innovation and 
release of data, codes, information and knowledge, all in the public domain, 
support incremental and cumulative innovation. This method of innovation has 
proved to be particularly efficient in supporting incremental and cumulative 
innovation. The essence of the model is the accumulation of small inventive 
steps, which are shared within a community and form a collective invention. 
Open Source software also operates in a legal environment, using, inter alia, 
GPL (General Public License) or “copyleft” license; other models use Community 
Source License Agreements (used by Sun Microsystems), etc.
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The objective of open source models is to create information and knowledge 
commons with important welfare implications in terms of: (i) no deadweight loss 
from above-marginal-cost pricing (directly associated with IPRs); and (ii) a built-in 
mechanism for price reduction, thereby increasing social welfare. In open source 
models, competition is based largely on the quality of post-product service rather 
than in the product development stage. Market entry costs are lower as entry 
is immediate; since innovation is shared; fixed costs of product development 
are significantly lower than in proprietary (IP) models. For innovators to be 
motivated to produce knowledge, there is no need for strong “rights to exclude”, 
for exclusivity is not required in order to capture economic returns.  Moreover, 
the model benefits from scale and network effects, as researchers and developers 
share new knowledge with their counterparts outside their own laboratories and 
firms. Access, production and use of new knowledge are achieved without the 
high social costs and inefficiencies associated with traditional proprietary models. 
This model is particularly applicable to LDCs because of its cost advantages and 
greater possibilities for learning thanks to the willingness of the innovators to share 
knowledge and ideas (David, 2005; Ghosh and Schmidt, 2006).
Other non-IP-based incentive mechanisms include: (i) subsidizing research 
(provision of funding for R&D through grants, tax credits, and work in government 
laboratories); (ii) developing prizes; and (iii) trade secrets. Additionally, other 
mechanisms that should be considered include: (i) legal provisions to stimulate 
firms to implement multipart pricing (Lanjouw, 2002); (ii) compulsory licensing; 
(iii) patent buy-outs (Kremer, 1998); (iv) advanced purchase commitments 
(Kremer); (v) public–private partnerships (Moran, 2005); (vi) information 
commons and open source initiatives (Maurer, 2003; Lessig, 2004; Nelson, 2005; 
David, 2005);36 and (vii) compensatory liability regime (“use and pay system”) 
(Reichman and Lewis, 2005). 
1. LEARNING TO USE FLEXIBILITIES:
THE ROLE OF NATIONAL AND REGIONAL IP OFFICES
Fully exploiting the scope of TRIPS flexibilities (limitations, exceptions or 
extensions, such as compulsory licensing, fair use or fair dealing and parallel 
imports) is a crucial issue linked to the issue of the technical capabilities to use 
the opportunities offered by the system. The institutional capacity of national IP 
offices is critical, since those mechanisms are difficult to implement; sophisticated 
knowledge and competences in law and international agreements may therefore 
be required.
That is why a TRIPS provision involves the obligation for the developed 
countries to provide technical assistance to the LDCs (Article 67).  It is also 
essential that the national patent offices build their legal competences for using 
those mechanisms more effectively; the considerable flexibility offered by TRIPS 
would then be better exploited by LDCs.
In contrast to patent protection, the costs incurred and the time spent by 
competitors in IP protection under trade secrets has no acquisition costs, while 
overcoming the secrecy barrier through legitimate reverse engineering may 
in some cases be substantial. Trade secret protection, however, may not be a 
valid option when the technology can be easily traced from a product put on 
the market. Additionally, enforcement of trade secrets may impose significant 
procedural burdens.
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2. UTILITY MODELS
Utility models have been implemented in a large number of developed and 
developing countries.37 Box 6 summarizes the differences between utility models 
and patents. 
Utility models are essentially suited to protecting “minor” or incremental 
innovations and can be acquired more easily and at lower cost than patents.  In all 
countries where utility models are recognized, the great majority of applications 
and grants are in respect of domestic applicants, in contrast with patents, where 
foreign applicants largely dominate, particularly in developing countries.
The extent to which a system of utility models may be useful in LDCs is 
debatable. Given the low level of development of manufacturing activities in 
LDCs, it is unclear whether there is a sufficient flow of (minor) innovations that 
can be captured by the system. Also, it is unclear whether the availability of utility 
models protection will necessarily encourage such innovations. However, as most 
LDC firms rely on mature technologies and imported machinery and equipment, 
it is unlikely that at this stage utility models could be of great value to them, 
but this could change as their technological capacity is upgraded. Utility models 
protection seems, in any case, a better starting point than patents. 
In addition to the traditional channels of technology transfer and dissemination, 
alternative means and mechanisms, such as joint research, country-level 
technology-sharing consortia, patent pools and technology-sharing consortia at 
the regional level, could be explored. 
Joint research initiatives involving various firms and research institutions 
may enable LDCs to put together the human and financial resources needed to 
undertake well-defined projects. Significant efforts should be made, however, to 
overcome the lack of an innovation culture and to build up the required inter-
firm and inter-institutional trust and operational methods. The role of “bridging 
institutions”, such as financial entities, specialized NGOs, business and farmers’ 
associations, and public extension and technology support services, would be 
crucial for linking possible partners and helping them to define common objectives 
and procedures (UNCTAD, 2006b). 
Transfer and dissemination of technology could also be boosted through 
country-level technology-sharing consortia. Members of the consortia that receive 
technology from one or more suppliers may mutually support absorptive efforts 
and reduce the costs of incorporation of new technologies.38 As in the case of 
joint research initiatives, a great deal of collaboration by bridging institutions 
Box 6. Utility models and patents
• The requirements for acquiring a utility model are less stringent than for patents. While the requirement of
“novelty” has always to be met, that of “inventive step” or “non-obviousness” may be much lower or absent
altogether. In practice, protection for utility models is often sought for innovations of a rather incremental
character which may not meet the patentability criteria.
• The term of protection for utility models is shorter than for patents and varies from country to country (usually
between 7 and 10 years without the possibility of extension or renewal).
• In most countries where utility model protection is available, patent offices do not examine applications as to
substance prior to registration. This means that the registration process is often significantly simpler and faster,
taking, on average, six months.
• Utility models are much cheaper to obtain and to maintain.
• In some countries, utility model protection can be obtained only for certain fields of technology, and for prod-
ucts but not processes.
Source: WIPO at www.wipo.org/sme/en/ip_business/utility_models/.
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would be necessary for setting up consortia among firms with low technological 
development.
Patent pools organized by technology suppliers in particular fields may also 
help to provide access to required technologies, where the latter are protected 
under patents.  A patent pool is an agreement between two or more patent 
owners to license (one or more) of their patents to (one or more) third parties. 
The benefit accruing to LDCs from patent pools would require the agreement of 
patent owners to license their technologies free or at a pre-determined royalty 
rate. Patent pools can reduce transaction costs, as individual negotiations are 
avoided. Given that LDCs’ markets represent a tiny portion of global markets, 
licensing conditions under patent pools could encourage exporting in order to 
enable potential licensees to exploit economies of scale from external markets. 
The generally accepted view is that joint ventures offer greater opportunities 
for the transfer of technology than do other modalities of firm governance, since 
domestic partners share in the ownership and management of the enterprise 
that receive new technologies.  There may be inter-firm cooperation, via joint 
research, technology-sharing consortia or other modalities, at the national and 
regional levels, although firms tend to prefer linkages with companies in more 
advanced countries that can offer up-to-date technologies, access to markets and 
other learning advantages, rather than to link up with firms at the same level of 
knowledge. Monitoring technologies in the public domain is an important source 
of learning for LDCs; therefore, restrictions on this option will curtail their options 
and learning possibilities. 
While our discussion is by no means exhaustive, it suggests that in addition 
to IPP, a panoply of tools and mechanisms exists, many of which are already 
being used successfully in other developing countries to enhance knowledge 
governance. Policymakers in LDCs, in collaboration with their international 
development partners, would be well advised to explore those alternatives. 
G. Conclusions and recommendations
for improving knowledge governance
The 1994 TRIPS Agreement initiated a move towards minimum global 
standards on patentable subject matters with far-reaching implications for the 
catch-up growth strategy of LDCs. In the context of the single undertaking of 
the Uruguay Round, developing countries, including the LDCs, undertook to 
align large parts of their IP legislation with the legislation of the major industrial 
economies in the hope that greater intellectual property protection would lead 
to more innovation and increased technology transfer. However, the expectation 
that this would yield higher rates of technology transfer, FDI and innovation has 
not been met. The relationship between strong IP protection and development 
is not straightforward; the impact of strong IP protection depends on a country’s 
knowledge ecology (the institutional framework that enables access to, and 
production and use of, knowledge for learning and innovation) and the level 
of its technological absorptive capacity, or the ability of a firm to recognize 
the value of new, external information, assimilate that information and apply 
it to commercial ends. Strong IP protection may induce FDI and innovation in 
countries with developed knowledge systems; however, in economies with weak 
domestic knowledge systems, as is the case in all LDCs, strong IP protection limits 
policy options and may even be negative, if associated with increased prices for 
inputs and restricted opportunities for imitation. Despite a differential sectoral 
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impact, those findings are corroborated by the case study of the impact of IPRs 
on innovation in the domestic processing sector in Bangladesh (subsection D.3).
The knowledge systems in the LDCs are very weak. Initiating a sustainable 
process of knowledge governance that could accelerate the development of 
productive capacities in those countries is a daunting task, but not an impossible 
one. Several initiatives proposed in this Report may alleviate the constraints 
faced by LDCs so that they can better integrate into the global knowledge 
economy.  Such initiatives crucially depend on the learning capacity to upgrade 
the capabilities of different domestic actors, with a large input of development-
oriented technical assistance and foreign cooperation.
The enterprise is the locus where technology learning and innovation take 
place. Any process of technological upgrading is inconceivable without the 
strengthening of entrepreneurial capacity, but this cannot be achieved via 
technology policies alone. Even in the absence of restrictions on accessing 
knowledge, no policy initiative, no matter how well designed, will catalyse 
learning until local firms begin to acquire the financial, managerial and 
technological capabilities necessary for incorporating new technologies and 
innovating accordingly. This process also requires institutions to provide technical 
support and establish linkages between local participants and external knowledge 
sources, e.g. technology providers, research partners, FDI partners, public and 
private R&D institutions, Internet content providers, other firms, educational 
and research institutions, NGOs, academic institutions, business associations and 
specialized technology institutions. Therefore, complementary institutional and 
organizational innovations need to dovetail with the learning process in order to 
enhance the technological absorptive capacities of the countries concerned. 
A number of thorny issues arise with respect to the role of IPRs in the LDCs. 
Economists have found it extremely hard to measure the costs and benefits of 
IPRs, particularly at different stages of development. It seems clear, however, 
that IPRs do not automatically lead to learning and innovation, and may even 
jeopardize them. This is confirmed by the case study of the textiles and garments, 
agro-processing and pharmaceutical sectors in Bangladesh (Gehl Sampath, 
2007a; subsection D.3).  As argued by most experts, in the area of IPRs “one size 
does not fit all”, and this implies that in the design and implementation of IPR 
policies it is necessary to consider the impact of varying levels of development and 
countries’ initial conditions (CIPR, 2002; UNCTAD and ICTSD, 2005; Correa, 
2000; UNIDO, 2006; UNCTAD, 2006a, 2006b and 2006c; World Bank, 2001). 
IPR protection has historically followed rather than anticipated economic and 
technological development.
Developing countries were subject under the TRIPS Agreement to the same 
standards of protection as those applicable to developed countries, subject 
only to transitional periods that have already expired. The same treatment was 
accorded to the LDCs; only longer transitional periods, renewable upon request, 
were permitted. As a result, LDCs are obliged to apply the same “minimum” 
IP standards as soon as the transitional periods expire or upon graduation. In 
many cases, TRIPS-plus regulations impose on LDCs even higher standards and 
obligations than on other WTO members. 
However, TRIPS Article 66.1 recognizes that LDCs need a more flexible 
approach to IPRs, including the total lack of protection, in order to develop 
“a sound and viable technological base”.  LDCs still have the opportunity — 
until 2013 (and until 2016, in the case of pharmaceuticals) — to undertake an 
imitative path of technological development, as developed countries did in the 
past. However, that window of opportunity may close in a period shorter than 
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that enjoyed by the majority of developed countries, and although LDCs may 
have the freedom to imitate, foreign markets will be closed to their products, 
as higher standards of IP protection have almost become universalized. Since 
interactive learning is a time-consuming, cumulative process involving many 
agents, our recommendation is as follows:
• It is recommended that the transitional period for LDCs should not be 
subject to an arbitrarily predetermined deadline, but become enforceable 
only once those countries have reached, “a sound and viable technological 
base” (as stated in the TRIPS preamble).
 Moreover, TRIPS Article 66.2 requires the granting of incentives to promote 
transfer of technology to the LDCs. The Decision of 19 February 2003 and the 
Doha Declaration are steps forward in the implementation of that provision, but 
concrete measures to facilitate access to technologies by LDCs are either non-
existent or insufficient. It remains unclear which measures that could effectively 
contribute to mobilizing technology transfer by developed countries’ enterprises 
to LDCs need to be adopted by developed countries. As required by Article 66.2, 
incentives should be given directly to enterprises and institutions, in developed 
countries, since that is where most of the technologies are located. That obligation 
cannot be met merely through cooperation provided by public agencies. 
• It is recommended that the concept of “transfer of technology”, for the 
purposes of compliance with Article 66.2, be elucidated by the WTO, so as 
to make it clear that developed countries’ Governments should provide firm-
based incentives for the transfer of IPR and non-IPR-protected technology, 
and that “technology” should be understood as manufacturing methods, 
formulae, designs, and basic and detailed engineering — that is,  knowledge 
that may be effectively applied to upgrade the technological capacity of 
LDCs’ recipients, as opposed to a simple transfer of general training and 
technical assistance or scientific cooperation. ·
Furthermore,
• It is recommended that developed countries effectively implement their 
obligations under Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement by adopting special 
incentives, specifically aimed at facilitating  the transfer of technology to 
LDC enterprises (such as tax breaks and subsidies), including machinery 
and equipment.  With a view to avoiding any inconsistencies with other 
WTO rules and reducing uncertainty for prospective technology suppliers, 
the wording specifically allowing such incentives may be incorporated into 
the GATT Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.·
An approach consistent with the concept underlying Article 66.2 should not 
be limited to the granting of incentives whose impact with regard to securing 
successful outcomes is doubtful. Although LDCs can delay the granting of patents 
in all areas, this only permits LDC firms to exploit inventions patented abroad 
in their own markets. This exemption is likely to have only a limited impact in 
terms of setting up competitive production facilities in LDCs (in which internal 
economies of scale are not likely to be achieved). Despite the fact that IPRs 
are “private rights”, WTO member countries have no limitation on adopting, 
in the context of the WTO’s special and differential treatment, measures 
exempting exports originating from LDCs from patent infringement actions in 
their jurisdictions.39 In practice, such exemptions may benefit only a narrow 
range of products manufactured in LDCs, but may provide a strong incentive for 
investment and technological learning in particular areas with spillover effects in 
other sectors of LDCs’ economies.
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IPR-related technical assistance to LDCs should be premised on the 
understanding that the introduction of IPRs may entail significant costs with little, 
if any, benefits to LDCs.
• It is recommended that the technical assistance provided by WIPO and 
other organizations be unbiased and, development-focused, and inform 
LDCs about all the flexibilities allowed by the TRIPS Agreement. The content 
and forms of delivery of IPRs-related technical assistance should be defined 
by the recipient Government, in accordance with its own priorities and 
development objectives and in full consultation with other stakeholders, 
including public-interest-oriented NGOs.
• It is recommended that studies assessing the economic impact of IPR regimes 
on the development of productive capacities in LDCs be carried out, with 
the assistance and cooperation of all relevant partners, inter alia those from 
the wider international community, including UNCTAD and civil society.
Moreover, certain LDCs acceding to the WTO have been required to forgo the 
transitional periods enjoyed by the original LDC members and to provide TRIPS-
plus protection in several areas. There is no legal or economic justification for 
such requirements. This burden should not be imposed on new WTO members, 
in view of the recognition — in Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement — that IPRs 
may constrain rather than accelerate the development of a viable technological 
base.
• It is recommended that the LDCs currently in the process of accession to 
the WTO not be required to provide accelerated and TRIPS-plus protection, 
and be granted the same transitional periods as those granted to other LDC 
members.
• It is recommended that LDCs use to the fullest extent possible the flexibilities 
allowed by the TRIPS Agreement (parallel imports, compulsory licences, 
permissible exceptions to exclusive rights, fair use, etc.) and seek to avoid 
the erosion of such flexibilities through FTAs, BITs or trade agreements, or 
in the context of accession to the WTO.
• It is recommended that the inclusion of IPRs as “covered investments” be 
reviewed in any further bilateral or regional agreement. 
1. RECOMMENDATIONS AS PER TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES
• It is recommended that the international community reconsider the 
development dimension of the TRIPS Agreement, with a view to meeting the 
need for a balanced approach and pro-development IPR regime, especially 
with regard to LDCs.
• It is recommended that greater flexibility be built into the current patent 
system, with a view to obtaining more and longer special and differential 
treatment for LDCs.
• With a view to accommodating technological and knowledge asymmetries 
between economies, it is recommended that LDCs be granted LDC-specific 
IP standards with regard to novelty, nature of inventions, terms of protection 
and calibrated disclosure.
• It is recommended that with respect to TRIPS-plus provisions on patents, the 
scope of limitations and exceptions be increased in order to allow greater 
flexibility for IPR users. The full use of exceptions and limitations should be 
granted to LDCs, especially with regard to research and fair use.
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• It is recommended that there be more flexibility in determining the terms 
of protection and the conditions for issue of compulsory licenses.
2. RECOMMENDATIONS AIMED AT IMPROVING LEARNING CAPACITIES
The LDCs should consider the following measures aimed at improving their 
learning capacities:
LDCs should be afforded special arrangements to provide them with access 
to information and knowledge in the public domain, which is increasingly 
being eroded owing to the widespread application of stringent IPRs. 
It is recommended that IPR provisions be excluded in FTAs with LDCs.
It is recommended that as regards the terms of licensing, licensing conditions 
be reviewed with a view to accommodating LDC-specific market conditions, 
including factor prices.
It is recommended that the current TRIPS-plus policy regime trends (through 
FTAs and BITs) be reversed.
It is recommended that LDC-based resources and knowledge be pooled in 
the search for economies of scale and collective efficiency solutions in all 
IPR-related institutional arrangements, including in multilateral forums.
It is recommended that guidelines be developed in Patent Offices with respect 
to patentability criteria — that is, to examine applications carefully rather 
than simply copy international standards (in drafting national legislation).
It is recommended that national legislation be drafted with a view to providing 
clear criteria definitions in line with countries’ own conditions and needs, 
without discrimination aimed at preventing the “ever greening” of patents 
phenomenon (i.e. extension of patents that do not add value).
It is recommended that third parties be introduced to challenge the granting 
of patents (as done, for example, in Israel, Pakistan India and Viet Nam).
All of the above should be reviewed with a view to making the IP system a 
positive force rather than a barrier to development.
As regards alternative non-proprietary mechanisms for knowledge governance, 
the LDCs, in collaboration with the international community, should explore a 
panoply of existing mechanisms, which are being successfully used in many other 
countries, in order to stimulate learning and knowledge governance — patent buy-
outs, price discrimination mechanisms, public–private partnerships,  subsidizing 
research (directly and indirectly) via  grants, tax credits, fiscal measures to support 
R&D and other types of innovative activities, developing prizes, government-
based advance market commitments, open source collective mechanisms, 
information and knowledge commons, compensatory liability regime (“use and 
pay system”), joint research initiatives of various kinds, local as well as regional 
technology-sharing consortia, joint research ventures and licensing agreements 
with technology transfer clauses. Moreover, improving linkages between S&T 
institutions and the enterprise sector is highly recommended. 
• It is recommended that in order to encourage institutional diversity for 
enhanced knowledge ecology, a plurality of options be explored with a 
view to accelerating technological learning and innovation.
 The underlying assumption of this Report is that the main challenge which 
policymakers in LDCs need to address is how to improve the knowledge ecology, 
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devise supportive policy frameworks and consider the plurality of options 
available with a view to better managing and benefiting from their own as well 
as already available knowledge resources. Establishing proprietary IP systems and 
creating property rights are but one response, among a number of responses, to 
a more generic and fundamental problem, which is how to create and improve 
their knowledge ecology. That challenge goes beyond fine-tuning the existing IPR 
regime.
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Notes
  1 This rapprochement has been intensifying since the introduction of software patents in 
the United States (an area subject to copyright in the TRIPS Agreement). Not all WTO 
Members have followed the United States approach. 
  2 This trend is identified with the “copyright maximalist” agenda that is currently being 
seriously challenged (David, 2005; Macmillan, 2003, 2005; South Centre, 2002, 
2007; Musungu, 2005; Smiers, 2005; CIPR, 2002; Kozul-Wright and Jenner, 2007 
forthcoming; Maskus and Reichman, 2005). 
  3 With respect to patent applications, data are available for only 17 LDCs; for varying 
years between 1999 and 2004.
  4 See World Bank, World Development Indicators online. 
  5 Article 66.1 provides as follows:  “In view of the special needs and requirements of least-
developed country Members, their economic, financial and administrative constraints, 
and their need for flexibility to create a viable technological base, such Members shall 
not be required to apply the provisions of this Agreement, other than Articles 3, 4 and 5,
for a period of 10 years from the date of application as defined under paragraph 1 of 
Article 65.”
 6 Compulsory licensing occurs when a Government allows someone else to produce 
the patented product or process without the consent of the patent owner. WTO rules 
on compulsory licences are outlined in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement and were 
reaffirmed in the Doha Declaration, adopted in 2001 (http://www.wto.org).
  7  Parallel importation refers to “the importation of a good or service as to which exhaustion 
of an IPR has occurred abroad” (Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, UNCTAD 
and ICTSD, 2005: 93).
  8  “Fair dealing” refers to the right granted by copyright laws to reproduce limited portions 
of copyrighted works without infringing the legitimate interest of the authors or copyright 
owners. This right exists in the United Kingdom and other regions whose copyright 
ordinances are derived from the United Kingdom, such as Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and Hong Kong (China). In the United States, the term “fair use” is adopted. 
  9 See the WTO General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 for a system to address this 
issue.
10 Apart from a provision that exceptions should not unreasonably conflict with normal 
exploitation by the patent, taking into account the legitimate interests of third parties, 
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement does not define the scope or nature of permissible 
exceptions.
11 The issue of TRIPS-plus standards has been a sensitive one during stalled United 
States–Southern African Customs Union (SACU) free trade agreement negotiations 
with Lesotho being included.
12 Either the UPOV 1978 or the UPOV 1991 Convention. 
13 See Article 46 (5) of the Agreement.
14 Some FTAs also restrict the use of test data for off-patent products. 
15 “The extent to which the country provides protection of intellectual property rights 
consistent with or greater than the protection afforded under the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property Rights described in section 101(d)(15) of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act”.
16 AGOA has been in force between the United States and 48 sub-Saharan African countries 
since 2000, including 26 LDCs (source: http://www.agoa.gov/eligibility/country_eligibility.
html).
17 This restriction does not apply to LDC members of ARIPO, which have more flexibility 
to mould their own patent legislation and practice.
18 See WIPO (2007b), Correa (2007), UNCTAD and ICTSD (2005) and UNIDO (2006).
19 Only 7 per cent of firms in LDCs engage in licensing (UNCTAD, 2006b).
20 See, for example, Maskus (2005:  paragraphs 41–74).
21 In Brazil, for example, only one out of 176 “transfer of technology” contracts in the 
pharmaceutical sector registered with the National Institute of Intellectual Property 
included the exploitation of a patent. In 138 cases the use of trademarks was licensed 
(Elias, 2004).
22 The exception to this pattern occurs when there is a credible threat of compulsory 
licence or government use in accordance with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
One example is the case brought before the South African Competition Commission 
by COSATU and others against GlaxoSmithKline, South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Boehringer 
Ingelheim, which eventually led to the negotiation of voluntary licences.
23 See the extensive literature, e.g., David and Foray (2003); Foray (2000, 2007); Von 
Hippel (2005); Jaffe and Lerner (2004); Suthersanen, Dutfield and Chow (2007); Nelson 
(2004).
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24 For an exhaustive study of theory and evidence about the role of IPRs in technology 
transfer, see UNIDO (2006).
25 In contrast to patent protection, the protection under trade secrets has no acquisition 
costs, while competitors’ cost and time involved in overcoming the secrecy barrier by 
legitimate reverse engineering may in some cases be substantial. 
26 This is equally valid for SMEs in developed economies. 
27 See Von Hippel (1981); Levin, et al. (1987); Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000); Scherer 
(2005); Arundel (2001). 
28 See the empirical study by Levin, et al. (1987), which found that firms in 130 lines of 
business reported that patents were the least important means of securing competitive 
advantage for new products. See study by Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000), which 
concluded that in many different industries, being first to manufacture a product far 
outweighs the benefits of monopoly rents associated with patents. 
29 Its results are corroborated by another broader study on the pharmaceutical sector in 
Bangladesh, which looks at all other components in the domestic knowledge system 
(such as universities, public research institutes, hospitals and clinics), in addition to the 
firms (Gehl Sampath, 2007b).
30 The main technology source variables were included when estimating the model for 
agro-processing only and pharmaceutical biotechnology only. None of them is significant, 
and they are jointly insignificant in each sector. 
31 UNCTAD (2006c); CIPR (2002); Foray (2000, 2004); Correa (2000); Sampat (2003); 
Maskus and Reichman (2005). 
32 There is strong evidence, for instance, suggesting that patents do not encourage R&D in 
pharmaceuticals for diseases prevalent in developing countries, as large pharmaceutical 
companies concentrate on projects leading to  profitable drugs and tend to ignore those 
for which the effective demand is low (CIPR, 2002) .
33 For an analysis of patenting strategies, see Granstrand (1999) and OECD (2005).
34 According to the New York Times, TRIPS has become a mechanism for transferring 
rents from the South to the North. According to World Bank figures, the net obligation 
resulting from TRIPS amounts to more than $40 billion annually, which developing 
countries owe to American and European corporations (New York Times, 17 April 
2007).
35 The Decision of the TRIPS Council of November 2005 also stipulates that in order 
to help LDCs draw up the information to be presented, and “with a view to making 
technical assistance and capacity building as effective and operational as possible, 
the WTO shall seek to enhance its cooperation with WIPO and with other relevant 
international organizations”. The WTO has set up a working group on trade and transfer 
of technology to address this issue. 
36 For a more extensive discussion of these mechanisms, see Foray (2007). 
37 Utility patents are used in many countries, including Argentina, Armenia, Austria, 
Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Netherlands, members of the African Organization of Intellectual Property, members 
of the Andean Community, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Moldova, 
Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Tajikistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Uruguay and Uzbekistan.
38 As amply demonstrated in the literature on the economics of innovation, and contrary 
to Arrow’s concept of a passive, automatic and costless process, the adoption of 
technologies requires deliberate efforts and investment (Radosevic, 1999).
39 The details of such an exemption should be carefully worked out in order to avoid 
fraud in its implementation as well as legal challenges based on eventual limitations 
imposed on the exercise of pre-existing rights. 
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4
Addressing the
International Emigration
of Skilled Persons
A.  Introduction
The human capital endowment of an economy is a fundamental determinant 
of its long-term growth performance, of its absorptive capacity and of its 
performance in technological learning. It is an essential precondition for the 
development of domestic firms’ technological effort. It is also a requirement for the 
effective working of trade, foreign direct investment, licensing and other channels 
as means of technology diffusion (Mayer, 2001; Kokko, 1994). Indeed, the 
movement of persons possessing a particular type of knowledge has traditionally 
been identified as a means of technology diffusion. It therefore appears alongside 
international flows of goods, investment and disembodied technology (analysed 
in chapter 1 of this Report) as a channel for technology transfer. 
The movement of skilled persons may take place both within countries 
(e.g. among different firms) and internationally. The second case refers to both 
temporary movement of qualified persons (e.g. international technicians or 
consultants on short-term assignments) and permanent (or long-term) migration 
of skilled persons.1 Those two forms of international flows are channels for 
the international transfer of knowledge, but are of different kinds. The short-
term movement of professionals occurs mostly in the context of market-based 
transactions by firms seeking to acquire qualified services from other countries 
or to send them to other countries. Migration of skilled persons, by contrast, 
has different determinants, longer-term consequences and policy implications for 
countries of origin and for countries of destination. Countries may either gain 
or lose from those flows: international permanent (or long-term) immigration of 
skilled persons in principle contributes to building countries’ skills endowment, 
while international permanent (or long-term) emigration of qualified persons 
entails (at least immediately) a loss in a country’s stock of human capital. Those 
two processes are commonly referred to as “brain gain” and “brain drain” 
respectively. The circulation of qualified persons in any direction is termed “brain 
circulation”. The most important issue for countries’ long-term development is 
the net effect of migratory flows.
Least developed countries have a low skill endowment. Therefore, the 
international migration of skilled persons from and to those countries can have 
a strong impact on their human capital stock. This chapter discusses trends in 
international migration of skilled and professional workers from LDCs and 
endeavours to assess its consequences for those countries’ brain drain and brain 
gain. It does not aim at an overall discussion of migration and its social and 
economic effects on LDCs. Rather, its main focus is to evaluate the impact of 
international migration of qualified professionals on the absorptive capacity of 
LDCs, so as to make policy recommendations regarding how to mitigate possible 
negative consequences of that type of migration or, possibly, how to make those 
flows contribute positively to the national knowledge system of LDCs. 
The analysis is based on lifetime migration data for OECD countries. Skilled 
emigrants are proxied by the number of tertiary educated persons born in LDCs 
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and living in those developed countries. The skilled emigration rate is that figure 
as a share of the stock of tertiary educated persons in source countries in 1990 
and 2000 (Manning, 2007). However, the increasing proportion of skilled workers 
migrating on temporary contract to developed and other developing countries is 
not covered here.2 Furthermore, the discussion does not address South–South 
migration because it is less relevant for the migration of skilled persons. Although 
movements of persons among developing countries account for about half of all 
migration flows (Ratha and Shaw, 2007), they consist mostly of unskilled persons 
(except for Southern Africa and South-East Asia). By contrast, an estimated 90 
per cent of international skilled migration flows were to OECD countries in the 
1990s.
B.  Causes and consequences of emigration
1.  MAIN CAUSES
For many decades supply and demand forces in origin and destination 
countries have combined to increase the migration of skilled workers from LDCs 
to developed countries and higher-income developing countries. Slow economic 
growth and political instability, especially in parts of Africa, led to an increase in 
cross-border movements of professionals during the 1970s and 1980s, both to 
developed countries and to more rapidly growing neighbouring States (Russel, 
Jacobsen and Stanley, 1990). That migration supply pressure continued in 
subsequent years and into the new century, underpinned by economic, political 
and social conditions in source countries, as well as military conflicts in some 
cases. The economic situation of most LDCs has generally entailed limited 
employment opportunities for professionals and/or poor working conditions and 
career paths. Other factors are the low level of pay and the huge and widening gap 
between earnings in LDCs and those in developed countries or more advanced 
developing countries for the same careers. In contrast, economic growth and the 
creation of employment opportunities for educated manpower in LDCs appear 
to be closely associated with slower rates of brain drain (Lucas, 2004).  Since that 
favourable situation has not been generalized in those countries, supply forces for 
emigration of skilled persons from many LDCs have remained strong in the past 
two decades. 
At the same time, demand pressure for increased deployment of skilled 
migrants from developing countries (including LDCs) has increased in industrialized 
countries, despite their rapidly rising numbers of tertiary graduates. Opportunities 
for work among professionally qualified immigrants in developed countries have 
accelerated since the 1990s. More open policies were related to increasing 
shortages of skilled manpower, as a result of demographic and structural change. 
The major labour-importing economies, particularly the United States, the EU 
and its member States, Canada and Australia, have reacted in different ways to 
increase the supply of skilled manpower by attracting workers from abroad.3
While skill shortages have been experienced across the board in many 
increasingly technologically advanced developed countries, three sets of factors 
have been especially important in influencing renewed demand for skilled 
manpower. First, the ageing of developed country populations, especially in 
Europe and later in Japan, has contributed to slow growth in labour supply and 
increased demand for skill-intensive non-tradable services, particularly in health 
and old-age care. Second, the information technology revolution has greatly 
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increased the demand for skilled manpower in the production of computer 
software and the demand for computer and ICT engineers. Third, shortages of 
lower- to middle-level skilled manpower — technicians, electricians, plumbers, 
nurses and teachers — have been especially marked, as developed country 
workers shun difficult blue-collar and related jobs, and the output of their 
educational institutions has failed to keep pace with demand.
2. IMPACTS OF EMIGRATION ON DEVELOPMENT
The net impact of the migration of skilled persons in terms of the brain 
drain and brain gain of origin countries has not been clearly determined in the 
theoretical and empirical literature. A range of factors have been identified as 
important: the rate of economic growth and utilization of skilled persons back 
home, especially in certain skilled occupations (particularly relevant to the LDCs); 
the size of the brain drain relative to the domestic supply of skilled persons; the 
role of remittances; and the extent to which migration stimulates development of 
human capital in countries of origin (which is partly determined by the scale of 
out-migration and the role of the diasporas).
Early theoretical studies focused on the short-run impact of a loss of human 
capital, the cost of which is mostly borne by domestic taxpayers, and the impact 
of the decrease in the supply of educated persons on national output (Grubel and 
Scott, 1966; Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974). Subsequent research regarding the 
impact of out-migration of skilled persons on countries of origin can be divided 
into two groups: the findings of the migration “optimists” and the findings of the 
migration “realists”. 
“Optimistic” models stress the dynamic effects of migration (e.g. Stark, 2004, 
and Mountford, 1997). They highlight the positive impact of remittances,4 and 
the impact on human capital development in home countries, as a result of 
increased demand for and access to education among those left behind. The 
scope broadened to include technology and knowledge transfer and other 
benefits of brain circulation, and the potential benefits deriving from diaspora 
links. Docquier and Rapoport (2004: 27) summarize the main effects of the 
successful experience of migrants abroad: “successive cohorts adapt their 
education decisions, and the economy-wide average level of education partly…
or totally catches up, with a possible net gain in the long run” and “the creation 
of migrants’ networks that facilitate the movement of goods, factors and ideas 
between migrants’ host and home countries”.  The diaspora reduces the costs of 
migration and risks in countries of destination, providing greater incentive and 
demand for migration-linked education at home (Kanbur and Rapoport, 2004, 
cited in Docquier and Rapoport, 2004). It must, however, be pointed out that the 
existence of a positive impact on countries of origin  rests on the assumption that 
a significant number of graduates of new courses and new schools, who initially 
enrolled with the aim of going abroad, end up contributing to the provision of a 
higher value of goods and services to the domestic economy.
At the same time, dynamic effects associated with brain circulation have 
received increasing attention. More attention in the empirical literature has been 
paid to the role of return migrants in raising skill levels, and promoting technology 
transfer and capital accumulation, especially in the successful growth cases of 
East and South Asia since the 1990s (Saxenian, Motoyama and Quan, 2002).5
The above-mentioned relationships are complicated, however, especially 
since theoretical models fail to take account of a number of factors: migration 
“realists” have focused on differences in the quality of out-migrants and return 
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Box 7. The importance of remittances
Remittances have increased dramatically in recent years, totalling an estimated $167 billion in 2005, according to World Bank 
estimates. They have grown faster than foreign direct investment and official development assistance over the past decade, dou-
bling in several countries and increasing by close to 10 per cent per annum between 2001 and 2005 (World Bank, 2006). Their 
major role in receiving countries is to stimulate consumption and investment in those countries, help relax foreign exchange 
constraints and contribute to poverty alleviation (Adams, 2007). Their contribution to development depends on their macroeco-
nomic impact and how they are used in receiving countries.  There is evidence that they are more directed to consumption than 
investment, which perhaps explains why no link between them and long-term growth has been found (IMF, 2005: chapter 2). 
Although remittances arise from both skilled and unskilled emigration, their effects just mentioned appear to be stronger in 
cases where unskilled migration predominates, as compared with situations where skilled migration predominates. Qualified 
emigrants have higher earnings abroad than unskilled ones, but are more likely to become permanent immigrants with weaker 
links to countries of origin; eventually, this leads to smaller remittances (Faini, 2006; Niimi and Ozden, 2006).
Box table 2 presents data on remittances over the period between 1990 and 2005 for a collection of LDCs for which data ap-
pear to be plausible.1 On average, excluding a number of extreme values in the calculation of changes over time, remittances 
per capita appear to have increased quite significantly in LDCs in the 1990s and even more in 2000–2005. The mean value 
doubled from $284 million in 1990 to an estimated $621 million in 2005. Remittances are highly correlated with total rates of 
emigration to OECD countries and out-migration rates among skilled workers (for both there was a correlation coefficient of 
0.79 between the value of remittances and migration rates in 2000). 
These figures are significant in terms of foreign exchange earnings for a large number of countries, apart from the major oil 
and mineral exporters, given that total merchandise exports were less the $500 million per year for the large majority of LDCs 
Box table 2. Value of remittances and remittances per capita, least developed countries 
and selected countries with high rates of emigration, 1990–2005
Country group/Country  Value of Remittances
(Current $ millions)
 Remittances
(% increase) 
Value of 
Remittances
(Per capita 
in current $)
1990 2000 2005 (estimate) 1990–2000  2000–2005  2004
Africa and Haiti
Sudan 62 641 1 403 934 119 43
Haiti 61 578 919 848 59 107
Senegal 142 233 511 64 119 45
Lesotho 428 252 355 -41 41 153
Uganda 238 291 22 11
Mali 107 73 154 -32 111 13
Togo 27 34 149 26 338 28
Benin 101 87 84 -14 -3 12
Asia
Bangladesh 779 1 968 3 824 153 94 23
Yemen 1 498 1 288 1 315 -14 2 52
Nepal 111 785 607 34
Cambodia 121 138 14 10
Island States
Cape Verde 59 87 92 47 6 197
Samoa 43 45 45 5 0 249
Comoros 10 12 12 20 0 20
Vanuatu 8 35 9 338 -74 43
Kiribati 5 7 7 40 0 76
Total
Average 284 366 621 29 70 53
Average without outliersa 12 64
India 2 384 12890 21 727 441 69 20
Mexico 3 098 7 525 18 955 143 152 175
Philippines 1 465 6 212 13 379 324 115 141
Colombia 495 1 610 3 668 225 128 70
Jamaica 229 892 1 398 290 57 528
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on Global Economic Prospects data set (World Bank), 2006, for remit-
tances; and UNCTAD, GlobStat database for population.
  a Sudan, Haiti and Vanuatu.
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migrants, compared with their (potential) replacements back home and on the 
extent to which skilled migrants are employed in skilled occupations abroad 
(Docquier and Rapoport, 2004; Lucas, 2004).  Several of those factors have been 
identified as reducing potential gains from brain circulation and remittances from 
skilled and professional persons in many LDCs. 
Many studies have focused on the migration premium — a range of 2–10 
times higher earnings among migrants compared with non-migrants in the same 
occupations, according to Docquier and Rapoport (2004) — while paying less 
attention to the costs of migration, both psychological and social, as newcomers 
seek to assimilate in new environments. One important finding about the jobs 
undertaken by educated migrants suggests that many work in less skilled jobs, and 
thus experience brain “waste”. In such cases, the migration of educated persons 
is not necessarily a stimulus for education in countries of origin, or may be a 
stimulus for learning skills which do not replace those that are lost (for example, 
doctors retraining to become nurses in the Philippines). 
Impacts on human capital in places of origin are likely to be varied and 
larger in low-human-capital and low-migration contexts, either through return 
migration or remittances, than where an abundant supply of educated persons 
and substantial out-migration already exist (Docquier and Rapoport, 2004). 
Short-run brain drain effects are likely to be greater in countries with a narrow 
human capital base. 
Heterogeneity among migrants and non-migrants is also an important issue. 
Schiff (2006) has drawn attention to the fact that the more optimistic models of 
migration tend to ignore self-selection, which results in higher-quality persons 
going abroad. For those migrants there are not near-perfect substitutes among 
the remaining stock of skilled or potential persons. It has also been noted that the 
(UNCTAD, 2006: chart 1). For example, estimated remittances of nearly $4 billion in Bangladesh in 2005 were greater than the 
total value of merchandise exports of $1.4 billion in 2003–2004; among the smaller exporters — for example, Lesotho, Uganda 
and Senegal — an amount totalling approximately $200 million was equivalent to or greater than total exports in the same years. 
Among two very small countries — Cape Verde and Samoa — remittances of $92 million and $45 million, respectively, were 
the major source of foreign exchange. It is noteworthy that Senegal, Cape Verde and Samoa all had emigration rates of 20 per 
cent or more (69 per cent for Cape Verde) in 2000, and hence skilled out-migration probably played a major role in remittance 
incomes.
1 The data need to be interpreted with care, given that the reliability of coverage appears to differ significantly for individual 
countries from year to year.
Box 7 (contd.)
Box 8. Return migration
There is little quantitative information about the contribution of return migrants to skill formation and technology back home 
among LDCs. Nevertheless, limited studies in similar economies show that return migrants can make a difference in terms of 
the skills endowments of origin countries. Ammassari (2003: 2) concludes from a study of skilled returnees in Côte d’Ivoire and 
Ghana that they “fostered positive development effects in both private and public sectors”. This differed across generations, 
with earlier return migrants assisting in “nation building”, while the contribution of later cohorts was more directly related to 
entrepreneurship. Among the benefits which returnees themselves cited as most important, specialized technical expertise and 
communication skills ranked highest. Knowledge and skills were more important than work experience, although contributions 
to work morale and productivity in new jobs were also ranked quite high. In addition to technical expertise, returnees brought 
modest amounts of capital with them (reported to be less than $10,000 for over half of respondents in both countries), and 
mainly used them for housing and consumption of durable goods, although about one third also reported providing assistance 
to family members. Therefore, the main contribution of returnees in low-income countries seems to be their skills and human 
capital, rather than investment in the home country.  It is likely that the same is the case in LDCs.
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less successful skilled migrants tend to return home, and hence the brain gain is 
smaller than some of the theoretical models predict.
3. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LDCS
According to Docquier and Rapoport (2004: 34), while the optimal rate 
of skilled and professional out-migration “is likely to be positive”, whether the 
“current rate is greater or lower than this optimum is an empirical question that 
must be addressed country by country”. There appears to be huge variation in 
individual country experience with respect to brain drain, brain circulation and 
brain gain. One important factor is the size of the brain drain, which has both 
positive and negative effects: a large diaspora provides a cushion and a support 
for would-be skilled migrants, but at the same time may reduce the potential 
benefits to countries of origin over time. More settled migrants tend to have more 
tenuous links with home countries and their remittances tend to decrease in 
time.
Industries that employ emigrants also play a part in determining the benefits. 
The out-migration of doctors and nurses in a largely non-tradable and heavily 
regulated industry (despite the internationalization of health care service provision 
in some countries) might be expected to have few benefits for home countries 
in terms of technology transfer, investment from abroad and, of course, trade. 
Benefits can be expected to be much more positive in a highly open, tradable 
industry such as ICT, where economic benefits provided by nationals working 
for private investors abroad can be substantial for technology, employment and 
investment in countries of origin. 
Home country policies and growth prospects can play a major role in increasing 
brain gain and reducing the costs of brain drain. Rapidly growing middle-income 
countries that have passed the migration “hump”6 are likely to be in a better 
position to utilize skilled persons from abroad and to invest in the human capital 
that is necessary for filling the gaps created by emigrants. But even at lower levels 
of per capita income, domestic policies appear to be important. 
C.  Skilled emigration trends and developments
The latest data on the total number of skilled out-migrants are from the round 
of censuses conducted in 1990 and 2000 in OECD countries, which are host to a 
high proportion of all skilled migrants. The data suggest that skilled out-migration 
from developing countries increased sharply in the 1990s.7 While the total OECD 
population expanded by less than 20 per cent in the 1990s, skilled immigration 
increased by some two thirds (12 to 20 million). The patterns are documented by 
Docquier and Marfouk (2006). Table 30 summarizes several of the main findings 
of that study: 
• Skilled out-migration rates were inversely related to country size. 
• Rates of skilled out-migration were highest in LDCs (13 per cent). Nevertheless, 
LDCs accounted for only less than 5 per cent of all skilled migrants, while 
middle-income and high-income country groups accounted for close to 30 
per cent each.
• The stock of skilled persons was positively related to the level of economic 
development, as might be expected. However, the share of skilled migrants 
was negatively correlated with the level of development.
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These data on skilled (tertiary educated) migration flows provide no 
breakdown by industry/occupation and level of schooling. Thus out-migration 
is much higher in certain professions that are skill-intensive and where skills 
are relatively uniform internationally, such as medicine. Moreover, migration of 
highly educated persons with more than basic tertiary training tends to be much 
greater than for the tertiary educated population as a whole. Lowell, Findlay and 
Stewart (2004) cite studies which suggest that as many as 30–50 per cent of 
the developing world’s population trained in science and technology live in the 
developed world. This has a direct impact on those countries’ skills base, on their 
absorptive capacity and on their technological catch-up possibilities. 
Tables 30 and 31 provide information on the rates of emigration for all 
emigrants and tertiary educated emigrants, as well as on changes in those 
rates during the period 1990–2000 for all LDCs for which data are available.8
To facilitate interpretation, the data are organized by regions.9 Within regions, 
countries are ranked by total population size (table 31), which is correlated with 
the absolute number of emigrants, although not necessarily with migration rates. 
Three main patterns of skilled emigration and changes in emigration rates in 
the period 1990–2000 among the LDCs stand out. First, emigration rates were 
generally high among tertiary educated persons by international standards, with 
an unweighted mean for those countries of 21.4 per cent in 2000. That was much 
higher than for all lower-middle and low-income countries (7.6 and 6.1 per cent 
respectively in table 30), although the latter figure (weighted) is heavily influenced 
by quite low out-migration rates for China and India. There was considerable 
variation in the (unweighted) total rates of emigration among tertiary educated 
persons within and by country group among the LDCs. They were close to 25 per 
cent in the island LDCs, West Africa and East Africa, and lowest in the generally 
more populated Asian LDCs (6.4 per cent), with Central Africa falling in between 
(14.1 per cent). 
Second, these average rates of emigration of skilled persons across the main 
LDC regions conceal very substantial intraregional variations, with coefficients of 
variation close to 1 in all regions except East Africa. All regions, especially West 
and East Africa, show substantial variations in rates across countries in both 1990 
Table 30. Rates of emigration for all workers and skilled workers
among LDCs and other country groups, 2000
(Percentage)
Rate of emigration Share of skilled 
workers
Share of 
migrants
Total Skilled Among
residents
Among
migrants
By size
Large (pop. >25 million) 1.3 4.1 11.3 36.4 60.6
Intermediate (pop. 15-<25 million) 3.1 8.8 11.0 33.2 15.8
Smaller (pop. 2.5-<15 million) 5.8 13.5 13.0 33.1 16.4
Small (pop. <2.5 million) 10.3 27.5 10.5 34.7 3.7
Total 96.5a
By income
High-income 2.8 3.5 30.7 38.3 30.4
Upper-middle income 4.2 7.9 13.0 25.2 24.3
Lower-middle income 3.2 7.6 14.2 35.4 26.6
Low-Income 0.5 6.1 3.5 45.2 15.1
Total 96.4a
Least developed countries 1.0 13.2 2.3 34.0 4.2
Source: Docquier and Marfouk (2004, 2006).
a Total sums to slightly less than one hundred because of rounding. 
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Table 31. Brain drain from LDCs to OECD countries, 1990 and 2000
(Percentage)
Country group/ Country Rate of out-migration Increase in
out-migration rate
1990 2000 1990–2000
Total Tertiary 
educated
Total Tertiary 
educated
Total Tertiary 
educated
(A) (B) (C) (D) (C-A) (D-B)
Africa and Haiti
Central (and North)
Democratic Rep. of the Congo 0.3 8.3 0.3 7.9 0.0 -0.4
Sudan 0.1 5.0 0.2 5.6 0.1 0.6
Angola 2.7 7.1 2.7 25.6 0.0 18.5
Chad 0.1 8.7 0.1 6.9 0.0 -1.8
Central African Republic 0.2 4.4 0.2 4.7 0.0 0.3
Equatorial Guinea 0.2 4.3 4.1 34.1 3.9 29.8
 Average 0.6 6.3 1.3 14.1 0.7 7.8
West (and Haiti)
Burkina Faso 0.1 2.6 0.2 3.3 0.1 0.7
Mali 0.7 6.6 0.7 11.5 0.0 4.9
Niger 0.1 8.3 0.1 6.1 0.0 -2.2
Senegal 1.6 11.1 2.6 24.1 1.0 13.0
Guinea 0.3 5.1 0.5 11.1 0.2 6.0
Haiti 7.3 78.3 10.2 81.6 2.9 3.3
Benin 0.2 6.1 0.3 7.5 0.1 1.4
Sierra Leone 0.5 31 1.4 41 0.9 10.0
Togo 0.5 8.9 1.0 13.6 0.5 4.7
Liberia 1.1 27.7 2.6 37.4 1.5 9.7
Mauritania 0.6 3.5 1.4 23.1 0.8 19.6
Gambia 1.3 76 3.1 64.7 1.8 -11.3
Guinea-Bissau 0.8 5.9 1.8 29.4 1.0 23.5
Average 1.2 20.9 2.0 27.3 0.8 6.4
East (and South)
Ethiopia 0.4 13.9 0.5 17.0 0.1 3.1
United Rep. of Tanzania 0.3 14.8 0.3 15.8 0.0 1.0
Uganda 0.4 29.9 0.5 21.6 0.1 -8.3
Mozambique 0.8 18.2 0.9 42.0 0.1 23.8
Madagascar 0.2 55.2 0.2 36.0 0.0 -19.2
Malawi 0.1 7.5 0.1 9.4 0.0 1.9
Zambia 0.2 12.2 0.3 10.0 0.1 -2.2
Somalia 14.2 48.9 14.6 58.6 0.4 9.7
Rwanda 0.1 9.4 0.2 19.0 0.1 9.6
Burundi 0.1 5.0 0.3 19.9 0.2 14.9
Eritrea - - 2.3 45.8
Lesotho 0.1 6.2 0.0 2.4 -0.1 -3.8
Djibouti 0.3 9.4 0.5 17.8 0.2 8.4
Average 1.4 19.2 1.6 24.3 0.2 5.0
Average 1.2 17.4 1.7 23.6 0.5 6.2
Asia
Bangladesh 0.1 2.3 0.3 4.7 0.2 2.4
Myanmar 0.1 3.3 0.2 3.4 0.1 0.1
Afghanistan 0.8 11.7 1.0 13.2 0.2 1.5
Nepal 0.0 1.9 0.1 2.7 0.1 0.8
Yemen 0.1 3.3 0.2 5.7 0.1 2.4
Cambodia 3.0 6.6 3.1 6.8 0.1 0.2
Lao PDR 6.7 14.9 7.1 13.8 0.4 -1.1
Bhutan 0.0 1.7 0.1 1.2 0.1 -0.5
Average 1.4 5.7 1.5 6.4 0.2 0.7
Islands
Pacific Islands
Solomon Islands 0.5 6.2 0.6 3.7 0.1 -2.5
Vanuatu 1.0 9.4 1.2 5.0 0.2 -4.4
Samoa 35.3 75.9 43.1 66.6 7.8 -9.3
Kiribati 3.9 26.8 5.1 24.9 1.2 -1.9
Average 10.2 29.6 12.5 25.1 2.3 -4.5
Other Islands
Comoros 1.0 6.4 2.2 14.5 1.2 8.1
Cape Verde 23.8 54.4 23.5 69.1 -0.3 14.7
Maldives 0.1 2.3 0.2 2.2 0.1 -0.1
Sao Tome and Principe 6.2 9.7 5.6 35.6 -0.6 25.9
Average 7.8 18.2 7.9 30.4 0.1 12.2
Average 9.0 23.9 10.2 27.7 1.2 3.8
Mean 2.5 16.5 3.1 21.4 0.6 4.9
Standard deviation 6.4 20.3 7.2 20.0 0.8 -0.4
Source: Docquier and Marfouk (2004).
Note: Averages are unweighted arithmetic means.
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and 2000. Out-migration rates were especially high in several of the very small 
island countries, in the South Pacific and elsewhere (Sao Tome and Principe, 
Cape Verde and Samoa), in countries that had experienced political instability in 
the 1980s and 1990s (Sudan, Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia and Eritrea) and in 
some of the poorest countries (e.g. Sierra Leone) (chart 11). The high emigration 
rates of LDCs were (weakly) inversely correlated with population size and the 
human development index, while GDP was positively correlated with out-
migration among educated people (particularly in West Africa). These findings 
for LDCs are similar to patterns found for other developing countries (section 
A). Emigration rates were lowest in some of the larger countries (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Niger and Malawi), and in all the more populous 
Asian countries (especially Nepal, Myanmar and Bangladesh) (chart 22). 
Chart 11. Ten highest rates of out-migration (tertiary educated)
among LDCs, 2000
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Chart 12. Ten lowest rates of out-migration (tertiary educated)
among LDCs, 2000
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Third, increases in out-migration among the tertiary educated to OECD 
countries were quite substantial. The unweighted mean emigration rate rose 
from 16.5 per cent in 1990 to 21.4 per cent 10 years later. Such intensification 
of emigration among skilled persons was much stronger than among all emigrants 
from LDCs. The latter’s emigration rate increased only moderately — from 2.5 
per cent to 3.1 per cent over the same period. The major increases in emigration 
rates for skilled persons occurred in West Africa and in Central Africa. In five LDCs 
— Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and 
Mauritania — the emigration rate increased by 20 percentage points or more. In 
the Asian LDCs, by contrast, emigration rates were fairly constant between 1990 
and 2000. In the Pacific islands they declined slightly, but were still high in 2000. 
The largest decreases in emigration rates (between 10 and 20 percentage points 
lower) were in Madagascar, Gambia and Samoa.
A projection based on figures in table 30 indicates that by 2004 one million 
tertiary educated people from LDCs had emigrated, out of a total stock of 
educated persons of about 6.6 million (including over one million in Bangladesh 
alone).
To put figures for LDCs in perspective, we have compared them with those 
for countries with the largest absolute number of out-migrants. Two points stand 
out. First, the absolute number of tertiary educated out-migrants was relatively 
small among all LDCs, viewed on a global scale. While several of the large origin 
countries (Philippines, India, China and Mexico) had about a million educated 
people living abroad in 2000, only Haiti among LDCs recorded close to 100,000 
skilled emigrants. Most of the rest of the larger LDC exporters recorded a stock 
of about 20,000 to 40,000 tertiary educated people living overseas in 2000. The 
differences between the two groups of countries are partly a function of population 
size and low enrolment rates at tertiary level in the LDCs. Second, emigration 
rates among the educated were indeed very high by international standards in a 
number of LDCs. Table 32 indicates that among the large emigration countries 
only Jamaica recorded higher out-migration rates than Haiti, Cape Verde, Samoa, 
Somalia, Eritrea and Mozambique. This was not simply a matter of scale. Although 
emigration rates were high in some of the smallest countries, five LDCs with 
populations of four million or more ranked among the top 10 countries in the 
world in terms of emigration rates in 2000: Haiti, Somalia, Eritrea, Mozambique 
and Sierra Leone. Thus, even for a sample of larger countries, high emigration 
rates of qualified professionals are a feature of economic and social life in the 
LDCs.
D.  Regional patterns 
There are many similarities between countries in the main LDC regions — in 
Africa, Asia and the Pacific islands — but there are also some important differences 
related to geography, history, demography and economic development. 
1.  AFRICA
As the region with most LDCs, Africa has often been highlighted as the 
continent that suffers most from brain drain. The region has remained an area 
of net out-migration to the rest of the world, especially for skilled migrants. 
Economic conditions, wage differentials, rapid population growth among young 
people and conflict have been identified as the key reasons for high rates of out-
migration (Lucas, 2006). In the African case, there is no clear resolution of the 
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brain gain–brain drain debate. While out-migration of skilled persons can impose 
severe economic and social costs in sectors such as health (see box 9), a number 
of factors need to be taken into account before one can conclude that emigration 
is negative for national economies and communities. One consideration is the 
underutilization of skilled persons at home, which is common in many countries, 
including the LDCs. In such circumstances the social costs of out-migration 
are likely to be lower, at least in the short run. Furthermore, gains need to be 
evaluated carefully. Benefits from reverse capital flows, technology transfer and 
greater trade with countries of origin, such as identified in the case of India and 
the Philippines, are likely to be small in most African LDCs. Such benefits depend 
critically on economic conditions and the level of development of productive 
capacities in home countries.
Table 32. Migration of skilled persons from developing countries and LDCs 
with highest emigration rates, 2000
Country Total 
population
GDP per
capita
No. of highly 
educated
out-migrants
Emigration
rate
(Millions)  (PPP $) (000)  (%) 
2005 2005 2000 2000
(1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Developing countries
Philippines 84.2 4 923 1261 14.8
India 1 094.3 3 320 1022 4.2
China 1 307.6 7 198 906 4.2
Mexico 105.3 10 186 901 14.3
Viet Nam 83.2 3 025 447 39.0
Dem. People’s Rep. of Korea 23.1a 1 800 423 5.3
Cuba 11.4a 3 900b 336 28.9
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 69.5 7 980 283 13.1
Jamaica 2.7 4 381 261 82.5
Brazil 184.2 8 561 254 3.3
Colombia 46.0 7 326 233 11.0
Least developed countries
Population > 4 million
Haiti 8.3 1 791 92 81.6
Angola 11.1 2 813 38 25.6
Ethiopia 73.0 823 36 17.0
Mozambique 19.4 1 379 36 42.0
Uganda 27.2 1 501 32 21.6
United Republic of Tanzania 36.7 723 29 15.8
Madagascar 18.0 908 26 36.0
Senegal 11.1 1 759 24 24.1
Somalia 8.5 600c 16 58.6
Sierra Leone 6.0 903 14 41.0
Rwanda 8.4 1 380 5 19.0
Burundi 6.3 739 4 19.9
Eritrea 4.6 858 8 45.8
Population < 4 million
Liberia 3.3 1 033 14 37.4
Samoa 0.2 6 344 7 66.6
Cape Verde 0.5 6 418 5 69.1
Source : Docquier and Marfouk (2004) for out-migration; World Economic Outlook Database 
(IMF), 2006, for per capita GDP; and UNCTAD, GlobStat database for population. 
a  2006 estimate; b  2005 estimate; c  2003–2004 estimate.
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Box 9. The case of health practitioners
The situation facing the health-care sector has been given particular attention in the literature on brain drain, especially with 
reference to the plight of Africa.1 The main factors that have been identified as contributing to the brain drain among medical 
practitioners are very large wage differentials between countries of destination and origin,2 poor working environments and 
poorly designed career paths, especially for nurses. Associated problems relate to the low efficiency of health-care systems, high 
risks for practitioners, especially those involved in HIV/AIDS programmes, and poorly designed social security programmes.
The emigration of doctors to the United States is a case in point (Hagopian et al., 2004). The proportion of Africans is small 
among the large number of doctors of foreign origin in the United States, and LDC Africans make up a tiny proportion of the to-
tal.3 Nevertheless, these movements are significant in terms of the stock of doctors remaining at home. Box table 3 presents data 
on the number of physicians from four LDCs — Ethiopia, Uganda, Zambia and Liberia — residing in the United States. For these 
four countries, the percentage of doctors practising in the United States relative to the total stock of doctors back home ranged 
from 43 per cent (Liberia) to 10 per cent (Zambia). This might not be a problem if the stock of doctors remaining in their country 
of origin was sufficient to meet the needs of the population, but this is not the case. All four countries had very few doctors to 
serve their populations: even the country with the highest proportion — Zambia — had only seven doctors per 100,000 people. 
The percentage was low in all four countries, even compared with an African average of 13 per 100,000. Moreover, it was tiny 
compared with the United States level of close to 300. Thus, even though the absolute number of professionals from the poorest 
countries working abroad may be small, the impact on professional services back home can be severe. Moreover, the number of 
recent graduates leaving sub-Saharan Africa has been increasing in recent years (Hagopian et al., 2004).
Among South Asian LDCs, in Bangladesh and Nepal quite substantial early investment in the health sector and a supply of well-
trained English-speaking medical practitioners have facilitated the brain drain. Adkoli (2006) notes, for example, that 65 per 
cent of all newly graduated Bangladeshi doctors seek jobs abroad and that the country loses 200 doctors from the government 
sector each year. 
The emigration of health professionals is not the only cause of poor standards of health care in many LDCs and ODCs, particu-
larly since many health-care workers are unemployed prior to departure. Lack of sufficient resources and insufficient (or inap-
propriate) training to meet the health-care needs of national populations have also been responsible for poor health systems. 
However, the emigration of health professionals aggravates the situation either in the short or medium term. 
1 For general surveys see for example Hardill and MacDonald (2000), and Martineau, Decker and Bundred (2004).
2 The gap amounts to over 20 times in the case of Ghanaian nurses, compared with the United Kingdom and the United States, 
and it is likely to be similar or higher for LDCs.
3 The large majority (some two thirds) of sub-Saharan African doctors working in the United States were from Nigeria and South 
Africa.
Box table 3. Number of African trained physicians residing in the United States 
and Canada compared with number residing in countries of origin, 2002
Country No. of African trained 
doctors residing in
the United States
or Canada (A)
No. of doctors 
residing in
place of origin
(B)
A/(A+B)
(%)
Physicians
per 100,000 
populationa
Ethiopia 266 1 564 15 2.0
Uganda 175 722 20 3.0
Zambia 74 676 10 6.9
Liberia 55 72 43 2.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 5 334 12 912 29 12.5b
Source: UNCTAD secretariat adaptation from Hagopian et al. (2004, tables 1 and 2).
a Physicians practicing in respective country or region.
b Data for all African countries.
Lucas (2006) shows that in Africa tertiary enrolment and skilled emigration 
rates are strongly positively correlated, a fact that would seem to provide some 
support for the brain-drain hypothesis. Nevertheless, Lucas  (p.41) warns that 
the interpretation of the finding for tertiary enrolments rates is not as simple as 
it might first appear (“whether a higher brain drain induces more students to 
enrol, or expanding the college education systems results in a larger exodus of 
the highly skilled, remain to be disentangled”), as it requires case studies covering 
long periods. An interpretation in favour of brain gain would be valid if emigration 
of tertiary graduates induces high levels of enrolment.
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2. ASIA
Densely populated Asian LDCs (Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan and 
Cambodia) have experienced much lower levels of brain drain than the African or 
island LDCs, as mentioned earlier (chart 2).10 Only the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic has emigration rates that approach the levels of other major LDCs. This 
is despite the fact that tertiary- level enrolments and the stock of tertiary educated 
are relatively high by LDC standards. For example, gross tertiary enrolment rates 
were estimated at 6.5 per cent in Bangladesh according to UNESCO (2006), 
higher than in any other LDC economy, with the possible exception of Samoa (for 
which more recent data are not reported).
On the demand side, relatively rapid economic growth in recent decades, 
in Bangladesh and Cambodia in particular, has almost certainly increased 
demand for skilled persons across a range of occupations. Nevertheless, brain 
drain issues have been important in development debates in the largest LDC 
economy — Bangladesh — especially with regard to the outflow of doctors to the 
United Kingdom (Dovlo, 2004). Loss of skilled persons abroad is also significant 
in Myanmar and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, both of which have 
experienced slow rates of economic growth in the last decade.11 In the case of 
Myanmar, political conflict has also been a factor over several decades.  
3. ISLANDS
The very small island State LDCs in the South Pacific — the Solomon Islands, 
Vanuatu, Samoa, Kiribati and Tuvalu — are characterized by relatively small 
populations, land abundance and dependence on Australia and nearby New 
Zealand in particular as migration havens. Consequently, emigration is intensive in 
some of those countries, and skilled out-migration and associated brain drain are 
an important policy issue across the region.   The rate of emigration of professionals 
is particularly high in the case of Samoa and Kiribati (table 31), although it is 
considered a major policy issue throughout the region. Connell (2006) draws 
attention to some of the underlying factors contributing to movement overseas. 
Many of them are strikingly similar to those applying to many smaller African 
countries: slow economic growth and high youth (and educated) unemployment, 
especially in the main towns and cities; high rates of population growth; and 
close proximity to former colonial countries — in this case, Australia and New 
Zealand — both of which have experienced skill shortages in the past decade. 
Although brain drain is an issue in countries such as Samoa and Kiribati, 
Governments are less concerned about its impact on development than in many 
other LDCs. They are more likely to be proactive in encouraging out-migration 
in order to support resident populations, many of which have few alternatives 
for developing gainful occupations. The Philippines has been taken as a model 
for the development of beneficial links through skilled migration in Samoa and 
Kiribati, with nurses and seafarers playing a major role in generating remittances 
(Connell, 2006). Diasporas play a major role in supporting communities back 
home, and remittances from some groups of skilled persons have remained 
high over several decades.12 Unlike in Africa, however, brain gain in the form of 
return migration is not an issue: it is accepted that most skilled out-migrants will 
never return to work in their countries of origin, except perhaps to retire. The 
main policy issue appears to be the utilization of remittances and the skills of 
those abroad to greater advantage for community and national development (for 
example, through temporary return visits).
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E.  Conclusions and policy recommendations
1.  IMPLICATIONS
Permanent emigration of skilled professionals entails a loss of human capital 
for the home country in the short run and hence a contraction in its absorptive 
capacity, including its capacity to make use of the major channels of international 
technology diffusion. This effect is particularly strong in LDCs, most of which are 
very poorly endowed with skills. 
However, if emigrants are unemployed before leaving the country, the 
immediate loss for the latter is less great. Moreover, the costs of emigration can 
in principle be (partly) offset by other developments, including the eventual brain 
gain through the return of emigrants, brain circulation by means of temporary 
return, creation of business and knowledge linkages between emigrants and 
home countries (leading to technology flows, investment, etc.), higher enrolment 
in tertiary education and an increase in remittances. Many of those positive 
effects, however, occur only once countries have reached a certain level of 
development and income growth. That implies the existence of considerably 
improved economic conditions in home countries, which provide incentives for 
temporary or permanent return of emigrants and for the establishment of stronger 
knowledge and economic flows. Moreover, an improved domestic environment 
entails lower out-migration pressure.
That situation is obviously not the one prevailing in LDCs. Those countries 
are therefore most likely to suffer from brain drain, rather than benefiting from 
brain circulation, brain gain or the other positive effects possibly associated with 
emigration. The economic, social and political situation in LDCs means that the 
emigration rate of skilled persons in those countries is on average higher than in 
other groups of countries, being in some cases among the highest in the world. 
They are particularly high in African and island LDCs. By contrast, Asian LDCs 
have relatively low skilled emigration rates. 
LDCs are more likely to have their accumulation of technological capabilities 
hampered by skilled out-migration. That situation requires policy action in order 
to minimize the costs of emigration and to maximize its benefits. The following 
subsections discuss policy alternatives that can be adopted at different levels. 
Some preliminary observations must be made, however. First, brain drain and 
the costs associated with out-migration of skilled workers are a consequence 
of dramatically different standards of living, wages and opportunities, widening 
in absolute terms, between LDCs and developed and even middle-income 
countries. It is not possible to halt those flows in the foreseeable future. It is 
therefore reasonable to suggest that policies in both sending and receiving 
countries should be targeted at reducing the flows that are shown to be most 
detrimental to national development, and at increasing the benefits from all 
types of skilled out-migration. Second, given the importance of circumstances in 
sending countries, the key to reducing the costs of brain drain, and increasing the 
benefits from brain gain, lies with economic and political conditions and related 
policies in countries of origin. 
2.  RECIPIENT COUNTRY POLICIES
Two broad and potentially conflicting policy objectives have emerged in 
recent years in countries of destination.13 On the one hand, both rapid ageing of 
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populations and rising living standards in developed countries have contributed 
to shortages of skilled persons. Governments in major developed countries have 
sought to fill those gaps by attracting qualified professionals from abroad through 
permanent (or long-term) immigration. On the other hand, there is growing 
recognition, especially in areas such as health care, that excessive brain drain can 
hurt developing economies and LDCs in particular. Several countries, led by the 
United Kingdom, have developed innovative policies to attempt to minimize the 
brain drain in certain sectors, especially from poor countries in Africa, but with 
mixed success. 
The United Kingdom has been at the forefront of policies to reduce the 
impact of brain drain in the health sector in poorer countries (Lowell, Findlay and 
Stewart, 2004). Initiatives include banning National Health Service trusts from 
recruiting from South Africa and Caribbean countries, and the issuance by the 
Department of Health of guidelines on international recruitment for nurses, with 
a list of countries (including many in sub-Saharan Africa) from which recruitment 
is prohibited.14
Clearly, these are still limited objectives and might be extended to other areas 
where the social costs of migration are demonstrated to be high. Other European 
countries are still reluctant to introduce similar legislation, despite pressure from 
the United Kingdom. As a recent agreement between the EU and African countries 
indicates, developing a broader approach that slows the movement of skilled 
workers by seeking to dampen demand in developed countries is still a difficult 
task. The Joint Africa–EU Declaration on Migration and Development signed by 
foreign ministers on 23 November 2006 shied away from the sensitive issue of 
payments to African countries to compensate for the costs of skilled migration.15
The EU rejected the African ministers’ proposal that a special development fund, 
provided by the EU, be created to finance development in order to prevent young 
Africans from leaving for work in Europe. In essence, that fund would seek to have 
the similar effect, albeit in a different form, as the long-discussed migration tax 
proposed by Bhagwati in the 1970s (Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974). Nevertheless, 
progress was indicated by the joint decisions on “[p]romoting concrete and tailor-
made policies and reforms to address skills shortages caused by brain drain” by 
supporting human resource and educational development and on “[s]upporting 
programmes which foster the mobility and temporary return of members of the 
diasporas with the necessary skills in their countries of origin”. More proactive 
measures are required in order to enforce this commitment, however.
Development assistance is another, perhaps more effective, channel through 
which developed countries can help tackle the worst forms of brain drain. The 
case of the assistance provided to Malawi by the United Kingdom’s Development 
for International Development (DFID) is instructive. Malawi has expanded the 
training of health professionals but has major problems in keeping staff in the 
country (Record and Mohiddin, 2006). DFID has developed a special programme 
of assistance for that country to increase training for both doctors and nurses, and to 
increase pay and job opportunities. DFID reports, moreover, that the programme 
has met with some initial success, with the enrolment of 450 new health workers, 
some 570 new staff members recruited to the Ministry of Health, recruitment of 
international volunteers and the establishment of new laboratories.16
While the United Kingdom has taken some important initiatives in the health-
care sector, selective policies targeting professional and skilled workers is a major 
element in the country’s immigration programme, regardless of country of origin 
(Nunn, 2005).17 Professionals accounted for approximately 40 per cent of all 
migration into the United Kingdom from the mid-1990s, as an integral component 
of the medium-term economic growth programme. While North America and 
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the EU contributed the major share of foreign born academic staff, the number 
of African recruits totalled well over 1,000, including 100 from LDCs among 
lecturers and professors in the United Kingdom in 2002. In the light of a serious 
shortage of university staff in many African countries, Nunn recommends that the 
United Kingdom promote international protocols on recruitment similar to those 
developed by the National Health Services, in addition to efforts to improve 
the quality of teaching and the output of universities, and promote debate on 
compensatory mechanisms.
Incentives for emigrants to return home have been offered by some European 
countries. For example, France, Italy and Germany have provided loans, training 
and technical assistance to migrants (World Bank, 2006). France has provided 
loans to emigrants from Mali and Senegal to establish businesses in their home 
countries. However, the small size of the programmes, lack of experience in 
undertaking business ventures (particularly among less educated migrants) and 
poor economic conditions at home are reported to have reduced the programmes’ 
effectiveness. All those factors need to be taken into account if such programmes 
are to have a significant influence on the return of emigrants and on the impact 
of their return on local economies.
 3. LDC POLICIES
Brain retention and gain depend crucially on general economic and political 
developments in LDCs. The creation of employment opportunities for qualified 
professionals with increasing rates of pay is crucial for retaining locally trained 
human capital and for attracting returnees. That includes higher salaries, improved 
working conditions and career paths, and advances in governance, especially 
administrative and bureaucratic, in key public sector areas such as health and 
education. The successful development of technological capabilities in firms 
entails the creation of employment opportunities for a range of professionals, 
including engineers, technicians and researchers. The establishment of endowed 
professorships, through State, private, bilateral or multilateral partnerships, 
can help in retaining academic staff in LDCs (Tettey, 2003). However, targeted 
interventions can also be effective in the short to medium term.
Policies aimed at increasing the gains from return migration have some potential 
for LDCs. The benefits for LDCs are likely to be greater in the case of permanent 
return of former emigrants (as compared with temporary returns), particularly in 
terms of the skills endowment of countries of origin.18 Policies to that end are, 
however, difficult to devise and implement, and there have been several cases 
of failure (see below). LDCs should therefore target short-term visits by skilled 
professionals, since that is where policy initiatives are most likely to succeed. 
They can involve teachers and professors giving crash courses, engineers providing 
specific inputs in sectors relevant to their field of expertise, doctors returning to 
assist with specific health-care campaigns, and so forth. Such actions can make a 
significant difference to specific development projects and programmes. Skilled 
persons selected from among the diaspora are likely to have the advantage over 
other international experts in terms of their understanding of local circumstances. 
Nationals living abroad who are interested in particular projects are likely to self-
select if language ability and knowledge of local circumstances are important 
for effective application of higher-level skills in projects in LDCs. This is likely 
to obviate the need to apply “national preference” criteria in the selection of 
professionals based abroad.
Programmes targeting emigrants can also produce longer-term “external” 
benefits by keeping them engaged with the environment and challenges of their 
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home countries, and keeping open the possibility of return if conditions are 
favourable. Such programmes for return migration have been successfully applied 
by, for example, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, Malaysia and, 
more recently, India and China.
One important initiative to ensure greater utilization of diaspora skills is the 
collection and tracking of information on the occupations and training of nationals 
working abroad. This requires that databases, which facilitate the establishment 
of networks of professionals, be established and maintained.
Countries of origin should also ensure that overseas nationals are able to retain 
their citizenship, even if they take up citizenship in destination countries. This 
means recognizing dual nationality, which may require special arrangements with 
countries of destination that do not allow dual citizenship, either in general or in 
specific cases (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2002). Other incentives involve revising 
regulations that discriminate against emigrants, such as eliminating restrictions on 
ownership of land and property.
In the health-care sector new initiatives are beginning to produce the desired 
effects in some countries (Dovlo, 2004). Measures taken include significant 
increases in salaries, especially those of nurses (Botswana); schemes to develop 
health-care cadres, particularly in rural areas (for example, Malawi and Zambia 
have clinical officers, and Mozambique has a similar category of health carer); and 
new programmes for management of migrant return, especially on a temporary 
basis. Other initiatives include extending the retirement age (for example, beyond 
55, as is currently the practice in Malawi and Lesotho), using community-based 
curricula and strengthening training systems, especially those targeted at retaining 
skilled trainers. While some of those initiatives have met with resistance from the 
medical profession (such as substituting health cadres for trained professionals), 
they provide encouraging signs that targeted initiatives can have a positive impact 
in occupations badly affected by brain drain. 
The policies described above replace unsuccessful initiatives utilized in the 
past. Such initiatives include programmes for the permanent return of migrants, 
and the use of bonds and financial sanctions. The latter have often failed because 
of poor administration and unrealistic restrictions placed on doctors and nurses, 
including long periods of placement in rural areas despite high wage differentials 
between those areas and urban areas, in addition to significant differentials 
between opportunities abroad and those at home (Dovlo, 2004).
Regional initiatives to increase the brain gain have been particularly important 
in Southern Africa through the South Africa Network of Skills Abroad (Mutume, 
2003). Some 22,000 graduates from five countries were reported to be linked 
through its website to universities back home in a range of fields, including 
medicine, commerce, education and engineering. Brain gain consists in offers 
to train South African counterparts or help them conduct research, help transfer 
technology (for example, though the provision of computers and software) and 
facilitate business contacts. Initiatives of that kind could be extended to LDCs. 
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), has also addressed 
brain drain issues through discussion of conditions that help curb the brain drain, 
although concrete initiatives for LDCs in particular have not yet been addressed 
systematically.
Benefits deriving from programmes such as the ones outlined above are 
unlikely to be large in terms of overall national economic and social development, 
but they can assist in overcoming specific bottlenecks. 
Programmes targeting 
emigrants can also produce 
longer-term “external” 
benefits by keeping 
them engaged with the 
environment and challenges 
of their home countries, and 
keeping open the possibility 
of return.
One important initiative to 
ensure greater utilization of 
diaspora skills is the collection 
and tracking of information 
on the occupations and 
training of nationals working 
abroad.
Countries of origin should 
also ensure that overseas 
nationals are able to retain 
their citizenship, even if 
they take up citizenship in 
destination countries. Other 
incentives involve revising 
regulations that discriminate 
against emigrants, such 
as eliminating restrictions 
on ownership of land and 
property.
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4. INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMMES
While discussions of recipient developed country programmes have centred 
on restricting inflows and on compensation, international agency policies have 
put greater emphasis on brain gain through returnees. The focus has been on 
maximizing brain gain by working with diasporas (either providing incentives 
for skilled migrants to return permanently or assisting in technology and skill 
transfer). The International Organization for Migration has been at the forefront 
of those efforts, which have had mixed success. In 1983 it established the Return 
of Qualified African Nationals (RQAN) programme with the main objective 
of “mobilising, and promoting the utilisation of highly qualified, qualified and 
skilled personnel in the development of African countries through voluntary 
programs” (Wickramasekera, 2002: 11–12). Over nearly two decades some 1,500 
Africans were induced to return to their home countries before the programme 
was discontinued. The numbers may seem very small, although they are not 
insignificant in the context of the importance of highly trained returnees for 
certain LDC African countries. Nevertheless, the high unit cost of the programme, 
equity considerations (with regard to colleagues back home who did not migrate) 
and especially lack of ownership by recipient Governments were all identified 
as problems. However, there are indications that qualified return migrants are 
making a difference by occupying key positions in the public and private sectors 
(Ammassari, 2005).
In 2001 RQAN was replaced by the Migration and Development for Africa 
programme, which puts much greater emphasis on short-term visits and transfer 
of knowledge through the Internet and diaspora groups, rather than on the 
permanent return of skilled migrants.19 The UN Development Fund for Women 
has launched a Digital Diaspora Initiative, which involves overseas professionals 
helping women in countries of origin use new information technologies (Mutume, 
2003).
These shorter-term and more modest programmes appear to have greater 
chances of success, although they are not without their critics. Martin, Abella 
and Kuptsch (2006) note that only emigrants with permanent residence rights 
overseas are likely to return even for short visits, and the costs are still high by 
poor country standards.
Relaxing restrictions on trade in services can contribute to brain circulation 
of professionals from LDCs. The latter can benefit from temporary movement 
of professionals to technologically more advanced countries, where they can 
enhance their skills, learn new technologies and acquire more experience. That 
can be useful when professionals are working once again in their home countries. 
Temporary emigration rules should therefore be relaxed in order to benefit 
LDCs. In the case of services, this could be part of commitments by destination 
countries on temporary movement of persons (Mode 4) under the WTO’s 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (Martin, Abella and Kuptsch, 2006). 
However, the political obstacles to temporary (contract) migration are much 
greater than for permanent movements. This fact is reflected in the stalled world 
trade negotiations of the Doha Round on those issues. Developed countries have 
not been prepared to remove many of the “economic needs” tests that inhibit 
the movements of skilled workers.20
International agreements on migration, or even the creation of an international 
body similar to the WTO (to establish rules and procedures for regulating 
international migration), appear to be difficult to achieve in the short to medium 
term.21 However, regional agreements, often between LDCs and their more 
developed neighbours, may have greater prospects of success. For example, 
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the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations — the regional equivalent of arrangements through GATS — has 
made some progress in facilitating the movement of architects, engineers, health-
care workers (mainly nurses rather than doctors) from LDCs such as Myanmar, 
Cambodia and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic to their better-off 
neighbours, particularly Singapore and Malaysia. However, actual migration under 
this programme is still limited; in practice, most movements between LDCs and 
the more developed countries in the ASEAN region have occurred as the result 
of unilateral policies that encourage the movement of skilled workers through 
the migration of “talents” and professionals on a contract basis for a period (with 
renewals) of up to six to seven years (Manning and Sidorenko, 2007). 
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Notes
 1.  In this chapter the terms “skilled”, “qualified worker”, “skilled professional” and “tertiary 
educated” are used interchangeably. The terms “out-migration” and “emigration” are 
also used interchangeably.
 2. The numbers of professionals moving abroad on temporary contract are large, and are 
comparable in certain respects comparable with permanent movements. However, 
several of the issues for temporary migrants are somewhat different from those with 
respect to permanent out-migration, which was the consequence of the dominant 
mode of recruitment in most developed countries through to the 1980s and 1990s. 
Return migration is more predictable for many contract workers, although contracts 
are renewed in many cases, and highly valued contract workers may well become 
permanent. In destination countries, the brain gain related to those who do move is 
more immediate, but probably less substantial, and remittances are probably larger.
 3. Both Canada and Australia have substantially liberalized their immigration regimes 
since 2000 with regard to skilled workers from abroad. Changes have occurred through 
programmes which allow graduates to stay on after completing their courses, and 
through the adoption of points systems that target specific skill groups in short supply. 
In Europe, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands have 
also significantly relaxed restrictions on the employment of skilled persons through new 
legislation since the late 1990s (Mahroum, 2001).
 4. See box 7.
 5. See box 8 concerning the experience of low-income countries.
 6. The migration “hump” refers to the process whereby the rate of (net) out-migration 
increases in the early stages of economic development until it reaches a peak, somewhere 
in the middle-income range of national GDP per capita, and then begins to decline.
 7. More recent studies show that those patterns continued thereafter (Adams, 2003).
 8. The main source of data is Docquier and Marfouk (2004), which was updated in 
Docquier and Marfouk (2006). While the earlier study contains data for a quite large 
number of countries, the revised version reports only the data for selected countries. The 
latter reports higher migration rates in 2000 for the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
(37 per cent compared with 14 per cent reported in the earlier version), Uganda (36 
per cent compared with 22 per cent) and Angola (33 per cent compared with 26 per 
cent); at the same time, the rate is lower for Somalia (33 per cent versus 59 per cent 
earlier). For consistency, we have used only the data from the 2004 publication for the 
discussion of country trends in this chapter. While the absolute rates differ between 
the two studies, only the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (which was already the 
highest out-migration country among LDCs in Asia according to the 2004 study) changes 
significantly in ranking among the high emigration countries.
  9. The main sub-regions among LDCs in Africa are East, Central and West Africa. Sudan 
and Lesotho are included in Central and East Africa respectively. Haiti is included in 
West Africa.
10. Iguchi (2003) and Chalamwong (2004) provide general surveys of skilled migration 
from Asia. 
11. In the case of Myanmar, official OECD data on out-migration are probably a significant 
underestimate, given substantial movements to other South and South-East Asian 
countries (such as the employment of Myanmar doctors in Malaysia). For a discussion 
of the migration of health care and IT professionals from those two countries within 
South-East Asia, see Manning and Sidorenko (2007).
12.  Brown and Connell (2006) demonstrate that Samoan and Tongan nurses continued to 
remit considerable amounts back home 20–25 years after emigration, contrary to the 
pattern found elsewhere, whereby diaspora links with home countries and remittances 
tend to decline over time.
13.  Lowell (2002), Lowell and Findlay (2002), Wickramasekera (2003) and Lowell, Findlay 
and Stewart (2004) provide general surveys of developed country policies.
14.  www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/world-health-day-2006.asp.
15. See www.euractiv.com/en/justice/eu-africa-talk-migration-brain-drain/article-159976.
16. www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/world-health-day-2006.asp.
17. The three-tier programme launched in 2002 differentiates between the highly 
skilled (doctors, lawyers, engineers and academics), the skilled (nurses, teachers and 
administrators) and the low skilled.
18. See box 8.
19. Other international programmes include the Return for Qualified Afghans Programme 
(co-funded by the EU) and the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals 
project run by the UNDP. The latter also stresses returns for shorter periods of three to 
six months (Lowell, Findlay and Stewart, 2004).
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20. “Economic needs” tests require host employers to demonstrate that local workers with 
equivalent skills are not available.
21. Bhagwati (2003) has been in prominent in calling for the establishment of a world 
migration body equivalent to the WTO. 
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5
Knowledge Aid
A.  Introduction
This chapter focuses on how foreign aid can be used to support enhanced 
use of science, technology and innovation (STI) for economic development and 
poverty reduction in the LDCs. The scale and the effectiveness of aid are critically 
important for those countries’ economic development and the achievement 
of substantial poverty reduction. The justification for aid is usually articulated 
within a framework which stresses the limited ability of most LDCs to mobilize 
the domestic financial resources needed to meet a range of pressing economic, 
social and political objectives. But equally important, and actually even more 
fundamental, aid can help to build up the knowledge resources and knowledge 
systems of LDCs. This is particularly important for the LDCs because, as we 
have seen in chapter 1, knowledge accumulation and technological learning 
through international market linkages are currently weak in the LDCs. In that 
situation, there is a real danger of socio-economic marginalization for the now-
open LDC economies as knowledge becomes increasingly important in global 
competition. Aid can play an important role in developing a minimum threshold 
level of competences and learning capacities which will enable LDCs to rectify 
that situation. Knowledge aid that strengthens the knowledge resources and 
knowledge systems of the LDCs is an essential component of aid which is not a 
hand-out, but rather a hand-up.
Thinking about knowledge aid is particularly important for ensuring aid 
effectiveness. Towards the end of the 1990s, a strong consensus emerged that aid 
worked if the recipient country’s policies and institutions were right. As discussed, 
in earlier LDC Reports, the econometric research underlying that position was 
flawed (see Hansen and Tarp, 2001; UNCTAD, 2002:  box 19). Although it is clear 
that good domestic policies are necessary for effective aid, the precise nature of 
what constitutes the right policies is not as clear-cut as earlier thought. Moreover, 
by emphasizing the importance of recipients’ policies, the role of donors’ policies 
in the effectiveness of aid was left out of the picture. In effect there was a “one-
eyed approach” to aid effectiveness (UNCTAD, 2000). With the Paris Declaration 
on donor alignment and the harmonization of aid practices, much more attention 
is now being paid to the role of donor practices in aid effectiveness. But there 
is still insufficient discussion of the impact of the composition of aid on aid 
effectiveness. This chapter is a contribution to the widening of the discussion. 
It is based on the belief that the provision of more knowledge aid could, if it is 
directed towards the right areas and through appropriate modalities, be the base 
for a radical break with past aid failures.
The chapter is organized into five major substantive sections. Section B defines 
knowledge aid and its relationship to aid for STI, and summarizes the findings of 
recent surveys on donor support for STI. Section C focuses on aid for STI in 
LDCs, identifying the scale and composition of STI-related ODA and also the 
types of projects and programmes towards which it is directed. From that analysis 
it is possible to identify a number of strategic weaknesses in knowledge aid for 
LDCs, and the next two sections make recommendations for improving aid for 
LDCs in building science, technology and innovation capacity, focusing firstly on 
agriculture (section D) and, secondly, on industry and infrastructure (section E). 
Section F looks at the current and potential role of aid for STI within Aid for Trade 
initiatives, and more specifically within the Integrated Framework for Trade-
Related Technical Cooperation, and suggests how it may be possible to deepen 
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trade preferences for LDCs through support for technological development. The 
conclusion summarizes the major message of the chapter.
 B.  Knowledge aid and aid for STI
1.  FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE AID
The idea that by intensifying the knowledge content of their aid activities 
donors could increase aid effectiveness has been recognized since the 1990s (King 
and McGrath, 2004). But there is no agreed definition of knowledge aid. In the 
present Report it will be defined as aid which supports knowledge accumulation 
in partner countries through the development of their knowledge resources and 
their domestic knowledge systems.
Chart 13 sets out different donor approaches to intensifying the use of 
knowledge for development to clarify the scope of knowledge aid. It distinguishes 
between approaches that are donor-centred and those that are partner-centred. 
The former approaches are designed to strengthen the knowledge base of 
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Chart 13. Donor approaches to intensifying the use of knowledge for development
Source: Bell (2007).
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the donors themselves:  this can be done through internal reforms to increase 
intra-organizational knowledge-sharing, better knowledge management and IT 
system development. It is intended to increase the effectiveness of formulation 
and implementation of aid activities. It can also go further by providing partner 
countries with access to that donor knowledge — a notion that underlay the 
idea that the World Bank should act as a “knowledge bank”. Partner-centred 
approaches, in contrast, are designed to support directly knowledge accumulation 
in partner countries. This can be done in two ways: either through supplier-
executed services, where, for example, donors provide consultants who advise 
on, or design and develop, projects, programmes and strategies; or through 
strengthening the knowledge resources and knowledge systems of the partners 
themselves, a process which may be called partner learning. In either case, these 
activities might be designed to support better governance through increasing 
knowledge resources for institutional, regulatory and policy development, or to 
support the development of productive capacities through technological learning 
and innovation. 
In this Report, knowledge aid is equated with partner-centred approaches. 
Aid for science, technology and innovation is a particular form of knowledge aid 
which is focused on building the science, technology and innovation capacity of 
partner countries. This can support innovation in productive sectors as well as 
social services such as health, and it can include enhancement of the capacity 
of policymakers to formulate and implement STI policy. The types of activities 
which have been traditionally supported as aid for S&T can include human 
capacity-building in relation to STI; support for other types of STI infrastructure, 
notably scientific research, technological R&D, and agricultural and industrial 
extension, and support for standards compliance and metrology. But aid for 
STI goes beyond this in supporting enterprise-based learning and innovation 
— for example, through enterprise-centred training activities, the development 
of domestic business linkages and the development of STI-related international 
linkages, including scientific cooperation and business-to-business links.
Aid for STI is a particularly important form of knowledge aid because 
developing innovation capacity within enterprises (both firms and farms) is the 
key to economic dynamism in the LDCs.
Technical cooperation grants are one mechanism for delivering knowledge 
aid. Technical cooperation is provided in two ways: firstly, as technical services 
required for the implementation of specific investment projects; and secondly, 
as free-standing technical cooperation, which is defined as “the provision of 
resources aimed at the transfer of technical and managerial skills or of technology 
for the purpose of building up general national capacity without reference to 
the implementation of any specific investment projects” (see OECD, 2006: 113). 
Some part of free-standing technical cooperation may be directed at building 
science, technology and innovation capacity within a country and as such would 
be part of aid for STI as defined here. But technical cooperation is not synonymous 
with aid for STI.
This chapter focuses on aid for STI as a form of knowledge aid.  However, 
it is important to emphasize at the outset that donor approaches to intensifying 
the use of knowledge for development have generally been more donor-centred 
than partner-centred. King and McGrath (2004) demonstrate with respect to 
the experience of the World Bank and bilateral agencies in Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and Japan, that a very large part of the effort to mobilize knowledge 
for development has been concentrated on donor-centred activities. Moreover, 
even when this has ostensibly also been designed in a way that provides partner 
Aid for science, technology 
and innovation (STI) is a 
particular form of knowledge 
aid that can support 
innovation in productive 
sectors as well as social 
services. 
Aid for STI  develops 
innovation capacity within 
enterprises (both firms and 
farms), which is key to 
economic dynamism
in the LDCs.
The Least Developed Countries Report 2007164
countries with access to donor knowledge, the extent of such knowledge-sharing 
has been less effective than expected (King and McGrath, 2004). 
Similarly, with respect to technical cooperation, the OECD’s Development 
Co-operation Report 2005 distinguishes between technical cooperation which 
involves (a) “direct supply of skills from outside” and (b) “efforts to enhance the 
capacities of the local population” (OECD, 2006: 112), and noted that “In the 
past, donors have broadly assumed that they will promote capacity development, 
but reality has proved much more complex” (p. 111). A detailed case study of 
Cambodia shows how difficult it is to build domestic capacity in a situation in 
which there is chronic underfunding of government and very low salaries (Godfrey 
et al., 2002). Much technical assistance in that case actually served to facilitate 
donor resource flows rather than build domestic capacity, and the sustainability 
of donor projects and the effectiveness of government were undermined as key 
personnel were drawn out of the public sector to service a succession of donor 
projects.
2. AID FOR STI: EVIDENCE FROM RECENT SURVEYS
Various recent surveys enable the reconstruction of trends in aid for STI from 
multilateral and bilateral donors. 
Crawford et al. (2006) survey World Bank lending for science and technology 
over the period 1980–2004. Their conclusion is stark: “Maybe with the exception 
of long-term support for agricultural research, the analysis of S&T projects over 
the last 25 years reveals no consistent approach or strategy on the part of the Bank 
toward developing S&T capacity in its client countries. In agriculture, sustained 
efforts have been put into supporting NARS [national agricultural research 
systems], much of which has been in the form of minor support undertaken in 
connection with other rural development activities. Regarding nonagricultural 
projects in general, the Bank’s approach has been ad hoc, experimenting with 
different mechanisms for different circumstances as they occurred” (Crawford et 
al, 2006: 28–29). Quantifying the level of financing for S&T projects is difficult. 
But the study estimates (with quite a stringent definition of aid for S&T1) that:
• “Although 647 projects provided some support for science and technology, 
only 119 of the World Bank’s 6,059 projects were dedicated primarily to 
promoting science and technology or contained a significant science and 
technology capacity building component” (p. 10).
• Over the last 25 years only 3.9 per cent of total World Bank lending has on 
average gone to S&T projects (p. 33).
• “Lending to science and technology in the last 5 years has declined significantly 
with respect to the previous 20 years” (p.14).
• Commitments to agricultural research projects have been declining since the 
1990s, as part of a dramatic decline in World Bank lending to agriculture 
which began in the mid-1980s.
The geographical distribution of World Bank non-agricultural S&T lending 
during this period is also significant. The Republic of Korea was by far the largest 
borrower and other large borrowers were India, Indonesia, Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico. The only LDC in the list of countries with major non-agricultural S&T 
projects is Bangladesh. The overall focus has been on countries with a large 
population and on more advanced developing countries, with LDCs (other than 
Bangladesh) thus being effectively excluded. 
In a situation in which there 
is chronic underfunding of 
government and very low 
salaries, much technical 
assistance served to facilitate 
donor resource flows rather 
than build domestic capacity.
The analysis of S&T projects 
over the last 25 years reveals 
no consistent approach 
or strategy on the part of 
the World Bank toward 
developing S&T capacity
in its client countries. 
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Although S&T projects constituted a minor share of total World Bank lending 
and may have been “ad hoc”, there was long-term involvement and continuity 
with a few countries. For non-agricultural projects, this focused on STI capacity- 
building blocks, namely the development of factor markets (for both technical 
skills and capital) and the development of public R&D and the general higher 
education system (Yammal and Casabonne, 2005). Table 33 summarizes some 
of the distinctive feature of this lending, differentiating between two major 
approaches –– R&D system-centred capacity-building (exemplified by Brazil 
and Mexico) and firm-centred capacity-building (exemplified by India and the 
Republic of Korea). It seems that the latter approach was more effective.  
With regard to bilateral lending, Watson, Crawford and Farley (2003) write: 
“Bilateral support has fluctuated enormously, with funding for research being 
one of the first activities to be cut when budgets are declining. This is especially 
damaging as continuity of support is vitally important to research and capability 
building. In general, only a small sub/group of donors have made systematic 
Table 33. Different approaches to World Bank lending for STI: A cross-country comparison
Brazil/Mexico India/Republic of Korea
Content of lending
Human capital • Emphasis on the scientific PhD/Master’s level
• General tertiary education
•Emphasis on technical, vocational level and engineering
•Mostly engineering at the tertiary level
Public R&D system   Maintenance investment in public R&D 
infrastructure (almost no buildings)
• Priority is given to cutting-edge research
- Centres of excellence
•   Expansive investment in R&D infrastructure (staff,
and equipment intensive building)
•  Priority is given to developing technical skills
  Support for technology diffusion (e.g. electronic projects
in the Republic of Korea and India)
•
•
STI legal framework Sparse STI legislation linked to World Bank 
projects
• • Dynamic legal reform, institutionalized incentive structure
Breadth of 
intervention
• Mostly horizontal
- Petrochemicals (Brazil)
Vertical and horizontal
- Electronics (India, Republic of Korea)
- Petrochemicals (India)
- Machinery (Republic of Korea)
- Cement (India), software (India)
- Pharmaceuticals (India)
•
Financial 
mechanisms
  Predominant use of matching grants in more 
recent projects
  Very recent venture capital initiatives
  Private sector as passive beneficiary
  Industrial credit dispersed (in addition to banking 
reform, trade and export)
•
•
•
•
  Targeted credit for import and absorption of technology
  Early efforts on venture capital
  Private sector as co-investor and beneficiary
  Focus on providing credit to industries
•
•
•
•
Methodology of lending
Size of projects • Fewer, larger projects (Mexico: 19; Brazil: 13) •More, smaller projects (India: 37; Republic of Korea: 29)
Number of projects Fewer repeater projects (back to back or with 
minor gaps within a project series)
- 4 loans for industrial equipment fund (Mexico)
- 4 loans for small- and medium scale industrial 
development (Mexico)
- 3 loans for comprehensive STI (Brazil)
- 3 loans for development banking (Brazil)
•   Many repeater projects, overlapping; “holding hand”
approach of Bank lending that enabled learning feedback
- 11 loans supporting ICICI (India)
- 9 loans for industrial import project (India)
- 4 loans for technology development (Republic of Korea)
- 3 loans for technology advancement (Republic of Korea)
- 5 loans for technical education (Republic of Korea)
•
Focus   Comprehensive and multi-component 
(“omnibus” projects)
• Sectoral budget support
• • Highly focused and single-component
Intensity • Low intensity: few concurrent projects
- Brazil and Mexico, 1980s: up to 4 concurrent  
projects
• High intensity: many concurrent projects
- India, 1990s: up to 9 projects
- Republic of Korea, 1980s: up to 7 projects
- Republic of Korea, 1990s: up to 9 projects
Priorities • R&D system-centered capacity-building • Firm-centered capacity building
Timing (start 
of continued 
involvement)
• Mexico: 1972 (exc. 1950)
• Brazil: 1976
• India: 1955
• Republic of Korea: 1969
Source: Yammal and Casabonne (2005).
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attempts to: (i) give prominence to improving S&T capacity as an essential long-
term development goal; (ii) approach S&T in an integral manner, emphasizing 
cross-sectoral connections; and (iii) reach out to smaller and poorer countries 
that have the greatest need and face the greatest challenges in improving S&T 
capacity. Success has been notable, although it has been on a small scale with 
modest resources” (p. 25–26). 
This situation is now changing. Farley (2005: 7), in a snapshot of the global 
landscape of support for science, technology and knowledge for development, 
found that: “Support to science, technology and knowledge for development, as 
defined by the institutions profiled, is increasing across the donor community and 
resulting in a wide array of activities and modalities for support”. However, “this 
increase in support appears to be driven without a parallel increase in strategic 
guidance within donor institutions, or between them although their attention is 
now turning to this oversight”. 
Moreover, an updated and extended analysis of the pattern of donor support 
shows that some donors are beginning to develop a strategic approach to aid for 
STI (Farley, 2007). In particular:
• The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) has crystallized its 
vision for support to STI through its new Innovation, Technology and Society 
(ITS) Program Initiative with its 2006–2011 Prospectus.
• The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) 
has appointed a Chief Scientific Adviser and is formulating a science and 
innovation strategy.
• The Swedish International Development Agency’s Development for Research 
Cooperation (SAREC) is completing a revised research strategy that will focus 
more on innovation systems research, climate, water, biodiversity and urban 
research.
• A reorganization at the African Development Bank in 2006 has led to the 
creation of a new unit that focuses explicitly on higher education, science, and 
technology.  This unit recently started a draft Strategy on Higher Education, 
Science and Technology and an accompanying Action Plan.
• The World Bank’s new Science and Technology Coordinator has 
commissioned a number of studies that examine the Bank’s approach to 
STI for development, which is being re-evaluated at present.2
Meanwhile, a number of other donors — the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway 
and the Canadian International Development Agency — are in the process of 
rethinking their strategies, which may change the proportion of aid they each 
devote to STI and the countries to which this aid is allocated. 
C.  Aid for STI in LDCs:
Elements of the current situation
1.  THE SCALE AND COMPOSITION OF AID
FOR STI-RELATED HUMAN RESOURCES AND RESEARCH
One of the striking facts emerging from discussions with donors is that they 
cannot actually quantify how much aid they are giving for STI (Farley, 2005). 
This is indicative of the low priority given to the issue, as well as of the unclear 
Support to science, 
technology and knowledge 
for development is increasing 
across the donor community, 
but this support appears to 
be driven without a parallel 
increase in strategic guidance 
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conceptualization of the subject. There is no accepted definition of aid for STI, 
and thus this section uses the imperfect information which can be gathered from 
available OECD reporting codes to identify a number of features of the scale and 
composition of aid for STI in the LDCs. 
It focuses on two categories of aid for STI that are identifiable:
• Aid for research, which includes agricultural, forestry and fishing research; 
technological research and development (essentially related to non-
agricultural activities); education and medical research; and energy and 
environmental research;
• Aid for advanced and/or specific human skills, which includes vocational 
training, higher education, statistical capability-building, agricultural extension 
and various specific types of education and training related to social sectors, 
production sectors and trade.
Those categories (for which the Annex provides a complete list of the 
OECD Credit Reporting System Codes used in the analysis) are equivalent to a 
traditional view of aid for S&T which encompasses the development of human 
resources and building the institutional infrastructure for scientific research and 
technological development. The analysis examines reported aid disbursements 
and commitments. 
Table 34 summarizes annual aid disbursements to LDCs for the two categories 
of aid for STI and their subcategories during the period 2003–2005. From the 
table, it is apparent that:
• Aid for STI is a low priority for donors. Annual disbursements for the 
development of advanced and specific skills and for research during the 
period 2003–2005 constituted $727.7 million, which was equivalent to 
only 3.6 per cent of total disbursements. 
• Aid for advanced and/or specific skills is the major priority in aid for STI, 
constituting 90 per cent of the total disbursements during 2003–2005 as 
against only 10 per cent for research.
• Of aid for advanced and/or specific skills, 65 per cent was allocated to higher 
education. Without the latter, only 1 per cent of the total aid disbursements 
to LDCs in 2003–2005 was provided for developing advanced and/or 
specific skills. This included only $62.1 million per year for vocational 
training, only $12.4 million per year for agricultural education and training, 
and only $9.2 million per year for agricultural extension.  This is equivalent 
to 8 cents per person for vocational training and 3 cents per agricultural 
worker for agricultural education and training and agricultural extension. 
Aid disbursements for advanced technical and managerial skills constituted 
only $17.6 million per year.
• During 2003–2005, 37 per cent of the total disbursements for aid for research 
was earmarked for medical research. Agricultural research received 30 per 
cent of total aid disbursements for research, equal to only $22.1 million 
per year during the period 2003–2005. This is equivalent to 0.03 per cent 
of agricultural GDP. Aid disbursements for industrial technological research 
and development in LDCs –– a category which covers industrial standards, 
quality management, metrology, testing, accreditation and certification 
–– received only $5.1 million per year during 2003–2005. This is equivalent 
to 2 cents per non-agricultural worker.    
These aggregate numbers are stark. But there is also a geographical 
concentration of STI-related aid disbursements, and thus some LDCs did even 
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worse than those figures indicate. African LDCs received 82 per cent of total aid 
for research for LDCs during the period 2003–2005, whilst Asian LDCs received 
15 per cent. Senegal alone accounts for a third of STI-related aid disbursements 
going to African LDCs and for 28 per cent of total aid for research going to LDCs.3 
Similarly, over half of the aid disbursements for research to Asian LDCs go to 
Bangladesh alone. In value terms, however, Bangladesh received the equivalent 
of a fourth of aid for research going to Senegal. Similarly, African LDCs received 
more than 70 per cent, that is, $427.3 million, of the aid disbursements for 
advanced and/or specific skills for the period 2003–2005. As with research, 
Senegal is an important recipient. It received 11 per cent of aid disbursements for 
advanced and/or specific skills to LDCs during 2003–2005.
Disbursement data do not allow an over-time comparison to be drawn, as 
important donors started to report to the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) 
only from 2002. It is, however, possible to make a comparison with the recent 
past using aid commitments. The OECD’s CRS aid database contains data on 
donors’ commitments and donors’ disbursements. Differences between the two 
series could be due to bottlenecks, administrative delays and unrealistic pledges 
by donors as well as limits to the recipients’ absorptive capacity (Roodman, 
2006).
Table 35 shows the level of STI-related aid commitments for LDCs during the 
periods 1998–2000 and 2003–2005. From the table, it is clear that there can 
be major divergences between aid commitments and aid disbursements during 
a particular period. However, the aid commitments indicate donors’ intended 
priorities and in that regard a number of key trends are apparent:
• Aid commitments to LDCs for advanced and/or specific skills more than 
doubled between the periods 1998–2000 and 2003–2005. However, the 
Table 34. Composition of STI-related aid to the LDCs, 2003–2005
(Disbursements, average annual)
Total 
disbursements
(million, 2004 $)
Share of total aid 
disbursements (%)
Sector share in 
total defined
STI-related aid (%)
Subcategory share 
in each sector
(%)
Research 73.5 0.4 10.1 100.0
Agricultural research 22.1 0.1 3.0 30.1
Medical research 27.5 0.1 3.8 37.4
Environmental research 13.5 0.1 1.9 18.4
Industrial technology R&Da 5.1 0.0 0.0 6.9
Other 5.3 0.0 0.7 7.2
Advanced and specific human skills 654.2 3.2 89.9 100.0
Higher education 425.23 2.1 58.5 65.0
Vocational training 62.1 0.3 8.5 9.5
Advanced technical and managerial training 17.6 0.1 2.4 2.7
Research institutions 30.1 0.1 4.1 4.6
Agricultural education and training 12.4 0.1 1.7 1.9
Agricultural extension 9.2 0.0 1.3 1.4
Other 109.97 0.5 15.1 16.8
Total 727.7 3.6 100.0
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on OECD/CRS database; data extracted on 28 February 2007.
Notes:  Data refer to disbursements from bilateral and multilateral agencies that report to OECD.  For comparative purposes, the average annual 
real disbursements are as follows: ICT $28.7 million; road transport $894.9 million; primary education $580.8 million; and secondary 
education $29.3 million.
a This relates to the CRS code 32182, Technological Research and Development.
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major driving force behind this was an increase in commitments to higher 
education and, to a lesser extent to research institutions. Aid commitments 
for advanced technical and managerial training stagnated, and those for 
agricultural education and training and for agricultural extension actually 
fell between the period from 1998–2000 to 2003–2005.
• Aid commitments to LDCs for research remained at about the same level 
between 1998–2000 and 2003–2005. However, there was a major shift 
in the composition of aid commitments for research. Commitments for 
agricultural research halved to the benefit of medical and environmental 
research.
Those figures are indicative of the low level of importance that donors attach 
to STI and its role in strengthening productive sectors.  There is, however, a major 
effort to strengthen universities. But the kinds of activities which can support 
innovation at the enterprise level  –– vocational training, advanced technical and 
managerial training, agricultural education and training, agricultural extension, 
and strengthening key technological support services such as industrial standards, 
quality management, metrology, testing, accreditation and certification –– are all 
poorly funded. The last category, which is so important for developing enterprise 
competitiveness, received 0.02 per cent of total aid disbursements to LDCs 
during 2003–2005.
It may be argued that those low levels of reported aid for STI reflect the 
insubstantial treatment of STI issues in PRSPs (see chapter 2). But in practice, for 
the one STI area which is emphasized in the PRSPs, namely agricultural research 
and extension, aid commitments to LDCs have actually fallen rather than risen 
Table 35. Composition of STI-related aid to the LDCs, 1998–2000 and 2003–2005
(Commitments, average annual)
Total commitments 
(million, 2004$)
Share of total aid 
commitments
(%)
Sector share in total 
defined STI-related aid
(%)
Subcategory share
in each sector
(%)
1998–2000 2003–2005 1998–2000 2003–2005 1998–2000 2003–2005 1998–2000 2003–2005
Research 84.7 86.8 0.5 0.3 20.5 10.5 100.0 100.0
Agricultural research 65.4 32.0 0.4 0.1 15.8 3.9 77.2 36.9
Medical research 5.4 26.1 0.0 0.1 1.3 3.2 6.3 30.1
Environmental research 1.2 16.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.9 1.4 18.6
Industrial technology R&Da 1.3 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.8 1.6 7.7
Other 11.5 5.9 0.1 0.0 2.8 0.7 13.5 6.8
Advanced and specific human 
skills
329.4 740.4 1.8 2.4 79.5 89.5 100.0 100.0
Higher education 141.3 427.5 0.8 1.4 34.1 51.7 42.9 57.7
Vocational training 67.3 99.0 0.4 0.3 16.3 12.0 20.4 13.4
Advanced technical and 
managerial training
15.5 16.3 0.1 0.1 3.8 2.0 4.7 2.2
Research institutions 9.6 37.2 0.1 0.1 2.3 4.5 2.9 5.0
Agricultural education and training 23.2 10.2 0.1 0.0 5.6 1.2 7.0 1.4
Agricultural extension 13.7 12.4 0.1 0.0 3.3 1.5 4.2 1.7
Other 58.7 137.9 0.3 0.4 14.2 16.7 17.8 18.6
Total 414.1 827.3 2.3 2.7 100.0 100.0
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on OECD/CRS database; data extracted on 28 February 2007 and 22 April 2007.
Notes:  Data refer to commitments from bilateral and multilateral agencies that report to OECD. For comparative purposes, the average annual 
real commitments for the period 2003–2005 are as follows: ICT $73.6 million; electricity production and distribution $363.1 million; 
road transport $2,044.6 million, primary education $1,162 million; and secondary education $227.7 million.
a This relates to the CRS code 32182, Technological Research and Development.
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since the late 1990s. It would thus seem that the low priority for STI reflects 
donors’ practice rather than recipients’ concerns.
2. STI PROJECTS AND PROGRAMMES
A more detailed picture of aid for STI in LDCs can be obtained by examining 
the types of projects and programmes that donors are supporting in LDCs. Farley 
(2007) analyzes 170 separate donors’ initiatives undertaken in both the LDCs and 
other developing countries by eight bilateral donors (United Kingdom, Canada, 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United States and European Union), 
four multilateral donors (Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development 
Bank, UNESCO and World Bank), and two foundations (Carnegie Corporation and 
Rockefeller Foundation). The analysis identifies some of the key characteristics of 
projects and programmes supported by donors in developing countries and how 
donor support in LDCs differs from that in other developing countries.
Farley (2007) identifies four major orientations for donor support for all 
developing countries (table 36). They are as follows:
Cluster 1 — global or regional public goods initiatives. These includes projects 
such as the International Aid Vaccine Initiative (IAVI) and the East Coast Fever 
Vaccine Project (see Chataway, Smith and Wield, 2005) or support for the 
CGIAR.
Cluster 2 — initiatives that deepen domestic STI capacity. These include 
projects for developing human resources, supporting domestic research institutes, 
improving universities or supporting the development of technological capabilities 
at the enterprise level. 
Cluster 3 — international linkage initiatives.  The emphasis of donor-funded 
activities, projects and programmes in this cluster is on the creation of capacity to 
link up with global and regional knowledge networks.
Cluster 4 — integrated initiatives.  These initiatives seek to strengthen 
innovation systems or to integrate the multiple dimensions of STI capacity-
building addressed in clusters 1, 2, and 3. 
Table 36. Four major orientations of donor support to STI for development
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Global or regional 
public goods initiatives
Initiatives that deepen domestic STI capacity
(i.e. sectoral, subnational or national) 
Linkage-based
initiatives
Integrated
initiatives
Support to research 
for global or regional 
public goods
• University development in STI-themed disciplines
Technical and vocation education and training 
Sector-focused skill upgrading through graduate and post-graduate 
training
Productivity enhancement through technology and skills deepening in 
the private sector
Research and development
Centres of excellence
STI decision-making and priority-setting 
Science and mathematics in primary and secondary schools, including 
teacher training
STI infrastructure and equipment
Information and communication technologies
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
North–South
linkage initiatives
South–South
linkage initiatives
North–North–South
linkages for policy 
alignment
Sectoral and cross-
sectoral linkages 
initiatives
Linking individuals 
or institutions
•
•
•
•
•
National
innovation
systems
initiatives
Integrated
innovation
initiatives
•
•
Source: Farley (2007).
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Of those four orientations, projects and programmes to deepen domestic 
STI capacity (cluster 2) are the most numerous for developing countries as a 
whole. They include the following types of programmes: development of S&T 
in universities; technical and vocational education; sector-focused graduate and 
postgraduate training; enterprise-based productivity enhancement; support for 
public R&D institutes; development of centres of excellence (research programmes 
within a university, a research institute or a centre operating independently); 
support for STI policy development and implementation; support for science 
and mathematics in secondary schools; support for STI equipment and buildings; 
and ICT infrastructure investments. Programmes to support international science 
and technology linkages (both North–South and South–South) are of increasing 
interest to donors. Integrated initiatives (cluster 4) are not a major approach for 
most donors, with the notable exception of the Inter-American Development 
Bank and the IDRC, with its Innovation, Policy and Science Programme, although 
many donors do have a few projects of this type. 
From this overall sample of projects and programmes, a number of clear 
patterns and concerns emerge with regard to the types of STI projects and 
activities that are supported for LDCs.
Firstly, global and regional public goods initiatives (such as the CGIAR) are 
important for LDCs. However, they do not appear to be sufficiently responsive to 
LDCs’ research needs. 
Secondly, programmes and projects to develop domestic STI capacity 
are the most numerous types of projects in LDCs, but they have a number of 
weaknesses:
• They are disjointed and there is in general very weak coordination between 
STI human resource capacity projects and sector development projects. This 
is evident in both Uganda and Rwanda.
• There needs to be more projects to develop capacity for STI policy formulation 
and implementation. An important example is the World Bank initiative in 
Rwanda to support the articulation of an S&T action programme.
• The non-agricultural sector is neglected. 
Thirdly, global linkage initiatives (cluster 3) are becoming an increasingly 
important aspect of donor support and they could be particularly important 
for LDCs. However, they tend to exclude LDCs because of the lack of a critical 
minimum level of capability for collaboration to take place. This is readily 
apparent in international science cooperation. But it is also apparent in technology 
cooperation. An example of this is NORAD’s matchmaking project, which is 
currently benefiting some developing countries but has not started in the LDCs 
because lack of infrastructure and human skills is preventing potential investors 
from matching with suitable local companies (see box 10).
 Fourthly, with regard to systems initiatives (cluster 4), there are no national 
innovation system initiatives in LDCs. However, there are examples of integrated 
initiatives which combine elements of the previous three clusters.  One example 
is the USAID-funded PEARL project and follow-on SPREAD project in Rwanda 
(see box 11).
To sum up, there needs to be a more systemic and strategic approach to 
supporting the development of STI capabilities in the LDCs. This should go 
beyond ad hoc projects to strengthen parts of public STI infrastructure, particularly 
unversities, and support innovation at the enterprise level by supporting the 
development of capabilities and knowledge systems. It should support firms as 
well as farms. 
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Box 10.  An example of how technology transfer could work in the LDCs:
The Norwegian Matchmaking Program
Originally started in 1994 in Sri Lanka, the Matchmaking Program (MMP) was later extended to South Africa and India. It is cur-
rently being extended until May 2009. 
The MMP aims at enabling business links between local companies and Norwegian companies through technology transfers, 
and exchange of management and skills. Norwegian companies create business links with their local partner companies mostly 
through outsourcing and joint ventures, and, depending on country characteristics, through more flexible forms of cooperation 
such as subcontracting and licensing.  The investing companies ensure that adequate technical competence, capacity and finan-
cial resources are available and included in long-term investment plans. 
Furthermore, they have to meet financial requirements in order to qualify for the programme. The investing companies’ areas of 
interest can be very diverse, ranging from sector-specific to product-specific activities.
Once the investing companies have been selected, the local contact point tries to find a potential partner. Although the compa-
nies have to pay a participation fee, financial support is provided by the Norwegian Agency for Development and Cooperation 
(NORAD) to enable them to visit the potential partners, and to support the start-up phase of outsourcing/joint ventures up to 
set levels. Matchmaking is successful when (i) it is commercially interesting for the investor and the local partner, (ii) the type of 
technology transfer is of interest to the local country, and (iii) there is enough capital to cover the risk.
The benefits of such a programme are multiple. They include unquantifiable benefits deriving from technology, and skills- and 
education-related transfers, as well as quantifiable ones deriving from the number of new joint ventures and new jobs created. 
For example, over the period 1994–2006, the programme has created 48 new joint ventures and some 3,000 news jobs in Sri 
Lanka. On average, 84 per cent of the Norwegian companies [that have joined the MMP] have been matched with one or more 
Sri Lankan profile.
Undoubtedly, similar projects would be very beneficial to the LDCs. However, the lack of suitable infrastructure and human 
skills, as well as weak capabilities, are regarded as being the major factors that discourage potential investors. LDCs have there-
fore not been included in this programme so far.
Source:   Direct communication with NORAD.
Box 11.  Coffee sector agribusiness development projects in Rwanda
In 2001, a USAID-funded project –– Partnership for the Enhancement of Agribusiness in Rwanda (PEARL) –– was started with 
the aim of improving rural livelihoods by reviving the coffee sector in Rwanda. PEARL has been successful in (i) improving-ca-
pacity building in the agricultural sector, (ii) improving agricultural quality, (iii) providing market diversification of export prod-
ucts, and (iv) empowering local farmers and building linkages with other actors in the private and public sectors.
In just six years the PEARL project has had a considerable impact. It introduced new practices for rural smallholder farmers, 
which increased the quality of the final product and made changes in local production, technology and supply-chain develop-
ment. Two technological transformations that contributed to increased quality were (i) the introduction of new and improved 
washing stations, which enabled cleaning and sorting in accordance with qualitative standards, and (ii) training facilities to 
improve local washing techniques as well as tasting skills. The latter type of knowledge is necessary in order to enable sellers to 
negotiate a fair price for their coffee products. In 2006, for example, 60 individuals received training in testing, tasting and other 
quality-improving processes. The training, tasting and research facilities provided through the programme also facilitate the crea-
tion of a closed collaboration and linkages between farmers, sellers and researchers at the National University of Rwanda.
It is estimated that the technology and innovation programmes implemented through the PEARL project have increased the 
price for a kilo of unprocessed dried coffee –– from $0.22 to roughly $2.00 –– to the benefit of the local smallholder farmers. 
Furthermore, the number of farmers engaged in the cooperative increased from 400 in 2002 to 1,600 in 2006. The quality im-
provements brought about by the new washing facilities led to the creation of 75 stations throughout Rwanda. 
Once the capacity to produce and sustain the production and export of high-quality products had been acquired, second-level 
agribusiness activities, such as coffee roasting and spin-off enterprises could be started. Building upon this improved capacity, a 
second project was launched as a follow-up to PEARL in 2007. The new programme –– Sustaining Partnership to Enhance Rural 
Enterprise and Agribusiness Development SPREAD –– aims at introducing the second-level activities as well as strengthening the 
linkages between development partners, including NGOs and universities. The SPREAD programme will increase linkages with 
technology extension agronomists and business development specialists to include health professionals, ICT experts and media 
programmes in a more integrated approach. 
Source:   Farley ( 2007).
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3.  THE ORIENTATIONS OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION
The current orientations of technical cooperation reinforce this picture. How 
statistics on technical cooperation are collected is now a subject that is being 
discussed, and it is therefore impossible to indicate where LDCs stand in detail 
in terms of modalities of technical cooperation.4 However, table 37 shows the 
sectoral composition of technical cooperation disbursements to LDCs during the 
period 2003–2005 and technical cooperation commitments during 1998–2000 
and 2003–2005. A number of very important patterns are apparent.
• Sixty-six per cent of total technical cooperation disbursements to LDCs 
during 2003–2005 were allocated to social infrastructure and services, with 
20 per cent of total disbursements during that period going to governance 
(government and civil society), 18 per cent to education and 10 per cent 
to health.
• Only 22 per cent of total technical cooperation disbursements to LDCs 
during 2003–2005 were devoted to economic infrastructure and productive 
sectors (including multisector).
• Nine per cent of total technical cooperation disbursements in 2003–2005 
went to emergency assistance and reconstruction.
• The share of total technical cooperation commitments to LDCs devoted for 
governance increased from 14 per cent during the period 1998–2000 to 
25 per cent in 2003–2005. 
• The share of technical cooperation commitment for economic infrastructure 
and productive sectors fell from 32 per cent during 1998–2000 to 25 per 
cent during 2003–2005.
Table 37. Scale and composition of technical cooperation activities
(Disbursements and commitments, average annual)
Disbursements Commitments
Million,
2004 $
As % of 
total TC
As % of 
totai aid
Million, 2004 $ % of total technical 
cooperation
% of total aid
2003–2005 1998–
2000
2003–
2005
1998–
2000
2003–
2005
1998–
2000
2003–
2005
Social infrastructure and services 2 308.1 65.8 11.2 1 579.3 3 452.5 62.1 66.0 8.8 11.3
of which:
Education 626.2 17.9 3.0 577.3 794.9 22.7 15.2 3.2 2.6
 Health 361.1 10.3 1.8 291.2 480.8 11.4 9.2 1.6 1.6
 Population Programmes 343.7 9.8 1.7 189.0 509.7 7.4 9.7 1.1 1.7
Water Supply and sanitation 46.6 1.3 0.2 84.7 71.2 3.3 1.4 0.5 0.2
Government & civil society 684.5 19.5 3.3 343.2 1 299.4 13.5 24.8 1.9 4.2
Other social infrastructure 245.9 7.0 1.2 93.9 296.6 3.7 5.7 0.5 1.0
Economic infrastructure 198.5 5.7 1.0 170.6 354.0 6.7 6.8 1.0 1.2
Production sectors 269.9 7.7 1.3 366.9 379.9 14.4 7.3 2.0 1.2
Multisector 297.9 8.5 1.4 278.9 553.1 11.0 10.6 1.6 1.8
Commodity aid/
general programme assistance 103.3 2.9 0.5 23.2 96.2 0.9 1.8 0.1 0.3
Action  relating to debt 1.5 0.0 0.0 3.0 2.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Emergency assistance & 
reconstruction 306.8 8.8 1.5 58.0 366.6 2.3 7.0 0.3 1.2
Administrative costs of donors 2.4 0.1 0.0 18.1 1.2 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.0
Support to NGOs 3.0 0.1 0.0 0.9 3.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Refugees in donor countries 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Unallocated/unspecified 13.9 0.4 0.1 46.6 23.5 1.8 0.4 0.3 0.1
Total 3 505.5 100 17.0 2 546.7 5 233.5 100 100 14.2 17.1
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calcualtions based on OECD/CRS; data downloaded on 5 March 2007.
Only 22 per cent of total 
technical cooperation 
disbursements to LDCs during 
2003–2005 were devoted to 
economic infrastructure and 
productive sectors.
The Least Developed Countries Report 2007174
From this it is very clear that technical cooperation activities in LDCs are 
basically designed to improve public sector capabilities for governance and 
provision of services rather than private sector capabilities related to production. 
Donor priorities are starkly evident in the fact that annual technical cooperation 
commitments to improve governance (in the widest sense) in 2003–2005 were 
$1.3 billion, which may be compared with annual aid commitments of $12 
million for agricultural extension during the same period.
A new approach to technical cooperation has been strongly advocated; 
it would be focused on “capacity development”, which is defined as “the 
process whereby people, organizations and society unleash, strengthen, create 
adapt and maintain capacity over time” (OECD website), with capacity being 
broadly defined as “the ability to perform functions, solve problems and set 
and achieve objectives” (Fukuda-Parr, Lopes and Malik, 2002: 8). Similarly, the 
Commission for Africa (2005) defines capacity development as “investment in 
people, institutions and practices that will, together, enable a country to achieve 
its development objectives” (p. 389). This open-ended definition of capacity 
opens up the possibility that there can be greater use of technical cooperation to 
support technological learning and innovation at the firm level. But implementing 
this vision in the LDCs requires a change in the use of technical cooperation funds 
towards developing private sector capacities, and in particular STI capacities, 
rather than simply public sector capacities. 
D.   How donors can improve
aid for STI in LDCs: Agriculture
This section and the next one consider how donors could improve aid for STI 
in LDCs in, firstly, agriculture, and secondly, industry and infrastructure. One of 
the important findings of the quantitative analysis of the scale and composition 
of aid for STI in LDCs is the very small scale of aid disbursements for agricultural 
research. This is particularly surprising, and not only because agricultural 
research is identified as an S&T priority in all the PRSPs analysed (see chapter 
2, table 17). Empirical evidence suggests that there are “high rates of return 
from agricultural R&D investments, making agricultural research a cost-effective 
way for Governments to accelerate agricultural development” (Beintema and 
Stads, 2006: 1). The Bangladesh Rice Research Institute (BRRI), for example, 
has developed and released 31 modern varieties of rice (the main staple food) 
in the past two decades, and these now account for 65 per cent of total rice 
production. It is estimated that annual rice production doubled between 1970 
and 2002 from 10.8 million metric tonnes to 24.3 million metric tonnes, but that 
without the BRRI’s modern varieties, it would have increased by just 10 per cent 
over that period (UNESCO, 2005: 258). 
 The low level of donor support for agricultural research in LDCs makes it 
very difficult for LDCs’ Governments to sustain sufficient public investment in 
agricultural research.5 An agricultural research intensity ratio is typically used to 
measure the agricultural research investment effort of a country or a group of 
countries. It is calculated as the percentage share of investment in agricultural 
research in agricultural output. The latest agricultural public research intensity 
ratio for the LDCs amounts to 0.47 per cent versus 1.7 per cent for the other 
developing countries.6
Chart 14 shows the average evolution of public agricultural research intensity 
for the LDCs and other developing countries from 1971 to 2003. It can clearly be 
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seen that agricultural research intensity was at about the same level in each group 
of countries until 1991, when that of the LDCs dropped by more than half. If the 
slow increase in agricultural research intensity in the 1980s had continued in the 
1990s, it would have resulted in a ratio equal to 1.4 by 2001, three times higher 
than the actual measured intensity ratio.
Although there is no official recommendation about preferred intensity 
ratios for agricultural R&D investments, the World Bank has suggested a 2 per 
cent target rate, while the Inter-Academy Council, focusing particularly on sub-
Saharan Africa, recommends that an agricultural research intensity ratio of 1.5 be 
reached by 2015 (Beintema and Stads, 2004: 4). Raising the level of agricultural 
R&D expenditure even just to 1 per cent of agricultural GDP by 2015 will require 
a major increase in investment in the latter.
Part of that increase could come from the private sector. However, past patterns 
are not encouraging. Estimates suggest that only 2 per cent of total agricultural 
research expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa in 2000 came from the private sector 
(Beintema and Stads, 2006). It is extremely unlikely that the pattern is different in 
other LDCs. Pray and Umali-Deininger (1997: 1143) note that “profitability is the 
main determinant of private for-profit participation in agricultural research”. Thus, 
they argue that private research can fill the gap created by stagnating or declining 
public research budgets in countries and industries with large markets for modern 
input and products for which returns on research are highly appropriable. But 
“products and sectors that may be of high social value, but command only a 
small market and exhibit a high degree of geographical and ecological specificity 
will most likely be ignored by the private for-profit sector. Because of their public 
good nature and their ‘distance’ from commercial application, basic and strategic 
research usually receive little attention by the private for-profit sector. This implies 
that the private for-profit sector will not always fill the gap and that alternative 
sources of research output, that is public and private non-profit sectors, have to 
be found to service socially beneficial but privately unprofitable ‘orphan sectors’ 
”(p. 1144).
Similarly, a study of ongoing attempts to privatize certain parts of agricultural 
research in seven African countries, including Ethiopia, Senegal, Uganda and 
the United Republic of Tanzania, warns of the possible emergence of a two-
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Chart 14. Agricultural research intensity in the LDCs
and other developing countries (ODCs), 1971–2003
Source:  UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on data extracted from the ASTI database on 5 May 2007.
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track research system (Chema, Gilbert and Roseboom, 2003). Such a system 
may emerge if there is a large degree of privatization of research services and if 
farmers’ associations, the agribusiness community (exporters, processors, input 
suppliers and commodity traders) and other beneficiaries are called upon to 
finance the research programme and researchers are paid incentives according 
to their proven contribution to farming profitability. In such a situation, peasant 
farmers who are engaged in low-value subsistence-oriented food production and 
keep livestock will be relatively neglected and there will be little incentive for 
researchers to work in those areas. Thus, the two-track research system could 
emerge “with a reduced number of researchers, drawing low salaries, conscripted 
to the war against poverty, while the best researchers work on those commodities 
for which there is private funding” (ibid.: 26).
Against that background, it would be wrong to believe that public research 
expenditure has been crowding out private sector investment in LDCs and that 
the latter will automatically increase as the former declines. Although the private 
sector can make a small contribution and there are certainly opportunities for 
some kinds of public–private partnerships, increasing the agricultural research 
intensity ratio in LDCs will require increased public R&D expenditure and this 
will, in turn, need increased ODA for agricultural R&D. Indeed, ODA flows to 
agricultural research for the LDCs must increase to levels much higher than the 
current ones.
There may be some reluctance to increase levels of and owing to disappointing 
results from past aid for agricultural R&D. However, there is an increased 
understanding of the weaknesses in national agricultural research systems (NARS). 
Those include imbalances in financing for research, extension and education, 
with Eicher (2001) pointing out the very low level of expenditure on agricultural 
education and Hayami and Ruttan (1985) the bias towards extension. Emphasis 
is now being placed on a systems approach to agricultural innovation (World 
Bank, 2006). Moreover, it is generally agreed that key elements for more effective 
NARS include a pluralistic institutional structure with many actors, including 
NGOs and the private sector; new competitive mechanisms for research funding; 
and management reforms to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public 
research organizations (Byerlee, 1998). The African case studies referred to 
earlier also indicate that important reforms in NARS are taking place and include 
decentralization of agricultural research, greater stakeholder participation, a shift 
from block grants to competitive research funds, and the strengthening of system 
linkages.
 Finally, global scientific linkages are important for increasing agricultural 
productivity in the LDCs. In that regard, recent research has identified worrying 
trends in global R&D in which “there is evidence of a large and sustained, if 
not growing gap, between a comparatively small group of scientific haves and 
a substantial group of scientific have-nots” (Pardey et al., 2006: 2). Those 
authors note that the rich countries’ agricultural research agendas are shifting 
away from simple productivity concerns, and to high-technology inputs (such as 
precision farming technology), which are not as easily adopted and adapted by 
the developing countries as they were before and are particularly irrelevant for 
LDCs. They indicate that some fear that less developed countries will become 
“technological orphans”.
Against the background of global shifts in agricultural R&D, the role of the 
network of international agricultural research centres known as the Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) is particularly important in 
undertaking scientific research relevant for increasing agricultural productivity in 
the LDCs.7 In the 1990s there was a broadening of the CGIAR’s research agenda 
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away from research on agricultural production of staple foods towards post-
harvest handling, food processing and food safety and environmental issues, and 
this was accompanied by a stagnation of donors’ financing. This change in goals 
reflects the developed countries’ concern about environment and agriculture-
related issues that are not strictly related to farming improvements, as well as the 
rise of new and powerful lobbying groups. Whilst issues related to post-harvest 
handling, environmental sustainability and food processing are certainly relevant, 
it is important that agricultural research continues to not reflect the reality of 
subsistence-oriented smallholder agriculture in LDCs. It has been estimated that 
in 2003 CGIAR spent only 10 per cent of the combined real spending by the 
African national agricultural research agencies on “African” issues (Beintema and 
Stads, 2006). Alston, Dehmer and Pardey (2006) argue that “Over time, the 
CGIAR has misplaced its original, well-defined sense of purpose and to some 
extent has degraded its capacity to meet its original objective: to stave off hunger 
by enhancing the capacity of the world’s poor people to feed themselves, through 
research-induced improvements in agricultural productivity” (p. 348).
Thus, a second key priority for aid for STI in the agricultural sector is to ensure 
that CGIAR work remains LDC-relevant.
E.  How donors can improve aid
for STI in LDCs: Industry and infrastructure 
Donors should not neglect aid to build STI capacity outside agriculture. There 
is at present very little aid that is supporting STI capacity in industry and economic 
infrastructure. Moreover, what is provided appears to be for supporting the 
development of human capacities and public S&T infrastructure. In contrast, very 
much less attention is given to enterprise-based STI activities and to strengthening 
the capacity to innovate. 
Against that background, Bell (2007) identifies three broad directions for 
an ODA strategy aimed at STI-related technological learning and capability 
development relating to industrial and physical infrastructure development:
• Supporting expanded activities and reoriented approaches to STI infrastructure 
development in LDCs;
• Developing new, modified or substantially expanded forms of ODA for 
fostering enterprise-based technological learning and capability building;
• Supporting policy development and implementation relating to industry 
and infrastructure-oriented activities.
With regard to STI infrastructure, the major objective should be to increase 
the scale of support for those activities and to reorient them so as to increase their 
relevance for industrial development and physical infrastructure development, 
and to improve their effectiveness. Reorientation might involve, for example, 
increasing support for engineering in university education or re-examining the 
content of technical and vocational training. But beyond that, there is a need 
for a shift in the way in which technical and business support services away 
from providing services to enterprises towards supporting arrangements for 
strengthening capabilities in enterprises by embedding support services alongside 
commercial transactions in value chains. Such embedded business services are 
packaged within or bundled around commercial transactions between a buyer 
and a seller. An example of such an approach is the Local Industry Upgrading 
Programme set up in Singapore in 1986, which included the conclusion of cost-
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sharing contracts between the Government and subsidiaries of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) for enhancing local firms’ learning and their linkages with 
the subsidiaries.
The second broad direction for ODA is the development of new approaches 
to support enterprise-based technological learning and capability-building. This 
requires novel forms of ODA which recognize that there is a need for investment 
in knowledge assets (particularly design and engineering capabilities) and that 
those assets must in large part be created through the training and learning 
activities of enterprises, because there are limits to what can be achieved 
through formal learning. Problems of non-appropriability, externalities and public 
goods mean that there is insufficient investment in those activities. Addressing 
that issue requires grants and soft loans for investment in the relevant types of 
knowledge assets. That could be achieved not by initiating totally new activities 
but by “stretching” existing donor activity to include STI capability-building. The 
following areas are particularly important:
• Value-chain development schemes;
• FDI complementation and linkage development;
• Industrial and infrastructure project funding, including through public–private 
partnerships;
• Promoting the role of the World Federation of Engineering Associations 
and NGOs dealing with engineering issues, including through fellowship 
funding;
• Facilitating South–South collaboration. 
1. VALUE-CHAIN DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES
Some donor-funded projects to strengthen the technological capabilities of 
firms in the value chain and to foster knowledge-centred interactions between 
them are already in place. However, there is a need now to consider how to apply 
the principle of explicitly contracting with larger firms to augment the capabilities 
of value chain partners, and also the potential for such contracts with large 
importer organizations. Donors may be resisting the introduction of such projects 
because (i) it might appear that “subsidies” are being provided to large firms; (ii) 
there is limited funding; and (iii) limited analyses of the structure of the value 
chains prevent them from knowing the key actors and points for action. Those 
constraints should be actively addressed. Box 12 presents a successful value-
chain development scheme in which business support services are embedded in 
commercial transactions along the value chain.
2.  FDI COMPLEMENTATION AND LINKAGE DEVELOPMENT
Donors should consider cost-sharing partnerships with TNC subsidiaries 
investing in LDCs in order to forge new supply linkages with domestic firms and 
strengthen the capabilities of existing suppliers. The idea that TNC subsidiaries can 
be expected to engage in such efforts to build the capabilities of local suppliers 
without financial incentives is farfetched. However, evidence suggests that they 
are willing to collaborate in skills development activities if they are reimbursed for 
conducting expanded training activities. An example of this is the way in which 
SME linkages with the MOZAL aluminium smelter in Mozambique have been 
fostered by providing firms with packages of business and technical training and 
with access to finance, together with the development of local consultant support, 
partly funded by the International Finance Corporation. 
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3. INDUSTRIAL AND PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT FUNDING
This is the area where donors can have the greatest effect on STI development in 
the LDCs. What is required is that industrial and physical infrastructure investment 
projects are implemented in such a way that they incorporate substantial learning 
elements and are organized to generate knowledge spillovers. Donors should thus 
introduce STI capability components alongside core investment projects. Physical 
infrastructure development can be expected to provide a major contribution to 
the development of design and engineering skills in LDCs (see United Nations 
Millennium Project Task Force, 2005; Juma, 2006).
Box 12.  Building Support Service Capabilities into Value Chains:
Ghana’s Craft Basket-making Industry
During the 1990s Ghana developed an export trade in craft products including woven baskets. This was based on a value chain 
that ran from small producers (many in rural areas) via export companies, some of which were also producers, to importers and 
wholesalers in advanced country markets. The Ghanaian exporters had played an important role in providing a range of services 
to their suppliers (independent producers and sub-contractors). These services fell into two roughly distinguishable categories: 
market and management services (e.g. shipping, market intelligence, financing) and technological services (e.g. product design, 
quality management).
By the early 2000s, it was evident that, although they were important, these services that were embedded in the transactions of 
the value chain were falling far short of achieving their full potential. In particular the more ‘technology-centred’ services were 
seriously constrained by a combination of limited skills in firms and limited incentives to invest in creating or hiring them - be-
cause of various forms of externality. This can be illustrated, for example, by the case of product design. Exporters sometimes 
passed on to their suppliers ideas about new product designs they received from importers. However this was a relatively ‘pas-
sive’ process. The importers seldom had the design skills or time required to work with exporters on more purposeful product 
development. Also, besides lacking design capabilities, the exporters were hesitant to invest in new product designs because 
these would be rapidly copied by competitors. There had been one or two cases in which aid donors had sponsored interna-
tional design consultants to advise on design and production, but this service was much too expensive to be sustained by the 
industry on an ongoing basis beyond the one-off, donor-funded ‘injections’.
To address this gap between potential and realised achievement, a project was implemented in 2002-2003 with donor support 
to strengthen the business service support system for the industry. This involved an integrated array of services, cutting across 
both ‘technological’ and others. It was distinguished from many such schemes by a simple principle: the aim was not to use spe-
cialised service suppliers to provide services for firms in the industry, but to strengthen the capabilities of firms in the value chain 
to provide services along the chain to other firms – focusing in particular on the capabilities of the Ghanaian exporters to provide 
support services to their upstream suppliers. Three selected components of the project can illustrate this principle in operation.
• Quality management (QM). Initially rejection rates by exporters were high and several had lost overseas clients because of 
poor quality. The project set up a two stage programme. The first involved several training workshops for teams of QM trainers. 
Each team brought together different actors in the value chain: technical officers from the exporters, co-ordinators of sub-
contracted producers, and master weavers from producers. In the second step these teams provided training workshops for 
producers. Supported by a radio campaign, this resulted in reject rates falling to negligible levels, and key actors in the value 
chain had learned about organising QM development activities and about the gains they could derive from doing so.
• Market access. Exporters were supported in connecting to new international markets (e.g. via visits to trade fairs in the US and 
by training in ICT skills). This enhanced not only their own trade opportunities but also the opportunities for their suppliers to 
expand output and test-market new products.
• Product design and development. The design capabilities of exporters were enhanced by arranging firm-based internships for 
students from the College of Art at the Kumasi University of Science and Technology. This enabled the exporters to elaborate 
and test product design ideas they had not been able to fully develop. This formed the basis for securing large trial orders from 
importers and for providing new product specifications to producers. It also led to a critically important form of learning:  “… 
a growing realization among the export companies that investment in new product development was the only way to remain 
competitive on the international market” (source, p. 42). This was linked to the demonstration of a mechanism for organising 
such in-house design activity on a sufficiently low-cost basis to be sustainable.
There were two important learning outcomes. One was the enhanced knowledge-base of the value chain firms (especially the 
exporters) that enabled them to provide key services to other value-chain members. The other was the exporters’ learning that 
it was in their longer term interest to bear the short term costs of playing this role. Their trade volume increased, their costs fell 
and their margins widened - also their export market position was more sustainable relative to competition from Asian copiers 
of ‘Ghanaian’ craft products.
Source:  Bell (2007).
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The basic constraints knowledge accumulation through industrial projects 
and physical infrastructure development are conceptual, namely (a) limited 
recognition by developing country clients and Governments (as well as aid donors) 
of the longer-term developmental significance of investing in engineering-centred 
knowledge assets as well as the physical assets of industrial and infrastructural 
facilities; (b) limited recognition of the importance of enterprise-based learning 
as a large part of the process of creating those assets; and (c) limited recognition 
of major investment projects as potentially important vehicles within which to 
embed such learning activities. However, it is clear that donor practices have 
also sometimes militated against local learning.  For example, Marcelle, in her 
study of the wide variation in learning across a sample of investment projects 
for telecommunications facilities in four African countries, noted that “operating 
companies in Uganda and Tanzania, which relied on development assistance for 
network expansion programmes, reported the least satisfaction with the quality 
of the [learning] interface with suppliers” (Marcelle, 2004: 120). The limitations 
on learning arose from aspects of donor intervention that led, for example, to 
increased numbers of suppliers — resulting in poor long-term relationships 
with suppliers and lack of interoperability among equipment and network 
components. Larger operator companies in other countries that implemented 
network development programmes without such dependence on donors gained 
from the learning-intensive nature of long-term relationships with suppliers as well 
as from the ability to build up cumulatively deeper competence by standardizing 
equipment and network facilities across successive projects.
 Donors should explore innovative mechanisms for exploiting the learning 
potential of physical infrastructure investment projects with which they are 
already involved. Some of those mechanisms may be particularly promising in 
the context of donors’ existing activities to foster public–private partnerships in 
infrastructure development.
4. ENGINEERING ASSOCIATIONS AND NGOS
Several engineering associations and NGOs, such as the World Federation of 
Engineering Organizations and Engineers without Borders, are active in pursuing 
development-related issues in the LDCs. Together with donors’ support for 
engineering education activities and support for engineering volunteers to act 
in developing countries, those professional associations and NGOs constitute 
another way of pushing forward specific technical training and capacity 
development at the local level. Donors currently provide fellowship funding for 
collaborative research projects and technical training carried out at universities 
in the donor countries. Another way to strengthen STI capacity in LDCs would 
be to use the in-house training programmes of private engineering companies in 
developed countries. This would be an innovative way of involving the private 
sector through cost-sharing in building engineering capabilities in LDCs. 
5.  FACILITATING SOUTH–SOUTH COLLABORATION
A particular problem in developing engineering capabilities in LDCs is the 
small size of the economies of those countries, the sporadic nature of investment 
projects and thus weak incentives to invest in creating engineering capabilities. 
That problem may be addressed if, in implementing the above proposals, donors 
foster greater South–South cooperation. In Africa, for example, this might involve 
a collaborative approach amongst neighbouring LDCs. 
The third and final broad direction of policy that is required is greater donor 
support for STI policy formulation and implementation by LDC Governments. 
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F.  Technological learning and Aid for Trade
1.  TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY-BUILDING:
THE OVERLOOKED COMPONENT OF AID FOR TRADE
In response to the calls which were made by the G8 at the Gleneagles Summit 
in 2005 for reduction of the adjustment pressure that developing countries will 
face with the current round of trade negotiations, the Ministerial Declaration of 
the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference calls for an “Aid for Trade” (AfT) framework 
whose aim is: 
“to help developing countries, particularly LDCs, to build the 
supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure that they need to 
assist them to implement and benefit from WTO agreements and more 
broadly to expand their trade. Aid for Trade cannot be a substitute for the 
development benefits that will result from a successful conclusion to the 
DDA, particularly on market access” (Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, 
2005, para. 57, WT/MIN(05)/DEC). 
Although the Ministerial Declaration called for AfT to build supply-side 
capacity and trade-related infrastructure, no definition of supply-side capacity was 
included, and thus the scope for AfT is rather flexible. An informal understanding 
on the meaning of supply-side capacity exists, but it is equally vague as it defines 
supply-side constraints as “those that impede the efficient production of goods 
and services”.
WTO (2006a: 2) –– which is now the basic reference document on what 
constitutes Aid for Trade –– states that “the scope of Aid for Trade should be 
defined in a way that is both broad enough to reflect the diverse trade needs 
identified by the countries, and clear enough to establish a border between Aid 
for Trade and other development assistance of which it is a part”. It extends the 
categories of AfT to (a) trade policy and regulations, (b) trade development, (c) 
trade-related infrastructure, (d) building productive capacity, (e) trade-related 
adjustment, and (f) other trade-related needs. Along similar lines, the OECD 
(2006) proposes a definition of Aid for Trade that uses the objectives of the 
activity to be financed, rather than the type of activities it is supposed to finance, 
including (i) trade policy and regulations, (ii) economic infrastructure, and (iii) 
building productive capacity.8
One striking feature of this conceptual debate is that the role of technological 
capability-building and upgrading and its impact on export competitiveness 
and poverty reduction are currently marginal to the ongoing discussions. The 
importance of physical infrastructure is clearly recognized, but the development 
of technological capabilities is largely overlooked. This is a serious omission which 
must be rectified. Interestingly, the United Nations Conference on Financing for 
Development, which took place three years before the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference, provided a definition of supply-side constraints and asked donors 
to:
“remove supply-side constraints, through improving trade infrastructure, 
diversifying export capacity and supporting an increase in the technological 
content of exports, strengthening institutional development and enhancing 
overall productivity and competitiveness” (United Nations, 2002: para. 
36: 8).
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The role of technological upgrading has been clearly demonstrated in a 
number of case studies on successful export development (Chandra and Kolavalli, 
2006). There is thus an urgent need explicitly to integrate measures to promote 
technological development in the framework of AfT.
2.  THE INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK (IF)
FOR TRADE-RELATED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
Similar arguments can be applied for the IF. The IF is the major initiative 
through which donors, LDCs and agencies are seeking to improve the efficiency 
of trade capacity development within LDCs. Created in 1997, it was revamped 
in 2001 with the aim of including trade in the countries’ poverty reduction 
strategies or development plans and assisting in the delivery of trade-related 
technical assistance. The Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies (DTIS), which are 
the main output under the first of the two funding “windows”, contain an analysis 
of the constraints on trade competitiveness, and of policy responses and capacity-
building strategies to overcome them. After discussion between Governments 
and stakeholders, the trade-capacity-building priorities should be integrated into 
the development plans, while concrete projects listed in the Action Matrix are 
financed under the second funding “window” (see UNCTAD, 2002 and 2004, 
for more details). 
Several evaluation exercises have been conducted recently to assess the 
efficacy of the IF. Their results highlighted weak country ownership, inadequate 
capacity-building support, and failure to integrate trade into the PRSP process and 
to finance the priorities identified in the action matrix (WTO, 2006a) The increased 
interest in the development dimension of trade to which the current round of 
trade negotiations has given rise led to the current and ongoing discussions on 
how to increase the effectiveness and timeliness of the IF (Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration, para. 48). The task force that was created to discuss the modalities 
for “enhancing” the IF “agreed that the scope of the IF should be broadened 
to support activities related to the analysis and prioritization of needs” (WTO, 
2006a: 6). The DTIS template includes broader trade-related issues and response 
to needs emanating from the ongoing round of trade liberalization negotiations. 
Furthermore, the core areas eligible for intervention cover (i) institution-building 
to handle trade policy issues, (ii) strengthening of export supply capabilities, (iii) 
strengthening of trade support services, (iv) strengthening of trade facilitation 
capacity, (v) training and human resource development, and (vi) assistance in 
the creation of a supportive trade-related regulatory and policy framework to 
encourage trade and investment (WTO, 2006a).
Clearly, the current attempt to enhance the IF9 fits into the broader discussions 
on how to strengthen the domestic (country-driven) approach of Aid for Trade. 
Specifically, the policies that would need to be implemented to achieve the 
DTIS core areas (ii) and (iv) include domestic technological upgrading and 
other structural transformation policies. At the current level of technological 
development, the LDCs have only a limited comparative advantage in exports 
other than primary commodities and low-skill manufactures. 
An analysis of how science and technological upgrading is treated in the latest 
eight DTIS shows that, with some exceptions, S&T initiatives and considerations 
are included in the main body of the DTIS, but their relevance has not been fully 
recognized in the Action Matrices (table 38). In five out of eight DTIS, S&T matters 
are given only scant consideration in the Action Matrices.  In those in which 
they are mentioned, the focus is related only on research (mostly agricultural-
based) and training. The Action Matrices of Sierra Leone and the Lao People’s 
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Democratic Republic refer only to the development of processing activities that 
could lead to higher-value products. Undoubtedly, new or improved processing 
techniques are an important, although not an exclusive, effect of the introduction 
of new technologies in the domestic production processes. Only the Action Matrix 
of Maldives contains specific projects aimed at fostering domestic technological 
improvements.
The scant consideration given to S&T matters in the Action Matrices does not 
reflect the way in which technological changes and improvements are treated in 
the main text of the DTIS. In the case of  the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
the DTIS states that “[…] the rapid pace of globalization and technological 
change threatens to bypass Laos and relegate its producers to relatively low rungs 
on the value chain unless action can be taken to adapt and adopt emerging 
technologies […] (p. 124). The DTIS of Sierra Leone states that “efforts to export 
new products or to maintain competitiveness or exposure to imports, can lead 
to the introduction of new technology which results in higher productivity and 
lower costs per unit of output” and that “the most obvious way to use trade for 
poverty reduction is to expand output and employment. [.] A way to increase 
output and employment is through the introduction of better farming practices or 
new technologies, which improve farmer productivity and increases the range of 
options regarding production” (p. 19/20). 
The majority of the DTIS contain a specific paragraph or section covering and 
highlighting the importance of S&T issues. For most of the DTIS, trade policies 
include S&T initiatives, which are primarily linked with projects aimed at improving 
the technological content and capabilities of the domestic customs authorities 
through ASYCUDA and related technological improving projects. Surprisingly, 
Table 38. How S&T is treated in the latest eight DTIS
Benin Chad Lao
PDR
Maldives Rwanda Sao Tome
& Principe
Sierra
Leone
Zambia
(Dec. 05) (Oct. 06) (Nov. 06) (Nov. 06) (Nov. 05) (Mar 06) (Oct. 06) (Oct. 05)
In the main text of the DTIS:
Is there a specific section/paragraph 
covering S&T issues?
N N Y Y Y Y Y N
Do international trade policies include S&T 
initiatives?
N N Y Y Y Y Y N
Are S&T issues treated at the level of
    - trade policies N N Y Y Y Y Y N
   - FDIs Y N Y N Y N N Y
Are there technology-related infrastructure 
projects to improve
   - electricity N Y N N Y Y N N
   - telecommunication Y N Y Y Y Y Y N
Are there projects aimed at increasing 
technological awareness through
   - vocational training W Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
   - R&D activities N Y Y Y N Y Y N
Are there sector-specific technology 
extension programmes
N N
   - in agriculture Y Y Y Y
   - other (tourism, mining) Y Y
Are S&T considerations included in the 
Action Matrix? W W Y Y W W Y W
Source: UNCTAD secretariat compilation based on IF, DTIS studies.
Note:   Y = yes;  N = no;  W = weak.
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the technological implications arising from FDI inflows have not been accounted 
for in four DTIS. Although the development of technology-related infrastructure 
requires the expansion and improvement of electricity networks (necessary 
for the use of electrical machineries and devices) and of telecommunications 
(necessary for facilitating the flow of information and know-how), not all DTIS 
include them and they give priority to telecommunications. Virtually all DTIS 
recognize the importance of education, training and R&D activities for raising 
technological awareness. As in the PRSPs, vocational training is considered to 
be a critical instrument for the promotion of S&T development in the LDCs and 
for economic development in general, as the new skills can be directly applied 
to production processes. Furthermore, half of the DTIS include initiatives aimed 
at promoting and disseminating best practices in agriculture10 and agriculture-
related sectors (e.g. fisheries).
The DTISs have great potential since they could become the vehicle that 
could provide domestic Governments with an overall vision of where they are 
in terms of the technological upgrading policies for tradable activities, and what 
can be done to improve the domestic technological level on the basis of an ad 
hoc analysis of the countries’ technological landscapes and policies. Furthermore, 
the DTIS could be a key instrument for ensuring that the role of technological 
upgrading in trade development is fully recognized in Governments’ and donors’ 
policy agendas. The DTIS Action Matrix is the means that Governments can 
utilize to present their policies on technological and human skills improvements 
for donors’ financing. It has a dual role: (i) to summarize in single identifiable 
projects the analysis and recommendations contained in the main body of the 
DTIS, whether or not related to technology development, and (ii) to provide 
donors with clear projects in sectors and industries that are considered to be 
crucial for countries’ development prospects and that require financing. The 
main text of the DTIS and the sector’ studies are a useful tool that would enable 
Governments to identify the sectors and the industries with the greatest potential 
for expansion, whether it is for export-related purposes or not, and to indicate 
technological needs to ensure that export competitiveness is built up. 
3. DEEPENING PREFERENTIAL MARKET ACCESS
THROUGH A TECHNOLOGY FUND
For some LDCs market access preferences have supported the development 
of simple manufacturing activities, particularly garment manufacture. Those 
preferences enable exporters from the LDCs to pay lower tariffs or even enter 
markets quota- and duty-free. As discussed in past LDC Reports, the effectiveness 
of trade preferences can certainly be improved, particularly by widening the 
scope of product coverage and relaxing the rules of origin. However, some 
specialists have argued that they would be even more effective if they addressed 
supply-side constraints at the same time. In that regard, it has been suggested, for 
example, that trade preferences be linked to FDI.
If this issue is examined through the point of view of technological learning 
and innovation, it is apparent that trade preferences have succeeded in some 
countries — such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, Lesotho and Madagascar — in 
initiating the development of new sectors. But there has been limited diffusion 
of technological capabilities within domestic enterprises and little upgrading of 
production. This is particularly apparent in the case study of Cambodian ready-
made garments discussed in chapter 1.
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Against that background, it may be worthwhile to consider how a dedicated 
technology fund could be designed in such a way as to be linked to trade 
preferences. Its specific aim would be to increase the local learning impact of new 
economic activities stimulated by trade preferences. In particular, such a fund 
— which could be part of AfT provisions — should support local technological 
diffusion from foreign to domestic investors and also technological upgrading. 
Without such local learning effects, the benefits of market access preferences 
could be transitory. Enhanced technological learning is particularly important at 
the present time for the garments industry in LDCs as the transitional arrangements 
following the expiry of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing themselves come 
to an end. 
G.  Conclusions
The main message of this chapter is that one of the most important 
insights regarding development in the last 25 years is that knowledge and 
learning are at the centre of the process of economic growth, and that most 
of the LDCs’ development partners still need to translate this insight effectively 
into their programmes. Increasing knowledge aid which is directed to supporting 
knowledge accumulation in recipient countries by expanding their knowledge 
resources and supporting their knowledge systems could be the key to increasing 
aid effectiveness. 
It is difficult to quantify the level of aid for STI in LDCs. But only 3 per cent of aid 
disbursements went to research and advanced and/or specialized training during 
the period 2003–2005. Moreover, aid for STI in LDCs is currently provided in a 
disjointed way with insufficient focus on systemic support for enterprise learning 
and innovation. The declining level of aid commitments for agricultural research, 
agricultural extension and agricultural education are particularly disturbing since 
agricultural research and extension are identified as priorities in LDCs’ PRSPs. But 
it is equally important that donors support technological learning and innovation 
outside agriculture. 
The Report makes a number of specific recommendations with regard to aid for 
STI in relation to agriculture, industry and trade. Firstly, there is a need for a rapid 
increase in ODA for agricultural R&D for the LDCs. Secondly, the effectiveness of 
ODA for non-agricultural technological learning and innovation has been severely 
compromised because donors do not prioritize that activity. It is recommended 
that donor-supported physical infrastructure projects all include components 
which use the construction process to develop domestic design and engineering 
capabilities. In addition, there is a need for public support for enterprise-based 
technological learning, which should be in the form of grants or soft loans for 
investment in the relevant types of knowledge assets. Such public support should 
be undertaken as a cost-sharing public–private partnership for creating public 
goods, particularly in relation to the development of design and engineering skills 
through enterprise-based practice. These STI capacity-building activities could be 
particularly useful if they are linked to value-chain development schemes, FDI 
linkage development and the facilitation of South–South cooperation. 
Thirdly, it is important to integrate a technological development component 
into “Aid for Trade” and ensure that technological development issues are included 
in the Action Matrices of DTIS. Finally, there has been some discussion of ways 
in which trade preferences for LDCs could be enhanced not simply by extending 
their depth and coverage but also by linking them to supply-side support, for 
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example through complementary measures to encourage FDI. From the point of 
view of technological assimilation, it is clear that trade preferences, particularly 
in relation to garments, have successfully stimulated the initial implementation of 
manufacturing activities in some LDCs. However, they do not explicitly facilitate 
the diffusion of best practices to domestic firms within a country and do not 
encourage technological upgrading. Against that background, it is worth examining 
whether trade preferences can be supplemented with a trade-preference-related 
technology fund which seeks to leverage the technological learning effects of the 
productive activities that are stimulated through such preferences, in particular 
through diffusion of best practices and encouragement of upgrading. Work 
should be done on the possible design for such a fund.
Notes
  1 This includes (i) agricultural projects which involve investments in adaptive and applied 
research, the strengthening of national agricultural research systems (NARS) and human 
capital formation; and (ii) non-agricultural projects which were human resource 
development projects, including university-based research, projects to restructure 
public R&D institutes, technology development projects, health projects, environmental 
projects and comprehensive S&T projects which sought to link supply and demand for 
S&T services (Crawford et al, 2006: 8–9). 
  2 The Global STI Forum on “Building Science, Technology and Innovation Capacity for 
Sustainable Growth and Poverty Reduction”, held in Washington, DC, from 13 to 15 
February 2007, was an important aspect of that process. 
  3 Data in the OECD CRS database indicate that half of the aid for research going to 
Senegal is spent on medical research and a third on environmental research. France is 
the major donor.
  4 For the latest thinking on measuring technical cooperation, see OECD (2007a).
  5 For case studies within LDCs, see Ahmed and Karim (2006) and Elliott and Perrault 
(2006). The latter state that “the erosion of the current research capacity in Zambia” 
is a “quiet crisis” because it takes place against a positive chorus of achievements in 
liberalization and privatization while ignoring the simultaneous serious and perhaps 
permanent loss of institutional and human capacity” (p. 239). 
  6 Data are taken from the ASTI database and refer to 2001 for LDCs and 2003 for other 
developing countries. Available from the following URL:  http://www.asti.cgiar.org/index.
cfm. This database is not a full time-series database and covers only 19 LDCs, with 
data sparsely available through the period between 1971 and 2003. The implementing 
agencies considered include Governments, higher education and non-profit agencies. 
The private sector has been excluded as in Beintema and Stads (2006).
  7 For discussion of agricultural research as a global public good, see Anderson (1998), 
Gardner and Lesser (2003) and Spielman (2007). 
  8 The OECD definition includes trade policy and regulations and trade development 
under trade-related technical assistance and capacity-building; transport and storage, 
communications and energy under economic infrastructure; and banking and financial 
services, business services, agriculture, forestry and fishing, industry and mining, and 
tourism under productive capacity (OECD, 2006: figure 5).
  9 The objectives of the Enhanced Integrated Framework are to increase the volume and 
predictability of funding, strengthening of the in-country implementation capacity and 
improvement of the governance structure of the IF. 
10  Specifically cocoa, rice, cotton, and palm oil.
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 CRS code Description Clarifications
1.  Research
11182 Educational research Research and studies on education effectiveness, relevance and quality; 
systematic evaluation and monitoring
12182 Medical research General medical research (excluding basic health research)
23082 Energy research Including general inventories and surveys
31182 Agricultural research Including plant breeding, physiology, genetic resources, ecology, taxonomy, 
disease control and agricultural bio-technology
31282 Forestry research Including artificial regeneration, genetic improvement, production methods, 
fertilizer and harvesting
31382 Fishery research Pilot fish culture; marine/freshwater biological research.
32182 Technological research and 
development
Including industrial standards, quality management, metrology,  testing,  
accreditation, and certification
41082 Environmental research Including establishment of databases, inventories/accounts of physical and 
natural resources, environmental profiles and impact studies if not sector- 
specific
2.  Improvements of Human Skills
11330 Vocational training Elementary vocational training and secondary-level technical education, on-
the job training,  apprenticeships, including informal vocational training
11420 Higher education Degree and diploma programmes at universities, colleges and polytechnics; 
scholarships
11430 Advanced technical and 
managerial training
Professional-level vocational training programmes and in-service training
12181 Medical education/training Medical education and training for tertiary-level services
12261 Health education Information, education and training of the population for improving health 
knowledge and practices; public health and awareness campaigns. 
12281 Health personnel development Training of health staff for basic health-care services
13081 Personnel development for 
population and reproductive 
health
Education and training of health staff for population and reproductive health 
care services
14081 Education and training in water 
supply and sanitation 
16062 Statistical capacity-building In national statistical offices and any other government ministries
21081 Education and training in 
transport and storage
23081 Energy education/training Applies to all energy sub sectors; all levels of training
24081 Education/training in banking 
and financial services
31181 Agricultural education/training
31166 Agricultural extension Non-formal training in agriculture
31281 Forestry education/training
31381 Fishery education/training
33181 Trade education/training Human resources development in trade not included under any of the above 
codes.  Includes university programmes in trade
41081 Environmental education/ 
training
43081 Multisector education/training Including scholarships
43082 Research/scientific institutions When sector cannot be identified
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